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Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  both	  have	  a	  sizeable	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority,	  share	  a	  similar	  Soviet	  
past,	  and	  their	  democratic	  transitions	  were	  characterised	  by	  a	  similar	  nationalising	  rhetoric.	  The	  
two	   countries,	   however,	   have	   different	   experiences	  with	  minority	   political	   representation	   and	  
minority	  grassroots	  mobilisation.	  This	  thesis	  compares	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  to	  analyse	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	   minority	   voices	   can	   be	   included	   or	   excluded	   from	   the	   political	   processes	   in	   ethnically	  
divided	  democracies.	  
The	   theoretical	   framework	   of	   this	   study	   is	   informed	   by	   the	   literature	   on	   minority	  
representation	  (mostly	  US-­‐based)	  and	  ethnic	  parties	  (which	  has	  a	  stronger	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  
European	   focus).	   My	   approach	   reframes	   the	   insights	   of	   these	   debates	   to	   address	   the	  
fundamental	  question	  of	  quality	  of	  democracy	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  societies.	  The	  underpinning	  
normative	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  democratic	  decision	  depends	  on	  the	  inclusion	  in	  
the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  of	  those	  most	  concerned	  by	  it.	  The	  quality	  of	  an	  ethnically-­‐divided	  
democracy	   can	   thus	   be	   evaluated	   not	   least	   by	   the	   level	   of	   inclusion	   its	   policymaking	   process	  
affords	  the	  minority.	  	  
In	   this	   thesis	   I	   process-­‐trace	   policymaking	   with	   regard	   to	   specific,	   minority-­‐sensitive	  
policies.	   Five	   potential	   channels	   for	   minority	   inclusion	   in	   policymaking	   are	   analysed	   and	  
compared:	  parliamentary	  representation,	  recourse	  to	  international	  organisations,	  incorporation	  
in	   city	   governments,	   institutionalised	   civil	   society	   consultation	   mechanisms,	   and	   minority	  
grassroots	  mobilisation.	  The	  research’s	  focus	  on	  the	  policymaking	  process	  problematises	  the	  link	  
between	  desirable	  policies	  and	  desirable	  processes.	  The	  cases	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  show	  that	  a	  
liberal	   minority	   policy	   can	   be	   the	   result	   of	   an	   exclusionary	   democratic	   process,	   while	   an	  
inclusionary	  democratic	  process	  does	  not	  necessarily	   return	  policies	   that	  are	   favourable	  to	  the	  
minority.	  By	  decoupling	  policy	  outcome	  and	   the	  policymaking	  process,	   this	   study	  offers	  a	  new	  
framework	   to	   assess	   the	   effects	   of	   minority	   political	   presence	   and	   inclusiveness	   in	   ethnically	  
divided	  democracies.	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If	  inclusion	  in	  decision	  making	  is	  a	  core	  of	  the	  democratic	  ideal,	  then,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
such	  political	  exclusions	  exist,	  democratic	  societies	  do	  not	  live	  up	  to	  their	  promise.	  
—Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  Inclusion	  and	  democracy	  
	  
My	   research	   starts	   with	   a	   basic	   question:	   how	   does	   democracy	   work	   in	   ethnically	   divided	  
societies?	  More	  specifically,	  how	  are	  minority-­‐sensitive	  policies	  formulated	  and	  in	  what	  ways	  are	  
minorities	  included	  in	  (or	  excluded	  from)	  the	  policymaking	  process?	  The	  normative	  assumption	  
that	   underpins	   these	   questions	   is	   that	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   democratic	   decisions	   depends	   on	   the	  
inclusion	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  of	   those	  who	  are	  affected	  by	   them	   (Lijphart,	  1999,	  p.	  
31;	  Young,	  2000,	  pp.	  5–6).	  Hence,	  in	  an	  ethnically	  divided	  democracy,	  quality	  must	  be	  assessed	  
by	  looking	  at	  the	  minority’s	  inclusion	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
Much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  (CEE)	  minorities	  has	  been	  focused	  
on	  evaluating	  minority	   policies	   and	  assessing	   their	  more	  or	   less	   liberal	   content.	  However,	   this	  
thesis	  shows	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  policy	  outcomes	  can	  be	  a	  very	  misleading	  indicator	  of	  the	  quality	  
of	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  The	  argument	  for	  inclusiveness	  made	  in	  this	  study	  means	  that	  the	  
quality	  of	  a	  democracy	  rests	   in	  the	  equal	  access	  of	  all	  components	  of	  society	   in	  the	  process	  of	  
making	   political	   decisions,	   rather	   than	   only	   (or	   even	   primarily)	   in	   this	   process’s	   outcome.	  
Through	   the	   comparison	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   cases,	   this	   thesis	   aims	   at	   developing	   a	  
deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  mechanisms,	  patterns	  and	  trade-­‐offs	  that	  govern	  the	  inclusion	  and	  
exclusion	   of	   minorities	   from	   policymaking.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   better	   understand	   how	   democracy	  
works	  (or	  fails	  to	  work)	  in	  divided	  societies.	  
Both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  have	  a	  sizeable	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority,	  share	  a	  similar	  Soviet	  
past,	  and	  their	  democratic	  transitions	  were	  characterised	  by	  similar	  nationalising	  policies.	  Both	  
countries	  are	  listed	  by	  Freedom	  House	  as	  free	  liberal	  democracies	  and	  their	  membership	  in	  the	  
European	  Union	  (EU)	   is	  often	  considered	  an	  authoritative	  seal	  of	  approval	  on	  their	  democratic	  
status.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  both	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  ethnic	  democracies,	  that	  is,	  democracies	  
that	  contain	  non-­‐democratic	  elements	  of	  minority	  exclusion	  and	  minority	  control	  (e.g.	  Smooha	  
&	  Järve,	  2005).	  Notwithstanding	  these	  similarities,	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  have	  remarkably	  different	  
experiences	   with	   minority	   political	   representation	   and	   minority	   grassroots	   mobilisation.	   In	  
Estonia,	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers	   have	   been	   underrepresented	   in	   parliament,	   ethnic	   minority	  
parties	  have	  failed	  to	  become	  relevant	  actors	  in	  the	  political	  scene,	  and	  Russian-­‐speakers	  mostly	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vote	   for	   a	   minority-­‐friendly	   Estonian	   party.	   The	   minority	   civil	   society	   has	   also	   been	   weakly	  
organised,	  and	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  has	  been	  negligible.	   In	  Latvia,	   instead,	  Russian-­‐speakers	  
have	   been	   represented	   in	   parliament	   by	   ethnic	   parties,	   and	   a	  moderate	  minority	   party	   is	   the	  
biggest	  party	  in	  parliament	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing.	  Minority	  civil	  society	  activism	  and	  grassroots	  
mobilisation	   have	   also	   been	  more	   prominent.	   These	   differences	   and	   similarities	  make	   Estonia	  
and	   Latvia	   ideal	   comparative	   cases	   to	   look	   at	   the	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	   of	   minorities	   from	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  different	  contexts	  of	  minority	  representation	  and	  mobilisation.	  
The	   evidence	   from	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   problematises	   the	   link	   between	  desirable	   policies	  
and	  desirable	  processes.	  Indeed,	  this	  thesis	  shows	  that	  a	  liberal	  minority	  policy	  can	  be	  the	  result	  
of	   an	   exclusionary	   democratic	   process,	   while	   an	   inclusionary	   democratic	   process	   does	   not	  
necessarily	  return	  policies	  that	  are	  favourable	  to	  the	  minority.	  At	  the	  basis	  of	  this	   is	  what	  I	  call	  
the	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma,	  which	  exposes	  the	  multifaceted	  relationship	  between	  minority	  
political	  presence,	  policy	  outcomes	  and	  minority	  empowerment.	  High	  minority	  political	  presence	  
can	   polarise	   political	   debates	   and	  make	   compromise	  more	   difficult.	   However,	   it	   also	   imposes	  
minority	  voices	  as	  legitimate	  participants	  in	  the	  policymaking	  debate	  and	  challenges	  the	  majority	  
elites’	  role	  as	  gatekeepers	  of	  democracy.	  Conversely,	  low	  minority	  political	  presence	  reduces	  the	  
risk	  for	  polarisation,	  means	  that	  the	  majority	  elite	  does	  not	  feel	  threatened,	  and	  can	  thus	  result	  
in	   more	   liberal	   policies.	   However,	   this	   comes	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   minority	   exclusion	   from	   the	  
policymaking	  process,	  leaving	  the	  minority	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  democratic	  polity.	  	  
Whether	   more	   minority	   voice	   (with	   the	   risk	   for	   more	   polarisation)	   or	   less	   polarisation	  
(with	   the	   risk	   for	  minority	  marginalisation)	   is	  more	   desirable	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   normative	   choice.	  
This	   thesis’s	  goal	   is	   to	  clearly	  present	   the	  terms	  of	  such	  choice.	  Studies	  of	  CEE	  minorities	  have	  
especially	   tended	   to	   focus	  on	   the	   ‘ethnically	  divided’	   aspect	  of	   ‘ethnically	  divided	  democracy’,	  
putting	   all	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   risks	   of	   polarisation.	   This	   thesis	   redresses	   this	   imbalance	   by	  
focusing	   instead	   on	   the	   ‘democracy’	   aspect.	   Seen	   from	   this	   perspective,	   lack	   of	   polarisation	  
cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself:	  rather	  than	  an	  indicator	  of	  democratic	  stability,	  it	  can	  in	  fact	  
be	  a	  symptom	  of	  minority	  exclusion.	  Likewise,	  a	  measure	  of	  polarisation	  within	  the	  boundaries	  
of	  democracy	  can	  be	  an	   indicator	  of	  a	   lively	  democratic	  debate	   in	  which	  the	  minority	  plays	  an	  
active	  role.	  This	  thesis	  shows	  that,	  in	  evaluating	  the	  quality	  of	  divided	  democracies	  (and	  indeed	  
all	   democracies),	   we	   must	   ask	   who	   is	   included	   in	   making	   democratic	   decisions	   and	   on	   what	  
terms,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  excluded	  groups	  can	  find	  channels	  to	  challenge	  their	  exclusion.	  
1. Research	  design	  
This	   thesis’s	   research	  design	   is	   based	  on	  multiple	   comparisons	   between	   Estonia’s	   and	   Latvia’s	  
policymaking	  processes	  on	  minority-­‐sensitive	  issues.	  Five	  channels	  are	  identified	  through	  which	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minority	   voices	   can	   participate	   in	   policymaking:	   parliamentary	   representation,	   recourse	   to	  
international	   organisations,	   representation	   in	   city	   government,	   inclusion	   in	   civil	   society	  
consultation	  mechanisms,	   and	   grassroots	  mobilisation.	   Each	  one	  of	   these	   channels	   potentially	  
offers	   Estonia’s	   and	   Latvia’s	   Russian-­‐speakers	   the	   possibility	   to	   actively	   take	   part	   in	  
policymaking,	  thereby	  influencing	  policy	  outcomes	  and	  claiming	  their	  role	  as	  equal	  members	  of	  
their	   country’s	   democratic	   polity.	   Taken	   together,	   the	   opportunities	   offered	   by	   each	   channel	  
define	  the	  level	  of	  inclusiveness	  of	  Estonia’s	  and	  Latvia’s	  democratic	  processes;	  they	  determine	  
who	  is	  included	  and	  who	  is	  excluded	  from	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  on	  whose	  terms.	  
While	   the	   focus	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   CEE	  minorities	   has	   often	   been	   on	  ways	   to	   regulate	  
inter-­‐group	   relations	   and	   prevent	   conflict,	   questions	   of	  minority	   inclusion,	   power	   distribution	  
and	  quality	  of	  democracy	  have	  remained	  marginal.	  This	  thesis	  addresses	  this	  gap	  by	  placing	  the	  
focus	   of	   analysis	   on	   the	   policymaking	   process,	   its	   inclusiveness	   and	   ‘democraticness’.	   The	  
question,	   therefore,	   is	   not	   whether	   minority	   political	   presence	   (through	   various	   forms	   of	  
representation	  or	  mobilisation)	   is	   good	  or	  bad	   for	  democratic	   stability	   and	   inter-­‐ethnic	  peace.	  
Rather,	  I	  start	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  a	  democracy,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  such,	  must	  be	  inclusive,	  and	  
then	  assess	  the	  policymaking	  processes	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  based	  on	  this	  principle.	  	  
My	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	   minority	   political	   presence	   finds	   a	   primary	   source	   of	  
inspiration	  in	  the	  academic	  debates	  on	  Black	  and	  Latino	  representation	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  
literature	   usually	   frames	   issues	   of	   minority	   representation	   in	   terms	   of	   Hanna	   Pitkin’s	   (1967)	  
famous	   distinction	   between	   the	   number	   and	   role	   of	   elected	   representatives	  who	   belong	   to	   a	  
defined	  group	  (descriptive	  representation)	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  group	  has	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  
policymaking	   process	   and	   an	   impact	   on	   actual	   policies	   (substantive	   representation).	   While	  
literature	   on	   CEE	   minorities	   typically	   takes	   descriptive	   representation	   as	   an	   end	   in	   itself,	   the	  
insights	  from	  the	  US	  literature	  show	  the	  importance	  of	  shifting	  the	  attention	  from	  mere	  minority	  
presence	   to	   the	   effects	   (and	   effectiveness)	  of	   that	   presence	   on	   policy	   outcomes	   and	  minority	  
empowerment.	  
My	  approach	  borrows	   from	   the	  US	   literature,	   but	   adapts	   its	   insights	   to	   the	   specific	   CEE	  
context.	   In	  particular,	   the	  question	  of	  minority	   representation	   in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	   cannot	  be	  
studied	  separately	   from	  the	  existence,	  electoral	  success	  and	  role	   in	   the	  party	  system	  of	  ethnic	  
parties.	   Ethnic	   parties	   have	   been	   defined	   in	   various	   ways	   in	   the	   literature,	   and	   there	   is	   no	  
agreement	   about	   whether	   they	   have	   a	   positive-­‐inclusive	   or	   negative-­‐divisive	   effect	   on	   a	  
country’s	  democracy.	  This	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  ethnic	  parties	  by	  proposing	  a	  new	  
perspective:	  I	  suggest	  looking	  not	  at	  whether	  ethnic	  parties	  foster	  peace	  or	  exacerbate	  conflict,	  
but	  at	  the	  way	  they	  perform	  their	  representative	  role	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process.	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A	  second	  aspect	  that	  differentiates	  my	  approach	  concerns	  the	  very	  understanding	  of	  what	  
representation	   is	   and	   how	   it	   can	   be	   studied.	   In	   the	  US	   literature	   the	   focus	   is	   typically	   on	   the	  
congruence	   (or	  proximity)	  of	  either	  policy	  outcomes	  or	   representatives’	   voting	  behaviour	  with	  
the	  minority’s	  needs	  and	  preferences.	  However,	  this	  approach	  presents	  at	   least	  two	  problems.	  
First,	  it	  presupposes	  that	  the	  minority’s	  needs	  and	  preferences	  are	  fixed	  and	  homogenous;	  that	  
is,	  it	  essentialises	  the	  minority,	  presenting	  it	  as	  a	  monolith.	  Second,	  it	  depicts	  representation	  as	  a	  
one-­‐way	   relationship	   in	  which	   the	   representatives	   represent	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   represented.	  
This	  neglects	  the	  fact	  that	  representatives	  do	  not	  limit	  themselves	  to	  representing	  existing	  group	  
interests,	   but	   in	   fact	   actively	   participate	   in	   creating	   the	   identities	   and	   interests	   they	   claim	   to	  
represent	  (Saward,	  2010).	  Therefore,	  the	  representatives’	  responsiveness	  to	  a	  group’s	  demands	  
that	   they	   themselves	   have	   helped	   to	   shape	   is	   a	   rather	   flawed	   measure	   of	   effective	  
representation.	  	  
This	  thesis	  avoids	  these	  theoretical	  pitfalls	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  policymaking	  process	  rather	  
than	  on	  its	  outcome,	  and	  by	  assessing	  the	  process’s	  inclusiveness	  towards	  minorities	  rather	  than	  
the	  representatives’	  (or	   institutions’)	  responsiveness	  to	  pre-­‐determined	  minority	   interests.	  This	  
approach	  also	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  study	  minorities	  in	  the	  role	  of	  policymakers	  rather	  than	  mere	  
policy	   objects.	   Moreover,	   the	   focus	   on	   inclusiveness	   allows	   questions	   of	   minority	   political	  
representation	  to	  be	  framed	  within	  the	  wider	  debate	  on	  quality	  of	  democracy.	  Not	  with	  the	  aim	  
of	   placing	   countries	   on	   an	   imaginary	   progressive	   line	   of	   democratic	   quality,	   but	   in	   order	   to	  
critically	  appraise	  the	  democratic	  process	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  represent	  diversity.	  
In	  order	  to	  study	  inclusiveness,	  this	  thesis	  applies	  the	  method	  of	  process	  tracing.	  The	  in-­‐
depth	   tracing	   of	   the	   policymaking	   processes	   on	   specific	   policies	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   unpack	  
complex	   patterns	   of	   exclusion	   and	   inclusion	   and	   assess	   them	   comparatively.	   The	   comparison	  
between	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   is	   structured	   along	   the	   five	   potential	   channels	   through	   which	  
minority	  voices	  can	  access	  the	  policymaking	  process	  in	  its	  different	  stages.	  For	  each	  channel,	  the	  
method	   of	   process	   tracing	   results	   in	   detailed	   analytical	   narratives.	   These	   different	   ‘stories’	   of	  
policymaking,	  once	  compared,	  allow	  for	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  minority	  presence	  
(or	   lack	   thereof)	   on	   the	   policy	   outcome,	   and	   more	   generally	   on	   the	   minority’s	   role	   in	   the	  
democratic	  process.	  
2. Structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  
The	   first	   chapter	   reviews	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	  minority	   politics	   and	   divided	   democracies,	  
presenting	  the	  theoretical	  approach	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  existing	  
debates	   on	   minority	   representation,	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   democratic	   quality.	   In	   doing	   this,	   it	  
merges	   the	   insights	   from	   the	   US-­‐focused	   literature	   with	   those	   from	   the	   literature	   on	   CEE	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minorities	  and	   links	   them	   to	   the	  debate	  on	  quality	  of	  democracy.	  Then,	   the	  chapter	  describes	  
the	  methodology,	  describing	  the	  method	  of	  process	  tracing	  and	  the	  way	  it	   is	  applied	  here.	  The	  
chapter	   concludes	   with	   a	   short	   glossary	   of	   some	   key	   terms	   (representation,	   presence,	   voice,	  
influence	  and	  empowerment)	  and	  brief	  notes	  on	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  
The	   second	   chapter	   introduces	   the	   case	   studies.	  While	   a	   thorough	   analysis	   of	   the	   post-­‐
independence	   political	   history	   of	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   is	   outside	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	  
chapter	   presents	   all	   the	  main	   issues	   that	   serve	   as	   background	   for	   the	   subsequent	   analysis.	   In	  
particular,	  it	  addresses	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minorities,	  the	  main	  policies	  directed	  
at	   the	   minorities	   in	   post-­‐independence	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   the	   representation	   of	   Russian-­‐
speakers	   in	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   state	   institutions,	   and	   the	   main	   developments	   in	   the	   two	  
countries’	  party	  politics.	  
Chapters	   three	   to	   seven	   constitute	   the	   empirical	   core	   of	   this	   thesis.	   Each	   of	   them	   is	  
dedicated	   to	   one	   of	   the	   five	   channels	   for	   minority	   access	   to	   policymaking.	   Chapter	   three	  
analyses	   parliamentary	   representation,	   through	   the	   process	   tracing	   of	   one	   specific	   piece	   of	  
legislation:	  the	  granting	  of	  voting	  rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens.	  The	  opposite	  outcomes	  of	  this	  legislation	  
in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   present	   an	   ideal	   comparative	   case	   to	   explore	   the	   complex	   relationship	  
between	   parliamentary	   representation,	   policy	   outcome	   and	   minority	   political	   empowerment.	  
The	  first	  outline	  of	  the	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma	  emerges	  from	  this	  comparison.	  
The	  fourth	  chapter	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  international	  channel,	  that	  is,	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  
minorities	   to	   push	   policy	   agendas	   through	   the	   mediation	   and	   involvement	   of	   international	  
organisations.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  given	  the	  vast	  literature	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  European	  
Union	   and	   other	   international	   organisations	   on	   the	   minority	   policies	   of	   their	   members	   and	  
perspective	  members.	  While	  usually	  the	  role	  of	  international	  organisations	  is	  evaluated	  in	  terms	  
of	   their	   effectiveness	   in	   pushing	   through	   certain	   ‘desirable’	   policies,	   this	   chapter	   looks	   at	  
international	   interventions	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   effects	   on	   minority	   political	   inclusion.	   The	  
comparison	   of	   the	   policymaking	   processes	   on	   language	   requirements	   for	   employment	   reveals	  
the	  unintended	  consequences	  that	  the	  international	  channel	  had	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  
Chapter	  five	  looks	  at	  the	  two	  capital	  cities,	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga,	  and	  at	  the	  possibilities	  offered	  
to	  the	  Russophone	  minorities	  by	  their	  representation	  in	  the	  city	  governments.	  Following	  the	  US	  
debate	   on	   minority	   incorporation	   into	   city-­‐level	   power	   structures,	   this	   chapter	   asks	   whether	  
minority	   representation	   in	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  offers	  effective	  opportunities	   for	  empowerment	  or	  
‘traps’	  the	  minorities	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  The	  policy	  chosen	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  implementation	  
of	   the	   education	   reforms.	   Comparing	   the	   approaches	   taken	   by	   the	   Tallinn	   and	   Riga	   city	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administrations	  towards	  this	  controversial	   issue,	  this	  chapter	  shows	  how	  city	  incorporation	  can	  
be	  –	  under	  different	  circumstances	  –	  either	  an	  opportunity	  or	  a	  trap	  for	  the	  minority.	  
Chapter	   six	   looks	   at	   a	   potentially	   more	   direct	   way	   for	   minorities	   to	   take	   part	   in	  
policymaking,	   beyond	  party	   politics	   and	   formal	   representation:	   civil	   society	   consultations.	   The	  
Integration	  Programmes	  –	  programmatic	  documents	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  minority	  issues	  written	  
periodically	  in	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  –	  offer	  multiple	  comparative	  cases	  to	  look	  at	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	   consultations	   empower	   minorities	   and	   give	   them	   a	   say	   on	   policies	   that	   concern	   them	  
directly.	  The	  analysis	  shows	  the	  existing	  gap	  between	  the	  principle	  of	  civil	  society	  consultations	  
and	  the	  practice	  of	  minority	  consultations	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  
Chapter	   seven	   is	   the	   last	   empirical	   chapter	   and	   deals	   with	   another	   channel	   for	   direct	  
participation:	  grassroots	  mobilisation.	  Differently	  from	  civil	  society	  consultations,	  this	  channel	  is	  
unmediated	   by	   state	   institutions	   and	   potentially	   offers	   more	   room	   to	   minority	   voices	   to	  
challenge	  the	  majority	  elites’	  gatekeeping	  role.	  Rather	  than	  centring	  on	  the	  process	  tracing	  of	  a	  
single	   policy	   case,	   this	   chapter	   analyses	   and	   compares	   different	   experiences	   with	   minority	  
mobilisation	   in	   the	   two	   countries.	   These	   include	   advocacy	  organisations,	   alternative	   elections,	  
protests,	   and	   the	   2012	   referendum	   on	   Russian	   as	   a	   second	   state	   language	   in	   Latvia.	   The	  
comparative	   analysis	   highlights	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   for	   grassroots	  
mobilisation,	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  emerged	  for	  formal	  representation.	  
Chapter	  eight	  discusses	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  five	  empirical	  chapters	  and	  relates	  them	  to	  the	  
theoretical	  background	  and	  academic	  debates	  presented	  in	  chapter	  one.	  It	  draws	  conclusions	  on	  
the	   risks	   and	   opportunities	   entailed	   by	   each	   of	   the	   five	   channels	   for	   minority	   access	   to	  
policymaking.	   It	  also	  shows	  how	  different	  channels	   interact	  and	  overlap.	  The	  chapter	  discusses	  
the	  roles	  and	  interactions	  of	  the	  main	  actors	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  policymaking	  
processes,	   and	   briefly	   discusses	   one	   actor	   that	   did	   not	   emerge	   prominently:	   the	   Russian	  
Federation.	  The	  chapter	  proceeds	  to	  explain	  the	  implications	  of	  my	  findings	  for	  the	  debates	  on	  
minority	   representation	   and	   ethnic	   parties.	   It	   concludes	   by	   explaining	   the	   findings	   from	   the	  
perspective	  of	  quality	  of	  democracy.	  
The	   concluding	   chapter	   extends	   the	   findings	   of	   this	   thesis	   beyond	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	  
showing	  how	  a	  similar	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  minority	  representation	  and	  inclusiveness	  could	  
be	   applied	   to	   other	   democracies	   both	   in	   and	   beyond	   CEE.	   While	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   are	  
remarkable	  for	  the	  size	  of	  their	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  minorities,	   issues	  of	   inclusiveness	  pertain	  to	  all	  
democracies,	  both	  new	  and	  established.	  This	  chapter	  concludes	  by	  proposing	  a	  research	  agenda	  
on	  quality	  of	  democracy	  that	  is	  focused	  on	  questions	  of	  inclusiveness	  and	  equal	  citizenship.	  








Guaranteeing	  the	  ‘effective	  inclusion’	  of	  minorities	  is	  problematic	  for	  both	  new	  and	  established	  
democracies	   (Beetham,	   2004,	   p.	   14).	  What	   effective	   inclusion	  means	   in	   practice,	   however,	   is	  
disputed.	   Sociological	   approaches	   tend	   to	   discuss	   minority	   inclusion	   in	   terms	   of	   societal	  
integration,	   looking	   at	   issues	   such	   as	   sense	   of	   belonging,	   identity	   and	   inter-­‐group	   trust	   (e.g.	  
Laitin,	  1998;	  Merritt,	  2000;	  Solska,	  2011).	  While	  recognising	  that	   issues	  of	   identity	  and	  societal	  
integration	  underpin	  every	  aspect	  of	  majority–minority	   relations	   (including	  politics),	   this	   study	  
focuses	  on	  the	  strictly	  political	  aspects	  of	  ‘effective	  inclusion’.	  My	  research	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  
workings	   of	   democratic	   systems	   in	   societies	   that	   are	   ethnically	   divided	   between	   a	   politically	  
dominant	   majority	   and	   a	   potentially	   marginalised	   minority.	   The	   normative	   basis	   for	   such	   an	  
approach	  is	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  sections	  of	  society	  from	  the	  political	  process	  is	  in	  contradiction	  
with	  the	  principles	  of	  democracy.	  The	  actual	  democratic	  practices	   in	  both	  new	  and	  established	  
‘real-­‐existing’	   democracies,	   however,	   often	   depart	   from	   the	   democratic	   principles	   of	   equality	  
and	   inclusiveness.1	   This	   thesis	   investigates	   the	   forms	   that	   minority	   political	   inclusion	   and	  
exclusion	  can	  take	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  democracies.	  	  
Issues	  of	  minority	  representation	   in	  democratic	   institutions	  and	  minority	  participation	   in	  
democratic	   processes	   are	   central	   to	   all	   studies	   of	   ethnically	   divided	   democracies.	   However,	  
approaches	   in	   studies	   focused	   on	   the	   US	   and	   on	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe	   (CEE)	   have	  
developed	  in	  different	  directions.	  In	  the	  US	  the	  main	  concern	  has	  been	  the	  access	  of	  Black	  (and	  
increasingly	  Latino)	  representatives	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  and	  what	  that	  has	  meant	  
in	  practice	   for	   the	  minority	   community.	   The	  main	   focus	  of	   this	   approach	   (which	   is	   rare	   in	  CEE	  
studies)	  has	  been	  on	  responsiveness,	  that	  is,	  the	  relationship	  between	  minority	  representatives	  
and	   their	   ‘minority	   constituencies’.	   The	   literature	   on	   CEE	   minorities	   has	   also	   looked	   at	  
representation,	   but	   with	   a	   stronger	   focus	   on	   the	   role	   of	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   on	   preventing	   or	  
managing	  inter-­‐ethnic	  conflict.	  This	  approach	  (most	  common	  in	  CEE	  studies,	  but	  also	  present	  in	  
US	   literature)	   is	   usually	   outcome-­‐focused.	   That	   is,	   it	   takes	   the	   political	   outcome	   (whether	  
‘desirable’	  policies	  are	  passed	  or	  inter-­‐ethnic	  conflict	  avoided)	  as	  the	  main	  object	  of	  analysis.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	   term	   ‘real-­‐existing	  democracy’	   is	  borrowed	  by	  Philippe	  C.	   Schmitter,	  who	  uses	   it	   to	  mean	   the	   ‘modern	   liberal	  
representative	  political	  constitutional	  democracy’	  (2007,	  p.	  1).	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My	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	   minority	   representation	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   integrates	  
insights	   from	   both	  US	   and	   CEE	   literature.	   However,	   it	   also	   departs	   from	   both,	   as	   it	   shifts	   the	  
focus	  from	  the	  responsiveness	  of	  minority	  representatives	  to	  the	  inclusiveness	  of	  the	  democratic	  
system,	   and	   from	   the	   outcome	   of	   minority	   representation	   to	   the	   democratic	   process	   within	  
which	   this	   representation	   takes	   place.	   In	   so	   doing,	   I	   anchor	   the	   study	   of	   ethnically	   divided	  
democracies	   and	   minority	   representation	   in	   the	   debate	   about	   quality	   of	   democracy.	   My	  
methodology,	  discussed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter,	  follows	  this	  shift	  by	  tracing	  the	  policymaking	  
process	   of	   specific	   minority-­‐sensitive	   policies	   and	   analysing	   the	   level	   of	   access	   enjoyed	   by	  
minority	  voices.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  existing	  literature	  on	  minority	  representation	  
and	  ethnic	  parties,	   and	   I	  present	  my	   theoretical	   and	  methodological	   approach	   to	   the	   study	  of	  
ethnically	  divided	  democracies.	  
1.1 Minority	  representation:	  Theory	  and	  debate	  
In	   her	   seminal	   work	   The	   Concept	   of	   Representation,	   Hanna	   F.	   Pitkin	   (1967)	   distinguishes	   four	  
different	   types	   of	   representation:	   (a)	   formalistic,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   the	   institutional	  
arrangements	   of	   authorisation	   and	   accountability;	   (b)	   symbolic,	   which	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	  
emotional	  meaning	  that	  the	  representative	  has	  for	  the	  represented;	  (c)	  descriptive,	  in	  which	  the	  
representative	   shares	   recognisable	   characteristics	   with	   the	   represented;	   and	   (d)	   substantive,	  
which	   is	   based	   on	   how	   the	   interests	   and	   needs	   of	   the	   represented	   are	   championed	   by	   the	  
representative.2	   The	   distinction	   between	   descriptive	   and	   substantive	   representation	   proved	  
particularly	   important	   for	   the	   subsequent	   (mostly	   North	   American)	   debate	   on	   minority	  
representation.	   In	   this	   debate,	   descriptive	   representation	   denotes	   the	   number	   and	   role	   in	  
relevant	  political	  institutions	  of	  minority	  representatives,	  that	  is,	  of	  political	  figures	  who	  are	  (or	  
identify	  themselves	  as)	  part	  of	  a	  specific	  ethnic,	  linguistic,	  racial	  or	  national	  minority.	  Substantive	  
representation	  refers,	  instead,	  to	  the	  championing	  of	  minority	  interests	  and	  needs.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
‘representing	   [...]	   means	   acting	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   represented	   in	   a	  manner	   responsive	   to	  
them’	  (Pitkin,	  1967,	  p.	  209).	  In	  Pitkin’s	  view,	  therefore,	  representation	  in	  its	  substantive	  form	  is	  a	  
matter	  of	   responsiveness,	  which	   is	  best	  ensured	   in	   terms	  of	   ‘action	   for’	  and	   ‘being	   responsive	  
toward’	  the	  represented.	  Putting	  the	  stress	  on	  symbolic	  and	  descriptive	  similarity	  between	  the	  
representatives	  and	  the	  represented,	  according	  to	  Pitkin,	  risks	  diverting	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  
real	  (substantive)	  issues	  (1967,	  pp.	  209–210).	  
Although	   US	   scholars	   largely	   agree	   on	   the	   usefulness	   of	   Pitkin’s	   terminology	   and	  
overwhelmingly	  use	  it	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  their	  study	  of	  minority	  representation,	  they	  are	  far	  
from	   unanimous	   in	   assessing	   the	   relationship	   between	   descriptive	   and	   substantive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This	  systematisation	  of	  Pitkin’s	  thought	  has	  been	  usefully	  proposed	  by	  Suzanne	  Dovi	  (2011).	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representation.3	   That	   is,	   on	   whether	   descriptive	   representation	   is	   necessary	   to	   guarantee	  
minority	  substantive	  representation.	  This	  is	  far	  from	  a	  purely	  academic	  question,	  as	  the	  answer	  
to	   it	   informs	   political	   decisions	   on	   the	   opportuneness	   of	   introducing	   legislative	   incentives	   to	  
minority	  representation,	  such	  as	  majority–minority	  redistricting,	  quotas	  or	  reserved	  seats.	  	  
Three	  main	  positions	  have	  emerged	  on	   this.	  The	   first,	  which	  stems	  directly	   from	  Pitkin’s	  
argumentation,	   maintains	   that	   descriptive	   representation	   is	   not	   necessary	   for	   substantive	  
representation,	   as	   non-­‐minority	   representatives	   can	   also	   champion	   a	  minority-­‐friendly	   agenda	  
(Welch	  &	  Hibbing,	  1984,	  p.	  329).	  Non-­‐minority	  representatives	  (White	  Democrats,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  US)	  can	  ‘act	  for’	  and	  ‘be	  responsive	  to’	  the	  minority	  electorate	  as	  well	  as	  (and,	  under	  certain	  
conditions,	  even	  better	  than)	  minority	  representatives	  (Lublin,	  1997).	  The	  second	  approach	  goes	  
a	   step	   further	   and	   warns	   about	   the	   risks	   of	   descriptive	   representation.	   This	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
empirical	   evidence	   of	   a	   paradoxical	   trade-­‐off	   between	   descriptive	   and	   substantive	  
representation	   in	   the	   case	   of	   US	   redistricting,	   which	   is	   said	   to	   have	   favoured	   the	   Republican	  
Party	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	  more	  minority-­‐friendly	   Democratic	   candidates.4	   Thus,	   excessive	  
stress	   on	   descriptive	   representation	   risks	   being	   detrimental	   for	   the	   minority	   interests	   it	  
ostensibly	  promotes.	  
The	   third	   approach	   sees	   minority	   descriptive	   representation	   as	   necessary	   to	   ensure	  
substantive	  representation.	  Anne	  Phillips	  (1995)	  advanced	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  ‘politics	  of	  presence’,	  
where	   representatives	   of	   excluded	   social	   groups	   are	   present	   in	   key	   political	   institutions,	   has	  
positive	   effects	   both	   at	   a	   symbolic	   level	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   policy	   outcomes.	   Minority	  
empowerment	   theories	   come	   to	   similar	   conclusions.	   Authors	   that	   support	   this	   view	   have	  
suggested	   that	   descriptive	   representation	   incentivises	   minority	   participation	   (Bobo	   &	   Gilliam,	  
1990;	   Clark,	   2013;	   Keele,	   Shah,	   White,	   &	   Kay,	   2013;	   Spence,	   McClerking,	   &	   Brown,	   2009),	  
enhances	   minority	   trust	   in	   institutions	   (Banducci,	   Donovan,	   &	   Karp,	   2004;	   Gay,	   2002;	   Gurin,	  
Hatchett,	   &	   Jackson,	   1989;	   Marschall	   &	   Ruhil,	   2007;	   Tate,	   2001),	   enhances	   policymakers’	  
responsiveness	   to	   the	  minority	   (Ueda,	  2008),	  and	  constitutes	  a	  communicative	  advantage	   that	  
improves	   the	   quality	   of	   minority-­‐related	   policies	   (Mansbridge,	   1999).5	   While	   recognising	   the	  
plausibility	   of	   the	   descriptive–substantive	   representation	   trade-­‐off	   effect,	   Jane	   Mansbridge	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  Pitkin’s	  definition	  see	  Richard	  H.	  Fenno	  (2003).	  
4	   Majority–minority	   ‘reapportionment’	   (redistricting)	   was	   introduced	   in	   the	   US	   in	   the	   1990s	   as	   a	   mechanism	   to	  
increase	   minority	   descriptive	   representation.	   The	   minority	   districts	   have	   stably	   guaranteed	   a	   certain	   number	   of	  
minority	   (Black	   and	   Latino)	   representatives	   in	   the	   US	   Congress.	   However,	   according	   to	   some	   analyses,	   the	  
reapportionment	  had	  a	  generally	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  dominant	  political	  agenda	  concerning	  minorities,	   in	  that	  it	  
had	  the	  perverse	  effect	  of	  shifting	  the	  electoral	  preferences	  of	  the	  neighbouring	  (white)	  districts’	  voters	  towards	  the	  
Republican	   Party	   and	   away	   from	   candidates	  with	   a	  more	   liberal	   approach	   towards	  minorities	   (Brace,	  Grofman,	  &	  
Handley,	  1987;	  Overby	  &	  Cosgrove,	  1996).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  general	  interests	  of	  the	  minorities	  in	  Congress	  might	  have	  
suffered	  from	  this	  shift	  more	  than	  they	  gained	  through	  the	  reapportionment.	  
5	  The	  symbolic	  effects	  of	  women’s	  descriptive	   representation	  on	   trust,	   satisfaction	  and	  participation	  have	  also	  been	  
analysed	  along	  similar	  lines	  (Bühlmann	  &	  Schädel,	  2012).	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(1999)	  suggests	  that,	  when	  distrust,	  system	  delegitimation	  and	  the	  conviction	  that	  a	  minority	  is	  
not	  fit	  for	  government	  are	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  inter-­‐ethnic	  relations,	  descriptive	  representation	  offers	  
advantages	  that	  outweigh	  its	  drawbacks.	  
1.1.1 Rethinking	  substantive	  representation	  	  
The	   predominance	   of	   Pitkin’s	   Concept	   in	   the	   study	   of	   minority	   representation	   (and	   of	  
representation	   in	   general)	   has	   not	   been	   uncritically	   accepted	   by	   all.	   The	  main	   critique	   to	   her	  
work	   regards	  what	  appears	   to	  be	  a	   conceptual	   flaw	   in	  her	  definition.	  Namely,	   several	   authors	  
have	  pointed	  at	  Pitkin	  as	  a	  champion	  of	  a	  narrow	  (and	  ultimately	  misleading)	  understanding	  of	  
representation	   as	   a	   one-­‐way	   process.	   In	   this	   interpretation,	   Pitkin’s	   Concept	   implies	   the	   pre-­‐
political	   existence	   of	   group	   interests	   and	   reduces	   representation	   (or,	   rather,	   ‘good’	  
representation)	   to	   the	   representatives’	   responsiveness	   to	   their	   constituents’	   interests.	   Indeed,	  
studies	   that	   have	   followed	   Pitkin	   in	   investigating	   the	   relationship	   between	   descriptive	   and	  
substantive	   representation	   have	   typically	   followed	  one	   of	   two	   approaches.	  Most	   studies	   have	  
understood	   substantive	   representation	   as	   responsiveness	   and	   have	   therefore	   focused	   on	   the	  
representatives’	   behaviour	   in	   office	   and	   whether	   it	   corresponds	   to	   their	   constituency’s	  
preferences	  (Gay,	  2007;	  Herring,	  1990;	  Parry	  &	  Miller,	  2006;	  Swain,	  1993).	  Other	  studies,	  have	  
intended	  responsiveness	   in	  a	  wider	  sense	  and	  have	   looked	  at	  the	  potential	  returns	  of	  minority	  
descriptive	  representation,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  congruence	  (or	  proximity)	  of	  actual	  policies	  
with	   the	  minority’s	   preferences	   (Kraus	  &	   Swanstrom,	   2001;	  Marschall	  &	  Ruhil,	   2007;	  Meier	  &	  
England,	   1984;	   Meier,	   Gonzales	   Juenke,	   Wrinkle,	   &	   Polinard,	   2005;	   Mundt	   &	   Heilig,	   1982;	  
Preuhs,	  2006).6	  
An	  early	  critique	  to	  Pitkin’s	  understanding	  of	  representation	  was	  provided	  by	  Terence	  Ball	  
(1979),	   who	   challenged	   the	   mainstream	   understanding	   of	   interests	   as	   primary	   causes	   of	  
behaviour.	   According	   to	   Ball	   ‘while	   interests	   may	   be	   either	   “dependent”	   or	   “independent”	  
variables,	  political	  scientists	  will	  most	  often	  be	  concerned	  with	  interests	  as	  causes	  rather	  than	  as	  
effects’	   (1979,	   p.	   194).	   Ernesto	   Laclau	   made	   a	   similar	   critique,	   accusing	   Pitkin	   of	   having	  
completely	   glossed	   over	   the	   fact	   that	   popular	   will	   is	   primarily	   constituted	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
representation	   (2005,	  p.	   159ff).	   The	  process	  of	   representation	   is	   thus	  essentially	   ‘impure’:	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   represented	   and	   the	   representatives	   is	   always	   reciprocal	   and,	  
therefore,	   pure	   responsiveness	   is	   a	   ‘logical	   impossibility’	   (Laclau,	   1996,	   pp.	   98–99).	   Similarly,	  
Michael	   Saward	   (2006)	   charged	   Pitkin’s	   Concept	   with	   positing	   group	   interests	   as	   objects	   of	  
representation,	   while	   overlooking	   the	   fact	   that	   representatives	   are	   engaged	   in	   shaping	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Similarly	   to	   literature	   on	   ethnic	   or	   racial	   representation,	   studies	   of	  women’s	   substantive	   representation	   have	   also	  
often	  concentrated	  on	  responsiveness	  (Campbell,	  Childs,	  &	  Lovenduski,	  2009;	  Celis	  &	  Erzeel,	  2014;	  Childs	  &	  Krook,	  
2006;	  Evans,	  2012;	  Lloren,	  2014).	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constituencies’	   interests.	  Seen	  this	  way,	   interests	  are	  not	   innate	  to	  a	  constituency,	  but	  are	  the	  
product	   of	   a	   discursive	   process	   of	   constituency-­‐creation.	   Saward	   (2006,	   2010)	   describes	  
representation	  as	  a	  process	  in	  which	  a	  representative	  makes	  a	  claim	  to	  represent	  a	  certain	  group	  
and,	   in	   so	   doing,	   contributes	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   that	   group.	   This	   act	   of	   claim	   making	   is	   by	  
definition	   contestable	   (as	   claims	   always	   are)	   and	   does	   not	   always	   succeed.	   Therefore,	   the	  
process	   of	   representation	   involves	   the	   represented	   and	   the	   representatives	   in	   a	   reciprocal	  
exchange	  in	  which	  claims	  and	  responses	  to	  claims	  are	  equally	  crucial.7	  	  
All	  these	  critiques	  to	  Pitkin’s	  work	  point	  at	  the	  fundamental	  fact	  that	  representation	  is	  a	  
dynamic	  process	  rather	  than	  a	  static	  relationship.	  However,	  a	  recent	  review	  of	  Pitkin’s	  Concept	  
ascribes	  these	  critiques	  to	  a	  misinterpretation	  of	  Pitkin’s	  complex	  text,	  a	  conflation	  of	  her	  work	  
with	   its	  mainstream	   reductionist	   readings,	   and	   (partially)	   to	   Pitkin’s	   own	   timidity	   in	   following	  
one	   of	   ‘her	   most	   radical	   insights’	   (Disch,	   2012,	   p.	   602).	   Interpreting	   Pitkin’s	   Concept	   in	   the	  
broader	   context	   of	   her	   subsequent	   research,	   Disch	   points	   at	   the	   ‘constituency	   paradox’	   as	  
Pitkin’s	   most	   original	   and	   much-­‐neglected	   intuition.	   The	   constituency	   paradox	   lies	   in	   the	  
contradiction	  between	   the	  exogenous	  nature	  of	   constituencies’	   interests	  and	   the	   insistence	  of	  
the	  proponents	  of	  democracy	  that	  policymakers	  respond	  to	  those	  interests.	  This	  paradox,	  which	  
goes	   hand	   in	   hand	  with	   Saward’s	   ‘representative	   claim’,	   casts	   doubts	   on	   responsiveness	   as	   a	  
normative	   ideal	  for	  democracy.	  As	  Disch	  put	   it:	   ‘if	  constituencies	  and	  constituent	   interest	  form	  
not	  prior	   to,	  but	  over	   the	  course	  of,	   the	   representative	  process,	   then	   responsiveness	   to	   those	  
interests	  is	  hardly	  a	  reliable	  indicator	  that	  democratic	  representation	  is	  functioning	  well’	  (Disch,	  
2012,	  p.	  600).8	  
A	  study	  of	  the	  genesis	  of	  this	  paradoxical	  conception	  of	  representation	  –	  whether	  its	  seeds	  
were	  already	  contained	  in	  Pitkin’s	  work	  or	  whether	  it	  was	  developed	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Laclau	  
and	  Saward	  not	  least	  in	  opposition	  to	  Pitkin	  –	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  research.	  Nevertheless,	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  two	  major	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  conception	  for	  my	  study.	  Firstly,	  it	  shifts	  
the	   focus	   of	   democratic	   representation	   ‘from	   responsiveness	   to	   responsibility’,	   from	   the	  
relationship	  between	  representative	  and	  represented	  to	  questions	  of	   ‘structural	  power’	   (Disch,	  
2012,	  pp.	  600–603,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  Representatives	  are	  responsible	  for	  their	  constituents	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	   For	   a	   critique	   of	   those	   uses	   of	   Saward’s	   theory	   that	   forget	   its	   dialogical	   dimension	   to	   concentrate	   only	   on	   the	  
representative	   as	   ‘maker’	   and	   do	   not	   put	   enough	   stress	   on	   the	   substantive	   (acting	   for)	   nature	   of	   the	   claims	   see	  
Severs	  (2012).	  
8	  Although	   she	   referred	   to	   accountability	   rather	   than	   responsiveness,	   Anne	   Phillips	   expressed	   a	   similar	   conceptual	  
paradox	  in	  the	  study	  of	  political	  representation	  of	  women	  and	  minorities:	  'Accountability	  is	  always	  the	  other	  side	  of	  
representation,	   and,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   procedures	   for	   establishing	   what	   any	   group	   wants	   or	   thinks,	   we	   cannot	  
usefully	   talk	   of	   their	   political	   representation'	   (Phillips,	   1993,	   p.	   99).	   Earlier,	   also	   Robert	   Dahl	   mentioned	   the	  
‘ambiguities’	  derived	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘leaders	  do	  not	  merely	  respond	  to	  the	  preferences	  of	  constituents;	  leaders	  also	  
shape	  preferences’	  (Dahl,	  1961,	  p.	  164,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	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in	  the	  sense	  that	  ‘[they]	  constitute	  and	  mobilize	  them	  by	  the	  “biases”	  they	  tap’	  in	  their	  claim	  to	  
representativeness	  (Disch,	  2012,	  p.	  608).	  
Secondly,	   understanding	   representation	   as	   a	   dialectical	   process	   calls	   for	   a	   more	  
sophisticated	   understanding	   of	   minorities,	   which	   avoids	   essentialist	   views	   and	   ‘groupism’	  
(Brubaker,	  2004).	  Rogers	  Brubaker	  rightfully	  cautions	  researchers	  against	  ‘the	  tendency	  to	  take	  
bounded	   groups	   as	   fundamental	   units	   of	   analysis	   (and	  basic	   constituents	   of	   the	   social	  world)’	  
(2004,	   p.	   2)	   and	   suggests	   taking	   ‘groupness’	   as	   a	   conceptual	   variable,	   which	   is	   by	   definition	  
constructed	  and	  fluctuating	  (2004,	  p.	  11).	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  no	  bases	  on	  which	  
minorities	  can	  create	  a	  shared	  identity,	  through	  external	  processes	  of	  identification	  and	  internal	  
processes	   of	   self-­‐identification.	   Studies	   on	   the	   identity	   and	   self-­‐identification	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐
speaking	  populations	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  have	  highlighted	  the	  predominance	  of	  local	  (Rose	  &	  
Maley,	   1993),	   regional	   (Merritt,	   2000,	   p.	   251)	   or	   multiple	   (Kolstø,	   1999)	   territorial	   self-­‐
identifications;	   the	  possible	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  unique	   identity	   (Cheskin,	  2012b;	  Ehala,	  2008)	  
or	   the	  development	  of	  multiple	   identities	   (Lauristin	  &	  Heidmets,	  2002;	  Linz	  &	  Stepan,	  1996;	  T.	  
Vihalemm,	   2005);	   the	   progressive	   assimilation	   within	   the	   titular	   culture	   (Laitin,	   1998),	   the	  
entrenchment	   of	   a	   diasporic	   identity	   (G.	   Smith	   &	   Wilson,	   1997),	   or	   the	   possibility	   for	   the	  
emergence	   of	   an	   integrated	   collective	   identity	   shared	   by	   so-­‐called	   ‘titulars’	   and	   ‘non-­‐titulars’	  
(Solska,	   2011).	   Far	   from	   discounting	   these	   insights	   on	   minority	   identity	   (or	   identities),	   the	  
rejection	   of	   groupism	   in	   my	   research	   means	   that	   the	   characteristics	   through	   which	   Russian-­‐
speakers	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  can	  (self)	  identify	  as	  a	  group	  are	  not	  immediately	  political	  and	  do	  
not	  necessarily	   imply	   shared	   interests	  and	  demands.	  They	  are,	   instead,	  potential	   features	   that	  
representatives	   can	   tap	   (more	   or	   less	   successfully)	   in	   order	   to	   unify	   and	   shape	   a	   minority	  
constituency.	  	  
A	  similar	  point	   that	  groups	  do	  not	  hold	   innate	   interest	  and	  needs	  has	  been	  made	   in	   the	  
literature	  on	  collective	  action.	  For	   instance,	  Dunleavy	  argues	  that	   ‘any	  convincing	  public	  choice	  
account	  must	  partly	  endogenize	  preferences’	  because	  of	  elite’s	  attempts	  to	  reshape	  what	  voters	  
perceive	   as	   their	   own	   interests	   (1991,	   pp.	   110–111,	   emphasis	   in	   text).	   Warnings	   against	  
assigning	  coherent	  interests	  to	  groups	  are	  also	  echoed	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Gould	  (2003)	  and	  Tilly	  
(2008,	   p.	   26).	   This	   is	   especially	   relevant	   for	   studies	   of	   ethnically	   divided	   democracies,	   as	  
widespread	   ‘underlying	   essentialism’	   blinds	   many	   students	   of	   ethnic	   politics	   to	   within-­‐group	  
differences	  (Zuber,	  2012,	  p.	  2).	  
These	  insights	  point	  to	  a	  research	  strategy	  that	  follows	  Pitkin	  in	  problematising	  the	  effect	  
of	  descriptive	  representation	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  in	  divided	  democracies,	  but	  departs	  from	  her	  (and	  
from	   the	  mainstream	   use	   of	   her	   theory)	   in	   not	   taking	   responsiveness	   as	   a	   viable	  measure	   of	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effective	  (‘good’)	  minority	  representation.	  This	  implies	  a	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  the	  responsiveness	  of	  
representatives	  and	  institutions	  to	  pre-­‐determined	  minority	  interests	  to	  the	  inclusiveness	  of	  the	  
democratic	  process	  towards	  (potentially	  multiple)	  minority	  voices.	  Since	  the	  minority	  cannot	  be	  
taken	  for	  granted	  as	  a	  politically	  relevant	  group	  with	  innate	  interests	  and	  needs,	  the	  question	  of	  
minority	   representation	   cannot	   be	   a	   question	   of	   responsiveness.	   It	   is,	   instead,	   a	   question	   of	  
whether	  structures	  of	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  are	  present	  in	  the	  representative	  
democratic	  system	  and	  how	  they	  operate.	  It	  is	  primarily	  a	  question	  of	  power	  distribution	  and	  of	  
how	  democracy	  works	  (or	  fails	  to	  do	  so)	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  societies.	  
My	   research	   draws	   from	   Pitkin’s	   conceptualisation	   of	   representation	   and	   its	  
interpretations	   (and	   critiques)	   in	   three	   ways.	   Firstly,	   I	   adopt	   Pitkin’s	   distinction	   between	  
descriptive	   and	   substantive	   representation	   as	   a	   way	   of	   shifting	   the	   focus	   from	   (descriptive)	  
presence	  to	  (substantive)	  impact	  of	  minority	  presence	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  Although	  it	  has	  
rarely	   been	   used	   outside	   the	   US,	   this	   distinction	   has	   the	   advantage	   of	   problematising	   the	  
outcome	   of	   representation,	   thus	   making	   it	   possible	   to	   push	   the	   enquiry	   beyond	   the	   mere	  
presence	  or	  absence	  of	  minority	  representatives	  in	  political	  institutions	  to	  explore	  the	  effects	  of	  
that	  presence/absence	  on	   the	  democratic	  process.	   Secondly,	   I	   understand	   representation	  as	  a	  
dialectical	  process	  and,	  therefore,	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  as	  
homogenous	  groups	  with	  innate	  and	  pre-­‐political	  interests,	  but	  take	  into	  account	  the	  existence	  
of	   multiple	   minority	   voices.	   Finally,	   I	   reject	   responsiveness	   as	   a	   valid	   measure	   of	   effective	  
minority	  representation	  in	  the	  divided	  democracies	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  study,	  
therefore,	   will	   not	   be	   on	   the	   proximity	   of	   representatives’	   positions	   to	   their	   minority	  
constituency’s	  opinions	  or	  the	  congruence	  of	  policy	  outcomes	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  minority	  interests.	  
Rather,	   I	  will	   analyse	   the	  availability	  of	   channels	   for	  minority	   voices	   to	  access	  policymaking	  as	  
legitimate	  and	  equal	  participants	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  
1.2 Ethnic	  parties	  
The	  American	  debate	  on	  minority	  representation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  US	  experience	  of	  a	  rigid	  two-­‐
party	   system,	   where	   minority	   representatives	   and	   issues	   must	   be	   accommodated	   (if	   at	   all)	  
within	  either	  the	  Republican	  or	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  ethnicity	  and	  race	  as	  
party-­‐generating	   cleavages	   is	   highly	  unlikely.	   This	  may	  partially	   account	   for	   the	   lower	   visibility	  
Pitkin	  enjoys	  outside	  North	  America.9	  The	  existing	  attempts	  at	  extending	  Pitkin’s	  terminology	  to	  
other	   geographical	   areas	   also	   do	   not	   include	   the	   possibility	   of	   ethnic	   party	   formation	   as	   a	  
relevant	   factor.	   A	   remarkable	   example	   of	   this	   is	   Bird,	   Saalfeld	   and	   Wüst’s	   The	   Political	  
Representation	  of	  Immigrants	  and	  Minorities	  (2011),	   in	  which	  Pitkin’s	  definitions	  are	  applied	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  For	  the	  adoption	  of	  Pitkin’s	  terminology	  in	  Canada	  see,	  for	  example,	  Andrew	  et	  al.	  (2008).	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the	  whole	  Western	  world.10	  Although	  their	  study	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  multi-­‐country	  analyses	  of	  the	  
phenomenon	  of	  ethnic	  minority	  representation	  and,	  arguably,	  the	  most	  extensive	  (both	  in	  terms	  
of	  geographical	  reach	  and	  of	  factors	  under	  analysis),	  for	  reasons	  of	  comparability	  the	  analysis	  is	  
limited	   to	   ‘advanced	   liberal	   democracies’	   and	   does	   not	   include	   post-­‐colonial	   and	   post-­‐
communist	   countries.	   This	   elision	   presents	   a	   problem,	   though,	   because	   it	   excludes	   countries	  
where	   ethnicity	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   emerge	   as	   a	   party-­‐generating	   cleavage.	   The	   emergence	   of	  
ethnic	  parties	  (or	  indeed	  their	  failure	  to	  emerge)	  and	  ethnic	  parties’	  role	  in	  democratic	  political	  
systems	  can	  hardly	  be	  overlooked	  in	  discussions	  of	  minority	  representation.	  The	  importance	  of	  
ethnic	  parties	  is	  further	  justified	  by	  the	  widely	  recognised	  fundamental	  role	  that	  political	  parties	  
play	  in	  modern	  (representative)	  democracies,	  and	  especially	  in	  new	  consolidating	  democracies.11	  	  
The	  main	   debates	   about	   ethnic	   parties	   have	   been	   about	   how	   to	   define	   them,	  whether	  
ethnic	   parties	   are	   all	   the	   same,	   what	   factors	   determine	   their	   emergence	   and	   electoral	  
performance,	   and	   whether	   they	   have	   a	   negative	   or	   positive	   impact	   on	   democracy.	   The	   2011	  
special	   issue	  of	  Party	  Politics	  devoted	   to	  ethnic	  parties	  provided	  a	   list	  of	   the	  open	  debates	  on	  
this	   theme	   that	   necessitate	   a	   contribution.	   Interestingly,	   the	   difference	   between	   minority	  
representation	  through	  ethnic,	  multi-­‐ethnic	  or	  non-­‐ethnic	  parties	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  outcome	  and	  
minority	   empowerment	   was	   not	   part	   of	   the	   list.	   This	   aptly	   illustrates	   the	   bias	   in	   favour	   of	  
descriptive	  representation	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  ethnic	  parties.	  
1.2.1 Defining	  ethnic	  parties	  	  
One	   of	   the	   most	   authoritative	   definitions	   of	   ethnic	   party	   was	   provided	   by	   Donald	   Horowitz,	  
according	   to	   whom	   the	   defining	   feature	   of	   an	   ethnic	   party	   is	   that	   it	   serves	   exclusively	   the	  
interests	   of	   an	   ethnic	   group	   (1985,	   p.	   293).	   This	  means	   that	   ‘the	   boundaries	   of	   party	   support	  
stop	  at	   the	  boundaries	  of	   ethnic	   groups’	   and	   that	  ethnic	  parties	  have	  an	   incentive	   to	   strongly	  
assert	   ethnic	   demands	   in	   order	   to	   retain	   their	   votes	   (Horowitz,	   1985,	   p.	   346).	   Most	   authors	  
propose	   definitions	   that	   are	   fundamentally	   analogous	   to	   Horowitz’s	   in	   that	   they	   stress	  
exclusivity	   as	   the	   crucial	   characteristic	   of	   an	   ethnic	   party	   (e.g.	   Bugajski,	   1994,	   p.	   ii;	   Chandra,	  
2005,	  p.	  236;	  Diamond	  &	  Gunther,	  2001,	  pp.	  22–23;	  Kitschelt,	  2001,	  p.	  314;	  Reilly,	  2003,	  p.	  818).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   According	   to	   this	   study,	   minority	   officials	   can	   act	   as:	   ethnic	   entrepreneurs,	   by	   playing	   the	   minority	   card	   and	  
reinforcing	  the	  minority’s	  group	  identity	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  majority;	  bridge	  builders,	  by	  presenting	  themselves	  as	  
compromise	  brokers	  between	  majority	  and	  minority;	  or	  party	  delegates,	  by	  following	  the	  party	  line	  even	  when	  this	  
contradicts	  their	  minority	  mandate.	  
11	   For	   a	   list	   of	   parties’	   ‘optimal’	   functions	   see	   Giovanni	   Sartori	   (2005,	   p.	   24).	   According	   to	   Sartori,	   ‘responsible	  
governments	  became	  “responsive”	  precisely	  because	  parties	  supplied	  the	  channels	  for	  articulating,	  communicating,	  
and	   implementing	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   governed’	   (1976,	   p.	   24).	   Furthermore,	  Seymour	   Lipset	   and	   Stein	  Rokkan’s	  
(1967)	  theory	  of	  political	  cleavages	  claims	  that	  the	  arrangement	  of	  parties	  along	  lines	  of	  societal	  conflict	  transforms	  
potentially	  disruptive	  conflicts	  into	  discursive	  political	  divisions.	  Parties	  in	  democratising	  states	  and	  new	  democracies	  
are	  said	  to	  perform	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  functions	  that	  help	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  democratic	  process.	  For	  a	  
comprehensive	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  parties	  in	  new	  democracies	  see	  Ezrow	  (2011).	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Similarly,	   Arend	   Lijphart	   refers	   to	   ethnic	   parties	   as	   ‘segmental	   parties’,	   whose	   role	   is	   the	  
representation	  of	  a	  specific	  segment	  of	  society	  and	  the	  selection	  of	  segmental	  leaders	  (1977,	  p.	  
61).	  	  
Other	  authors	  have	  taken	  a	  more	  flexible	  approach.	  For	  example,	  Ishiyama	  recognises	  that	  
parties	   can	   be	   characterised	   as	   ethnic	   also	   because	   they	   are	   ‘widely	   regarded’	   as	   primarily	  
representing	  a	   specific	  ethnic	  group	   (2009,	  p.	  64).	   Some	  authors	   (Gherghina	  &	   Jiglau,	  2011,	  p.	  
52)	   have	   openly	   contested	   definitions	   based	   on	   exclusivity	   as	   capable	   of	   capturing	   the	   ethnic	  
dimension	   of	   ethnic	   parties	   but	   failing	   to	   embrace	   their	   party	   dimension.	   An	   ethnic	   party	   is	  
therefore	   defined	   alternatively	   as	   ‘an	   organisation	   that	   runs	   in	   elections	   at	   a	   national	   level,	  
whose	   political	   programme	   acknowledges	   an	   identiﬁcation	   with	   an	   ethnic	   minority,	   but	   goes	  
beyond	  the	  goal	  of	  representing	  its	  interests’	  (Gherghina	  &	  Jiglau,	  2011,	  p.	  53).	  Similarly,	  Donna	  
Lee	  Van	  Cott	  defines	  ethnic	  parties	  as	   ‘organization[s]	  authorized	   to	  compete	   in	  elections,	   the	  
majority	   of	   whose	   leaders	   and	  members	   identify	   themselves	   as	   belonging	   to	   a	   nondominant	  
ethnic	   group,	   and	  whose	   electoral	   platform	   includes	   among	   its	   central	   demands	   programs	   of	  
ethnic	  or	  cultural	  nature’	  (2005,	  p.	  3).	  
Alongside	   exclusivity,	   other	   features	   of	   ethnic	   parties	   remain	   under	   discussion.	   For	  
example,	   while	   Van	   Cott	   (2005)	   explicitly	   links	   ethnic	   parties	   to	   nondominant	   ethnic	   groups,	  
Stroschein	   (2001)	   includes	   in	   this	   category	   also	   parties	   that	   advocate	   for	   the	   dominant	  
ethnicity.12	  Kanchan	  Chandra	  proposed	  that	   in	  defining	  ethnic	  parties	  scholars	  should	  also	  take	  
into	  account	   ‘temporality’,	   that	   is,	   the	   fact	   that	  ethnic	  parties	   change	  over	   time	   together	  with	  
the	   ethnic	   group	   they	   represent	   (2011,	   p.	   155).	   John	   Ishiyama	   and	   Marijke	   Breuning	   (2011)	  
added	   another	   dimension	   to	   the	   debate	   by	   objecting	   to	   the	   widespread	   tendency	   in	   the	  
literature	   to	   consider	   ethnic	   parties	   as	   all	   equal	   and	   proposed	   looking	   at	   parties’	   names	   to	  
distinguish	   between	   exclusionary	   ethnic	   parties	   (those	   that	   contain	   their	   ethnic	   allegiance	   in	  
their	  name)	  from	  moderate	  ones	  (that	  opt	  for	  names	  with	  potential	  for	  a	  broader	  appeal).	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   difficulties	   highlighted	   by	   these	   debates,	   a	   working	   definition	   of	  
ethnic	  party	  must	  be	  established	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  it	  to	  the	  context	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  In	  my	  
research	   an	   ethnic	   party	   is	   a	   party	  whose	  primary	   (although	  not	   necessarily	   unique)	   founding	  
reason	  and	  programmatic	  agenda	  is	  the	  promotion	  of	  group	  interests	  conceived	  in	  ethnic	  terms,	  
or	  a	  party	  that	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  having	  such	  characteristics.	  Two	  clarifications	  are	  essential	  
in	   order	   to	   avoid	   confusion.	   First,	   I	  will	   follow	  Van	   Cott	   (2005)	   and	   attach	   the	   label	   of	   ethnic	  
party	  exclusively	  to	  parties	  related	  to	  nondominant	  ethnic	  groups.	  Therefore,	  nationalist	  parties	  
–	   although	   their	   agendas	   have,	   strictly	   speaking,	   a	   markedly	   ethnic	   character	   –	   will	   not	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  She	  refers	  to	  ‘titular	  ethnic	  parties’	  (Stroschein,	  2001,	  p.	  61).	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categorised	   as	   ethnic.	   Second,	   although	   Ishiyama	   and	   Breuning’s	   (2011)	   suggestion	   that	   an	  
ethnic	  party’s	  name	   is	   an	   indicator	  of	   its	   level	  of	   radicalism	   is	  probably	   simplistic,	   I	  will	   follow	  
their	  contention	  that	  ethnic	  parties	  can	  position	  themselves	  differently	  in	  the	  radical–moderate	  
continuum.	   In	  other	  words,	  ethnic	  parties	  are	  not	  radical	  by	  default	  and	  a	  distinction	  between	  
radical	   and	   moderate	   ethnic	   parties	   must	   be	   made	   when	   analysing	   their	   role	   in	   the	   political	  
arena.	  The	  assumptions	   implied	   in	  this	  definition	  will	  be	  tested	  empirically	   in	  the	  Estonian	  and	  
Latvian	  cases.	  
1.2.2 Ethnic	  parties	  and	  democracy	  
Although	  scholars	  in	  political	  science	  largely	  agree	  on	  the	  pivotal	  role	  played	  by	  political	  parties	  
in	  democratic	   societies,	   there	   is	  no	   consensus	  on	   the	   role	   that	  parties	  play	   (or	   should	  play)	   in	  
ethnically	   divided	   societies.13	   Two	   main	   positions	   can	   be	   identified	   in	   the	   literature.	   Ethnic	  
parties	   are	   either	   seen	   as	   promoting	   intransigent	   interests	   and	   thus	   as	   intractable	   and	  
disinclined	   to	   compromise,	   or	   they	   are	   believed	   to	   play	   a	   constructive	   role	   by	   peacefully	  
articulating	  minority	  interests.	  
The	  first	  approach	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  politicisation	  of	  ethnicity	  is	  dangerous	  
for	  democracy.	  A	  classical	  all-­‐negative	  view	  of	  ethnic	  parties	  is	  provided	  by	  Alvin	  Rabushka	  and	  
Kenneth	   Shepsle’s	   (1972)	   ethnic	   outbidding	   thesis.	   This	   maintains	   that	   once	   ethnicity	   is	  
politicised,	  it	  has	  a	  centrifugal	  effect	  on	  the	  party	  system,	  as	  ethnic	  parties	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  
try	  to	  secure	  the	  vote	  of	  their	  group	  by	  taking	  an	  increasingly	  extremist	  stance	  on	  ethnic	  issues.	  
This	  destabilises	   the	  system	  and	  can	  ultimately	   lead	   to	  open	  conflict.	  The	  same	  assumption	  of	  
ethnic	  party	  extremism	  and	  disinclination	  to	  compromise	  is	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  those	  approaches	  
that,	  although	  differing	  in	  the	  solution	  proposed,	  agree	  on	  the	  necessity	  to	  depoliticise	  ethnicity.	  
Authoritative	   examples	   of	   this	   approach	   are	  Horowitz’s	   (1985)	   recommendation	   for	   structural	  
reforms	   and	   preferential	   policies	   aimed	   at	   reducing	   ethnic	   conflict,	   and	   Lijphart’s	   (1977)	  
advocacy	  for	  a	  consociational	  democracy	  based	  on	  elite	  bargaining	  and	  grand	  coalitions.	  Indeed,	  
although	  Horowitz’s	  centripetalism	  and	  Lijphart’s	  consociationalism	  are	  often	  (rightly)	  regarded	  
as	   competing	   theories	   (e.g.	   De	   Briey,	   2005),	   they	   are	   based	   on	   the	   common	   assumption	   that	  
ethnic	   competition	   must	   be	   stifled	   (either	   through	   internal	   incentives	   or	   through	   external	  
constraints)	  for	  democracy	  to	  work	  in	  ethnically	  diverse	  societies.	  Similarly,	  other	  authors	  have	  
found	  ethnic	  parties’	   effect	  on	  democracy	   to	  be	   ‘divisive	  and	  even	  disintegrative’	   (Diamond	  &	  
Gunther,	   2001,	   p.	   24),	   and	   that	   non-­‐ethnic	   state-­‐wide	   parties	   are	   to	   be	   encouraged	   (Reilly	   &	  
Nordlund,	   2008,	   p.	   10;	   Stepan,	   2001,	   p.	   331)	   or	   even	   engineered	   (Reilly,	   2003)	   to	   ensure	  
democratic	  stability.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  A	  normative	  dimension	  is	  often	  present	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  ethnic	  parties.	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I	   follow	   Johanna	   Birnir	   (2007)	   in	   contrasting	   this	   kind	   of	   theory	   to	   those	   that	   consider	  
ethnicity	  a	  flexible	  political	  cue	  and,	  therefore,	  do	  not	  propose	  ways	  to	  reduce	  politicisation	  of	  
ethnicity	   but,	   rather,	   to	   channel	   it	   in	   the	   democratic	   process.	   Scholars	   that	   use	   this	   approach	  
refuse	  to	  see	  ethnic	  politics	  as	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  and	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  ethnic	  parties	  
in	   articulating	   minority	   interests,	   including	   minorities	   in	   the	   political	   process,	   and	  
institutionalising	  conflict.	  Understood	  this	  way,	  ethnic	  parties	  do	  not	  automatically	  emerge	  from	  
the	   ethnic	   cleavage,	   but	   rather	   their	   appearance	   and	   electoral	   performance	   is	   determined	   by	  
exogenous	   factors.14	   Politicisation	   of	   ethnicity,	   far	   from	   being	   necessarily	   bad	   for	   political	  
stability,	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  way	  to	  grant	  representation	  to	  the	  excluded	  and	  to	  potentially	  avoid	  
more	  radical	  means	  of	  promoting	  minority	   interests.	  According	  to	  Stroschein,	  ethnic	  parties	  do	  
not	   create	   conflict	   but	   represent	   existing	   cleavages;	   they	   ‘“domesticate”	   ethnic	   issues	   into	  
institutional	   forms,	   thus	   allowing	   them	   to	   be	   resolved	   in	   parliament	   rather	   than	   through	  
violence’	   (2001,	   p.	   61).	   Chandra	   (2005)	   suggests	   that	   the	   normal	   process	   of	   ethnic	   party	  
positioning	   in	   the	   political	   spectrum	   is	   not	   ethnic	   outbidding	   but,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   a	   ‘reverse	  
centrist	   spiral’	   which	   tends	   towards	   centrist	   equilibrium	   and	   moderation.15	   There	   are	   no	  
endogenous	  factors	  that	  result	  in	  the	  inherent	  intractability	  of	  the	  ethnic	  issue,	  but,	  rather,	  it	  is	  
exogenous	   factors	   –	   such	   as	   access	   to	   government	   (Birnir,	   2007;	   Ishiyama,	   2009),	   the	   state’s	  
approach	   towards	   ethnic	   groups	   (Ishiyama,	   2009,	   p.	   80),	   formal	   and	   informal	   discrimination	  
(Gherghina	  &	   Jiglau,	   2011)	   –	   that	   can	   trigger	   the	   radicalisation	   of	   ethnic	   demands	   and	   foster	  
conflict.	  	  
A	  basic	  assumption	  behind	  these	  flexible	  understandings	  of	  ethnic	  representation	   is	  that	  
ethnic	  voters	  are	  rational	  rather	  than	  naturally	  inclined	  to	  radicalism.	  According	  to	  Birnir	  (2007)	  
we	  should	  expect	  that	  if	  an	  ethnic	  party	  is	  unable	  to	  represent	  a	  minority	  (because	  ethnic	  parties	  
are	  not	   institutionally	   viable	  or	  encounter	  barriers	   to	  access	  government),	  minority	   voters	  will	  
shift	   their	   votes	   to	   the	  non-­‐ethnic	   party	   that	   has	   the	  highest	   likelihood	  of	   representing	   them.	  
Yet,	  if	  such	  a	  non-­‐ethnic	  party	  does	  not	  exist,	  the	  minority	  will	  not	  have	  any	  incentives	  to	  enter	  
the	   electoral	   competition	   and	   might	   seek	   other	   (extra-­‐parliamentary)	   means	   to	   defend	   its	  
interests.	   Access	   to	   power	   has	   been	   indicated	   as	   having	   a	   ‘dampening	   effect’	   on	   a	   group’s	  
propensity	  to	  conflict,	  as	  it	  gives	  the	  group	  ‘a	  stake	  in	  the	  system’	  (Ishiyama,	  2009,	  p.	  79).	  This	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Van	  Cott	  (2005)	  grouped	  these	  factors	  into	  three	  macro	  categories:	  institutional	  openness,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  party	  
system,	  and	   the	   shape	  and	   role	  of	  ethnic-­‐oriented	   social	  movements.	  Other	  authors	   indicate	  endogenous	   factors,	  
such	  as	  the	  minority	  elite’s	  conscious	  decision	  to	  mobilise	  ethnicity	  to	  their	  own	  political	  advantage,	  to	  explain	  the	  
emergence	  of	  ethnic	  parties	  (Horowitz,	  1985,	  p.	  310;	  Rotschild,	  1981,	  p.	  248).	  
15	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Chandra’s	  theory	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Indian	  case,	  where	  language,	  religion,	  caste	  and	  tribe	  
are	  crosscutting	  cleavages	  that	  can	  be	  reinforced	  to	  prevent	  the	  ethnic	  dimension	  from	  becoming	  overemphasised.	  
Northern	   Ireland	   (Mitchell,	   Evans,	   &	   O’Leary,	   2009),	   Latvia	   and	   Estonia	   are	   all	   cases	   in	   which	   cleavages	   do	   not	  
crosscut,	  but	  rather	  tend	  to	  be	  cumulative	  and	  mutually	  reinforcing.	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particularly	   relevant	   for	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   where	   no	   ethnic	   party	   has	   been	   included	   in	  
governing	  coalitions	  and	  minority	  ministers	  have	  been	   few	  and	   far	  between.	  Birnir	   (2007)	  and	  
Ishiyama	   (2009)	   suggest	   that	   the	   routine	   exclusion	   from	   government	   risks	   reducing	   the	  
incentives	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  seek	  representation	  through	  institutional	  means.	  	  
1.2.3 The	  polarisation	  and	  presence	  paradigms	  
The	   debate	   about	   ethnic	   parties	   runs	   largely	   parallel	   to	   that	   on	   descriptive	   and	   substantive	  
representation.	  However,	  they	  both	  suggest	  the	  existence	  of	  two	  main	  paradigms	  in	  the	  study	  of	  
minority	  political	  presence:	   the	  polarisation	  paradigm	  and	  the	  presence	  paradigm.	  On	  the	  one	  
side	  there	  are	  those	  who	  find	  that	  the	  politicisation	  of	  ethnicity	  has	  mostly	  negative	  effects,	  as	  it	  
leads	   to	  ethnic	  polarisation	  and	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  political	  positions	  along	  ethnic	   lines	   (e.g.	  
Diamond	  and	  Gunther,	  2001;	  Horowitz,	  1985;	  Rabushka	  and	  Shepsle,	  1972).	  This	  view	  –	  which	  
we	  can	   call	   the	  polarisation	  paradigm	   –	   sees	  ethnicity	  as	  an	  uncompromising,	   zero-­‐sum	   issue,	  
and	  politicised	  ethnicity	  (especially	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ethnic	  parties)	  as	  dangerous	  for	  the	  peaceful	  
course	  of	  democracy.	  Not	  least	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  ethnic	  outbidding,	  high	  minority	  descriptive	  
representation	  and	  electorally	  strong	  ethnic	  parties	  lead	  to	  polarisation.	  This	  makes	  compromise	  
unlikely,	  and	  thus	  ends	  up	  being	  counterproductive	  for	  the	  minority,	  as	  minority-­‐friendly	  policies	  
become	  less	  likely.	  
Authors	   that	   take	   the	   opposite	   view	   –	   which	   can	   be	   called	   the	   presence	   paradigm	   –	  
highlight	   the	   democratic	   importance	   of	   minority	   inclusion	   and	   political	   participation,	   and	   the	  
trust	   towards	  state	   institutions	   that	  comes	  with	   inclusion	   (e.g.	  Chandra,	  2005;	   Ishiyama,	  2009;	  
Mansbridge,	   1999;	   Phillips,	   1995;	   Stroschein,	   2001).	   This	   paradigm	   considers	   ethnicity	   to	   be	  
flexible	   rather	   than	   zero-­‐sum	   and	   sees	   ethnic	   parties	   as	   positive	   for	   democracy,	   as	   they	  
articulate	   minority	   demands	   in	   democratic	   ways	   (Birnir,	   2007;	   Stroschein,	   2001).	   As	   a	  
consequence,	   minority	   political	   presence	   has	   positive	   effects	   on	   democratic	   stability	   and	  
increases	   the	   potential	   for	   the	   minority	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   policymaking	   and	   to	   reach	  
compromise	  solutions.	  My	  work	  –	  although	  normatively	  closer	  to	  the	  presence	  paradigm	  –	  does	  
not	   position	   itself	   within	   any	   of	   these	   two	   paradigms,	   but	   responds	   to	   both	   by	   enquiring	  
empirically	   into	   the	  effects	  of	  minority	  political	  presence	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   in	  ethnically	  divided	  
democracies.	  
1.3 The	  representation	  of	  ethnic	  minorities	  in	  CEE	  countries	  
The	  literature	  on	  minority	  representation	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  predominantly	  follows	  
from	  the	  debate	  on	  ethnic	  parties	  discussed	  above.	  More	  precisely,	  to	  use	  Pitkin’s	  terminology	  –	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which	  is	  rarely	  even	  mentioned	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  area16	  –	  this	  literature	  mostly	  focuses	  on	  
ethnic	  descriptive	  representation	  as	  the	  independent	  variable,	  whose	  presence	  or	  absence	  must	  
be	   explained.	   When	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   descriptive	   representation’s	   effects,	   these	   are	  
conceptualised	   in	   terms	   of	   democratic	   stability	   and	   inter-­‐ethnic	   peace	   (Ishiyama	   &	   Breuning,	  
2011;	   Ishiyama,	   2001;	   Johnson,	   2002;	   Stroschein,	   2011).	   Issues	   of	   substantive	   representation	  
and	  democratic	  inclusiveness	  are	  rarely	  touched	  upon.	  
An	   early	   example	   of	   CEE	   literature’s	   focus	   on	   descriptive	   representation	   is	   provided	   by	  
Benoît-­‐Rohmer	  and	  Hardeman	  (1994),	  who	  looked	  at	  the	  representation	  of	  ethnic	  minorities	  in	  
the	   new	   post-­‐communist	   democracies	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   number	   of	   minority	   MPs	   in	   their	  
parliaments.	  References	  to	  substantive	  representation	  are,	   instead,	  surprisingly	  rare.	  The	  focus	  
tends	  to	  be	  primarily	  on	  explaining	  ethnic	  party	  success	   (or	   lack	  thereof)	  and	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  
ethnic	   parties	   on	   the	   democratic	   stability	   of	   new	   democracies	   or	   democratising	   states.	   For	  
example,	  Stroschein	  (2001)	  looks	  at	  the	  Hungarian	  minority	  in	  Slovakia,	  Romania	  and	  Ukraine	  to	  
determine	   the	   success	   of	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   its	   effect.	   In	   her	   analysis,	   she	   mentions	   that	  
Hungarian	  parties	  in	  Romania	  and	  Slovakia	  have	  managed	  to	  influence	  some	  policies	  after	  being	  
included	   in	  governing	   coalitions	   (2001,	  p.	  61).	  However,	   the	  outcomes	  of	   representation	  were	  
not	  the	  focus	  of	  her	  research	  and	  this	  insight	  was	  not	  explored	  further.17	  	  
A	  particularly	  popular	  strand	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  CEE	  minorities	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  
impact	  of	  electoral	  rules	  on	  ethnic	  or	  multiethnic	  party	  formation	  and	  electoral	  success	  (Bieber	  
&	   Wolff,	   2007;	   Bochsler,	   2010;	   Friedman,	   2005;	   Protsyk	   &	   Matichescu,	   2010).	   Although	   this	  
debate	   is	   not	   immediately	   relevant	   to	   this	   study,	   some	   authors	   presented	   some	   useful	  
observations	  –	  often	  as	  a	  sideline	  to	  their	  research	  focus.	  For	  example,	  Oleh	  Protsyk	  and	  Lupsa	  
Marius	   Matichescu	   (2010)	   proposed	   a	   categorisation	   of	   minority	   MPs	   into	   three	   groups,	  
according	   to	   the	   channel	   through	   which	   they	   entered	   parliament:	   (a)	   minority	   parties,	   (b)	  
mainstream	  parties,	  or	  (c)	  reserved	  seats.	  While	  (c)	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  either	  Estonia	  or	  Latvia,	  (a)	  
and	  (b)	  are	  relevant	  for	  my	  comparison.	  Their	  content	  analysis	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  activities	  of	  
minority	  MPs	  from	  mainstream	  political	  party	   lists	  and	  a	  survey	  of	  the	   leaders	  of	  those	  parties	  
suggest	   that	  minority	  MPs	   from	  mainstream	  parties	   ‘lack	  a	  proﬁle	  as	   representatives	  of	  ethnic	  
minority	   communities’	   (2010,	   p.	   37).	   This	   introduces	   the	   question	   of	   ineffective	   descriptive	  
representation	   and	   suggests	   that	   there	  might	   be	   a	   qualitative	   difference	   between	   descriptive	  
representation	   through	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   through	   non-­‐ethnic,	  mainstream	   parties.	   However,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  An	  exception	  is	  Bernauer	  and	  Bochsler’s	  paper	  on	  CEE	  ethnic	  parties,	  in	  which	  the	  authors	  focus	  on	  ethnic	  parties’	  
electoral	  success	  but	  suggest	  that	   future	  studies	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  descriptive	  representation	  are	  needed	   (2010,	  p.	  
26).	  
17	  Stroschein’s	  subsequent	  research	  went	  in	  a	  more	  ‘substantive’	  direction	  with	  the	  study	  of	  minority	  mobilisation	  and	  
its	  complex	  relationship	  with	  policy	  outcomes	  (Stroschein,	  2012).	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given	  the	  different	  focus	  of	  their	  research,	  the	  authors	  did	  not	  advance	  this	   line	  of	   inquiry	  any	  
further.	  	  
Other	   authors	   refer	   to	   the	   link	   between	   minority	   descriptive	   representation,	   the	  
policymaking	  process	  and	  policy	  outcomes	  but,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  there	  are	  no	  comparative	  or	  
country-­‐specific	   studies	   that	   explore	   this	   link	   systematically.	   In	   his	   article	   about	   the	  
shortcomings	  of	  minority	  representation	  in	  Bulgaria,	  Bernd	  Rechel	  points	  out	  that	  the	  MRF	  (the	  
Turkish	  Movement	  for	  Rights	  and	  Freedom)	  has	  become	  part	  of	  the	  ‘political	  establishment’,	  but	  
that	  ‘it	  has	  done	  so	  in	  conditions	  that	  were	  detrimental	  to	  demands	  for	  minority	  rights’	  (2007,	  p.	  
353).	  This	   suggests	   the	  existence	  of	  a	   trade-­‐off	  between	  an	  ethnic	  party’s	  access	   to	  governing	  
coalitions	   and	   its	   political	   effectiveness	   in	   terms	   of	   minority	   representation.	   Yet,	   the	   article’s	  
subject	  matter	  is	  mostly	  descriptive	  and	  restricted	  to	  Bulgaria	  and	  the	  author	  does	  not	  attempt	  
any	  generalisable	  theoretical	  proposition	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  
Another	  original	  contribution	   in	  the	   literature	  on	  minority	  representation	   in	  CEE	   is	  Sonia	  
Alonso	  and	  Rubén	  Ruiz-­‐Rufino’s	  (2007)	  article	  on	  political	  representation	  and	  ethnic	  conflict.	   In	  
terms	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  Pitkin’s,	  the	  authors	  claim	  that	  ‘parliamentary	  representation	  does	  
not	   always	   allow	   for	   effective	   representation’	   (2007,	   p.	   237).	   Interestingly,	   they	   choose	   the	  
number	  of	  parliamentary	  seats	  won	  by	  ethnic	  parties	  rather	  than	  the	  number	  of	  minority	  MPs	  as	  
their	   independent	   variable,	   arguing	   that	   ethnic	   partisanship	   is	   a	   more	   reliable	   measure	   of	  
representation	   than	   ethnic	   affiliation,	   because	  membership	   of	   a	   politician	   in	   an	   ethnic	   group	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  determine	  her	  policy	  preferences.	  This	  choice	   implies	  an	   interesting	  claim	  
with	   regard	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   ethnic	   parties,	   descriptive	   and	   substantive	  
representation.	   If	   belonging	   to	   a	   certain	   party	   is	   a	   better	   predictor	   of	   a	   politician’s	   political	  
preference	  on	  ethnic	  issues	  than	  belonging	  to	  a	  certain	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  group,	  the	  assumptions	  
of	   descriptive	   representation	   must	   be	   questioned.	   The	   authors,	   however,	   do	   not	   suggest	  
possible	  measures	  of	  effective	   (substantive)	   representation,	  but	   concentrate	  on	  ethnic	  protest	  
and	  rebellion	  as	  measures	  of	  democratic	  stability.	  	  
Johanna	  Birnir	  and	  David	  Waguespack	  (2011),	   in	  a	   large-­‐N	  study	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  ethnic	  
governmental	   inclusion	   on	   economic	   development	   that	   includes	   former-­‐communist	   countries,	  
take	   a	   more	   outcome-­‐oriented	   view	   on	   representation.	   They	   test	   the	   impact	   of	   minority	  
representation	   on	   policy	   outcomes	   through	   general	   economic	   indicators,	   such	   as	  GDP	   growth	  
and	   GDP	   per	   capita.	   Their	   article	   contributes	   to	   the	   academic	   debate	   about	   the	   effect	   of	  
ethnicity	  on	   state	  performance.	  This	  debate	  –	  extensively	   reviewed	  by	  Birnir	   and	  Waguespack	  
(2011,	   pp.	   245–248)	   –	   is	   concerned	   with	   whether	   ethnic	   participation	   in	   the	   policymaking	  
process	   of	   demographically	   heterogeneous	   societies	   has	   a	   negative	   (fractionalisation,	   cross	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vetoes,	  political	  stalemate)	  or	  positive	  (more	  varied	  input,	  increased	  system	  legitimacy,	  full	  use	  
of	  human	   resources)	   impact	  on	   the	  quality	  of	  decision-­‐making	  and	  on	  economic	  performance.	  
However,	   the	   focus	   on	   economic	   performance	   as	   a	  measure	   of	   state	   efficiency	   does	   not	   take	  
into	  account	   the	  relative	  benefit	   for	   the	  ethnic	  minority	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  majority	  and	  also	   ignores	  
non-­‐economic	  policy	  issues	  with	  important	  ethnic	  implications.	  	  
Monica	  Robotin	  and	  Levente	  Salat	  (2003)	  analysed	  the	  effects	  of	  minority	  participation	  in	  
government	  in	  Macedonia,	  Romania	  and	  Slovakia	  along	  three	  dimensions:	  the	  status	  of	  minority	  
parties	   in	   the	   governing	   coalition;	   the	   legislative	  measures	   promoted	  by	  minority	   parties;	   and	  
the	  effect	  of	  minority	  government	  participation	  on	  democratisation.	  While	  recognising	  some	  of	  
the	  risks	  of	  including	  ethnic	  parties	  in	  governing	  coalitions	  –	  namely	  the	  emphasis	  on	  minority-­‐
related	   legislation	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  more	  general	  policies,	  and	  the	  high	  expectations	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  ethnic	  community,	  which,	  if	  they	  are	  not	  met,	  can	  lead	  to	  frustration	  and	  inter-­‐ethnic	  
tension	  –	  the	  authors	  conclude	  that	  overall	  it	  has	  a	  positive	  effect.	  They	  found	  that	  inclusion	  of	  
ethnic	   parties	   in	   governing	   coalitions	   favours	   the	   democratisation	   of	   society,	   produces	   better	  
quality	  of	  minority-­‐related	   legislation,	   improves	   the	   feeling	  of	   togetherness	  and	   trust	  between	  
minority	   and	   majority,	   makes	   the	   state	   more	   neutral	   and	   therefore	   more	   legitimate,	   and	  
promotes	  moderation	   in	  majority–minority	   relations	   (Robotin	  &	  Salat,	  2003,	  p.	  168).	  Although	  
their	  focus	  is	  primarily	  on	  conflict	  management,	  Robotin	  and	  Salat’s	  work	  shows	  the	  potential	  of	  
looking	  at	  the	  effects	  of	  minority	  representation	  on	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  
A	   notable	   exception	   to	   the	   prevalent	   focus	   on	   descriptive	   representation	   is	   Sherrill	  
Stroschein’s	  Ethnic	  Struggle,	  Coexistence,	  and	  Democratization	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	   (2012).	   In	  her	  
book,	   Stroschein	   conducts	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   ethnic	   mobilisation	   in	   three	   countries	   with	  
significant	   Hungarian	   minorities	   –	   Slovakia,	   Romania,	   and	   Ukraine.	   She	   traces	   the	   interaction	  
between	   policymaking	   and	   mobilisation	   over	   a	   period	   of	   time	   and	   concludes	   that	   grassroots	  
ethnic	  mobilisation	  and	  protest	  function	  as	  an	  indispensable	  democratising	  mechanism.	  While	  in	  
her	   analysis	   the	   role	   of	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   formal	   representation	   takes	   second	   stage	   to	  
grassroots	  mobilisation,	  the	  insights	  derived	  from	  her	  research	  are	  another	  testimony	  to	  the	  rich	  
possibilities	  offered	  by	  a	  focus	  on	  democratic	  processes	  in	  the	  study	  of	  divided	  democracies.	  
1.4 Beyond	  the	  state	  level	  
Most	  of	   the	   studies	  of	  minority	   representation	   reviewed	  so	   far	   take	   the	   state	  as	   their	   level	  of	  
analysis.	  Minority	  representation,	  however,	  also	  happens	  at	  other	  levels.	  Several	  studies	  on	  CEE	  
minorities	   introduce	   international	   and	   regional	   organisations	   as	   crucial	   in	   the	   definition	   of	  
minority	   policies.	   Besides	   this	   potential	   influence	   from	   above,	   local	   administrations	   offer	   the	  
possibility	  for	  minorities	  to	  influence	  policies	  from	  below.	  Local-­‐level	  minority	  representation	  is	  a	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much	  more	   understudied	   phenomenon,	   but	   it	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	  
where	   the	   Russophone	   minorities	   have	   achieved	   important	   positions	   of	   power	   in	   the	   local	  
governments	  of	  the	  capital	  cities.	  
1.4.1 International	  organisations	  and	  minority	  policies	  
Studies	   of	  minority	   politics	   in	   CEE	   countries	   have	   often	   dealt	   with	   the	   role	   that	   regional	   and	  
international	   organisations	   –	   in	   particular	   the	   European	   Union	   (EU)	   –	   played	   in	   influencing	  
minority	   policies.	   International	   organisations	   and	   the	   pressures	   of	   Europeanisation	   are	   often	  
believed	  to	  have	  had	  a	  central	  role	  in	  influencing	  the	  minority	  policies	  that	  CEE	  countries	  passed	  
after	  the	  end	  of	  their	  communist	  regimes,	  especially	  during	  EU	  accession	  negotiations	  (Gelazis,	  
2003;	  Hoffmeister,	  2004;	  Kelley,	  2004).	  The	  relevance	  of	  international	  pressures,	  however,	  is	  far	  
from	  undisputed.	  	  
Peter	   Van	   Elsuwege,	  while	   recognising	   that	   EU,	  UN,	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	  NATO’s	   pre-­‐
accession	  demands	  did	  result	   in	  some	  amendments	  to	  minority-­‐sensitive	  policies	  (2004,	  p.	  54),	  
stressed	  that	  the	  real	  impact	  of	  EU	  conditionality	  and	  international	  pressures	  is	  still	  controversial	  
(2004,	  p.	  11).	  Authors	  that	   look	  at	  the	  role	  of	   international	  organisations	  critically	  have	  argued	  
that	   international	   pressures	   did	   not	   determine	   real	   changes	   of	  minority	   legislation	   (Hughes	  &	  
Sasse,	   2003),	   and	   have	   highlighted	   that	   formal	   compliance	   with	   international	   demands	   on	  
minority	  issues	  has	  not	  been	  necessarily	  tantamount	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  general	  attitude	  towards	  
minorities	  (Agarin	  &	  Regelmann,	  2012;	  Sasse,	  2008;	  Schulze,	  2010).	  	  
Also	   authors	   that	   stress	   the	   relevance	   of	   accession	   conditionalities	   have	   questioned	  
whether	  international	  pressures	  remain	  important	  after	  EU	  accession.	  Timofey	  Agarin	  and	  Malte	  
Brosig	   highlight	   the	   important	   role	   played	   by	   international	   organisations	   in	   setting	   political	  
standards	  and	  promoting	  norms	  on	  minority	   issues,	  but	  note	  how	  the	   implementation	  of	  such	  
norms	   has	   been	   left	   entirely	   to	   the	   domestic	   politics	   of	   the	   members	   states	   (2009,	   p.	   340).	  
Riedel	  came	  to	  similar	  conclusions	  in	  her	  critical	  assessment	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  ‘promoter	  of	  minority	  
rights’	   (2009).	   Also	   Marju	   Lauristin	   and	   Peeter	   Vihalemm	   suggested	   that	   after	   EU	   accession	  
internal	   political	   actors	   –	   rather	   than	   international	   organisations	   –	   have	   tended	   to	   take	   the	  
leading	  role	  in	  setting	  the	  agenda	  on	  minority	  issues	  (2009,	  p.	  22).	  Even	  authors	  that	  reject	  the	  
usual	   incentive-­‐based	  explanations	  of	  policy	  change	  –	  claiming	  that	  the	   impact	  of	   international	  
organisation	  goes	  beyond	  accession	  conditionalities	   (Sedelmeier,	  2008)	  –	  do	  not	   find	  evidence	  
that	   influence	   ‘beyond	   accession’	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   case	   of	   minority	   policies	   (Epstein	   &	  
Sedelmeier,	  2008).	  Moreover,	  Gabriel	  Toggenburg	  observes	  that	  while	  the	  EU	  has	  become	  more	  
concerned	  with	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  new	  (immigrant)	  minorities,	  it	  has	  increasingly	  seen	  issues	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regarding	   ‘old	   (ethnic)	  minorities’	  as	  pertaining	  entirely	   to	   the	  member	   states	   (2008,	  pp.	  111–
112).	  
Two	   points	   need	   to	   be	   highlighted	   here.	   Firstly,	   in	   the	   reviewed	   literature	   on	   the	  
international	   impact	   on	  minority	   policies	   there	   is	   a	   tendency	   to	   treat	  minorities	   exclusively	   as	  
objects	  of	  policies	  and	  to	  ignore	  their	  potential	  as	  political	  actors.	  An	  illustrative	  example	  of	  this	  
is	   provided	   by	   Judith	   Kelley	   (2004).	   In	   the	   final	   chapter	   of	   her	   book,	   Kelley	   turns	   to	   potential	  
explanations	   of	   policy	   developments	   on	   minority-­‐sensitive	   issues	   other	   than	   international	  
organisations’	   membership	   conditionality.	   Democratic	   maturity,	   duration	   of	   international	  
involvement,	  and	  kin	  state	  political,	  military	  and	  economic	  pressures	  are	  all	  taken	  into	  account	  
and	  rejected	  as	  having	  low	  explanatory	  power.	  Minority	  political	  activism	  (either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
minority	  representation	  or	  of	  minority	  grassroots	  mobilisation)	  does	  not	  even	  feature	  as	  one	  of	  
the	  control	  factors.	  	  
Secondly,	   the	   direct	   impact	   of	   international	   organisations	   on	   policymaking	   is	   widely	  
understood	  as	  fluctuating,	  and	  there	  is	  general	  agreement	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  
before	   and	   after	   accession.18	   This	   would	   point	   to	   domestic	   factors	   as	   the	   most	   important	  
policymaking	  determinants	  at	  least	  in	  the	  post-­‐accession	  period	  (the	  watershed	  year	  for	  Estonia	  
and	   Latvia	   is	   2004,	  when	   they	   became	  members	   of	   both	   the	   EU	   and	  NATO).	   Even	   before	   the	  
accession,	   however,	   the	   significance	   of	   international	   pressure	   for	   policy	   outcomes	   cannot	   be	  
taken	  for	  granted	  and	  can	  hardly	  be	  looked	  at	  as	  disjointed	  from	  domestic	  factors	  and	  dynamics.	  
Moreover,	   a	   distinction	   should	   be	   made	   between	   formal	   and	   substantial	   compliance	   with	  
international	  demands	  (Schulze,	  2010).	  	  
This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   impact	   of	   international	   pressures	   on	   the	   policymaking	  
process	   will	   be	   discounted	   in	   this	   study.	   Most	   studies	   indicate	   that	   the	   interaction	   between	  
international	   pressures	   and	   domestic	   factors	   (that	   is,	   the	   way	   international	   pressures	   were	  
received	  and	  exploited	  by	  domestic	  actors)	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  outcomes	  on	  
minority-­‐related	  policies.	  In	  order	  to	  verify	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  interaction	  empirically	  in	  the	  cases	  
of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  special	  focus	  will	  be	  placed	  in	  Chapter	  4	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  opportunities	  (if	  
any)	  international	  pressures	  provided	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  minorities	  in	  policymaking.	  	  
1.4.2 Local-­‐level	  representation	  and	  minority	  city	  incorporation	  
Although	   there	   has	   been	   a	  measure	   of	   renewed	   academic	   attention	   to	   the	   city	   and	   the	   local	  
dimensions	  of	  politics,	  the	  importance	  of	  local	  government	  in	  CEE	  remains	  largely	  understudied.	  
While	   arguments	   have	   been	   made	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   good	   quality	   of	   local	   governance	   has	  
positive	  effects	  on	  sense	  of	  citizenship,	  participation	  and	  democracy	  (Gaster,	  1999),	  few	  authors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Also	  Kelley	  (2004)	  recognises	  this	  in	  the	  conclusions	  to	  her	  book.	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have	   focused	   their	   attention	   on	   local	   democracy	   in	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe.	   In	   Local	  
Governance	   in	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe,	   Tomila	   Lankina,	   Anneke	   Hudalla	   and	   Hellmut	  
Wollman	   (2008)	   remarked	   that	   ‘local	   government	   matters’	   and	   measured	   its	   performance	   in	  
different	  cities	  of	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  Hungary,	  Poland	  and	  Russia.	  Martin	  Horak	  (2007)	  offers	  an	  
interesting	   example	   of	   a	   study	   on	   the	   city	   (in	   this	   case	   Prague),	   whose	   focus	   goes	   beyond	  
institutional	  changes	  or	  the	  development	  of	  a	  specific	  policy	  (an	  approach	  that	  is	  typical	  of	  CEE	  
local	  government	  literature),	  to	  concentrate	  instead	  on	  the	  development	  of	  local	  democracy,	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	   local	  government	  and	  its	  openness	  to	  societal	   inputs	  and	  preferences.	  Andrew	  
Coulson	   and	   Adrian	   Campbell’s	   edited	   book	   on	   CEE	   local	   democracy	   (2006)	   also	   stressed	   the	  
importance	   of	   local	   government	   for	   post-­‐communist	   countries	   as	   a	   way	   of	   revitalising	  
community	   political	   participation	   and	   cohesion.	   However,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   in	   the	  
chapter	  of	  that	  book	  dedicated	  to	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  (Vanags	  &	  Vilka,	  2006)	  no	  mention	  is	  made	  
of	  majority–minority	  issues.	  
As	   for	   specific	   literature	   on	   ethnic	   minority	   representation	   at	   the	   local	   level,	   various	  
studies	   have	   pointed	   at	   the	   fact	   that	   local	   demographic	   distribution	   of	   ethnic	   groups	   has	   a	  
significant	   impact	   on	   voting	   behaviour	   and	   party	   strategies.	   For	   example,	   Stroschein	   (2011)	  
analysed	   local	  voting	  and	  ethnic	  parties’	   local	  election	  strategies	   in	  Hungary	  and	  Romania.	  She	  
found	   that	   local	   demography	   (that	   is,	   the	   size	   of	   the	   ethnic	  minority	   at	   the	   local	   level)	   is	   an	  
important	  determinant	  of	   local	  voting	  behaviour	  and,	   consequently,	  of	  parties’	   local	   campaign	  
strategy.	  She	  found	  that	  ethnic	  outbidding	  dynamics	  tend	  to	  appear	  only	   in	  cases	   in	  which	  the	  
state	  minority	   is	   the	   local	  majority,	   that	   is,	   when	   unity	   is	   not	   essential	   for	   a	  minority	   to	   gain	  
seats.	  In	  a	  similar	  study,	  Michael	  Pugh	  and	  Margaret	  Cobble	  (2001)	  measured	  the	  share	  of	  non-­‐
nationalist	  vote	  in	  the	  1997	  municipal	  elections	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina.	  They	  identified	  local	  
ethnic	  composition	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  factors	  that	  determine	  the	  preponderance	  of	  nationalist	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   non-­‐nationalist	   vote	   (Pugh	   &	   Cobble,	   2001,	   p.	   35).	   They	   found,	   perhaps	   counter-­‐
intuitively,	   that	   voters	   in	   more	   homogenous	   localities	   are	   the	   most	   predisposed	   to	   vote	   for	  
nationalist	   parties.	   The	   importance	   of	   ethnic	   demography	   for	   electoral	   behaviour	   and	   local	  
minority	   representation	   is	   also	   highlighted	   in	   the	   US	   literature	   on	   the	   topic	   (Engstrom	   &	  
McDonald,	  1982;	  Mundt	  &	  Heilig,	  1982;	  Sass,	  2000;	  Trebbi,	  Aghion,	  &	  Alesina,	  2008).19	  	  
It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   minority	   groups	   that	   are	   excluded	   from	   the	   decision-­‐making	  
process	  at	  the	  state	  level	  can	  more	  easily	  gain	  representation	  at	  the	  municipal	  level	  on	  account	  
of	  their	  demographic	  concentration,	  smaller	  electoral	  districts,	  easier	  electoral	  campaigns,	  and	  a	  
higher	   flexibility	   in	   the	  party	   structure	   (Bird,	  2004,	  p.	  182).	   It	  would	   therefore	  be	  a	  mistake	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  One	  of	  the	  main	  debates	  in	  the	  US	  literature	  on	  this	  theme	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  impact	  of	  electoral	  rules	  on	  minority	  
local	  level	  representation	  (Pomper,	  1966;	  Sass	  &	  Mehay,	  1995).	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overlook	  minority	  representation	  at	  the	  municipal	  level.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  Latvia	  and	  
Estonia,	   where	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minorities	   that	   are	   typically	   unsuccessful	   in	   gaining	  
representation	   in	   state	   government	   successfully	   sought	   access	   to	   local	   executives	   in	  
municipalities	  where	  they	  can	  count	  on	  bigger	  numbers	  and	  favourable	  minority–majority	  voting	  
dynamics.	   Local	   representation	   could,	   therefore,	   function	   as	   compensation	   for	   lack	   of	  
representation	  at	   the	   state	   level.	   This	  might	  be	  particularly	   the	   case	   for	   the	   two	  capital	   cities,	  
Tallinn	  and	  Riga,	  where	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  countries’	  inhabitants	  and	  wealth	  is	  concentrated	  
and	  where	   –	   unlike	   at	   the	   national	   level	   –	   Russophone	   representatives	   have	   gained	   access	   to	  
executive	  power.	  Minority	  representation	  in	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  Chapter	  5.	  
While	  literature	  on	  CEE	  largely	  overlooks	  minority	  politics	  and	  minority	  representation	  at	  
the	  local	  level,20	  there	  is	  extensive	  research	  on	  Black	  city-­‐level	  representation	  and	  Black	  mayors	  
in	   the	   US.	   This	   body	   of	   research	   provides	   useful	   theoretical	   tools	   for	   the	   study	   of	   minority	  
representation	   in	   Tallinn	   and	   Riga.	   The	   US	   literature	   often	   refers	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   political	  
incorporation	   to	   explain	   levels	   of	   minority	   power	   over	   policymaking	   in	   ethnically	   split	   cities	  
(Browning,	   Marshall,	   &	   Tabb,	   1990;	   Marschall	   &	   Ruhil,	   2007;	   Spence	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Political	  
incorporation	   is	   defined	   as	   ‘the	   extent	   to	   which	   [a	   group]	   is	   represented	   in	   a	   coalition	   that	  
dominates	  city	  policy	  making	  on	  issues	  of	  greatest	  concern	  to	  that	  group’	  (Browning	  et	  al.,	  1990,	  
p.	  9).	  Minority	  representatives	  can	  be	  incorporated	  into	  a	  city’s	  dominant	  coalition	  at	  different	  
levels,	  ranging	  from	  total	  exclusion	  to	  total	  control.	  What	   is	  at	  stake	  at	  the	   local	   level	   is	  hardly	  
negligible	   for	   the	   ethnic	   minorities,	   also	   beyond	   policy	   impact.	   For	   example,	   in	   her	   study	   of	  
minority	   presence	   in	   US	   cities’	   municipal	   workforce,	   Stein	   (1986)	   finds	   that	   minority	  
representation	   in	   local	   executives	   influences	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  minorities	   are	   employed	   in	  
local	  administrative	  bodies.	  
However,	   incorporation	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   power,	   not	   least	   because	   the	  
responsiveness	  of	  minority	   representatives	   to	   their	  minority	   constituency	   cannot	  be	   assumed.	  
Only	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	   incorporation	  may	   translate	   into	   substantial	   influence	   over	   policy	  
(Browning	   et	   al.,	   1990).	   Moreover,	   according	   to	   some	   urban	   theory	   scholars,	   political	  
incorporation	   can	   in	   fact	   have	   a	   demobilising	   effect	   on	   the	   ethnic	  minority,	   with	   consequent	  
negative	  effects	  on	  minority	  impact	  on	  policy	  outcomes	  (M.	  P.	  Smith	  &	  Feagin,	  1995).	  Minority	  
representation	   in	   the	   city,	   in	   other	  words,	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   palliative	   for	   the	  minority	   and	   thus	  
reduce	   its	   capacity	   for	   mobilisation	   and	   protest.	   This	   might	   end	   up	   disempowering	   minority	  
voices	   and	   limiting	   their	   impact	  over	  policymaking.	  On	  a	   similar	   note,	   it	   has	   also	  been	  argued	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  A	   notable	   exception	   is	   provided	   by	   Stroschein	   (2012).	   However,	   she	   focuses	   on	   protest	   as	   a	   form	   of	   local(ised)	  
contentious	   politics	   that	   can	   influence	   state	   policies,	   rather	   than	   city-­‐level	   (party)	   politics.	   For	   the	   importance	   of	  
looking	   at	   parties	   at	   the	   local	   level	   see	  Murray	   Low	   (2007),	   who	   argues	   that	   for	   parties	   national	   and	   local	   level	  
electoral	  competitions	  are	  not	  necessarily	  in	  hierarchical	  order	  of	  importance	  but	  are	  often	  horizontal	  to	  each	  other.	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that	  representation	  of	  racial	  minorities	   in	   local	  administrations	   in	  the	  US	  has	  been	  tantamount	  
to	  a	  neo-­‐colonial	   relationship	  and	  has	  not	   corresponded	   to	  a	   real	   sharing	  of	  power	   (Nelson	  &	  
Meranto,	  1977)	  
The	   US	   debate	   on	   political	   incorporation	   is	   highly	   relevant	   for	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   as	   it	  
problematises	   the	   relationship	   between	   a	   minority’s	   institutional	   presence	   in	   city	  
administrations	  and	  its	  actual	  political	  power.	  Once	  we	  problematise	  this	  relationship,	  the	  actual	  
political	   significance	   of	   Estonia’s	   and	   Latvia’s	   Russophone	   minorities’	   representation	   in	   city	  
executives	  cannot	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  but	  must	  be	  carefully	  investigated.	  
1.5 Minority	  representation	  and	  quality	  of	  democracy	  
Three	   main	   points	   can	   be	   made	   about	   the	   literature	   on	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   minority	  
representation	  in	  CEE	  countries.	  Firstly,	  as	  noted	  above,	  this	  literature	  often	  puts	  the	  accent	  on	  
descriptive	  representation,	  as	  it	   is	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  explaining	  minority	  political	  presence	  
(or	  absence)	  rather	  than	  with	   its	  substantive	  effects.	  Secondly,	  when	  references	  to	  substantive	  
representation	   are	  made,	   these	   tend	   to	   be	   based	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   responsiveness,	   with	   its	  
problematic	   implications	   of	   taking	   ethnic	  minorities	   as	   homogenous	   groups	  with	   fixed,	   innate	  
interests	  –	  what	  Brubaker	  called	  ‘groupism’	  (2004).	  While	  the	  studies	  of	  minority	  identity	  in	  CEE	  
have	   espoused	   a	   non-­‐essentialist	   understanding	   of	   identity	   and	   groups,	   the	   study	   of	  minority	  
political	   representation	   in	   the	   area	   still	   seems	   to	   be	   grounded	   on	   underlying	   ‘groupist’	  
assumptions	   about	   minorities.	   Insights	   from	   the	   US	   debate	   and	   from	   the	   theoretical	   debate	  
about	  the	  meanings	  of	  representation	  (also	  in	  feminist	  literature)	  can	  help	  to	  devise	  a	  research	  
approach	  that	  overcomes	  these	  limitations.	  	  
Thirdly,	  when	  the	  effects	  of	  minority	  political	  presence	  are	  indeed	  taken	  into	  account,	  the	  
focus	  of	  the	  analysis	  tends	  to	  be	  on	  issues	  of	  democratic	  stability	  and	  inter-­‐ethnic	  conflict.	  It	  is	  of	  
course	  crucial	  to	  understand	  the	  consequences	  of	  ethnic	  party	  success	  (or	   lack	  thereof)	  on	  the	  
probability	  of	  inter-­‐ethnic	  conflict.	  The	  predominant	  focus	  on	  conflict	  management	  and	  conflict	  
prevention,	   however,	   risks	   hiding	   part	   of	   the	   picture	   in	   countries	   such	   as	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	  
where	  the	  probability	  for	  conflict	  is	  arguably	  low.	  In	  such	  countries	  absence	  of	  conflict	  cannot	  be	  
taken	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  open	  and	  inclusive	  democratic	  process.	  Indeed,	  the	  
argument	  advanced	  by	  those	  who	  see	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  as	  examples	  of	  ethnic	  democracies	  (e.g.	  
Pettai	  &	  Hallik,	  2002;	  Smooha	  &	  Järve,	  2005)	  is	  exactly	  that	  democracies	  can	  be	  exclusive	  while	  
also	  being	  characterised	  by	  stability	  and	  absence	  of	  conflict.	  	  
Especially	   in	  CEE-­‐focused	   literature,	   the	   study	  of	   ethnically	   divided	  democracies	  has	  put	  
most	  of	   its	  emphasis	  on	   the	   ‘ethnically	  divided’	  aspect	  of	   the	   issue.	  My	  study	   is	  an	  attempt	  at	  
balancing	  this	  by	  directing	  the	  focus	  to	  the	  ‘democracy’	  aspect	  of	  ethnically	  divided	  democracies.	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In	   order	   to	   do	   this,	   I	   embed	   questions	   of	   minority	   representation	   into	   broader	   questions	   of	  
quality	  of	  democracy.	   The	   focus	   is	  not	  on	  whether	  minority	   representation	   is	   good	  or	  bad	   for	  
democratic	   stability	  and	   inter-­‐ethnic	  peace.	  Rather,	   I	   take	   inclusiveness	  as	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  
the	  democratic	  ideal	  and	  then	  assess	  the	  existing	  structures	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  that	  exist	  
in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  against	  this	  normative	  principle.	  
It	   is	   implicit	   here	   that	   my	   normative	   understanding	   of	   democracy	   follows	   Lijphart’s	  
consensus	  model,	  which	   is	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   that	   all	   those	  who	   are	   affected	   by	   a	   policy	  
should	  take	  part	  in	  making	  it,	  either	  directly	  or	  through	  representatives	  (1999,	  p.	  31).	  This	  model	  
of	   democracy	   is	   particularly	   suited	   to	   ‘plural	   societies’,	   where	   majoritarian	   rule	   would	  
persistently	  exclude	  minorities	  from	  power	  (Lijphart,	  1999,	  p.	  32).	   It	  must	  be	  specified	  that	  the	  
reference	  to	  the	  consensus	  model	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  my	  understanding	  of	  democracy	  is	  not	  centred	  
on	   the	   set	   of	   institutional	   arrangements	   proposed	   by	   Lijphart	   but,	   rather,	   on	   consensus	   as	   a	  
‘vision’	   of	   democracy.21	   Another	   formulation	   of	   this	   same	   vision	   was	   provided	   by	   Iris	  Marion	  
Young,	   who	   claims	   that	   ‘the	   normative	   legitimacy	   of	   a	   democratic	   decision	   depends	   on	   the	  
degree	  to	  which	  those	  affected	  by	   it	  have	  been	   included	   in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  
have	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  influence	  the	  outcomes’	  (Young,	  2000,	  pp.	  5–6).	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  
principle	  of	  inclusiveness	  is	  advanced	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  a	  quality	  democratic	  process.22	  
And	   in	   both	   cases	   the	   focus	   is	   implicitly	   on	   the	   process	   of	   making	   decisions	   and	   on	   who	   is	  
included	   or	   excluded	   from	   it.	  My	   understanding	   of	   quality	   of	   democracy	   in	   ethnically	   divided	  
countries	  follows	  this	  same	  vision.	  
Quality	  of	  democracy	  has	  been	  defined	  as	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  a	  country	   ‘approximates	  
perfect	   democracy’	   (Lijphart,	   1999),	   as	   ‘the	   extent	   to	  which	   any	   given	   polyarchy	   actualizes	   its	  
potential	  as	  a	  political	  regime’	  (Altman	  &	  Pérez-­‐Liñán,	  2002,	  p.	  86),	  or,	  similarly,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  
how	  well	  a	  democracy	  fulfils	  its	  ideal	  goals	  of	  political	  and	  civil	  freedom,	  popular	  sovereignty	  and	  
political	  equality	   (Diamond	  &	  Morlino,	  2005,	  pp.	  x–xi).	  Although	  different	  measures	  have	  been	  
used	   to	   assess	   a	   country’s	   democratic	   quality,	   these	   are	   all	   usually	   based	   on	   the	   distance	  
between	  the	  existing	  democratic	  practices	  and	  what	  democracy	  should	  be.23	  	  
Strictly	  procedural	   approaches	   to	   the	   study	  of	  quality	  of	  democracy	  are	  unsuited	   to	   the	  
assessment	   of	   democratic	   practices	   in	   plural	   societies,	   as	   strictly-­‐speaking	   democratic	  
procedures	   can	   be	   in	   place	   even	   when	   portions	   of	   society	   remain	   excluded.24	   Indeed,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Lijphart	  refers	  to	  his	  two	  models	  as	  ‘two	  visions’	  of	  democracy	  (Lijphart,	  1999,	  p.	  306).	  
22	   Rueschemeyer	   calls	   this	   the	   ‘reasonable	   principle’	   that	   people	   affected	   by	   a	   decision	   should	   have	   a	   say	   in	   its	  
formulation	  (2004,	  p.	  78).	  
23	  According	  to	  Sartori,	  ‘What	  democracy	  is	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  what	  democracy	  should	  be	  [...]	  in	  a	  democracy	  
the	  tension	  between	  facts	  and	  values	  reaches	  the	  highest	  point’	  (1973,	  p.	  4).	  
24	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  that	  criticises	  procedural	  approaches	  on	  these	  grounds	  see	  Gerardo	  Munck	  (2012,	  pp.	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majoritarian	   principle	   of	   democracy	   means	   that	   even	   the	   total	   exclusion	   of	   a	   minority	   from	  
political	  life	  would	  not	  be	  detected	  by	  strictly	  procedural	  assessments	  of	  quality	  of	  democracy.	  In	  
Luigi	  Ferrajoli’s	  words,	  ‘[e]ven	  a	  system	  in	  which	  the	  majority	  decides	  to	  do	  away	  with	  a	  minority	  
can,	  according	  to	  such	  a	  criterion,	  be	  considered	  “democratic”’	  (2011,	  p.	  356).	  The	  existence	  of	  
formal	   democratic	   structures	   (such	   as	   free	   and	   fair	   elections	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law),	   therefore,	  
does	  not	  guarantee	   that	  processes	  are	  democratic	   in	  cases	   in	  which	  other	   inequalities	  are	  not	  
addressed	  (Rueschemeyer,	  2004,	  p.	  77).	  	  
Scholars	   concerned	   with	   how	   democracies	   fare	   with	   regard	   to	   minorities	   and	  
disadvantaged	  groups	  have	  typically	  rejected	  procedural	  definitions	  to	  concentrate	  on	  issues	  of	  
exclusion	  from	  the	  ‘political	  community’	  and	  from	  ‘substantial	  citizenship’	  (Phillips,	  1993,	  p.	  2).	  
Two	  key	  democratic	  principles	  have	  been	  used	   to	  discuss	  quality	  of	  democracy	  with	   regard	   to	  
minority	  or	  otherwise	  disadvantaged	  groups:	   the	  principle	  of	   inclusion	   (Caraway,	  2004;	  Young,	  
2000)	   and	   that	   of	   (political)	   equality	   (Phillips,	   1993).25	   These	   two	  principles	   point	   to	   the	   same	  
expectation	   that,	   in	   a	   democracy,	   gender,	   race,	   ethnicity,	   socio-­‐economic	   status	   and	   other	  
societal	   differences	  must	   not	   negatively	   affect	   individuals’	   or	   groups’	   political	   citizenship	   and	  
their	  capacity	  to	  effectively	  exercise	  it.26	  This	  expectation	  is	  implied	  in	  definitions	  of	  democracy	  
that	   emphasise	  universal	   and	  equal	   access	   to	  power	   and	  decision-­‐making	   (Wissenburg,	   2013),	  
and	   in	   definitions	   that	   see	   democracy	   as	   a	   system	   that	   ‘entails	   the	   (boundedly)	   universalistic	  
attribution	  of	  agency’	  (O’Donnell,	  Vargas	  Cullel,	  &	  Iazzetta,	  2004,	  p.	  24).	  	  
While	  inclusiveness	  is	  not	  the	  only	  dimension	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  democratic	  quality,	  it	  
is	   certainly	   one	   of	   democracy’s	   fundamental	   qualities.27	   Especially	   in	   ethnically	   divided	  
democracies,	   ‘genuinely	   universal	   citizenship’	   –	   that	   is,	   the	   inclusion	   of	   all	   citizens	   in	   the	  
democratic	   process	   –	   is	   central	   to	   a	   quality	   democracy	   (Young,	   1989,	   p.	   273).	   If	   we	   accept	  
inclusiveness	  as	  a	  core	  democratic	  principle,	  democracies	  ‘do	  not	  live	  up	  to	  their	  promise’	  when	  
political	   exclusion	   takes	   place	   (Young,	   2000,	   p.	   13).	   Therefore,	   although	   it	   is	   not	   the	   only	  
dimensions	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   asses	   quality	   of	   democracy	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,28	  
inclusiveness	  cannot	  be	  neglected	  if	  we	  want	  to	  portray	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  how	  democracy	  
works	  in	  these	  countries.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28–29).	  
25	   In	   their	  discussion	  of	  quality	  of	  democracy,	  Diamond	  and	  Morlino	  do	  not	  pay	  specific	  attention	   to	  minorities	  and	  
other	  disadvantaged	  groups,	  but	   still	   list	   some	   related	  principles	   for	   the	  evaluation	  of	  democratic	  quality,	   such	  as	  
participation,	  political	  equality,	  and	  equal	  worth	  (2005,	  pp.	  ix–xl).	  
26	   For	   a	   critique	   of	   democracy	   and	   democratisation	   studies	   that	   use	   limited	   conceptualisations	   of	   inclusion	   (to	   the	  
exclusion	  of	  issues	  of	  gender,	  race	  and	  ethnicity)	  see	  Caraway	  (2004).	  
27	  According	  to	  Diamond	  and	  Morlino,	  we	  should	  speak	  of	  interacting	  and	  mutually-­‐reinforcing	  ‘qualities’	  rather	  than	  
of	  a	  general	  quality	  of	  democracy	  (2005,	  p.	  xxxi).	  
28	  For	  instance,	  a	  recent	  study	  of	  quality	  of	  democracy	  in	  CEE	  countries	  took	  citizens’	  influence	  over	  rulers	  as	  the	  main	  
principle	  of	  democracy	  and	  looked	  at	  issues	  of	  accountability,	  responsiveness	  and	  satisfaction	  (Roberts,	  2010).	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The	  inclusiveness	  (and	  thus	  the	  quality)	  of	  a	  democracy	  can	  best	  be	  assessed	  by	  looking	  at	  
the	  process	  of	  making	  decisions	  and	  looking	  at	  who	  is	  included	  in	  this	  process	  and	  how.	  This	  is	  by	  
far	   not	   the	   only	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	   quality	   of	   democracy.	   Quality	   has	   be	   understood	  
alternatively	   as	   effective	   governance	   or	   as	   democraticness	   (Plattner,	   2004,	   p.	   109):	   the	   first	  
approach	   implies	   a	   focus	   on	   outcome,	   the	   second	   on	   process.29	   According	   to	   some	   authors,	  
democracies	   should	   be	   evaluated	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   outcomes,	   because	   –	   irrespective	   of	   who	  
takes	  the	  decisions	  and	  how	  –	  the	  purpose	  of	  democracy	  should	  be	  taking	  ‘good’	  decisions	  that	  
satisfy	  the	  citizenry	  (Ferrajoli,	  2011;	  Ringen,	  2011).	  The	  main	  problem	  with	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  
it	  falls	  into	  the	  same	  conceptual	  flaw	  as	  studies	  of	  responsiveness.	  That	  is,	  it	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  
such	   a	   thing	   as	   an	   ‘optimal’	   policy	   and	   it	   is	   democracy’s	   task	   to	   actualise	   it.	   This	   cancels	  
disagreement	   out	   of	   democracy,	   and	   disregards	   the	   fact	   that	   disagreement	   about	   goals	   and	  
policies	   is	   central	   to	   democracy	   itself.	   In	   Andrew	   Sabl’s	   words,	   ‘[t]he	   whole	   point	   of	   many	  
(perhaps	   all)	   of	   our	   democratic	   institutions	   is	   to	   arrive	   at	   conditionally	   legitimate	   decisions	   in	  
spite	  of	   such	  disagreement’	   (2011,	  p.	  19).	  That	   is	  why	   in	  evaluating	  a	  democracy’s	  quality,	  we	  
must	   focus	   on	   the	   democraticness	   of	   the	   democratic	   process,	   rather	   than	   on	   a	   supposedly	  
optimal	  policy	  outcome:	  democracy	   is	  not	  about	  what	  decisions	  are	  made	  but	  about	  how	  they	  
are	  made	  (Munck,	  2012,	  p.	  22).	  If	  democracy	  is	  ‘a	  set	  of	  procedures	  for	  determining	  the	  content	  
of	  public	  policy’	  (Munck,	  2012,	  p.	  35)	  and	  we	  assume	  that	  policies	  are	  going	  to	  be	  contested	  (and	  
they	  are	  even	  more	   likely	   to	  be	   so	   in	  ethnically	  divided	   societies),30	   it	   is	   fundamental	   that	   the	  
process	  to	  make	  decisions	  is	  inclusive.	  
One	   final	   point	   about	   inclusiveness	   should	   be	   made:	   as	   a	   dimension	   of	   quality	   of	  
democracy	   it	   does	   not	   pertain	   only	   to	   new	   democracies	   or	   to	   democratising	   countries.	   It	   has	  
been	  argued	  that	  issues	  of	  access	  to	  power	  should	  be	  studied	  within	  the	  field	  of	  democratisation	  
rather	   than	  quality	   of	   democracy,	   as	   the	   latter	   should	   concentrate	   on	   issues	   of	   how	  power	   is	  
exercised	  (Mazzuca,	  2010).	  However,	  by	  portraying	  unequal	  access	  to	  power	  as	  a	  problem	  that	  
can	  exist	  only	  in	  the	  period	  of	  a	  country’s	  democratic	  transition,	  this	  approach	  unduly	  excludes	  
established	   democracies	   from	   analyses	   based	   on	   this	   metric.	   Moreover,	   this	   approach	   risks	  
running	  into	  the	  ‘definitional	  fallacy’	  –	  sometimes	  encountered	  in	  studies	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  new	  
democracies	  –	  of	   regarding	  a	  certain	  practice	  as	  democratic	  because	   it	  exists	  also	   in	  countries	  
that	   are	   commonly	   regarded	   as	   established	   democracies	   (Munck,	   2012,	   p.	   13).31	   While	   the	  
democratic	  principle	  of	   inclusiveness	   is	  here	  applied	  to	  ethnically	  divided,	  CEE	  democracies,	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	   Morlino’s	   distinction	   between	   quality	   as	   procedure,	   as	   content	   or	   as	   result	   (2004,	   p.	   6)	   partially	   captures	   this	  
distinction.	  
30	   According	   to	   Sabl,	   ‘the	   test	   of	   a	   good	   democracy	   is	   its	   ability	   to	   function	   amidst	   disagreement	   on	   substantive	  
criteria’	  (2011,	  p.	  22).	  
31	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  fallacy,	  see	  Roberts	  (2010,	  p.	  35).	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reach	  is	  much	  wider.	   Inclusive	  democratic	  processes	  (and	  the	  equal	  access	  to	  power	  and	  equal	  
worth	  they	  imply)	  are	  a	  measure	  of	  democratic	  quality	  in	  all	  existing	  democracies,	  both	  new	  and	  
long-­‐established,	  and	  with	  reference	  not	  only	  to	  ethnic	  minorities	  but	  also	  to	  other	  potentially	  
disempowered	  groups	  such	  as	  for	  example	  women,	  the	  poor,	  racial	  minorities,	  sexual	  minorities	  
and	  migrants.	  
1.6 Methodology	  
My	  approach	   to	   the	   study	  of	  divided	  democracies	   is	   focused	  on	  assessing	   the	   inclusiveness	  of	  
the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  democracies,	  that	  is,	  on	  how	  the	  power	  to	  make	  decisions	  that	  concern	  
the	  minority	  is	  distributed.	  The	  question	  is,	  then,	  how	  do	  we	  go	  about	  studying	  inclusiveness?	  As	  
discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   above,	   the	   notion	   of	   inclusiveness	   goes	   beyond	   mere	   numerical	  
presence	  of	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  in	  political	  institutions	  (descriptive	  representation),	  as	  this	  
does	   not	   automatically	   guarantee	   either	   influence	   or	   empowerment.	   Responsiveness	   is	   also	  
unsuited	   as	   a	   main	   line	   of	   investigation,	   even	   if	   intended	   widely	   as	   the	   proximity	   of	   actual	  
policies	   to	  minority	   preferences.	   Indeed,	   this	  would	   lead	   to	   an	  essentialist	   conceptual	   flaw,	   in	  
which	  the	  scholar	  must	  assume	  certain	  interests	  and	  needs	  as	  innate	  (and	  possibly	  immutable)	  
for	  the	  minority.	  Democratic	  inclusiveness	  can	  be	  best	  assessed	  by	  looking	  at	  how	  decisions	  are	  
made	  on	  policies	   that	   concern	   the	  minority.	   That	   is,	   the	   focus	  of	   the	   analysis	  must	   be	  on	   the	  
process	  of	  making	  decisions,	  rather	  than	  only	  on	  their	  content.	  
This	   study	   is	   based	   on	   the	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   a	   number	   of	   policymaking	   processes	   in	  
Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   Policymaking,	   as	   a	   process,	   is	   often	   seen	   as	   being	   composed	   of	   different	  
stages,	  running	  from	  agenda-­‐setting	  to	  implementation	  (May	  &	  Wildavsky,	  1978).	  This	  stage-­‐by-­‐
stage	  understanding	  of	  policymaking	  can	  of	  course	  be	  reductive,	  as	  it	  assumes	  the	  linearity	  of	  a	  
process	  that	  is	  often	  very	  complex	  (Barrett	  &	  Hill,	  1984;	  John,	  2012,	  pp.	  17–28).	  For	  reasons	  of	  
analytical	  expediency,	  in	  retracing	  the	  policymaking	  process	  for	  this	  study,	  agenda-­‐setting,	  policy	  
formulation	  and	  implementation	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  three	  different	  moments	  of	  policymaking,	  
and	   –	   consequently	   –	   as	   three	   distinct	   points	   of	   decision	   in	   which	   the	   minority’s	   level	   of	  
influence	  can	  be	  assessed.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  the	  process	  must	  be	  intended	  as	  
linear:	  policy	  problems	  and	  policy	  options	  on	  the	  one	  side	  and	  policy	  outcomes	  on	  the	  other	  are	  
not	  defined	  once	  and	  for	  all	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  policy	  process.	  They	  are	  both	  
constantly	   redefined	   through	   policy	   feedback,	   political	   negotiations	   and	   contentious	   politics.	  
This	  opens	   the	  possibility	   for	  multiple	   channels	   for	  minority	   voices	   to	  access	   the	  policymaking	  
process	  and	  potentially	  influence	  its	  outcome.	  	  
My	  study	  will	  be	  based	  on	  the	  comparison	  of	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  policymaking	  processes	  
on	  selected	  policy-­‐cases	   that	  concern	   the	  minority	  directly.	  The	  comparison	   is	  organised	  along	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five	  different	  potential	  channels	  for	  minority	  access	  to	  the	  policymaking	  process:	  parliamentary	  
representation,	   recourse	   to	   international	   institutions,	   city-­‐level	   incorporation,	   institutionalised	  
consultation	  mechanisms,	  and	  grassroots	  mobilisation.	  These	  five	  channels	  will	  be	  the	  topics	  of	  
five	   empirical	   chapters	   (Chapter	   3	   through	   7).	   Given	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   five	   channels,	   the	  
comparison	   spans	   across	   different	   levels	   of	   government.	   This	   means	   that	   decision-­‐making	  
processes	  that	  took	  place	  at	  state	  level	  are	  also	  compared	  with	  those	  at	  city	  level,	  to	  assess	  the	  
chances	  for	  inclusion	  they	  afforded	  to	  the	  Russophone	  minorities.32	  My	  analysis	  uses	  the	  lenses	  
of	   the	   five	   channels	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   the	   role	   and	   modalities	   of	   Russian-­‐speaking	   voices’	  
presence	   in	   policymaking	   and	   –	   more	   in	   general	   –	   their	   role	   in	   the	   democratic	   processes	   of	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  	  
The	   focus	  of	   this	   research	   is	  specifically	  on	  policies	   that	  are	  particularly	  sensitive	   for	   the	  
minority.	  This	  choice	  is	  not	  dictated	  by	  the	  expectation	  that	  underrepresentation	  and	  exclusion	  
concern	  only	  minority	  issues.	  If	  a	  minority	  is	  politically	  excluded	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  it	  
would	  be	   so	  also	  with	   regard	   to	  non-­‐minority	  policies,	   such	  as	   for	  example	  economic	  policies.	  
However,	   it	   is	   also	   reasonable	   to	   expect	   that	  minority	   actors	   have	   stronger,	  minority-­‐specific	  
concerns	  with	   regard	   to	  policies	   about	   language,	   education,	   and	   citizenship.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	  
that	   minority	   members	   have	   only	   minority-­‐specific	   concerns.	   Gender,	   class,	   and	   place	   of	  
residence	  are	  only	  some	  of	   the	  major	   lines	  of	   in-­‐group	  differentiation	  that	  determine	  minority	  
members’	   political	   concerns	   and	   priorities.	   This	   also	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   all	   members	   of	   the	  
minority	  hold	  the	  same	  opinion	  on	  minority-­‐sensitive	  issues,	  but	  simply	  that	  all	  of	  them	  will	  be	  
affected	  by	  minority-­‐sensitive	  legislation.	  The	  principle	  of	  inclusiveness	  as	  expressed	  by	  Lijphart	  
and	   Young	   places	   the	   stress	   on	   participation	   in	  making	   decisions	   that	   affect	   a	   group	   directly.	  
While	  other	  policies	  might	  affect	  different	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  differently,	  minority-­‐specific	  
policies	   are	   bound	   to	   affect	   the	   minority	   qua	   minority.	   While	   exclusion	   from	   other,	   non-­‐
minority-­‐specific	   policy	  processes	   is	   also	   relevant	   (but	  potentially	  more	  difficult	   to	   study),	   it	   is	  
particularly	   important	   to	   assess	   to	   what	   extent	   minorities	   have	   access	   to	   the	   policymaking	  
process	  with	  regard	  to	  policies	  that	  are	  explicitly	  directed	  at	  them.	  
My	   study	   is	   guided	   by	   the	   method	   of	   process	   tracing,	   which	   Alexander	   George	   and	  
Timothy	  McKeown	   define	   as	   the	   study	   of	   the	   ‘process	   by	  which	   various	   initial	   conditions	   are	  
translated	   into	  outcomes’	   (George	  &	  McKeown,	  1985,	  p.	  35).	  Collier	  defines	  process	  tracing	  as	  
‘an	   analytic	   tool	   for	   drawing	   descriptive	   and	   causal	   inferences	   from	   diagnostic	   pieces	   of	  
evidence’	   (2011,	   p.	   824).	   Process	   tracing	   is	   a	   flexible,	   qualitative	   method	   that	   allows	   us	   to	  
identify	   and	   systematically	   describe	   political	   and	   social	   phenomena,	   test	   and	   formulate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  comparability	  of	  local	  and	  national	  levels,	  see	  Horak	  (2007).	  
44	  
	  
hypotheses,	   explore	   causal	   mechanisms,	   and	   provide	   a	   valid	   alternative	   to	   conventional	  
statistical	   analysis	   for	   the	   study	  of	   complex	  phenomena	   involving	   reciprocal	   causation	   (Collier,	  
2011,	  p.	  824).33	  Cognate	  qualitative	  methods	  have	  also	  been	  called	  systematic	  process	  analysis	  
(Hall,	   2008)	   and	   causal-­‐process	   observations	   (Collier,	   Brady,	   &	   Seawright,	   2010).	   These	   are	  
different	   labels	   for	   roughly	   the	   same	   method	   (Collier,	   2011,	   p.	   823),	   which	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
intensive	  description	  of	  events	  that	  unfolded	  over	  time	  (for	  this	  study	  the	  policymaking	  process),	  
aimed	  at	  uncovering	  causal	  relationships.	  While	  the	  existing	  hypotheses	  and	  debates	  on	  minority	  
representation	   and	   ethnically	   divided	   democracies	   will	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   the	   analysis,	  
process	  tracing	  is	  an	  open-­‐ended	  method	  that	  leaves	  room	  for	  new	  hypotheses	  to	  emerge	  from	  
the	  analysis	  (Steinberg,	  2007,	  p.	  199).34	  
The	  method	  of	  process	  tracing	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sources	  in	  
order	   to	   construct	   detailed	   narratives	   and	   uncover	   the	   causal	   relations	   behind	   them	   (Collier,	  
2011,	   p.	   828).	   Following	   Van	   Cott’s	   application	   of	   this	   method,	   my	   analysis	   will	   be	   arranged	  
around	  ‘analytically	  organised	  narratives’	  (2005,	  p.	  21)	  of	  specific	  policy	  cases.	  For	  the	  first	  four	  
channels	   for	   minority	   access	   to	   policymaking,	   one	   policy	   has	   been	   selected	   that	   adequately	  
illustrates	  issues	  of	  minority	  presence	  and	  minority	  empowerment	  within	  that	  channel.	  Although	  
one	  specific	  policy	  case	  is	  used	  as	  illustration,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  observations	  derived	  
from	   the	   analysis	   pertain	   to	   that	   policy	   only.	   The	   general	   patterns	   of	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	  
observed	  for	  the	  selected	  policy-­‐case	  can	  be	  generalised	  to	  the	  other	  minority-­‐sensitive	  policies.	  
As	   for	   the	   last	   analytical	   chapter	   on	   grassroots	  mobilisation,	   this	   is	   a	   partial	   exception	   to	   this	  
structure.	   As	   there	   are	  multiple	  ways	   in	  which	  mobilisation	   can	   take	   place	   (from	   advocacy	   to	  
protest),	  this	  chapter	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  a	  single	  policy	  case	  but	  makes	  reference	  to	  a	  number	  of	  
different	   cases	   of	  mobilisation	   on	   several	  minority-­‐sensitive	   policies,	   including	   those	   analysed	  
with	  regard	  to	  other	  channels.	  
The	  construction	  of	  these	  in-­‐depth,	  analytically	  organised	  narratives	  is	  based	  on	  multiple	  
primary	  and	  secondary	  sources.	  The	  multiplicity	  of	  sources	  is	  intended	  to	  maximise	  validity	  and	  
avoid	  the	  potential	  bias	  that	  would	  result	  from	  overly	  relying	  on	  one	  of	  these	  sources	  only.	  The	  
sources	  include:	  minutes	  of	  parliamentary	  sessions	  and	  local	  council	  meetings;	  local	  media	  news	  
articles	   in	   both	   Russian	   and	   the	   state	   languages;	   semi-­‐structured	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	   with	  
representatives,	  civil	  servants,	  activists	  and	  experts	  who	  took	  part	   in	  the	  policymaking	  process;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	   On	   process	   tracing	   see	   also	   James	   Mahoney’s	   (2005,	   pp.	   17–20)	   discussion	   of	   qualitative	   methodologies	   in	  
comparative	  studies.	  	  
34	  Paul	  Steinberg	  discusses	  process	  tracing	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  causality	  in	  small-­‐N	  studies	  and	  points	  out	  that	  the	  ability	  
of	   process	   tracing	   to	   ‘produce	   rich	   causal	   narratives’	   is	   also	   associated	  with	   the	   risk	   of	   ‘indiscriminate	   pluralism’	  
(2007,	  p.	  193).	  However,	  far	  from	  discounting	  the	  method,	  Steinberg	  suggests	  strategies	  to	  manage	  the	  information	  
richness	  and	  complexity	  of	  process-­‐tracing	  studies.	  As	  he	  put	   it:	   ‘it	   is	  better	  to	  reveal	  complexity	  and	  to	  manage	  it	  
than	  to	  not	  engage	  complexity	  at	  all’	  (2007,	  p.	  198).	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reports	   by	   independent	   civil	   society	   organisations;	   documents	   produced	   by	   political	   parties	  
(party	  programmes	  and	  manifestoes,	  press	  releases,	  newsletters);	  and	  academic	  resources.35	  
I	  first	  conducted	  background	  research	  on	  existing	  academic	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  
suitable	  policy-­‐cases.	  Then,	  I	  conducted	  in-­‐depth	  studies	  of	  the	  primary	  sources	  related	  to	  those	  
policy-­‐cases	  (debate	  minutes	  and	  news	  items),	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  a	  preliminary	  narrative	  of	  how	  
the	  policymaking	  process	  had	  evolved.	  Finally,	  I	  conducted	  in-­‐depth,	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  
with	   policymakers,	   experts	   and	   civil	   society	   activists	   that	   had	   been	   directly	   involved	   in	   the	  
policymaking	  process.	  These	  interviews	  informed	  my	  analysis	   in	  at	  least	  four	  ways.	  Firstly,	  they	  
provided	   data	   in	   the	   form	   of	   insider	   information	   on	   the	   policymaking	   process,	   which	   I	   then	  
proceeded	   to	   verify	   with	   other	   sources.	   Secondly,	   they	   revealed	   discursive	   attitudes	   and	  
expectations	   about	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   and	   the	   minority’s	   role	   in	   it.	   Thirdly,	   they	  
helped	  me	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   data	   collected	   through	   other	   sources,	   disproving	   or	   reinforcing	  
original	   interpretations,	   and	   adding	   new	   dimensions	   to	   the	   analysis.	   Finally,	   they	   gave	   me	   a	  
clearer	  sense	  of	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  different	  factors	  and	  of	  their	  interactions	  in	  the	  reality	  of	  day-­‐
to-­‐day	   policymaking.	   While	   they	   did	   not	   serve	   as	   the	   primary	   source	   for	   policymaking	   facts,	  
these	   elite	   interviews	   helped	   me	   construct	   rich	   and	   detailed	   narratives	   of	   the	   policymaking	  
process	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   and	   suggested	   ways	   of	   analysing	   and	   inferring	   from	   these	  
narratives.36	  
1.7 Some	  key	  terms	  
A	  number	  of	  terms	  are	  used	  throughout	  this	  thesis	   in	  order	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  minorities’	  political	  
role	   in	   the	   democratic	   process.	   Namely,	   representation,	   presence,	   voice,	   influence	   and	  
empowerment.	  Given	  the	  contested	  nature	  of	  most	  of	  the	  vocabulary	   in	  this	   field,	   I	  will	  briefly	  
explain	  how	  these	  terms	  are	  used	  in	  this	  study.	  
Representation	   will	   be	   used	   mainly	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   descriptive	   aspect	   of	   political	  
representation,	   that	   is,	   the	  presence	  of	  members	  of	   the	  minority	   in	   state	   institutions	   (such	  as	  
the	  parliament	  and	  the	  government)	  and	  local	  institutions	  (city	  councils	  and	  city	  governments).	  
Intended	  this	  way,	  representation	  is	  a	  form	  of	  minority	  political	  presence	  that	  pertains	  strictly	  to	  
positions	  in	  formal	  representative	  institutions.	  Minority	  (political)	  presence,	  instead,	  indicates	  all	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  minority	  voices	  are	  represented	  (in	  the	  wider	  sense	  of	  ‘made	  present’)	  in	  the	  
political	  arena,	  including	  civil	  society	  activism	  and	  grassroots	  mobilisation.	  Minority	  presence	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  A	  similar	  set	  of	  data	  was	  used	  by	  Van	  Cott	  (2005)	  in	  her	  study	  of	  ethnic	  parties	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
36	  Goldstein	  identifies	  three	  goals	  of	  elite	  interviewing:	  ‘(1)	  gathering	  information	  from	  a	  sample	  of	  officials	  in	  order	  to	  
make	  generalisable	  claims	  about	  all	   such	  officials’	  characteristics	  or	  decisions;	   (2)	  discovering	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	  
information	  or	  getting	  hold	  of	  a	  particular	  document;	  (3)	  informing	  or	  guiding	  work	  that	  uses	  other	  sources	  of	  data’	  
(2002,	  p.	  669).	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be	  actualised	  through	  multiple	  channels,	  which	  include	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  representation	  in	  
formal	  institutions.	  Minority	  voices	  are	  the	  different	  possible	  expressions	  of	  such	  presence.	  Since	  
the	  minority	  is	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  a	  monolith	  with	  pre-­‐determined	  needs	  and	  interests,	  multiple	  
(and	   at	   time	   conflicting)	   voices	   can	   emerge.	   Different	  minority	   voices	   can	   access	   the	   political	  
debate	  through	  the	  different	  channels	  available	  to	  them	  and	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  success.	  	  
The	   effectiveness	   of	   minority	   presence	   will	   be	   referred	   to	   in	   terms	   of	   influence	   and	  
empowerment.	   When	   meant	   as	   the	   impact	   on	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   specific	   policy	   process,	  
effectiveness	   will	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   (policy)	   influence.	   Minority	   voices	   can	   influence	   the	  
policymaking	   process	   in	   different	   ways,	   from	   pushing	   issues	   into	   the	   political	   agenda,	   to	  
influencing	   the	   debate	   around	   certain	   issues,	   to	   shaping	   the	   policy	   outcome	   through	  
participation	   in	   decision-­‐making.	   However,	   the	   impact	   of	   minority	   presence	   on	   a	   country’s	  
democratic	  politics	  cannot	  be	  measured	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  substantive	  effects	  on	  specific	  policies.	  
The	  question	  of	  democratic	  inclusiveness	  is	  also	  a	  question	  of	  how	  power	  (not	  least	  the	  power	  to	  
make	  policies)	  is	  distributed	  in	  society	  (Patnaik,	  2013,	  pp.	  34–35).	  While	  empowerment	  has	  been	  
defined	   as	   ‘participation	   of	   an	   agent	   in	   decision-­‐making	   through	   an	   effective	   voice	   and	   vote’	  
(Young,	  1990,	  p.	  251),	  the	  empowerment	  of	  a	  marginalised	  group	  also	  (and	  crucially)	   implies	  a	  
challenge	  to	  the	  existing	  distribution	  of	  power	  (Patnaik,	  2013,	  p.	  35).	  In	  the	  same	  way	  as	  it	  does	  
not	  automatically	  guarantee	  policy	  influence,	  minority	  presence	  does	  also	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  
empowerment	  (Patnaik,	  2013,	  p.	  35).	  Whether	  presence	  actually	  guarantees	  empowerment	  and	  
what	  forms	  of	  presence	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  achieve	  this	  are	  the	  empirical	  questions	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  
this	  study.	  	  
1.8 Brief	  notes	  on	  fieldwork	  
In	  the	  period	  between	  April	  and	  September	  2013,	  I	  conducted	  fifty-­‐three	  interviews,	   in	  Tallinn,	  
Tartu	  and	  Riga.	  The	   interviews	  were	  conducted	   in	  two	  stages,	   following	  a	  general-­‐to-­‐particular	  
logic.	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	  I	   interviewed	  policy	  experts	  (academics,	  journalists	  and	  heads	  of	  NGOs)	  
to	  discuss	  the	  broader	  issues	  of	  minority	  representation	  in	  policymaking.	  Most	  of	  these	  experts	  
had	   directly	   taken	   part	   in	   official	   discussions	   on	  minority	   policies	   or	   in	   policy	   drafting	   (this	   is	  
especially	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Integration	  Programmes),	  in	  which	  case	  the	  interviews	  also	  focused	  
on	  their	  experience	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process	  and	  their	  role	  in	  it.	  	  
In	   the	   second,	   longer,	   stage	   I	   interviewed	   policymakers	   and	   civil	   servants	   who	   were	  
directly	   involved	   in	   policymaking	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   policies	   under	   analysis.	   The	   respondents	  
were	  selected	  based	  on	  my	  background	  research	  on	  the	  policy-­‐cases.	  I	  secured	  interviews	  with	  
politicians	   from	   different	   parties,	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   balance	   and	   better	   understand	   the	  
nuances	   of	   the	   existing	   policy	   debate.	   As	   for	   civil	   servants,	  when	   possible,	   I	   interviewed	   both	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top-­‐ranking	  civil	  servants	  with	  direct	  links	  to	  party	  politics	  and	  policymaking,	  and	  lower-­‐ranking	  
civil	   servants	  who	  could	  provide	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  description	  of	   the	  processes	   in	  place	  at	   the	  
implementation	  stage.	  Alongside	  these	  respondents,	  I	  also	  interviewed	  several	  Russian-­‐speaking	  
political	   activists,	   specifically	   about	   their	   activities,	   their	   strategies,	   and	   their	   interactions	  with	  
state	  and	  local	  authorities.	  
Respondents	  were	  given	  the	  possibility	   to	  remain	  anonymous	  and	  several	  decided	  to	  do	  
so.	   In	   these	   cases,	   I	   have	   referred	   to	   them	   in	   the	   text	  with	   a	   general	   description	  of	   their	   role	  
instead	  of	  their	  name.	  The	  respondents	  who	  decided	  not	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  are	  referred	  to	  
by	  their	  name	  and	  the	  interview	  date.	  Out	  of	  the	  53	  interviews,	  25	  were	  conducted	  in	  Latvia	  and	  
28	  in	  Estonia.	  As	  for	  the	  respondents’	  status,	  17	  were	  experts	  –	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  whom	  had	  
been	  involved	  in	  varying	  degrees	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process	  of	  one	  of	  the	  policy-­‐cases;	  13	  were	  
politicians	  and	  13	  civil	  servants,	  both	  at	  state-­‐level	  and	  in	  Riga	  and	  Tallinn	  city	  administrations;	  
and	   10	   were	   Russophone	   civil	   society	   activists.	   All	   respondents	   but	   one	   consented	   to	   having	  
their	  interview	  recorded.	  
In	  conducting	  the	  interviews	  I	  followed	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  approach,	  based	  on	  open-­‐ended	  
questions	  and	  appropriate	  probing.	  I	  asked	  the	  respondents	  to	  recount	  how	  a	  certain	  decision-­‐
making	  process	  had	  unfolded	   in	  practice,	  and	  only	  afterwards	   I	  asked	  additional,	  more	  specific	  
questions.	  This	  approach	   is	  usually	   favoured	   in	  elite	   interviews	  because	   it	  maximises	   response	  
validity,	  it	  provides	  the	  best	  answers	  for	  projects	  based	  on	  depth	  and	  context,	  and	  because	  elite	  
respondents	  tend	  to	  be	  put	  off	  by	  closed-­‐ended	  questions	  (Aberbach	  &	  Rockman,	  2002,	  p.	  674;	  
Berry,	  2002,	  p.	  682;	  Harvey,	  2010,	  p.	  202).	  	  
In	  preparing	  the	  interviews,	  I	  wrote	  down	  a	  topic	  guide	  with	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  guiding	  
themes,	  a	  list	  of	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  and	  potential	  probes,	  and	  some	  specific	  questions	  based	  
on	   the	   respondent’s	   profile.	   Although	   the	   topic	   guide	  was	   extremely	   helpful	   in	   organising	  my	  
preparatory	  work,	  during	  the	  interviews	  I	  followed	  it	  loosely,	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  the	  respondents	  
as	   much	   autonomy	   as	   possible	   in	   selecting	   the	   most	   important	   issues	   in	   the	   policymaking	  
process	   (or	   processes)	   they	   took	   part	   in.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this	   choice,	   the	   interviews	   are	  mostly	  
conversational	  and	  rather	  different	  one	  from	  the	  other.	  What	  was	   lost	   in	  uniformity,	  however,	  
was	  gained	  in	  validity	  and	  detail.	  The	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  meant	  that	  the	  respondents	  could	  
prioritise	   elements	   of	   the	   policymaking	   process	   autonomously,	   minimising	   the	   risk	   that	   the	  
research	   priorities	   would	   skew	   answers.	   Moreover,	   within	   the	   loose	   interview	   structure	  
respondents	  could	  (and	  often	  did)	  open	  up	  unforeseen	  aspects	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  
This	   proved	   particularly	   important	   when	   reflecting	   about	   the	   intersections	   and	   overlaps	  
between	  the	  different	  channels	  for	  minority	  access	  to	  the	  policymaking	  process.	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The	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  Russian	  or	  English.	  In	  giving	  my	  respondents	  the	  choice	  
between	   these	   two	   languages,	   I	   was	   aware	   that	   language	   is	   a	   very	   politicised	   issue	   in	   both	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  and	  therefore	  the	  language	  of	  the	  interview	  could	  not	  be	  a	  completely	  neutral	  
issue.	  However,	  I	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  all	  my	  respondents	  that	  my	  language	  skills	  do	  not	  inform	  my	  
analysis,	  and	  that	   I	  was	  accessing	  written	  sources	   in	  all	   the	  three	   languages	  spoken	   in	  the	  two	  
countries,	  including	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian.	  Being	  from	  a	  third	  country,	  Italy,	  that	  is	  not	  associated	  
with	   a	   specific	   position	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   issues	   of	   minority	   politics	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	  
possibly	  lent	  more	  credibility	  to	  my	  position	  as	  an	  equidistant	  observer.	  	  
Alongside	   the	   interviews,	   during	   my	   fieldwork	   I	   attended	   several	   local	   meetings	   and	  
conferences	  organised	  by	  political	  parties,	  Russophone	  activists,	  NGOs	  and	   state	   institutions.	   I	  
took	  abundant	  notes	  on	   these	  events	   as	  well	   as	  on	  other	   relevant	   interactions	  and	  episodes	   I	  
came	  across	  during	  my	  time	   in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  These	  notes	  also	  form	  part	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  
sources	  for	  my	  research.	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CHAPTER	  2	  	  




Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   offer	   ideal	   comparative	   cases	   to	   explore	   questions	   of	   minority	   political	  
representation	   and	   empowerment	   in	   ethnically	   divided	   democracies.	   They	   share	   similar	  
legislative,	   demographic	   and	   historical	   backgrounds.	   Both	   countries	   have	   a	   sizeable	   Russian-­‐
speaking	   minority	   and,	   upon	   independence,	   passed	   restrictive	   language	   and	   citizenship	   laws	  
aimed	  at	  establishing	  the	  Latvian	  and	  Estonian	  nations	  and	  languages	  as	  dominant	  in	  the	  newly	  
independent	   countries	   (Pettai	   &	   Hallik,	   2002).	   They	   passed	   similar	   citizenship	   and	   language	  
policies	   and	   shared	   similar	   nationalising	   discourses	   during	   their	   transition	   to	   democracy	   (D.	   J.	  
Smith,	  Galbreath,	  &	  Swain,	  2010,	  pp.	  117–119;	  D.	  J.	  Smith,	  2013,	  p.	  98).	  They	  have	  also	  struggled	  
with	  the	  same	  set	  of	  minority-­‐sensitive	   issues	  with	  regard	  to	  citizenship,	   language,	   integration,	  
and	   education.	   They	   share	   a	   similar	   system	   of	   government,	   and	   in	   both	   cases	   the	   political	  
representation	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	  minority	   has	   been	   a	   problematic	   issue.	   They	   are	   both	  
listed	  by	  Freedom	  House	  as	  liberal	  democracies	  and	  their	  membership	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  
confirmation	  of	  their	  democratic	  consolidation.	  	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   roughly	   similar	   starting	   points,	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   political	  
representation	   has	   developed	   differently.	   In	   Estonia	   Russophone	   ethnic	   parties	   have	   failed	   to	  
establish	   themselves	   as	   major	   political	   players	   and	   most	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   votes	   are	  
collected	  by	  a	  mainstream	  Estonian	  party,	  the	  Centre	  Party.37	  In	  Latvia,	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	  
have	  been	  electorally	  successful,	  and	  the	  moderate	  Russophone	  party	  Harmony	  Centre	  became	  
the	   largest	  party	   in	   the	  Saeima	   (the	  Latvian	  parliament)	   in	  2011.	  Both	   in	  Estonia	  and	   in	  Latvia,	  
representation	   in	  parliament	  never	   translated	   into	  substantial	   representation	   in	   the	  executive:	  
minority	   parties	   have	   never	   entered	   a	   governing	   coalition	   and,	   since	   independence,	   Russian-­‐
speaking	   ministers	   have	   been	   few	   and	   far	   between.	   The	   Centre	   Party	   and	   Harmony	   Centre,	  
however,	  control	  the	  governments	  of	  the	  two	  capital	  cities,	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga.	  	  
With	   their	   similar	  histories,	   form	  of	  government	  and	  minority	   issues,	  and	   their	  different	  
experiences	   with	   minority	   representation,	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   are	   ideal	   comparative	   cases	   to	  
study	   the	   effects	   of	   minority	   political	   presence	   on	   minority	   policy	   influence	   and	   political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Following	  Allan	  Sikk	   and	  Daniel	  Bochsler	   (2008),	   I	   use	   ‘mainstream	  parties’	   to	  mean	  nation-­‐wide	  parties,	   distinct	  
from	  ethnic	  parties.	  Parties	  within	  this	   loose	  category	  can	  have	  different	   levels	  of	  nationalism.	  Although	  in	  Estonia	  
and	  Latvia	  nationalist	  parties	  have	  strictly	  speaking	  an	  ethnic	  agenda,	  these	  will	  not	  be	  considered	  ethnic	  parties	  but	  
nationalist	  mainstream	  party.	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empowerment.	  While	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  history	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  is	  
outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research,38	  this	  chapter	  will	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  main	  features	  that	  
are	  particularly	   relevant	   to	   issues	  of	  minority	  political	  presence.	  The	   focus	  will	  be	  on	  the	  main	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minorities,	  the	  early	  management	  of	  minority	   issues	   in	  post-­‐
independence	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  and	  party	  politics	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  since	  independence.	  
2.1 The	  Russophone	  minorities	  in	  post-­‐independence	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  
When	  they	  regained	  independence	  in	  1991,	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  were	  confronted	  with	  the	  difficult	  
task	   of	   establishing	   a	   new	   constitutional	   and	   social	   order	   after	   fifty	   years	   of	   Soviet	   rule.	   The	  
demographic	   change	   in	   their	   populations	  was	   one	   of	   the	  most	   important	   Soviet	   legacies,	   and	  
one	   that	  would	  mark	   their	  politics	   to	   this	  day.	  As	  a	   result	  of	   internal	  migrations,	  deportations	  
and	  relocations,	  both	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  the	  share	  of	  non-­‐native	  population	  –	  overwhelmingly	  
Russian-­‐speakers	   –	   increased	  markedly	   during	   the	   Soviet	   period.	  While	   in	   the	   interwar	   period	  
the	  share	  of	  Russian-­‐speaking	  residents	  had	  been	  about	  8%	  in	  Estonia	  and	  12%	  in	  Latvia,	  in	  1989	  
it	   had	   increased	   to	   about	   35%	   and	   42%	   respectively	   (Daatland	   &	   Svege,	   2000,	   pp.	   254–256;	  
Hughes,	  2005,	  p.	  744).	  Although	  both	  countries	  have	  a	  large	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority,	  Latvia’s	  
minority	   is	   appreciably	   bigger:	   according	   to	   the	   2011	   census	   about	   34%	   of	   Latvia’s	   resident	  
population	   was	   Russophone,	   against	   about	   29%	   in	   Estonia.39	   As	   for	   their	   geographical	  
distribution,	   in	   both	   countries	   Russian-­‐speakers	   are	   heavily	   urbanised	   (Bottolfs,	   2000,	   p.	   75;	  
Daatland	  &	  Svege,	  2000,	  p.	  258).	  However,	  while	  in	  Estonia	  they	  are	  concentrated	  between	  the	  
capital	   Tallinn	   and	   the	   north-­‐eastern	   region	   of	   Ida-­‐Virumaa,	   in	   Latvia	   they	   tend	   to	   be	   more	  
evenly	  distributed	  and	  constitute	  a	  majority	  or	  a	  substantial	  minority	  in	  all	  the	  main	  cities.40	  	  
The	   first	  and	  most	  controversial	  decision	   that	   the	  newly-­‐independent	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  
had	   to	   take	  was	  how	  to	  define	   the	  boundaries	  of	   their	  demos,	  or,	   in	  other	  words,	  whether	   to	  
include	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  in	  their	  citizenry	  and,	  if	  so,	  under	  what	  conditions.	  This	  choice	  was	  
eventually	  determined	  by	  the	  prevalence	  of	  a	  nationalist-­‐restorationist	  approach	  to	  nationhood	  
over	   a	  more	   civic	   and	   inclusive	  one	   (Mole,	   2012,	   pp.	   82–92;	  D.	   J.	   Smith,	   2005;	  G.	   Smith,	   Law,	  
Wilson,	  Bohr,	  &	  Allworth,	  1998,	  pp.	  93–118).	  Both	  tendencies	  were	  present	  among	  the	  Estonian	  
and	   Latvian	   elites	   that	   had	   led	   their	   countries’	   independence	  movements	   (Mole,	   2012,	   p.	   76;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	   	  For	  thorough	  accounts	  of	  the	  two	  countries’	  post-­‐soviet	  history	  and	  politics	  see	  Richard	  Mole	  (2012)	  and	  Timofey	  
Agarin	  (2010).	  	  
39	  Unless	  otherwise	  specified	  all	  demographic	  data	  are	  from	  the	  Latvian	  Central	  Statistics	  Database	  (www.csb.gov.lv),	  
the	   Estonian	   Statistical	   Database	   (www.stat.ee)	   and	   the	   Estonian	   government’s	   official	   portal	   Estonia.eu	  
(http://estonia.eu/about-­‐estonia/society/citizenship.html).	  	  
40	   At	   the	   beginning	   of	   2012	   Russian-­‐speakers	   were	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   residents	   in	   Riga	   (51.2%)	   and	   Daugavpils	  
(61.3%),	   and	   constituted	   big	   minorities	   in	   Rēzekne	   (49.6%),	   Jūrmala	   (41.9%),	   Liepāja	   (40.5%),	   Ventspils	   (37.8%),	  
Jelgava	   (37.1%)	   and	   Jēkabpils	   (33.5%).	   71.5%	   of	   Latvia’s	   Russian-­‐speakers	   are	   urban	   settlers	   and	   they	   constitute	  




Pettai	   &	   Hallik,	   2002,	   p.	   511).	  Moreover,	   in	   both	   countries	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   support	   for	  
independence	   had	   been	   substantial	   (Mole,	   2012,	   p.	   83;	   D.	   J.	   Smith,	   1998,	   pp.	   6–8).	   The	  
restorationist	   approach	   to	   nation-­‐building	   that	   eventually	   prevailed	  maintained	   that	   the	  USSR	  
had	  illegally	  occupied	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  and	  so	  the	  two	  countries	  had	  the	  right	  to	  restore	  their	  
sovereignty	   in	   continuity	  with	   the	   interwar	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   republics.	   Consequently,	   the	  
Soviet-­‐time	  settlers	  and	  their	  descendants	  were	  the	  legacy	  of	  an	  illegal	  act	  and	  could	  not	  claim	  
any	   rights	   before	   their	   country	   of	   residence.	   Restricting	   citizenship	   was	   framed	   by	   the	  
nationalists	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  ‘safeguarding	  the	  ethnos’	  (Mole,	  2012,	  p.	  85;	  emphasis	  in	  text).	  In	  both	  
cases	   only	   those	   who	   had	   been	   citizens	   of	   the	   interwar	   republics	   prior	   to	   1940	   and	   their	  
descendants	  were	   granted	   citizenship	   by	   birth.	   The	   portion	   of	   Russian-­‐speakers	  who	   acquired	  
citizenship	   by	   birth	   upon	   independence	   was	   an	   estimated	   20%	   in	   Estonia	   and	   40%	   in	   Latvia	  
(Mole,	   2012,	   p.	   88;	  D.	   J.	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   2010,	   p.	   119).	   All	   the	   others	   –	   overwhelmingly	   Russian-­‐
speakers	   who	   had	   settled	   in	   these	   countries	   after	   the	   Soviet	   annexation	   –	   could	   acquire	  
citizenship	  through	  a	  process	  of	  naturalisation.41	  	  
The	  Estonian	  and	   Latvian	   constitutions	   testify,	   in	  different	  ways,	   to	   the	   centrality	  of	   the	  
nationalist-­‐restorationist	   approach	   to	   state	   building.	   In	   Latvia	   the	   1922	   constitution	   was	  
reinstated,	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  restoration	  of	  Latvia’s	  ‘normality’,	  that	  is,	  its	  pre-­‐Soviet	  condition	  
(Cheskin,	  2012b,	  p.	  329).	  In	  Estonia	  a	  constituent	  assembly	  was	  formed	  and	  a	  new	  constitution	  
adopted	   by	   popular	   referendum	   in	   1992,	   whose	   preamble	   explicitly	   referred	   to	   the	   1938	  
constitution	   and	   to	   the	   centrality	   of	   ‘the	   Estonian	   nation,	   language	   and	   culture’.42	   In	   Richard	  
Mole’s	   words,	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   constitutional	   frameworks	   ensured	   that	   ‘the	   political	  
power	  remained	  firmly	  in	  indigenous	  hands	  and	  Russian-­‐speakers	  were	  all	  but	  excluded’	  (2012,	  
p.	  98).	  
This	  had	  two	  major	  political	  consequences.	  The	  first	  was	  that	  a	  considerable	  portion	  of	  the	  
Russian-­‐speakers	  was	  completely	  excluded	  from	  the	  state-­‐building	  phase	  of	  post-­‐independence	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  Persons	  without	  citizenship	  had	  to	  fulfil	  a	  residency	  requirement	  in	  order	  to	  
be	  able	  to	  naturalise,	  and	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  residency	  requirement	  was	  such	  that	  no	  one	  could	  
have	  obtained	  citizenship	  by	  naturalisation	  before	  the	   first	   round	  of	  democratic	  elections	   (and	  
before	  the	  constitutional	  referendum	  in	  Estonia).43	  This	  confirmed	  the	   ‘ownership’	  of	  the	  state	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  For	   a	   history	  of	   citizenship	   in	   Estonia	   see	  Priit	   Järve	   (2009).	   For	   a	   thorough	  description	  of	   the	  Citizenship	   Law	   in	  
Estonia	  see	  Christer	  Daatland	  and	  Hans	  Svege	  (2000,	  p.	  263ff.),	  and	  in	  Latvia	  see	  Heidi	  Södergren	  (2000,	  p.	  292ff.).	  	  
42	  The	  reference	  to	  the	  Estonian	  language	  was	  introduced	  through	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  in	  2007.	  
43	  In	  Estonia	  the	  residency	  requirement	  was	  of	  two	  years	  before	  and	  one	  year	  after	  the	  application.	  Since	  the	  earliest	  
date	   from	  which	   residence	  could	  be	  counted	  was	  30	  March	  1990,	  an	  applicant	   could	  obtain	   citizenship	  at	  best	   in	  
1993	  –	  that	   is,	  after	  the	  constitutional	  referendum	  and	  the	  first	  parliamentary	  elections,	  both	  held	   in	  1992	   (Järve,	  
2009,	  p.	  48).	  In	  Latvia,	  the	  1991	  act	  on	  citizenship	  rights	  and	  naturalisation	  stipulated	  that	  naturalisation	  would	  begin	  
after	  1	  July	  1992	  (when	  registration	  of	  all	  residents	  had	  to	  be	  completed).	   In	  fact	  the	  process	  began	  only	  after	  the	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by	  the	  ‘titular’	  nations	  and	  meant	  that	  ethnic	  Estonians	  and	  Latvians	  entrenched	  themselves	  in	  
all	  the	  major	  positions	  in	  the	  state.	  Power-­‐sharing	  with	  the	  minorities	  was	  thus	  avoided,	  and	  the	  
ethnocentric	   principle	   of	   restoration	   took	   pre-­‐eminence	   over	   the	   inclusive	   principle	   of	  
democratic	  participation	  (Järve,	  2009,	  p.	  47).	  
The	   other	   consequence	   of	   the	   restorationist	   Citizenship	   Laws	  was	   the	   creation	   of	   three	  
categories	   of	   permanent	   residents:	   citizens,	   people	  without	   citizenship	   and	   citizens	   of	   a	   third	  
country	  (Kasekamp,	  2010,	  p.	  185).	  These	  categories	  run	  through	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority,	  
splitting	   it	   in	   as	   many	   groups,	   each	   with	   different	   political	   rights.	   In	   2014	   about	   53%	   of	   the	  
Russian-­‐speaking	  population	  of	  Latvia	  were	  Latvian	  citizens.	  In	  Estonia	  the	  corresponding	  figure	  
for	   2011	   was	   about	   52%.	   Among	   them	   there	   are	   both	   citizens	   by	   birth	   and	   citizens	   by	  
naturalisation.44	  All	   citizens	  enjoy	   full	  political	   rights	  and	  can	  vote	  and	   stand	   for	  election	  at	  all	  
levels	   of	   government.45	   In	   both	   countries,	   the	   conditions	   for	   naturalisation	   are	   a	   residency	  
requirement,	  a	  permanent	  legal	  income,	  adequate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  state	  language,	  knowledge	  
of	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  Citizenship	  Law,	  and	  taking	  an	  oath	  of	  loyalty	  to	  the	  state.	  Some	  of	  
the	   initial	   conditions	   for	   naturalisation	   have	   been	   relaxed.	  Most	   notably	   in	   1998	   both	   Estonia	  
and	  Latvia	  allowed	  stateless	  children	  of	  non-­‐citizens	  to	  be	  registered	  as	  citizens.	  In	  the	  same	  year	  
the	  Latvian	  parliament	  eliminated	  the	  window	  system	  for	  naturalisation	  that	  had	  slowed	  down	  
the	   process	   until	   then.46	  Other	   amendments	   provided	   for	   simplified	   naturalisation	   procedures	  
for	   disabled	   and	   elderly	   people,	   and	   the	   recognition	   of	   school	   exams	   in	   language	   and	   civic	  
knowledge.	  Naturalisation	  rates,	  however,	  have	  fluctuated	  and	  stagnated	  by	  the	  second	  half	  of	  
the	  2000s	  (Järve,	  2009,	  p.	  59;	  Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  100;	  Poleshchuk,	  2009,	  p.	  171).	  	  
The	  number	  of	  people	  without	  citizenship	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  remains	  high,	  although	  it	  
has	   decreased	   through	   emigration,	   mortality,	   naturalisation	   and	   acquisition	   of	   foreign	  
citizenship.	  In	  2014,	  6.6%	  and	  12.7%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  remained	  non-­‐citizens	  in	  Estonia	  and	  
Latvia,	  respectively.	  As	  these	  are	  almost	  exclusively	  Russian-­‐speakers,	  this	  means	  that	  about	  22%	  
of	   Estonia’s	   Russian-­‐speakers	   and	   almost	   40%	  of	   Latvia’s	   are	  without	   citizenship.	  Moreover,	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Citizenship	   Act	   was	   adopted	   in	   1994	   (Kindlová,	   2006),	   that	   is,	   after	   the	   first	   post-­‐independence	   parliamentary	  
elections	   in	  1993.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  population,	  therefore,	  was	  cut	  out	   from	  taking	  part	   in	  the	  
first	  electoral	  cycle	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  post-­‐Soviet	  democracies	  (Kasekamp,	  2010,	  pp.	  184–185).	  
44	  A	  further	  possibility,	  the	  acquisition	  of	  citizenship	  for	  special	  merits	  or	  services	  to	  the	  state,	  is	  provided	  for	  by	  article	  
10	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  article	  13	  of	  the	  Latvian	  constitution.	  
45	  The	  only	  difference	   in	  political	   rights	   in	  Estonia	   is	   that	  only	   citizens	  by	  birth	   (but	  not	  naturalised	  citizens)	   can	  be	  
elected	  President	  of	  the	  Republic.	  
46	  The	  Latvian	  Citizenship	  Law	  originally	  established	  a	  window	  system,	  which	  divided	  potential	  applicants	  into	  different	  
cohorts	  that	  could	  apply	  for	  naturalisation	  at	  different	  times.	  Under	  these	  rules	  the	  last	  cohort	  would	  have	  been	  able	  
to	  apply	  for	  naturalisation	  only	  in	  2003.	  The	  nationalist	  parties	  initiated	  a	  referendum	  against	  these	  amendments	  on	  
the	  Latvian	  Citizenship	  Law,	  which	  they	  perceived	  as	  a	  dangerous	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  naturalisation	  procedure.	  On	  
the	   event,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   voters	   expressed	   their	   support	   for	   the	   liberalising	   amendments	   and	   they	   were	  
retained.	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  1998	  referendum	  see	  Södergren	  (2000,	  p.	  295ff.).	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Figure	  2.	  Citizenship	  status	  in	  Latvia	  (Russian-­‐speakers)	  
Data:	  Latvia's	  Central	  Statistical	  Database,	  2014.	  
portion	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  holds	  the	  citizenship	  of	  a	  third	  country,	  usually	  the	  Russian	  
Federation.	   This	   is	   far	   more	   common	   in	   Estonia,	   where	   census	   figures	   from	   2011	   show	   that	  
about	   24%	   of	   the	   country’s	   Russian-­‐speakers	   and	   7%	   of	   the	   total	   population	   hold	   a	   Russian	  
passport.	   In	   Latvia,	   only	   about	   6%	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers	   and	   less	   than	   2%	   of	   the	   total	  













In	  Estonia,	  residents	  with	  no	  citizenship	  and	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  are	  recognised	  by	  law	  
under	   the	   same	   category	   of	   ‘aliens’	   and	   share	   the	   same	   political	   rights.	   They	   cannot	   vote	   for	  
parliamentary	  elections	  or	  referenda,	  but	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  (but	  not	  to	  stand	  for	  elections)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Both	   countries	   saw	   an	   increase	   in	   applications	   for	   Russian	   citizenship	   in	   recent	   years.	   In	   Estonia	   applications	   for	  
Russian	  citizenship	  apparently	  surged	  after	  the	  2007	  Bronze	  Soldier	  crisis	  (Järve,	  2009,	  p.	  57).	  In	  Latvia	  an	  increase	  in	  
applications	  for	  Russian	  citizenship	  was	  observed	  in	  2012,	  after	  the	  failed	  referendum	  on	  Russian	  language	  as	  second	  
state	   language.	   For	   news	   about	   this,	   see	   ‘Negrazhdane	   vybiraiut	   rosiiskoe	   grazhsdanstvo’	   (Non-­‐citizens	   choose	  
Russian	   citizenship),	   Telegraf.lv,	   1	   June	   2012.	   Available	   at:	   http://www.telegraf.lv/news/negrazhdane-­‐vybirayut-­‐
rossiiskoe-­‐grazhdanstvo	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	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Figure	  1.	  Citizenship	  status	  in	  Latvia	  (total	  population)	  
Data:	  Latvia's	  Central	  Statistical	  Database,	  2014.	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Figure	  3.	  Citizenship	  status	  in	  Estonia	  (total	  population)	  









Figure	  4.	  Citizenship	  status	  in	  Estonia	  (Russian-­‐speakers)	  
Data:	  Estonia’s	  Statistical	  Database,	  2011	  Census	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at	  the	  municipal	  level.	  While	  they	  can	  belong	  to	  non-­‐profit	  organisations	  and	  trade	  unions,	  non-­‐
citizens	   cannot	   form	   or	   join	   political	   parties.	   In	   Latvia,	   residents	   without	   citizenship	   are	  
recognised	   under	   the	   special	   category	   of	   ‘Latvia’s	   non-­‐citizens’	   (Latvijas	   nepilsoņi),	   separately	  
from	  foreign	  nationals.	  This,	  however,	  does	  not	  imply	  significant	  differences	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  
rights.	   Both	   non-­‐citizens	   and	   third-­‐country	   nationals	   are	   completely	   disenfranchised	   at	   the	  
national	  and	  local	  level.	  However,	  non-­‐citizens	  have	  the	  right	  to	  join	  political	  parties,	  as	  long	  as	  
they	  compose	  less	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  membership	  (LCHR,	  2008,	  p.	  41).	  
While	  citizenship	  cross-­‐cuts	   the	  minorities,	   language	   functions	  as	   the	  major	  dividing	   line	  
between	  majority	  and	  minority,	  and	  its	  management	  has	  deep	  social	  and	  political	   implications.	  
In	  both	  countries	  we	  find	  Language	  Acts	  (which	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  titular	  and	  foreign	  languages	  
in	   the	   public	   space),	   Language	   Inspectorates	   (which	   ensure	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   Language	  
Acts),	  and	  references	  to	  the	  titular	  languages	  are	  conspicuous	  in	  their	  constitutions.48	  A	  language	  
proficiency	  exam	  has	  to	  be	  passed	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  citizenship	  by	  naturalisation,	  higher	  levels	  
of	  proficiency	  are	   required	   to	  hold	  public	  posts	  and	   some	  posts	   in	   the	  private	   sector,	  election	  
candidates	   were	   subject	   to	   language	   requirements	   until	   2001	   in	   Estonia	   and	   until	   2002	   in	  
Latvia,49	  and	  most	   integration	  strategies	  focus	  on	  titular	   language	  learning.	  All	  these	  provisions	  
are	   directed	   to	   the	   ‘non-­‐titulars’,	  who	   are	   not	   exclusively	   ethnic	   Russians	   but	   also	  Ukrainians,	  
Belarusians	  and	  other	  former-­‐USSR	  settlers	  whose	  main	  language	  of	  communication	  is	  Russian.	  
Therefore,	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   language,	  more	   than	   ethnicity,	   defines	   the	   borders	   of	   an	   in-­‐
group	  and	  an	  out-­‐group	  in	  society.	  
According	  to	  some	  observers,	  language	  legislation	  de	  facto	  establishes	  a	  dual	  structure	  of	  
social	  and	  political	  exclusion	  based	  on	  mother	   tongue	  and	  state	   language	  proficiency,	  creating	  
collective	  privileges	  for	  the	  titular	  nations	  (Järve,	  2000,	  p.	  7).	  On	  a	  similar	  line,	  some	  researchers	  
applied	   Smooha’s	   model	   of	   ethnic	   democracy	   to	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   An	   ethnic	   democracy	   is	  
defined	  as	  a	   ‘democracy	  that	  contains	  the	  non-­‐democratic	   institutionalization	  of	  dominance	  of	  
one	   ethnic	   group’	   (Smooha	   &	   Järve,	   2005,	   p.	   21).	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   are	   deemed	   to	   be	   an	  
exemplary,	   although	   imperfect,	   form	   of	   it	   (Smooha,	   2009,	   p.	   57).	   According	   to	   the	   ethnic	  
democracy	  thesis,	  minority	  exclusion	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  has	  been	  institutionalised	  in	  a	  system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  The	  Latvian	  constitution	  stipulates	  that	  each	  new	  member	  of	  the	  Saeima	  (the	  Latvian	  parliament)	  shall	  pronounce	  
an	  oath	   in	  which	  she	   recognises	  as	  one	  of	  her	  primary	  duties	   ‘to	   strengthen	   […]	   the	  Latvian	   language	  as	   the	  only	  
official	  language’	  (art.	  18).	  In	  Estonia	  a	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  Estonian	  language	  was	  added	  in	  2007	  in	  the	  preamble	  
to	  the	  constitution,	  which	  now	  posits	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  state	  to	  ‘guarantee	  the	  preservation	  
of	  the	  Estonian	  nation,	  language	  and	  culture	  through	  the	  ages’	  (emphasis	  added).	  
49	  In	  the	  late	  1990s	  both	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  parliaments	  introduced	  legislation	  that	  required	  candidates	  in	  state	  
and	  municipal	  elections	  to	  provide	  language	  certificates	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  proficiency.	  After	  a	  case	  arising	  from	  
the	   application	  of	   this	   law	  was	   successfully	   brought	   before	   the	   European	  Court	   of	  Human	  Rights,	   and	   yielding	   to	  
mounting	   pressure	   on	   the	   part	   of	   international	   bodies,	   both	   countries	   repealed	   their	   language	   requirements	   for	  
candidates	  (Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  86ff.;	  Poleshchuk,	  2009,	  p.	  189).	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in	  which	  elements	  of	  participatory	  democracy	  are	  combined	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  majority	  control	  
over	   state	   institutions,	   which	   guarantees	   the	   majority’s	   disproportionate	   political	   dominance	  
over	  the	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  minority	  (Commercio,	  2008;	  Järve,	  2000;	  Linz	  &	  Stepan,	  1996;	  Pettai	  &	  
Hallik,	  2002;	  Pettai,	  1998;	  Smooha	  &	  Järve,	  2005).	  Alternatively,	  Estonia	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  a	  
‘control	  system’,	  in	  which	  ethnic	  minorities	  are	  politically	  fragmented	  (internally	  and	  in	  relation	  
to	   the	   majority),	   dependent	   on	   the	   majority	   for	   social,	   economic	   and	   political	   benefits,	   and	  
integrated	   into	   state	   institutions	   only	   through	   assimilation	   and	   co-­‐optation	   (Pettai	   &	   Hallik,	  
2002).	  	  
The	  centrality	  of	  language	  in	  defining	  an	  in-­‐group	  and	  an	  out-­‐group	  has	  important	  effects	  
on	   the	   political	   sphere.	   Most	   notably	   the	   questions	   of	   the	   language	   of	   education,	   language	  
requirements	  for	  employment,	  and	   language	  use	   in	  the	  media	  have	  been	  often	  pointed	  out	  as	  
problematic.	  Language	  requirements	  and	  language	  of	  education	  will	  be	  treated	  more	  in	  depth	  in	  
chapters	  5	  and	  6.	  As	  for	  language	  use	  in	  the	  media,	   it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  in	  both	  Estonia	  and	  
Latvia	  majority	  and	  minority	   tend	   to	   live	   in	   two	  separate	   information	  spaces	   (Heidmets,	  2008,	  
pp.	  77–81;	  Ustinova,	  2011,	  p.	  10).	  This	  linguistic	  segregation	  affects	  the	  kind	  of	  information	  that	  
reaches	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   population	   and	   can	   facilitate	   the	   formation	   of	   an	   ethno-­‐
linguistically	  split	  electorate.	  Moreover,	  relying	  heavily	  on	  media	  content	  from	  Russia	  can	  create	  
split	   allegiances	   in	   the	  minority,	   reinforcing	   tendencies	  of	   estrangement	   from	   their	   country	  of	  
residence	  and	  its	  institutions	  (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  224).	  
Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  are	  the	  official	  languages	  of	  administration	  both	  at	  the	  national	  and	  
at	   the	   local	   level.	   In	   Estonia	   there	   is	   a	   constitutional	   guarantee	   for	   all	   members	   of	   national	  
minorities	  to	  receive	  answers	   in	  their	  own	   language	   in	   localities	  where	  they	  constitute	  at	   least	  
one	   half	   of	   the	   population.	   In	   those	   localities,	   the	   municipal	   administration	   can	   use	   an	  
alternative	  working	  language,	  subject	  to	  approval	  by	  the	  Estonian	  government.	  So	  far,	  however,	  
no	   request	   from	   a	   local	   administration	   to	   use	   Russian	   as	   their	   working	   language	   has	   been	  
approved	   (Adrey,	   2005,	   p.	   459;	   Järve,	   2002,	   pp.	   85–86).	   In	   Latvia	   there	   is	   no	   constitutional	  
obligation	   to	   provide	   answers	   in	   the	   language	   of	   a	   national	   minority	   and	   no	   constitutional	  
provision	   to	   conduct	   local	   government	   meetings	   in	   a	   minority	   language.	   In	   both	   countries	  
informal	   practices	   partially	   compensate	   for	   what	   could	   constitute	   an	   excessive	   barrier	   to	   the	  
Russian-­‐speaking	  citizens’	  access	  to	  institutions	  (Smooha	  &	  Järve,	  2005,	  p.	  95).	  Yet,	  these	  are	  not	  
sanctioned	  by	  law	  and	  depend	  on	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  administrative	  officers	  on	  a	  case-­‐to-­‐case	  
basis.	  
As	   for	   the	   social	   status	   of	   the	   Russophone	  minorities	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	  
majorities,	  ethnic-­‐based	  socio-­‐economic	  inequality	  is	  more	  pronounced	  in	  Estonia	  than	  in	  Latvia	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(Rozenvalds,	  2007,	  p.	  37).	  Estonia’s	  Russian-­‐speakers	   tend	  to	  suffer	   from	  above-­‐average	  socio-­‐
economic	   exclusion,	   with	   higher-­‐than-­‐average	   unemployment	   and	   a	   high	   pay	   gap	   between	  
cohorts	  with	  similar	  educational	  achievements	  but	  different	  mother	  tongue	  (Leping	  &	  Toomet,	  
2008;	   Vetik	   &	   Helemäe,	   2011).	   Surveys	   showed	   that	   Russian-­‐speakers	   with	   a	   higher	   Estonian	  
proficiency	   feel	   discriminated	   on	   language	   and	   ethnic	   bases	  more	   often	   than	   people	  with	   no	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  state	  language	  (Lagerspetz	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  92).	  This	  might	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  
fact	   that	   Russian-­‐speakers	  who	   are	   proficient	   in	   Estonian	   (unlike	   those	  who	  do	   not	   speak	   the	  
state	  language)	  compete	  in	  the	  same	  job	  market	  as	  native	  Estonian-­‐speakers	  and	  might	  be	  more	  
exposed	   to	   informal	   discrimination	   (Poleshchuk,	   2009,	   pp.	   52–53).	   The	   unexplained	   socio-­‐
economic	  gap	  between	  Estonians	  and	  non-­‐Estonians	  has	  been	  ascribed	  to	  ‘discrimination	  in	  the	  
form	   of	   entry	   barriers	   combined	   with	   low-­‐level	   segregation,	   and	   explanations	   related	   to	  
segregated	  social	  networks’	  (Leping	  &	  Toomet,	  2008,	  p.	  614).	  	  
Although	   instances	  of	  discrimination	   in	   the	   labour	  market	   and	  a	  history	  of	   ethnic-­‐based	  
income	  gap	  have	  been	  reported	  also	  for	  Latvia,	  socio-­‐economic	  exclusion	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	  in	  
this	   country	   is	   a	  much	   less	   remarkable	   phenomenon	   (Aasland	   &	   Fløtten,	   2001,	   p.	   1046).	   The	  
ethnic-­‐based	  employment	  gap	  existing	   in	   the	   late	  1990s	  had	  completely	  disappeared	  by	  2007,	  
due	  to	  Latvia’s	  economic	  boom	  and	  to	   the	  out-­‐migration	  of	  many	  ethnic	  Latvians	  after	   the	  EU	  
accession	  that	  had	  opened	  up	  new	   job	  opportunities	   for	   the	  non-­‐Latvians	   (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  
128).	  Although	  the	  gap	  reopened	  with	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  it	  is	  still	  considerably	  smaller	  than	  in	  
Estonia	  (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  140).	  Also	  the	  ethnic	  pay	  gap	  is	  rather	  modest	  compared	  to	  Estonia	  
(Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  142).	  Income	  inequality	  in	  Latvia	  is	  generally	  high	  (Golubeva	  &	  Gould,	  2010,	  
p.	  97),	  but	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  overlap	  with	  either	  ethnic	  or	  citizenship	  divide	  (Poleshchuk,	  2009,	  
p.	  227).	  This	  might	  be	  at	  least	  partially	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  Latvia	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  
settlers	  were	  on	  average	  more	  highly	  educated	  than	  Estonia’s	  mostly	  working-­‐class	  Russophone	  
settlers,	   and	   after	   independence	   they	   came	   to	   control	   a	   good	   share	   of	   the	   newly	   emerging	  
business	  sector	  (Lieven,	  1993,	  p.	  187).	  
Socio-­‐economic	   stratification	   is	   only	   one	   of	   the	   dimensions	   that	   internally	   differentiate	  
the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minorities.	  Although	  they	  speak	  the	  same	  language	  and	  share	  the	  status	  of	  
‘non-­‐titular’	   settlers,	   Russian-­‐speakers	   do	   not	   constitute	   homogenous	   groups	   with	   uniform	  
socio-­‐political	   interests	   (Solska,	   2011,	   p.	   1094).	   The	   minorities	   are	   segmented	   according	   to	  
citizenship	  status	  and,	  consequently,	  political	  rights.	  There	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  Russian-­‐
speakers’	   time	   of	   settlement	   in	   the	   country,	   which	   might	   correspond	   with	   varying	   levels	   of	  
attachment	   to	   the	   state	   and	   of	   integration	   in	   society	   (Aasland,	   1994,	   p.	   237).	   There	   are	   also	  
differences	  in	  state	  language	  proficiency,	  inter-­‐generational	  differences	  (T.	  Vihalemm	  &	  Kalmus,	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2009),	   and	   differences	   in	   cultural	   and	   political	   outlook	   (Kirch	   &	   Kirch,	   1995,	   pp.	   46–49;	   D.	   J.	  
Smith,	  1998,	  p.	  5).	  This	  lack	  of	  in-­‐group	  homogeneity	  has	  sometimes	  been	  seen	  as	  affecting	  the	  
Russian-­‐speakers’	  capacity	  for	  political	  mobilisation	  and	  policy	  impact	  (Jubulis,	  2001,	  p.	  151;	  D.	  J.	  
Smith,	   1998,	   p.	   9).	   This	   does	   not	  mean,	   however,	   that	   Russian-­‐speakers	   cannot	  mobilise	   as	   a	  
group,	  especially	  on	  the	  bases	  of	  shared	  language	  and	  shared	  grievances	  (Laitin,	  2003,	  p.	  275).	  	  
2.2 The	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  political	  representation	  
Estonia’s	   and	   Latvia’s	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minorities	   are	   generally	   underrepresented	   in	   state	  
institutions,	   both	   in	   elected	   posts	   and	   in	   the	   bureaucracy.	   In	   the	   Estonian	   parliament,	   the	  
Riigikogu,	   minority	   representation	   has	   been	   consistently	   less	   than	   proportional.	   In	   Latvia	  
Russian-­‐speakers	   have	   secured	   more	   seats,	   especially	   after	   the	   electoral	   exploits	   of	   the	  
moderate	   Russophone	   party	   Harmony	   Centre.	   Although	   Russian-­‐speakers	   are	   still	  
underrepresented	   if	   the	  disenfranchised	  non-­‐citizens	  are	   taken	   into	  account	   (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  
pp.	   109–110),	   Russophone	   representation	   in	   the	   Saeima	   (the	   Latvian	   parliament)	   is	   roughly	  
proportional	   to	   the	  share	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	   in	  Latvia’s	  citizenry.	  As	   for	   representation	   in	   the	  
state	  executive,	   the	  situation	   is	  more	  markedly	  exclusionary.	  At	   the	   time	  of	  writing,	   in	  Estonia	  
only	   two	  Russian	   speakers	  have	  entered	  government,	   one	  as	   a	  minister	  without	  portfolio	   and	  
one	   as	   Education	  Minister.50	   In	   Latvia	   three	   Russian-­‐speakers	   have	   been	   appointed	  ministers,	  
but	  none	  of	  them	  claimed	  in	  any	  way	  to	  represent	  the	  Russophone	  community,	  and	  one	  of	  them	  
was	   in	   fact	   part	   of	   the	   Latvian	   nationalist	   party	   For	   Fatherland	   and	   Freedom/Latvian	  National	  
Independence	  Movement	  (TB/LNNK).51	  
Russian-­‐speakers	   are	   also	   underrepresented	   in	   state	   bureaucracies.	   Civil	   service	  
employment	   is	   reserved	   to	   citizens,	   and	   language	   requirements	   apply,	   which	   makes	   it	   more	  
difficult	  for	  members	  of	  the	  minorities	  to	  access	  employment	  in	  this	  sector.	  In	  both	  countries	  the	  
share	  of	  Russian-­‐speaking	  employees	   in	  all	  ministries	  has	  consistently	  been	  very	   low,	  very	   few	  
judges	  have	  a	  Russian-­‐speaking	  background,	  and	  minority	  members	  are	  also	  underrepresented	  
among	  the	  civil	  servants	   in	   local	  administrations.	  Exceptions	  to	  this	  rule	  are	  the	  police	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Eldar	  Efendijev	  from	  the	  Centre	  Party	  was	  Minister	  for	  Population	  Affairs	  (2002–2003),	  a	  post	  without	  portfolio	  that	  
was	   subsequently	   disbanded.	   Jevgeni	   Ossinovski	   from	   the	   Estonian	   Social	   Democratic	   Party	   (SDE)	   was	   appointed	  
Education	  Minister	  in	  March	  2014,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  government	  formed	  after	  the	  resignation	  of	  the	  long-­‐standing	  Prime	  
Minister	  Andrus	  Ansip	  and	  before	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  set	  for	  March	  2015.	  
51	  Vasiīijs	  Meļņiks	   (Democratic	  Party	   ‘Saimnieks’)	  was	  Finance	  Minister	   for	  only	   five	  days	   in	   January	  1997.	  Vladimirs	  
Makarovs	  was	  Welfare	  Minister	   (1995–1999),	  Minister	  of	  Economics	   (1999–2000),	  and	  Minister	   for	  Environmental	  
Protection	   and	   Regional	   Development	   (2000–2002).	   However	   Makarovs	   belongs	   to	   the	   Latvian	   nationalist	   party	  
TB/LNNK	  and	   is	  not	  usually	   regarded	  as	  a	   representative	  of	   the	  Russian-­‐speakers.	  On	  this	   regard,	   the	  Russophone	  
mayor	  of	  Riga	  Nils	  Ušakovs	  stated	  that	  the	  multiple	  appointments	  of	  Makarovs	  as	  minister	  do	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  
that	   ‘ethnic	   Russians	   do	   not	   become	  ministers’.	   ‘Ušakovs	   listed	   the	   three	   problems	   of	   Latvia’s	   Russian-­‐speakers’,	  
MixNews,	   21	   February	   2012.	   Available	   at:	   http://www.mixnews.lv/ru/politics/news/2012-­‐02-­‐21/89495	   (Last	  
accessed	   16	   February	   2015).	   Vjačeslavs	   Dombrovskis	   from	   the	   centre-­‐right	   Latvian	   party	   Unity	   was	   Education	  
Minister	  from	  2013	  to	  2014	  and	  was	  then	  appointed	  Minister	  of	  the	  Economy	  in	  2014.	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prison	  administration,	  where	  minority	  employees	  are	  usually	  overrepresented	  (Pabriks,	  2002,	  p.	  
15ff.;	   Poleshchuk,	  2009,	  pp.	  225–226;	   Smooha	  &	   Järve,	  2005,	  pp.	  66,	  99–100).	  Warnings	  have	  
been	  raised	  that	   the	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  unbalance	   in	  civil	   service	  staffing	  might	   result	   in	  a	  bias	   in	  
the	   implementation	   of	   laws,	   in	   ways	   that	   might	   unduly	   penalise	   members	   of	   the	   ethnic	  
minorities	   (Smooha	   &	   Järve,	   2005,	   p.	   70).	   Ethnocentric	   conceptions	   of	   loyalty	   and	   the	  
securitisation	  of	   the	  Russophone	  minority	  have	  been	   indicated	  as	  at	   least	  partially	   responsible	  
for	  the	  high	  level	  of	  control	  by	  the	  ‘titular	  nations’	  over	  their	  countries’	  bureaucratic	  structures	  
(Kallas,	  2008,	  p.	  8).	  
The	   rhetoric	   of	   loyalty,	   often	  based	  on	   the	   implicit	   assumption	   that	   loyalty	   to	   the	   state	  
comes	  with	  ethnicity,52	  has	  been	  often	  used	  for	  political	  and	  electoral	  purposes	  (Cheskin,	  2012b,	  
p.	  335;	  Golubeva	  &	  Gould,	  2010,	  p.	  87ff.).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  implicit	  ethnic	  connotations	  of	  
this	  rhetoric	  can	  be	  used	  by	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  national	  elites	  to	  avoid	  power-­‐sharing	  with	  
Russophone	  parties	  and	  politicians	  (Semjonov,	  2000,	  p.	  6).	  Although	  this	  rhetoric	   is	  not	  always	  
accompanied	  by	  heartfelt	  nationalist	  beliefs,	   it	   creates	  an	  additional	   inhibition	   for	  mainstream	  
parties	  to	  enter	  into	  coalition	  with	  ethnic	  parties	  or	  to	  appoint	  Russian-­‐speakers	  in	  governmental	  
positions.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   descriptions	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers	   as	   ‘occupants’	   or	   Russia’s	  
‘fifth	   column’	   can	   be	   picked	   up	   by	   minority	   representatives	   to	   reinforce	   minority	   voters’	  
identification	  as	  part	  of	  an	  excluded	  minority	  (Cheskin,	  2012b,	  p.	  330).	  	  
In	  both	   countries	  minority	   representation	   in	  positions	  of	  power	  on	  par	  with	   the	   ‘titular’	  
majorities	   has	   often	   been	   presented	   as	   unacceptable	   by	   the	  majority	   elites	   (Agarin,	   2011,	   p.	  
184).	  As	  for	  popular	  views	  on	  the	  matter,	  a	  2007	  survey	  showed	  a	  rather	  divided	  picture	  in	  the	  
Estonian	   society:	   34%	   of	   ethnic	   Estonians	   expressed	   the	   view	   that	   ‘the	  wider	   participation	   of	  
non-­‐Estonians	  in	  Estonian	  politics	  and	  economic	  life	  would	  rather	  be	  harmful	  to	  Estonia’,	  while	  
28%	   thought	   that	   it	   could	   be	   ‘a	   positive	   development’.	   Moreover,	   87%	   of	   Russian-­‐speaking	  
respondents	   and	   only	   34%	   of	   the	   Estonian-­‐speaking	   ones	   ‘believed	   that	   Estonian	   politicians	  
should	   take	   the	   opinions	   of	   Estonian	   Russians	   into	   account	   to	   a	   greater	   degree	   than	   before’	  
(Heidmets,	  2008,	  p.	  58).	  Although	  no	  similar	  surveys	  are	  available	  for	  Latvia,	  there	  are	  grounds	  
to	  believe	  that	  also	  in	  Latvia	  the	  idea	  that	  Russian-­‐speakers	  are	  not	  fit	  (or	  not	  loyal	  enough)	  for	  
government	   is	   also	   widespread,	   and	   is	   reflected	   by	   the	   resistance	   of	   even	   moderate	   ethnic-­‐
Latvian	  parties	   to	  enter	   in	   a	   governing	   coalition	  with	  Harmony	  Centre	   (Ikstens,	   2011,	  p.	   1038;	  
Pryce,	  2012,	  p.	  615;	  P.	  Vihalemm	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  p.	  150).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	   For	   an	   example	   of	   this	   rhetoric,	   see	   Denis	   Hanov’s	   (2011)	   analysis	   of	   the	   Latvian	   National	   Alliance’s	   electoral	  
campaign	  in	  2011.	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2.3 Parties	  and	  party	  politics	  	  
Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   are	   parliamentary	   republics	   with	   a	   unicameral	   parliament	   and	   a	   weak	  
presidency.	  The	  legislative	  initiative	  rests	  with	  the	  parliament	  and	  the	  government.	  In	  Latvia	  the	  
president	   and	   one	   tenth	   of	   the	   electorate	   can	   initiate	   laws,	   too.	   In	   Estonia	   the	   president	   can	  
initiate	   only	   amendments	   to	   the	   constitution,	   while	   no	   procedure	   for	   popular	   initiative	   is	  
provided.	  The	  Riigikogu	  and	  the	  Saeima	  have	  101	  and	  100	  members	  respectively,	  elected	  every	  
four	  years	  by	  proportional	  representation	  (PR)	  with	  a	  5%	  threshold.	  The	  electoral	  systems	  of	  the	  
two	   countries	   are	   otherwise	   different.	   In	   the	   11	   Estonian	   electoral	   districts	   voters	   cast	   their	  
ballot	   directly	   for	   a	   party-­‐nominated	   or	   independent	   candidate,	   then	   votes	   are	   counted	   and	  
seats	  allocated	   following	  a	   three-­‐level	   system,	  based	  on	   individual,	  district	  and	  national	   levels.	  
Latvia	   is	   divided	   into	   five	   multi-­‐member	   constituencies	   and	   voters	   can	   vote	   for	   a	   party	   and,	  
additionally,	   express	   positive	   preferences	   by	   adding	   a	   plus	   sign	   beside	   the	   names	   of	   as	  many	  
candidates	   as	   they	   want	   or	   negative	   preferences	   by	   striking	   names	   out.	   Seats	   are	   allocated	  
according	  to	  candidates’	  aggregated	  totals	  of	  votes,	   from	  which	  personal	  negative	  preferences	  
are	  detracted.	  Preference	  voting	  is	  optional,	  but	  there	  is	  an	  incentive	  for	  voters	  to	  express	  their	  
preferences	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  which	  candidates	  get	  elected.	  Even	  though	  list	  leaders	  tend	  to	  
get	   elected,	   voters	   have	   repeatedly	   shown	   that	   they	   can	   punish	   unpopular	   candidates	   even	  
when	  they	  are	  at	  the	  top	  of	  their	  preferred	  party’s	  list	  (Millard,	  2011,	  p.	  311).	  	  
In	   both	   countries	   the	   political	   scene	   is	   dominated	   by	   political	   parties,	   which	   nominate	  
candidates,	   form	   coalitions,	   animate	   the	   political	   debate,	   and	   determine	   the	   access	   to	   the	  
executive	  branch	  (almost)	  exclusively	  (Meleshevich,	  2007,	  pp.	  40,	  74).	  Access	  to	  government	   is	  
fundamental	  for	  a	  party	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  policies.	  Indeed,	  while	  Latvia	  and	  Estonia	  
are	   parliamentary	   systems,	   the	   government	   tends	   to	   have	   the	   upper	   hand	   in	   terms	   of	   both	  
proposing	   draft	   laws	   and	   having	   its	   laws	   approved.	   This	   leaves	   little	   room	   for	   parties	   in	   the	  
opposition	   to	  have	  an	  effective	   impact	  on	  policymaking	   (Rozenvalds,	   2007,	   pp.	   56–57).	   This	   is	  
particularly	  relevant	  for	  this	  study,	  as	  in	  both	  countries	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	  never	  entered	  
governing	  coalitions	  and	  Russian-­‐speaking	  ministers	  have	  been	  few.	  It	  must	  be	  noted,	  however,	  
that	   there	   are	   no	   formal	   limitations	   to	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   representation	   and	   political	  
participation	  and	  no	  serious	  impediments	  exist	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  ethnic	  parties.53	  Rather	  than	  
formal	   impediments,	   it	   is	   party	   systems	   and	   their	   informal	   rules	   of	   party	   competition	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  In	  Estonia	  party	  formation	  rules	  are	  more	  stringent	  than	  in	  Latvia:	  the	  minimum	  number	  of	  members	  to	  register	  a	  
party	  increased	  from	  200	  to	  1,000	  in	  1995,	  making	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  parties	  more	  difficult	   in	  a	  country	  where	  
party	  membership	  is	  generally	  low	  (Daatland	  &	  Svege,	  2000,	  p.	  58).	  In	  Latvia,	  the	  minimum	  number	  of	  members	  is	  
200,	   and	   the	   Latvian	   legislation	   is	   considered	   fairly	   liberal	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   registration	   of	   new	   political	   parties	  
(Ikstens,	  2003,	  p.	  3).	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coalition	  building	  that	  have	  so	  far	  consistently	  kept	  minority	  parties	  out	  of	  government	  and	  have	  
made	  minority	  ministers	  a	  rare	  occurrence.	  
The	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   party	   systems	   reflect	   the	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   cleavage	   in	   their	  
societies	   differently.	   In	   Latvia	   the	   party	   system	   tends	   to	   follow	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   more	   than	  
ideological	   lines	   (Golubeva	  &	  Gould,	   2010,	   p.	   81).	   The	   rise	   of	   Latvian	  nationalist	   forces	   as	   the	  
agenda-­‐setters	   of	   the	   independence	   movement,	   together	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   well-­‐
organised	  Russian-­‐speaking	  political	  field,	  created	  a	  clear	  divide	  in	  the	  Latvian	  party	  system	  from	  
the	  early	  days	  of	   independence.	  All	   the	  more	  so	  as	  the	  political	  elite	  has	  shown	  a	  tendency	  to	  
emphasise	  the	  ethnic	  dimension	  in	  electoral	  campaigns	  (Bottolfs,	  2000,	  pp.	  75–76;	  Golubeva	  &	  
Gould,	  2010,	  p.	  97).	  Parties	  in	  Latvia	  have	  been	  classified	  as	  radical	  nationalist	  parties,	  moderate	  
parties	   or	   Russophone	   parties	   (Bottolfs,	   2000).	   While	   this	   distinction	   is	   broadly	   valid,	   two	  
specifications	  are	  needed.	  First,	  Russophone	  parties	  –	  like	  mainstream	  ones	  –	  can	  also	  be	  either	  
moderate	   or	   nationalist	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	   taking	   strong	   ethnic	   and	   exclusivist	   stances	   in	   the	  
definition	  of	  their	  constituency).	  Second,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  parties	  can	  evolve	  over	  
time	  and	  can	  use	  different	  strategies	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  ethnic	   issue.	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Latvian	  
party	   system	   can	   be	   conceptualised	   as	   a	   continuum	   between	   ‘titular’	   nationalist	   and	  
Russophone	   nationalist	   parties.	   Except	   the	   radicals	   on	   both	   sides,	   parties	   in	   the	   middle	   can	  
strategically	   adjust	   their	   positions	   before	   elections.	   Mainstream	   ‘titular’	   parties	   can	   adopt	   a	  
more	  or	  less	  nationalist	  rhetoric,	  while	  minority	  parties	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  uncompromising	  on	  
ethnic	  issues.	  
At	   one	   extreme	   of	   the	   Latvian	   party	   continuum,	   a	   single	   radical	   nationalist	   party	  
consolidated	  its	  dominant	  position:	  the	  National	  Alliance	  (Nacionālā	  apvienība,	  NA),	  which	  since	  
2011	   includes	   the	   nationalist	   union	   TB/LNNK	   (Tēvzemei	   un	   Brīvībai/Latvijas	   Nacionālās	  
Neatkarības	   Kustība,	   For	   Fatherland	   and	   Freedom/Latvian	  National	   Independence	  Movement)	  
and	  All	  for	  Latvia!	  (Visu	  Latvijai!).	  NA	  increased	  its	  share	  of	  Saeima	  seats	  from	  8	  in	  2010	  to	  17	  in	  
2014.	  While	  NA	  explicitly	  adopts	  strong	  chauvinistic	  and	  anti-­‐Russian	  rhetoric,	  moderate	  Latvian	  
parties	   tend	  to	  employ	  a	  milder	  nationalist	   rhetoric.	  For	   instance,	   the	  now	  disbanded	  People’s	  
Party	   (Tautas	   partija,	   TP)	   has	   been	   pointed	   out	   as	   a	   clear	   example	   of	   a	  moderate	   nationalist	  
party,	   in	   that	   it	  made	  concessions	  to	  the	  minority’s	  demands	  during	   its	  period	   in	  power,	  while	  
maintaining	  a	  ‘mild	  but	  distinctive	  nationalist	  image’	  (Sikk	  &	  Bochsler,	  2008,	  p.	  14).	  TP	  was	  one	  
of	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘oligarchs’	  parties’,	   that	   is,	  parties	  whose	   leadership	   is	  associated	  with	  specific	  
companies	  and	  entrepreneurs.	  These	  parties,	  which	  included	  Latvia’s	  Way	  (Latvijas	  Ceļš,	  LC)	  and	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the	   Union	   of	   Greens	   and	   Farmers	   (Zaļo	   un	   Zemnieku	   Savienība,	   ZZS),54	   all	   occupied	   a	  middle	  
ground	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  nationalist	  outlook.	  	  
After	  TP	  fell	  victim	  to	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis	  (a	  TP-­‐led	  government	  was	  in	  charge	  until	  
2009)	   and	   to	   the	   surge	   of	   an	   anti-­‐corruption	   and	   anti-­‐oligarch	   mood	   among	   the	   population	  
(Dudzińska,	   2011,	   p.	   98),	   it	   has	   been	   replaced	   in	   its	   position	   of	   economically	   right-­‐wing,	  
moderately	  nationalist	  governmental	  party	  by	  Unity	  (Vienotība).	  Unity	  has	  been	  so	  far	  successful	  
in	   gathering	   the	   moderate	   Latvian	   vote	   and	   has	   led	   the	   country’s	   governing	   coalitions	   since	  
2010.	   In	  recent	  years,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  minority-­‐friendly	  parties	  among	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  
has	  arguably	  been	  the	  short-­‐lived	  Zatlers’	  Reform	  Party	   (later	  renamed	  Reform	  Party,	  Reformu	  
partija,	  RP).	  RP	  was	  formed	  on	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  platform	  by	  the	  then	  president	  Valdis	  Zatlers	  
in	  2011	  after	  a	  corruption	  scandal	  had	  led	  to	  a	  successful	  popular	  referendum	  for	  the	  dissolution	  
of	  the	  parliament.	  In	  the	  early	  elections	  that	  followed,	  RP	  proceeded	  to	  win	  almost	  22%	  of	  the	  
vote,	  becoming	  the	  second	  biggest	  party	  in	  the	  Saeima	  after	  Harmony	  Centre.	  Before	  eventually	  
entering	   a	   governing	   coalition	  with	  Unity	   and	  NA,	  RP	  attempted	  negotiations	   to	   form	  a	   grand	  
coalition	  with	   Harmony	   Centre.	   The	   party	   subsequently	   collapsed	   and	   several	   of	   its	  members	  
entered	  Unity	  in	  2014.	  
At	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  continuum,	  there	  are	  the	  minority	  parties.	  For	  Human	  Rights	  in	  a	  
United	  Latvia	   (Par	  Cilvēka	  Tiesībām	  Vienotā	  Latvijā,	   FHRUL)	  had	  united	   the	  Russophone	   forces	  
under	   the	  same	  coalition	   in	   the	  early	  2000s,	  but	  split	  before	   the	  2006	  elections	   into	   the	  more	  
radical	  FHRUL	  (renamed	  Latvia’s	  Russian	  Union/LRU	  in	  2014)	  and	  the	  moderate	  Harmony	  Centre	  
(Saskaņas	  Centrs).55	  Harmony	  Centre	  is	  currently	  led	  by	  Nils	  Ušakovs,	  the	  first	  Russian-­‐speaker	  to	  
be	  mayor	  of	  Riga.	  While	  FHRUL	  maintains	  radical	  Russophone-­‐centric	  positions,	  Harmony	  Centre	  
does	   not	   depict	   itself	   as	   an	   exclusively	   Russophone	   party	   but	   as	   an	   inclusive,	   liberal	   and	  
(increasingly)	  social-­‐democratic	  force	  (Dudzińska,	  2011;	  Poleshchuk,	  2009,	  p.	  188).	  This	  strategy	  
seems	   to	  have	  been	   successful	   as	  Harmony	  Centre	  attracted	  most	  of	   the	   ‘Russian	  vote’	   and	  a	  
portion	   of	   the	   ethnic	   Latvian	   one,	   becoming	   the	   biggest	   party	   in	   the	   Saeima	   since	   2011.	  
FHRUL/LRU’s	  share	  of	  the	  vote,	  instead,	  decreased	  rapidly	  and	  since	  2010	  it	  has	  not	  managed	  to	  
clear	  the	  5%	  threshold.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  The	   leader	  of	  TP,	  Andrin	  Šķēle,	   is	   the	  main	  shareholder	  of	  AVE	  Lat,	  a	   large	  trading	  company;	  ZZS	   is	  dominated	  by	  
Aivars	   Lembergs,	   one	   of	   the	   richest	   men	   in	   Latvia;	   LC	   –	   later	   united	   with	   Latvia’s	   First	   Party,	   Latvijas	   Pirmā	  
partija/Latvijas	  Ceļš,	  LPP	  to	  form	  LPP/LC	  –	  was	  controlled	  by	  the	  local	  tycoon	  Ainārs	  Šlesers	  and	  linked	  to	  successful	  
businessmen	  like	  Vilis	  Kristopans	  (Bottolfs,	  2000,	  p.	  98;	  Golubeva	  &	  Gould,	  2010,	  pp.	  97–98).	  
55	  Harmony	  Centre	  was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  merger	  of	  the	  National	  Harmony	  Party,	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party,	  the	  New	  










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Harmony	   Centre’s	   evolution	   seems	   to	   be	   following	   the	   mainstreaming	   course	   that	   has	  
been	   observed	   in	   other	   Eastern	   European	   ethnic	   parties.	   According	   to	   the	   mainstreaming	  
theory,	   repeated	   interaction	   of	   ethnic	   parties	   in	   the	   party	   system	   creates	   incentives	   for	  
moderation	   and	   compromise	   (Stefanova,	   2012).	   Ahmed	   Dogan’s	   observation	   that	   the	   ethnic	  
Turkish	   party	  Movement	   for	   Rights	   and	   Freedom	   in	   Bulgaria	   is	   changing	   ‘from	  ethnic	   political	  
organization	   to	  national	  political	  organization	  of	  ethnic	   type’	   (quoted	   in	  Stefanova,	  2012,	  p.	  8)	  
seem	  to	  apply	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  also	  to	  Harmony	  Centre.	  
Notwithstanding	   this,	   Russophone	   parties	   have	   been	   consistently	   excluded	   from	  
governing	   coalitions.	   This	  has	   so	   far	   remained	  an	   inviolable	  unwritten	   rule,	   although	  Harmony	  
Centre’s	   electoral	   results	   did	   lead	   to	   some	   talk	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   its	   inclusion	   in	  
government	   (Golubeva	  &	  Gould,	   2010,	   p.	   88).	   The	   routine	   exclusion	   of	   this	  major	   party	   from	  
governmental	   coalitions	   has	   meant	   that	   the	   large	   moderate	   and	   nationalist	   parties	   have	   an	  
almost	  mathematical	  guarantee	  to	  end	  up	  in	  government.	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  this	  situation	  of	  
guaranteed	  power	  might	  weaken	   these	  parties’	   political	   accountability	   towards	   the	   electorate	  
(Kažoka	  &	  Akule,	  2009,	  p.	  4).	  
Interestingly,	  there	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  overlap	  between	  the	  minority–nationalist	  and	  the	  left–
right	  divide	  in	  Latvia’s	  party	  system.	  In	  the	  first	  democratic	  elections	  in	  1993	  the	  left	  was	  defined	  
less	   by	   traditional	   labour	   values	   than	   by	   its	   commitment	   to	   a	   more	   liberal	   citizenship	   law	  
(Bottolfs,	  2000,	  p.	  85).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Russophone	  parties	  tend	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  leftist	  
positions	   in	   political	   economy.	   This	   conflation	   of	   leftist	   positions	   and	   Russophone	   parties	   has	  
been	  consistently	  used	  to	  discredit	  the	  former	  by	  implying	  the	  disloyalty	  of	  the	  latter	  (Golubeva	  
&	  Gould,	  2010,	  p.	  96).	  According	  to	  some	  observers,	  however,	   the	  2008	  global	  economic	  crisis	  
that	  hit	  Latvia	  particularly	  hard	  might	  change	  the	  voters’	  disposition	  towards	  leftist	  policies,	  and	  
the	  absence	  of	  a	  mainstream	  Latvian	  contender	  on	   the	   left	  might	  drive	  more	  Latvian-­‐speaking	  
voters	  towards	  Harmony	  Centre	  (Dudzińska,	  2011,	  p.	  99).	  
In	   contrast	   to	   Latvia,	   in	   Estonia	   the	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   cleavage,	   although	   strongly	   felt	   in	  
society	  and	  present	  in	  the	  political	  debates,	  does	  not	  straightforwardly	  shape	  the	  party	  system.	  
It	   has	   been	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   cleavage	   structure	   of	   the	   Estonian	   party	   system	   is	   arranged	  
along	   three	   lines:	   ethnic,	   urban–rural,	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   (Daatland	   &	   Svege,	   2000).	   These	  
dimensions	   do	   not	   balance	   each	   other	   out	   but	   each	   shows	   a	   clearly	  winning	   side,	  with	   three	  
overlapping	   winning	   poles:	   parties	   that	   are	   ethnic-­‐Estonian,	   urban	   and	   right-­‐wing	   have	  
dominated	  government	  since	  independence	  (Daatland	  &	  Svege,	  2000,	  p.	  65ff.).	  	  
The	  openly	   ethnic	  dimension	  of	   the	  party	   system	   faded	   in	   the	  early	   2000s.	  Russophone	  
parties	   that	   had	   emerged	   in	   the	   1990s	   did	   not	   succeed	   in	  monopolising	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	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electorate	  (Sikk	  &	  Bochsler,	  2008,	  p.	  17)	  and,	  since	  the	  2003	  elections,	  consistently	  failed	  to	  clear	  
the	  5%	  threshold.	   In	  1995	  for	  the	  first	   time	  a	  Russophone	  electoral	  bloc,	  Our	  Home	  is	  Estonia,	  
entered	   parliament	   (with	   six	   seats),	   but	   it	   broke	   apart	   soon	   after	   the	   elections	   into	   the	   two	  
smaller	   parties	   that	   constituted	   it	   (Pettai	   &	   Kreuzer,	   1998,	   pp.	   155–156).	   In	   the	   subsequent	  
elections	   in	   1999,	   Russophone	   parties	   run	   together	   again	   in	   a	   new	   formation	   (the	   Estonian	  
United	   People's	   Party)	   which	   secured	   six	   seats.	   After	   that,	   however,	   because	   of	   internal	  
divergences	  the	  block	  split	  into	  two	  parties,	  the	  Estonian	  United	  People's	  Party	  and	  the	  Russian	  
Party	  in	  Estonia	  (Grofman,	  Mikkel,	  &	  Taagepera,	  2000,	  p.	  344).	  Both	  failed	  to	  win	  seats	  in	  2003.	  
The	   failure	   of	   minority	   parties	   in	   Estonia	   has	   been	   commonly	   attributed	   to	   their	   internal	  
squabbles	  and	  divisiveness	  (Daatland	  &	  Svege,	  2000,	  p.	  273),	  and	  to	  their	  marginalisation	  both	  in	  
parliament	  and	  in	  local	  councils,	  which	  made	  them	  largely	  ineffective	  (Poleshchuk,	  2009,	  p.	  56).	  
Even	  when	  they	  ran	  under	  a	  single	  list	  in	  1995	  and	  1999,	  Estonia’s	  minority	  parties	  were	  never	  
entirely	  successful	  in	  mobilising	  the	  ‘Russian	  vote’	  (Galbreath,	  2005,	  pp.	  123–124;	  Mikkel,	  2006,	  
p.	  24),	  failing	  to	  become	  plausible	  contenders	  for	  political	  power	  or	  at	   least	  credible	  advocates	  
for	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority.	  	  
Even	  after	  minority	  parties	  virtually	  disappeared,	  the	  ethnic	  dimension	  remained	  relevant,	  
and	   an	   exclusive/nationalist–inclusive/civic	   continuum	   can	   be	   detected	   in	   the	   Estonian	   party	  
system.	   This	   continuum	   is	   more	   significant	   in	   defining	   the	   Estonian	   party	   system	   than	   the	  
traditional	  left–right	  divide.	  Although	  ethnically	  inclusive	  parties	  tend	  also	  to	  be	  more	  on	  the	  left	  
than	  exclusive	  ones,	  there	  has	  typically	  been	  consensus	  among	  the	  main	  parties	  about	  market-­‐
oriented	  economic	  policies	  (Sikk,	  2003,	  p.	  18).	  As	  for	  the	  parties’	  position	  on	  the	  nationalist–civic	  
continuum,	  like	  in	  Latvia	  this	  has	  not	  always	  been	  clear-­‐cut.	  On	  the	  one	  side	  of	  the	  continuum,	  
the	  Estonian	  nationalist	   right	  consolidated	  around	  a	  shared	  platform	   in	  2006,	  with	   the	  merger	  
into	  the	  Union	  of	  Pro	  Patria	  and	  Res	  Publica	  (Isamaa	  ja	  Res	  Publica	  Liit,	  IRL)	  of	  the	  long-­‐standing	  
Pro	   Patria	  Union	   (Isamaa	   Liit,	   IL)	   and	   the	   new	  party	   Res	   Publica	   (RP).	   Interestingly,	  when	   Res	  
Publica	   was	   created	   in	   2003	   it	   did	   not	   campaign	   on	   a	   downright	   nationalist	   agenda,	   but	  
successfully	   managed	   to	   balance	   its	   national	   appeal	   with	   its	   bid	   for	   Russian	   votes	   (Sikk	   &	  
Bochsler,	   2008,	   p.	   14).	   While	   IRL	   belongs	   firmly	   to	   the	   conservative	   nationalist	   right,	   it	   has	  
tended	  to	  show	  more	  moderation	   in	   its	  nationalist	  rhetoric	  than	   its	  Latvian	  counterpart,	  NA.	   It	  
has	  been	  argued	  that	  such	  moderation,	  far	  from	  being	  due	  to	  lower	  ethnic	  tensions	  in	  Estonia,	  is	  
explained	   by	   the	   absence	   of	   significant	   Russophone	   ethnic	   parties,	   which	   reduces	   the	   ethnic	  
conflict	  dimension	  within	   the	  party	   system	  and	  makes	   it	  unnecessary	   for	  nationalist	  parties	   to	  
resort	  to	  radical	  rhetoric	  (Bennich-­‐Björkman	  &	  Johansson,	  2012,	  p.	  15).	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The	   biggest	   centre-­‐right	   party,	   the	   Reform	  party	   (Eesti	   Reformierakond,	   RP),	   has	   always	  
been	  part	  of	   the	  governing	  coalition	   since	   it	  was	   founded	   in	  1994	  and	  could	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  
moderate	   nationalist	   party.	   As	   in	   Latvia,	   moderate	   parties	   can	   strategically	   sway	   between	  
inclusive	  and	  exclusive	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  minority.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Reform	  counted	  over	  
the	   years	   a	   number	   (admittedly	   limited)	   of	   Russian-­‐speaking	   MPs	   and	   has	   tried	   to	   bid	   for	  
Russian-­‐speakers’	   votes,	   for	   example	   by	   promising	   a	   development	   plan	   for	   the	   economically	  
depressed,	   majority-­‐Russophone	   Estonian	   north-­‐east.56	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   party	   used	  
markedly	  nationalist	  tones	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  relocation	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐time	  Bronze	  Soldier	  statue	  
from	  the	  centre	  of	  Tallinn,	  in	  order	  to	  boost	  its	  support	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  IRL	  in	  the	  2007	  elections	  (Pettai,	  
2008,	  p.	  965).	  	  
The	   Centre	   Party	   (Keskerakond,	   CP)	   can	   be	   placed	   at	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   continuum.	  
Over	  the	  years,	  CP	  has	  absorbed	  most	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  electorate	  and,	   in	  so	  doing,	  has	  
taken	  on	  also	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  resonate	  with	  the	  minority	  electorate.	  It	  is	  not,	  however,	  
an	  ethnic	  party.	  Its	  leadership	  is	  overwhelmingly	  ethnic	  Estonian	  and	  its	  electorate	  is	  not	  by	  any	  
means	   limited	   to	   the	   Russophone	   section	   of	   society.	   Heir	   to	   the	   Estonian	   Popular	   Front,	   CP	  
emerged	   in	   post-­‐independence	   Estonia	   from	   the	   moderate	   wing	   of	   the	   independence	  
movement	   –	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   position	   on	  minority	   issues	   and	   of	   its	   attitudes	   towards	   the	  
communist	   past	   (Saarts,	   2011,	   p.	   96).	   Its	  more	   leftist	   economic	   rhetoric	   (although	   it	   followed	  
liberal	   orthodoxy	   when	   in	   government),57	   its	   civic-­‐liberal	   positions	   regarding	   the	   Russophone	  
minority,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  nearly	  all	   the	  Russophone	  MPs	  that	  entered	  the	  Riigikogu	  after	  the	  
collapse	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	  were	  from	  CP	  made	  it	  the	  party	  of	  choice	  for	  the	  great	  
majority	  of	  Russophone	  voters.	  It	  also	  became	  the	  main	  avenue	  for	  ambitious	  Russian-­‐speakers	  
to	  enter	  politics.	  
Although	  it	  campaigns	  on	  a	  moderate-­‐inclusive	  agenda,	  CP	  has	  a	  mixed	  record	  in	  pursuing	  
Russian-­‐friendly	   policies	   and	   delivering	   on	   its	   promises.58	   However,	   CP’s	   ties	   with	   the	  
Russophone	   electorate	   and	   its	   lenient	   attitudes	   towards	   Russia	   do	   not	   go	   unnoticed	   in	   the	  
Estonian	  political	  landscape,	  and	  time	  and	  again	  these	  have	  been	  framed	  as	  anti-­‐Estonian	  by	  its	  
political	   adversaries.	   For	   instance,	   when	   in	   2010	   CP	   was	   involved	   in	   a	   party-­‐funding	   scandal	  
related	   to	  Russian	   funds,	   it	  was	  accused	  of	  being	   ‘Russia’s	   agent	  of	   influence’	   in	  Estonia	   (Sikk,	  
2011,	  p.	  963).	  CP	   is	   led	  by	  Edgar	  Savisaar,	  who	  has	  also	  been	  the	  mayor	  of	  Tallinn	  since	  2007.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	   See	   ‘Razvivaia	   Ida-­‐Virumaa’	   (Developing	   Ida-­‐Virumaa)	   in	   Reform’s	   official	   website:	  
http://www.reform.ee/ru/news/razvivaya-­‐ida-­‐virumaa	  (Last	  accessed	  17	  November	  2014).	  
57	  Russian-­‐speaking	  voters	  have	   traditionally	  been	  more	   left	   leaning	   than	   the	  average	   in	  Estonia	   (Daatland	  &	  Svege,	  
2000,	  p.	  263).	  
58	   For	   example,	   in	   2001	   the	   Centre	   Party	   faction	   in	   parliament	   voted	   alongside	   the	   nationalist	   Isamaaliit	   against	  
amendments	   to	   the	   election	   law	   that	   would	   have	   relaxed	   the	   language	   requirements	   for	   candidates	   (Galbreath,	  










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although	   it	   was	   intermittently	   included	   in	   governing	   coalitions,59	   CP	   is	   generally	   seen	   as	   an	  
uncomfortable	  coalition	  partner.	  Savisaar’s	  highly	  divisive	  figure	  (not	  least	  within	  his	  own	  party)	  
and	  his	  larger-­‐than-­‐life	  persona	  play	  no	  secondary	  role	  in	  this.	  	  
The	   Social	  Democratic	   Party	   (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik	   Erakond,	   SDE)	   has	   so	   far	   had	  unclear	  
credentials	   as	   a	   centre-­‐left,	   ethnically	   inclusive	   party.	   Its	   predecessor	   (Moderates,	  Mõõdukad,	  
another	   heir	   to	   the	   Popular	   Front)	   had	   initially	   campaigned	   for	   ‘a	   more	   enlightened	   policy’	  
towards	   the	  minority	   (Laitin,	   2003,	   p.	   201)	   and	   had	   pushed	   for	   the	   drafting	   of	   an	   integration	  
programme	  (Brosig,	  2008,	  p.	  6).	  In	  1999,	  however,	  it	  also	  ran	  in	  a	  joint	  list	  with	  Reform	  and	  the	  
nationalist	  Isamaaliit.	  After	  it	  was	  reorganised	  and	  renamed	  in	  2003,	  SDE	  has	  been	  moderate	  on	  
minority	  issues,	  while	  part	  of	  conservative	  governing	  coalitions	  with	  Reform	  (and,	  between	  2007	  
and	   2009,	   also	   with	   IRL).60	   There	   are	   indications	   that	   SDE	   might	   be	   trying	   to	   consolidate	   its	  
position	   as	   a	   centre-­‐left	   force	   with	   progressive	   views	   on	   the	   minority	   question.	   It	   not	   only	  
campaigned	   on	   an	   economically	   progressive	   platform,61	   but	   in	   2012	   it	   also	   absorbed	   the	  
remnants	   of	   the	   Russian	   Party	   in	   Estonia	   (Vene	   Erakond	   Eestis,	   VEE).62	   In	   2014	   a	   young	   SDE	  
Russophone	  politician,	  Jevgeni	  Ossinovski,	  became	  the	  first	  Russian-­‐speaking	  Education	  Minister	  
in	  the	  2014	  Reform-­‐SDE	  government.	  
In	  conclusion,	   in	  Latvia	  the	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  cleavage	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  party	  system	  
whereas	   in	   Estonia	   it	   has	   been	   mostly	   reabsorbed	   by	   mainstream,	   non-­‐ethnic	   parties	   and	  
remains	  as	  a	  milder	  divide	  among	  these	  parties.	  In	  both	  cases,	  however,	  this	  cleavage	  is	  always	  
ready	   to	   be	   exploited	   at	   election	   time	   and	   can	   potentially	   also	   create	   discordances	   within	  
parties.	   The	   nationalist–civic	   dimension	   of	   Estonia’s	   and	   Latvia’s	   party	   systems	   can	   be	  
understood	   as	   a	   continuum	  between	   the	   two	   radical	   extremes	   (radical	   nationalist	   parties	   and	  
radical	   ethnic	   parties),	   which	   can	   accommodate	   middle-­‐ground	   positions,	   such	   as	   moderate	  
nationalist	   parties,	   civic-­‐liberal	   parties,	   and	   minority-­‐friendly	   parties	   (Sikk	   &	   Bochsler,	   2008).	  
Especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Latvia,	   there	   is	   also	   a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   radical	   ethnic	   and	  
moderate	  ethnic	  parties.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Edgar	  Savisaar	  was	   the	   first	  Prime	  Minister	  of	   independent	  Estonia,	   led	  by	   the	  Popular	  Front.	  CP	  was	   included	   in	  
governing	  coalitions	  in	  1995,	  in	  2002–2003,	  and	  in	  2005–2007.	  
60	  For	  a	  history	  of	  the	  SDE	  see	  the	  party’s	  official	  website:	  http://www.sotsdem.ee/en/sotsidest/history/	  (Last	  accessed	  
17	  November	  2014).	  
61	   For	   SDE’s	   2011	   electoral	   programme	   see	   its	   official	   website:	   http://www.sotsdem.ee/ru/sotsial-­‐
demokratyi/programma-­‐k-­‐parlamentskim-­‐vyiboram-­‐2011-­‐goda/	  (Last	  accessed	  17	  November	  2014).	  
62	   See	   SDE’s	   press	   release	   (http://www.sotsdem.ee/ru/sotsial-­‐demokratyi-­‐i-­‐russkaya-­‐partiya-­‐podpisali-­‐dogovor-­‐ob-­‐
obedinenii/).	   When	   it	   merged	   into	   SDE	   in	   January	   2012,	   VEE	   was	   little	   more	   than	   an	   empty	   shell	   and	   had	   not	  
managed	  to	  get	  more	  than	  2%	  of	  the	  vote	  since	  the	  1999	  elections.	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2.4 Conclusions:	  What	  remains	  to	  be	  studied	  
This	   chapter	   provided	   the	   necessary	   background	   for	   the	   subsequent	   analysis	   of	   minority	  
inclusion	  in	  policymaking	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  Although	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  identity	  and	  minority	  
policies	   have	   received	   relatively	   high	   academic	   attention,	   not	   much	   has	   been	   written	   about	  
minority	   political	   representation	   in	   the	   two	   countries.	   Apart	   from	   inclusion	   in	   some	   of	   the	  
comparative	  studies	  on	  ethnic	  parties	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  
about	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   minority	   representation	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   has	  
been	   descriptive,63	   or	   has	   asked	   specific	   one-­‐country	   questions.64	   Several	   academic	  
contributions	  dealt	  with	  party	  system	  consolidation	  and	  stability	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  in	  which	  
case	   ethnic	   minority	   representation	   was	   but	   one	   of	   the	   factors	   taken	   into	   account.65	   Other	  
authors	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority’s	  party	  support	  and	  electoral	  behaviour	  
at	  the	  local	  (Berg	  &	  Sikk,	  2004)	  and	  national	  (Sikk	  &	  Bochsler,	  2008)	  level.	  	  
On	  a	  separate	  line	  of	  research,	  authors	  that	  have	  looked	  at	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  through	  the	  
model	  of	  ethnic	  democracy	  have	  proposed	  a	  useful	  framework	  to	  understand	  the	  logics	  of	  state-­‐
building	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  and	  the	  appropriation	  of	  state	  structures	  by	  the	  ethnic	  majority.	  
The	   way	   in	   which	   such	   control	   translates	   into	   democratic	   practices	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  
minorities	  can	  challenge	  majority	  control	  through	  political	  representation,	  however,	  remains	  to	  
be	  studied.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  task	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	   Vello	   Pettai	   and	   Marcus	   Kreuzer	   (1998)	   gave	   an	   account	   of	   the	   Baltic	   states’	   party	   system	   development,	   and	  
indicated	  the	  ethnic	  cleavage	  as	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  political	  fault	  lines	  in	  Latvia	  and	  Estonia.	  Bernard	  Grofman,	  Evald	  
Mikkel	   and	   Rein	   Taagepera	   (2000)	   wrote	   a	   comprehensive	   historical	   account	   of	   parties’	   ‘fissions	   and	   fusions’	   in	  
Estonia	  until	  1999,	  which	   includes	  ethnic	  parties.	  Marina	  Martynova	   (1999)	  gave	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  ethnic	  Russian	  
party	   development	   in	   Estonia	   up	   to	   1999.	   David	  Galbreath’s	   (2005)	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   nation-­‐building	   and	  
minority	  politics	  in	  Latvia	  and	  Estonia	  includes	  a	  comprehensive	  historical	  account	  of	  minority	  politics	  developments.	  
Jānis	  Ikstens	  (2006)	  gave	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  history	  of	  ‘East-­‐Slavic	  parties’	  in	  Latvia	  up	  to	  2006.	  Kristina	  Kallas	  
(2008)	   traced	   a	   history	   of	   the	   political	   participation	   of	   national	   minorities	   in	   the	   Latvian	   and	   Estonian	   political	  
decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  
64	  For	  example,	  Eiki	  Berg	   (2001)	  adopted	  a	  centre-­‐periphery	  perspective	   to	   try	  and	  explain	  why	  the	  overwhelmingly	  
Russian-­‐speaking	  Estonian	  Northeast	  has	  not	  engaged	  in	  autonomist	  or	  irredentist	  mobilisation.	  	  
65	  For	  instance,	  in	  Anatoly	  Kulik	  and	  Susanna	  Pshizova’s	  (2005)	  edited	  book	  on	  political	  parties	  in	  post-­‐Soviet	  countries,	  
ethnic	  parties	  and	  minority	  representation	  are	  considered	  only	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  party	  
system	  consolidation.	  Mikkel	  (2006)	  looked	  at	  the	  Estonian	  party	  systems	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  democratic	  transition	  
and	  consolidation.	  Artis	  Pabriks	  and	  Aiga	  Štokenberga	  (2006)	  gave	  a	  historical	  overview	  of	  Latvia’s	  party	  system	  to	  








Russophone	  minority	  voices	  can	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  policymaking	  process	  through	  five	  different	  
channels.	   First,	   the	   minority	   can	   participate	   in	   policymaking	   directly	   through	   formal	  
representation	   in	   parliament.	   Second,	   they	   can	   push	   their	   agenda	   forward	   through	   the	  
mediation	  and	  influence	  of	  international	  organisations.	  Third,	  they	  can	  use	  positions	  of	  power	  in	  
the	  city	  governments	  of	  the	  two	  capital	  cities	  as	  an	  alternative	  route	  to	  influencing	  policies	  and	  
their	   implementation.	   Fourth,	   they	   can	  be	   involved	   in	   setting	   the	  agenda	  and	   shaping	  policies	  
through	   institutionalised	   consultation	   mechanisms.	   And,	   fifth,	   they	   can	   influence	   policies	   by	  
mobilising	   at	   the	   grassroots	   level.	   These	   five	   channels	   are	   all	   potential	   routes	   though	   which	  
minority	   voices	   can	   take	   part	   in	   political	   debates	   but	   do	   not	   necessarily	   guarantee	   effective	  
inclusion	  or	  influence	  over	  policies.	  They	  will	  be	  analysed	  one	  by	  one	  in	  the	  next	  five	  chapters,	  
taking	  a	  specific	  policy	  (or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  last	  channel,	  a	  set	  of	  specific	  events)	  as	  illustration	  
of	  the	  possibilities	  for	  minority	  political	  inclusion	  and	  the	  risks	  of	  exclusion	  each	  channel	  entails.	  
While	  all	  policymaking	  processes	  involved	  in	  varying	  degrees	  all	  the	  five	  channels,	  specific	  policy-­‐
cases	  have	  been	  selected	  that	  best	  illustrate	  the	  potentialities	  of	  each	  channel.	  The	  specificity	  of	  
the	  policy-­‐cases	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  retrace	  the	  policymaking	  process	  as	  it	  unfolded,	  taking	  into	  
consideration	   more	   details	   than	   it	   would	   be	   possible	   were	   an	   entire	   policy	   area	   (education,	  
language,	  citizenship)	  to	  be	  analysed.	  	  
This	   chapter	   focuses	  on	   the	   formal	   representation	  of	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minorities	   in	   the	  
Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  parliaments.	  This	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  direct	  channel	  for	  minority	  voices	  to	  
enter	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  as	  both	  countries	  are	  parliamentary	  democracies	  and	  the	  most	  
important	  minority-­‐sensitive	  policies	  are	  discussed	  and	  decided	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  The	  policy-­‐
case	   that	   best	   illustrates	   the	   possibilities	   for	   minority	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	   through	   this	  
channel	   is	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   legislation	   on	   the	   non-­‐citizens’	   political	   rights.	   More	  
precisely,	  the	  decision	  on	  whether	  to	  grant	  non-­‐citizens	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  local	  elections.	  
The	  issue	  of	  non-­‐citizens’	  local	  voting	  rights	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  for	  this	  comparative	  
analysis	  because	  it	  had	  different	  outcomes	  in	  Estonia	  –	  where	  it	  was	  granted	  already	  in	  the	  1992	  
Constitution	  –	  and	  in	  Latvia,	  where	  minority	  MPs	  have	  presented	  proposals	  to	  that	  effect	  several	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  A	  version	  of	   this	   chapter	  was	  published	  as	   ‘Granting	   local	   voting	   rights	   to	  non-­‐citizens	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia:	   The	  
conundrum	  of	  minority	  representation	  in	  two	  divided	  democracies’	  in	  Journal	  on	  Ethnopolitics	  and	  Minority	  Issues	  in	  
Europe,	  13	  (1)	  2014,	  pp.	  86–112.	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times,	   only	   to	   see	   them	   always	   voted	   down	   in	   parliament.	   The	   comparison	   between	   the	  
different	   ‘stories’	   of	   this	   policy	   in	   Latvia	   and	   Estonia	   highlights	   fundamental	   differences	   and	  
similarities	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  minority	  voices	  can	  effectively	  take	  part	  in	  policymaking	  through	  
formal	   parliamentary	   representation.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   had	   opposite	  
outcomes	  makes	  this	  the	  ideal	  policy-­‐case	  to	  question	  the	  common-­‐sense	  assumption	  that	  what	  
could	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  ‘good	  outcome’	  (that	  is,	  one	  that	  is	  favourable	  to	  the	  minority)	  is	  always	  
the	  result	  of	  a	  ‘good	  process’	  (that	  is,	  a	  democratically	  inclusive	  one),	  and	  vice	  versa	  that	  a	  ‘good	  
process’	  will	  necessarily	  yield	  a	  ‘good	  outcome’.	  
As	   discussed	   in	  more	   detail	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	  minority	   formal	   representation	   in	   state	  
level	  institutions	  is	  usually	  looked	  at	  from	  within	  one	  of	  two	  theoretical	  paradigms:	  students	  of	  
minority	   representation	  tend	  to	   frame	  their	  studies	  either	  within	   the	  polarisation	  paradigm	  or	  
within	   the	   presence	   paradigm.	   The	   polarisation	   paradigm	   assumes	   that	   the	   politicisation	   of	  
ethnicity	   has	   mostly	   negative	   effects	   on	   democratic	   stability	   and	   inter-­‐ethnic	   peace	   (e.g.	  
Diamond	  and	  Gunther,	  2001;	  Horowitz,	  1985;	  Rabushka	  and	  Shepsle,	  1972).	  Ethnicity	  is	  seen	  as	  
a	   zero-­‐sum	   issue,	   and	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   ethnic	   representatives	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   prone	   to	  
engage	   in	   ethnic	   outbidding	   and	   radicalism.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   politicisation	   of	   ethnicity	  
makes	  compromise	  unlikely	  and	  makes	   it	  more	  difficult	   for	   liberal,	  minority-­‐friendly	  policies	  to	  
be	  passed.	  The	  presence	  paradigm	  starts	  from	  the	  opposed	  assumption	  that	  ethnicity	  is	  flexible	  
rather	   than	   zero-­‐sum,	  and	   thus	   it	   does	  not	  necessarily	   imply	  ethnic	  outbidding	  and	   radicalism	  
(Birnir,	  2007).	  Minority	  representation	  is	  seen	  as	  having	  positive	  effects	  for	  democracy	  and	  inter-­‐
ethnic	  peace,	  as	  ethnic	  parties	  peacefully	  articulate	  minority	  demands,	  include	  minorities	  in	  the	  
political	  process,	  and	   institutionalise	  conflict	   (e.g.	  Chandra,	  2005;	   Ishiyama,	  2009;	  Mansbridge,	  
1999;	   Phillips,	   1995;	   Stroschein,	   2001).	   Consequently,	   minority	   political	   presence	   makes	   it	  
possible	  to	  reach	  compromise	  solutions	  and	  potentially	  yields	  policies	  that	  are	  more	  favourable	  
to	  the	  minority.	  
While	  this	  study	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  presence	  paradigm	  as	  it	  rejects	  zero-­‐sum	  understandings	  
of	  ethnic	  politics,	   it	  does	  not	  assume	  that	  minority	  representation	  necessarily	  has	  an	  all-­‐round	  
positive	   effect	   on	   policymaking	   and	   policy	   outcome.	   Rather,	   its	   effect	   must	   be	   analysed	  
empirically.	   By	   process	   tracing	   and	   comparing	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   decision-­‐making	  
processes	  with	   regard	   to	  non-­‐citizens’	   voting	   rights,	   this	   chapter	   sets	  about	   to	  do	  exactly	   this:	  
analysing	   the	   patterns	   of	   minority	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	   in	   parliamentary	   policymaking	   and	  
revealing	   the	   causal	   mechanisms	   that	   link	   together	   minority	   formal	   representation	   (or	   lack	  
thereof),	   the	   unfolding	   of	   the	   policymaking	   process,	   and	   the	   policy	   outcome.	   The	   comparison	  
between	   the	   two	   cases	   reveals	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   that	   blurs	   the	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boundaries	  between	  competing	  paradigms	  for	  the	  study	  of	  minority	  political	  representation	  and	  
questions	  simplistic	  assumptions	  on	   the	  causal	   relation	  between	  the	  democratic	  quality	  of	   the	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  the	  content	  of	  its	  outcome.	  
3.1 The	  policymaking	  processes	  on	  non-­‐citizens’	  voting	  rights	  
The	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  post-­‐1991	  citizenship	   laws	  granted	  citizenship	  only	  to	  those	  who	  had	  
been	   citizens	   of	   the	   inter-­‐war	   republics	   and	   their	   descendants.	   These	   laws	   created	   a	   new	  
category	   of	   permanent	   residents,	   the	   non-­‐citizens.67	   These	   are	   former	   Soviet	   Union	   citizens	  
(almost	  exclusively	  Russian-­‐speakers)	  who	  did	  not	  qualify	  for	  Latvian	  or	  Estonian	  citizenship	  by	  
birth	   and,	   over	   the	   years,	   were	   neither	   naturalised	   nor	   acquired	   the	   citizenship	   of	   a	   third	  
country.	   In	  2014	   the	  permanent	   residents	  who	   fell	  under	   this	   category	  were	  6.5%	  of	  Estonia’s	  
total	  population	  and	  12.7%	  of	  Latvia’s.	   In	  both	  countries,	  non-­‐citizens	  enjoy	  a	   restricted	  set	  of	  
rights	   compared	   to	   citizens.	   While	   restrictions	   on	   travel	   have	   been	   mostly	   eliminated,68	  
limitations	  still	  apply	   in	  both	  countries	   for	  what	  concerns	  employment	  opportunities,	  property	  
rights	   and	   political	   rights.69	   The	   question	   of	   voting	   rights	   is	   particularly	   controversial	   as	   it	  
determines	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  the	  minority	  population	  can	  take	  part	  in	  
the	  democratic	  process	  of	  their	  country	  of	  residence.	  Since	  almost	  all	  non-­‐citizens	  are	  Russian-­‐
speakers,	   this	   issue	   also	   overlaps	   with	   the	   more	   general	   issue	   of	   the	   Russophone	   minority’s	  
chances	  for	  political	  representation.	  In	  2014	  in	  Latvia	  about	  40%	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	  were	  non-­‐
citizens.	  In	  Estonia,	  in	  2012	  about	  half	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  population	  did	  not	  have	  the	  
citizenship	  of	   their	   country	  of	   residence;	   that	   is,	   they	  were	  either	  non-­‐citizens	  or	   citizens	  of	   a	  
third	  country	  (Järve	  &	  Poleshchuk,	  2013,	  p.	  7).	  
Interestingly,	   despite	   their	   relatively	   similar	   historical	   contexts,	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	  
followed	  different	  paths	  in	  addressing	  voting	  rights	  for	  non-­‐citizens.	  While	  in	  Estonia	  the	  right	  of	  
all	  permanent	  residents	  to	  vote	  in	  local	  elections	  was	  already	  enshrined	  in	  the	  1992	  constitution,	  
in	   Latvia	   non-­‐citizens	   are	   to	   this	   day	   totally	   disenfranchised	   and	   this	   remains	   a	   hotly-­‐debated	  
question.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Differently	   from	  Latvia,	   the	  Estonian	   legislation	  refers	  to	   ‘people	  with	  undetermined	  citizenship’	  rather	  than	   ‘non-­‐
citizens’.	  For	  simplicity,	  and	  following	  the	  common	  usage	  of	  the	  term,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  both	  the	  Estonian	  ‘people	  with	  
undetermined	  citizenship’	  and	  the	  ‘non-­‐citizens	  of	  Latvia’	  as	  ‘non-­‐citizens’.	  
68	   Both	   the	   EU	   Schengen	   countries	   and	   the	   Russian	   Federation	   allow	   visa-­‐free	   travel	   for	   bearers	   of	   Estonian	   and	  
Latvian	  ‘alien	  passports’.	  By	  virtue	  of	  this,	  non-­‐citizens	  have	  more	  travel	  freedom	  than	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  citizens,	  
who	   need	   a	   visa	   to	   travel	   to	   Russia.	   This	   is	   sometimes	   mentioned	   as	   a	   deterrent	   for	   non-­‐citizens	   to	   apply	   for	  
naturalisation	  (Heidmets,	  2008,	  p.	  57;	  Ivļevs	  &	  King,	  2012,	  pp.	  9–10).	  For	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  non-­‐citizens’	  travelling	  
and	   working	   rights	   in	   the	   EU	   see	   Workpermit.com:	   http://www.workpermit.com/news/2007_01_02/eu/visa-­‐
free_travel_stateless_aliens.htm	  (Last	  accessed	  17	  November	  2014).	  
69	  For	  an	  updated	  list	  of	  the	  differences	   in	  rights	  between	  non-­‐citizens	  and	  citizens	  see	  Latvijas	  pilsoņu	  un	  nepilsoņu	  
tiesību	   atškīrību	   saraksts	   (List	   of	   differences	   in	   rights	   for	   Latvia’s	   citizens	   and	   non-­‐citizens)	   available	   at:	  
http://www.lhrc.lv/arxiv/p0_2010_lat.pdf	  (Last	  accessed	  17	  November	  2014).	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3.1.1 Policymaking	  in	  the	  Estonian	  parliament	  
The	  1992	  Citizenship	  Act	  de	   facto	  disenfranchised	  most	  Russian-­‐speakers	   in	   the	  very	  period	   in	  
which	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	   newly	   independent,	   democratic	   Estonia	   were	   being	   laid.	  Most	  
Russian-­‐speakers	   did	   not	   have	   the	   right	   to	   vote	   in	   the	   constitutional	   referendum	  on	   June	   28,	  
1992,	  nor	  in	  the	  general	  elections	  on	  September	  20	  of	  the	  same	  year.	  Not	  one	  Russian-­‐speaker	  
was	   elected	   in	   the	   first	   post-­‐independence	  Riigikogu,	   and	   the	   first	   laws	   passed	  by	   this	  mono-­‐
ethnic	  parliament	  were	  based	  on	  an	  ethnocentric,	  restorationist	  discourse	  (Melvin,	  1995,	  p.	  45;	  
Mole,	  2012,	  p.	  98).	  No	  ethnic-­‐Russian	  parties	  were	  present	  in	  parliament	  at	  that	  point.	  
Nevertheless,	   already	   in	   1992,	   arguably	   at	   the	   peak	   of	   Estonian	   national	   restoration	  
(Agarin,	  2010,	  p.	  99;	  Mole,	  2012,	  pp.	  92–98;	  D.	   J.	  Smith,	  2005,	  pp.	  300–303),	   the	   forces	   in	   the	  
Constitutional	   Assembly	   agreed	   on	   guaranteeing	   the	   right	   to	   vote	   locally	   to	   all	   permanent	  
residents,	   regardless	  of	   their	   citizenship	  status.	  The	  1992	  Estonian	  constitution	  prescribes	   that	  
‘in	  elections	   to	   local	   government	   councils,	   persons	  who	   reside	  permanently	   in	   the	   territory	  of	  
the	   local	   government	   and	   have	   attained	   eighteen	   years	   of	   age	   have	   the	   right	   to	   vote,	   under	  
conditions	  prescribed	  by	  law’	  (art.	  156).	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  motive	  behind	  this	  was	  the	  
conscious	  desire	  of	  the	  Estonian	  elite	  to	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  outside	  world	  as	   ‘Western,	   liberal	  and	  
democratic’	   after	   the	   ethnically	   homogenous	   result	   of	   the	   1992	   general	   elections	   had	   ‘cast	  
doubt	   on	   Estonia’s	   “democratic	   consolidation”’	   (Mole,	   2012,	   p.	   99).	   The	   granting	   of	   political	  
rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens,	  however,	  was	  already	  enshrined	  in	  principle	  in	  the	  constitution,	  which	  was	  
written	   and	   approved	   by	   referendum	   months	   before	   the	   first	   democratic	   elections	   of	  
independent	  Estonia.	  The	  explanation	  for	  this	  early	  decision	  must	  therefore	  be	  found	  in	  the	  very	  
process	  of	  drafting	  the	  new	  Estonian	  constitution	  and	  the	  subsequent	  Law	  on	  Local	  Elections.	  	  
The	   composition	   of	   the	   Estonian	   Constitutional	   Assembly	   (ECA)	   was	   the	   result	   of	   a	  
compromise	   between	   the	   Estonian	   Supreme	   Council,	   elected	   by	   the	   entire	   population	   before	  
the	  boundaries	  of	  citizenship	  had	  been	  designed,	  and	  the	  Estonian	  Committee,	  elected	  only	  by	  
pre-­‐war	  citizens	  and	  with	  a	  more	  restorationist	  outlook	  (Järve,	  1995,	  pp.	  19–30).	  Only	  seven	  of	  
its	  sixty	  members	  were	  Russian-­‐speakers	  and	   its	  proceedings	  were	  held	  exclusively	   in	  Estonian	  
(Metcalf,	   1996,	   p.	   231).	   Notwithstanding	   the	   underrepresentation	   of	   Russian-­‐speakers,	   the	  
Assembly	  agreed	  already	  in	  1991	  that	  all	  permanent	  residents	  be	  granted	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  and	  
stand	  for	  elections	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  The	  Assembly	  members,	  however,	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  
political	   implications	   of	   any	   decision	   regarding	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   rights,	   and	   thus	   consciously	  
decided	  on	  a	  wording	  that	  left	  room	  for	  interpretation.	  As	  the	  Moderate	  Assembly	  member	  Liia	  
Hänni	   put	   it:	   ‘The	   constitution	   itself	   does	   not	   impose	   restrictions	   on	   non-­‐citizens:	   it	   gives	   the	  
legislature	   the	   possibility	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   legislature	   must	   decide	   whether	   to	   make	   use	   of	   this	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possibility	  or	  not’	  (ECA,	  27	  March	  1992).70	  The	  interpretation	  of	  article	  156	  was	  therefore	  left	  to	  
the	  Law	  on	  Local	  Elections,	  passed	  by	  the	  then	  Estonian-­‐only	  Riigikogu	  in	  May	  1993.	  	  
The	  parliamentary	  debate	  on	  this	  law	  shows	  a	  clear	  divide	  between	  those	  who	  wanted	  to	  
interpret	  article	  156	  in	  the	  most	  restrictive	  terms	  possible,	  and	  those	  who	  appealed	  to	  the	  more	  
liberal	  intentions	  of	  the	  constituents	  (that	  is,	  granting	  full	  local	  political	  rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens	  and	  
third-­‐country	   nationals).	   The	   1993	   draft	   law,	   drawn	   up	   by	   the	   first	   elected	   government	   of	  
independent	   Estonia,	   followed	   this	   second	   interpretation.	   Interestingly,	   the	   government	   was	  
headed	  by	  the	  conservative	  prime	  minister	  Mart	  Laar	  and	  was	  composed	  of	  a	  coalition	  of	  parties	  
with	   an	   exclusivist	   approach	   to	   citizenship	   that	   ‘had	   benefited	   from	   the	   elections	   being	  
dominated	   by	   nationalist	   issues’	   (Galbreath,	   2005,	   p.	   120).	   This	   was,	   therefore,	   hardly	   a	   pro-­‐
Russophone	  government.	  Yet	   it	   found	  itself	   in	  the	  hard	  position	  of	  having	  to	  balance	  domestic	  
nationalist	  pressures,	  pragmatic	  considerations,	  and	  the	  pressure	  of	  international	  organisations	  
(at	   this	   stage	   especially	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   the	   OSCE),	   which	   pushed	   for	   a	   liberal	  
approach	   to	   non-­‐citizens’	   rights	   (Galbreath,	   2005,	   p.	   164).	  Members	   of	   the	   coalition	   parties	   –	  
especially	  the	  more	  nationalist	   Isamaa	  and	  the	  Estonian	  National	   Independence	  Party	  –	  openly	  
criticised	  the	  draft	  as	  showing	  excessive	  softness	  on	  the	  minority	  issue	  (Galbreath,	  2005,	  p.	  121).	  
In	  the	  all-­‐Estonian	  parliament,	  no	  party	  was	  arguing	  at	  this	  stage	  for	  the	  political	  rights	  of	  
the	  non-­‐citizens	  and	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle.	  Those	  coalition	  MPs	  who	  
defended	  the	  government’s	  draft	  did	  so	  with	  purely	  pragmatic	  arguments:	   the	   impossibility	   to	  
contradict	  the	  constitution;	  the	  risk	  that,	  had	  the	  law	  been	  appealed	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  
the	   upcoming	   local	   elections	   would	   have	   to	   be	   postponed;	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   non-­‐citizens,	   if	  
deprived	  of	   a	   legal	  way	   to	   influence	  politics,	  would	  do	   so	  by	   illegal	  means	   (Riigikogu,	   12	  May	  
1993).	  A	  coalition	  MP	  also	  tried	  to	  reassure	  his	  colleagues	  that	  granting	  active	  and	  passive	  local	  
voting	  rights	  to	  all	  permanent	  residents	  would	  not	  have	  resulted	   in	  a	  significant	  power	  shift	   in	  
favour	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minority.	  He	  argued	  that	  even	  in	  what	  he	  depicted	  as	  the	  worst	  case	  
scenario	   (that	   is,	   if	   all	   the	   Russian	   politicians	   had	   run	   under	   the	   same	   list	   and	   all	   Russian-­‐
speakers	   had	   voted	   for	   them)	   in	   Tallinn	   the	  majority	   of	   city	   counsellors	  would	   still	   have	  been	  
Estonian-­‐speaking	  citizens	  (Riigikogu,	  19	  May	  1993).	  
Nationalist	  MPs	  (also	  from	  governing	  parties)	  opposed	  the	  draft	  and	  suggested	  restrictive	  
interpretations	  of	  article	  156	  that	  would	  have	  reduced	  (or	  eliminated	  tout	  court)	  the	  number	  of	  
non-­‐citizens	   the	   article	   applies	   to.	   The	   most	   restrictive	   interpretation	   was	   provided	   by	   the	  
nationalist	   party	   Eesti	   Kodanik	   (Estonian	   Citizen),	   according	   to	   which	   the	   Constitutional	  
Assembly	  simply	  meant	  that	  Estonian	  citizens	  could	  vote	  only	  in	  their	  municipality	  of	  residence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Unless	  otherwise	  indicated,	  all	  translations	  from	  Estonian,	  Latvian	  and	  Russian	  are	  mine.	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(so,	   for	   example,	   Viljandi	   residents	   could	   not	   vote	   in	   Tartu	   local	   elections)	   and	   in	   no	   way	  
intended	  the	  ‘permanent	  residents’	  to	  be	  anything	  other	  than	  citizens	  of	  Estonia	  (Riigikogu,	  12	  
May	  1993).	  Another	   interpretation	  by	  an	  Eesti	  Kodanik	  MP	  claimed	  that	   ‘permanent	  residents’	  
referred	  only	  to	  legal	  immigrants,	  and	  so	  the	  Soviet-­‐time	  settlers	  –	  who	  had	  entered	  the	  country	  
as	  a	  consequence	  of	  an	  illegal	  occupation	  –	  did	  not	  fall	  under	  this	  definition	  (Riigikogu,	  12	  May	  
1993).	   Several	  nationalist	  MPs	  proposed	  amendments	   to	   increase	   the	  number	  of	   years	  a	  non-­‐
citizen	  had	   to	  be	   resident	  of	   the	  municipality	   to	  enjoy	   local	   political	   rights	   from	   five	   years	   (as	  
indicated	  in	  the	  draft)	  to	  15,	  50	  or	  75	  years	  (Riigikogu,	  12	  May	  1993).	  
Not	   only	   the	   governing	   parties,	   but	   also	   the	   opposition	   was	   divided	   on	   this	   issue.	   The	  
Centrist	  parliamentary	  group,	  which	  generally	  had	  a	  more	  liberal	  approach	  towards	  the	  Russian-­‐
speaking	  minority,	  was	  divided	  between	  those	  who	  were	   in	  favour	  of	  granting	  both	  active	  and	  
passive	   voting	   rights,	   and	   those	   who	   had	   a	   more	   cautious	   approach,	   especially	   towards	  
permanent	   residents	  who	  had	  opted	   for	  Russian	   Federation	   citizenship.	   In	   the	  end,	   the	   group	  
presented	  a	  motion	  to	  grant	  active	  and	  passive	  voting	  rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens,	  while	  granting	  only	  
active	  voting	  rights	  to	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  (Riigikogu,	  12	  May	  1993).	  In	  the	  event,	  the	  Law	  on	  
Local	  Elections	  was	  passed	  by	  the	  Riigikogu	  in	  an	  amended	  version	  that	  scrapped	  any	  provision	  
for	  passive	  voting	   rights	  and	  granted	  the	  right	   to	  vote	   in	   local	  elections	   to	  all	  non-­‐citizens	  and	  
third-­‐country	   nationals	   who	   have	   been	   permanently	   residing	   for	   at	   least	   five	   years	   in	   the	  
municipality	   where	   they	   wish	   to	   vote.	   Even	   so,	   only	   52	   deputies	   (just	   one	   more	   than	   the	  
minimum	  required)	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  law.	  
Different	   reasons	   have	   been	   suggested	   for	   the	   willingness	   of	   the	   Laar	   government	   to	  
adopt	  a	  liberal	  approach	  on	  this	  issue.	  Certainly	  pressures	  from	  international	  organisations	  were	  
felt	  strongly	  by	  an	  elite	  that	  had	  enthusiastically	  adopted	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  return	  to	  Europe	  (D.	  
J.	  Smith,	  2003,	  p.	  9).	  But	  the	  outcome	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  ‘be	  Western’	  alone:	  
after	  all	  Latvia,	  which	  was	  subjected	  to	  the	  same	  pressures,	  did	  not	  guarantee	  voting	  rights	  to	  its	  
non-­‐citizens.	   We	   must	   therefore	   turn	   to	   domestic	   considerations	   to	   understand	   the	   policy	  
outcome.	  	  
Firstly,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   first	   post-­‐independence	   parliament	   was	   made	   up	   entirely	   of	  
ethnic	  Estonians	  meant	  that	  the	  Estonian	  elite	  felt	  more	  safely	  in	  control	  of	  the	  state	  and,	  thus,	  
could	  be	  more	  magnanimous	  towards	  non-­‐citizens	  (Mole,	  2012,	  p.	  90).	  The	  input	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐
speaking	  elite	  was	  almost	  non-­‐existent	  at	  this	  stage,	  and	  the	  Law	  on	  Local	  Elections	  was	  entirely	  
drafted	  by	  the	  government	  without	  documented	  public	  consultations.	  Centrist	  MPs	  mentioned	  
that	   they	  had	  discussed	   the	   issue	  with	   ‘Russian	   community	   leaders’	   (Riigikogu,	   12	  May	  1993),	  
which	  –	   if	   anything	   –	   shows	   the	   intention	  of	   the	  moderate-­‐liberal	   elite	   to	   find	   a	   solution	   that	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could	  be	  acceptable	  for	  all	  the	  parties	  involved.	  These	  ‘community	  leaders’,	  however,	  were	  not	  
elected	  officials	  or	  in	  any	  way	  designated	  representatives	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority.	  The	  
Estonian	  moderate	  elite	  was	   thus	  entirely	   free	   to	   choose	  which	   community	   leaders	   to	   consult	  
and,	  if	  need	  be,	  to	  disregard	  their	  opinions.	  
Moreover,	   the	   government	   had	   reasons	   to	   fear	   unrest	   among	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers,	  
especially	   in	   the	   northeast,	   where	   most	   of	   the	   population	   had	   been	   disenfranchised	   by	   the	  
citizenship	   law	  (Melvin,	  1995,	  pp.	  44–45).	   Indeed,	   in	  the	  majority-­‐Russophone	  city	  of	  Narva,	  of	  
the	  65,000	   residents	  who	  had	   voted	   in	   the	  1990	  elections	   to	   the	   Supreme	  Council	   only	   6,000	  
were	  eligible	  to	  vote	   in	  1992	  (Metcalf,	  1996,	  p.	  226).	   In	  this	  situation,	   it	  was	  deemed	  safer	   for	  
the	  government	  to	  provide	  a	  legal,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  controllable,	  channel	  for	  the	  political	  
participation	  of	  the	  non-­‐citizens.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Moderate	  Ardo	  Ojasalu,	  who	  was	  in	  favour	  
of	  granting	  both	  active	  and	  passive	  voting	  rights:	  	  
The	  aliens	  will	  stay	  in	  Estonia,	  they	  will	  not	  leave,	  and	  they	  will	  influence	  the	  Estonian	  
political	  process.	  With	  this	  bill	  we	  are	  giving	  them	  the	  right	  to	  do	  so	  legally.	  If	  we	  take	  
the	  right	  to	  run	  for	   local	  elections	  away	  from	  them,	  they	  will	   find	  other	  ways	  to	  do	  it	  
(Riigikogu,	  19	  May	  1993).	  
In	   the	   event,	   granting	   local	   voting	   rights	   to	   all	   permanent	   residents	   did	   succeed	   in	  
defusing	  tensions	   in	  the	  areas	  where	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  constituted	  a	  majority.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  restricting	  the	  right	  to	  stand	  for	   local	  elections	  to	  Estonian	  citizens	  arguably	  de-­‐activated	  
the	  radical	  section	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  political	  elite	  (who	  would	  not	  apply	  for	  citizenship)	  by	  
excluding	   it	   from	   electoral	   competition	   (Daatland	   &	   Svege,	   2000,	   p.	   267).	   In	   the	   northeast,	  
where	  this	  exclusion	  risked	  creating	  a	  political	  deadlock,	  the	  government	  awarded	  citizenship	  for	  
special	  services	  to	  the	  country	  to	  a	  number	  of	  Russophone	  candidates	   (Metcalf,	  1996,	  p.	  229).	  
These	   candidates’	   participation	   in	   the	   local	   elections	   was	   thus	   guaranteed	   as	   an	   exceptional	  
measure	  by	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  majority	  elite.	  
After	  its	  approval	  in	  1993,	  the	  Law	  on	  Local	  Elections	  was	  re-­‐drafted	  in	  2002	  and	  amended	  
in	   2006.	   The	   2002	   version	   of	   the	   law	   left	   all	   the	   central	   provisions	   regarding	   non-­‐citizens	  
unchanged.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  the	  new	  law	  was	  the	  need	  to	  include	  the	  right	  for	  all	  EU	  
citizens	  residing	  in	  Estonia	  to	  participate	  in	  local	  elections	  (both	  as	  voters	  and	  as	  candidates),	  a	  
requirement	   for	   the	  2004	  accession	   to	   the	  EU.	   The	  Estonian	  United	  People’s	  Party	   (EUPP)	  –	   a	  
moderate	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  party	  that	  at	  the	  time	  had	  six	  representatives	  in	  parliament	  –	  raised	  
the	   issue	  of	  unequal	   treatment	  between	   (possibly	  newly-­‐arrived)	   EU	   citizens	   and	  non-­‐citizens,	  
who	   had	   lived	   in	   Estonia	   their	   whole	   lives	   and	  many	   of	   whom	  were	   actually	   born	   in	   Estonia	  
(Riigikogu,	  23	  January	  2002).	  Attempts	  to	  renegotiate	  non-­‐citizens’	  rights,	  however,	  did	  not	  gain	  
76	  
	  
the	   support	   of	   any	   other	   party.	  Not	   even	   the	   Centre	   Party,	  whose	   popularity	   among	  Russian-­‐
speaking	  voters	  was	  steadily	  increasing,71	  showed	  any	  willingness	  to	  discuss	  passive	  voting	  rights	  
for	  non-­‐citizens.	  
The	  2006	  amendments	   lifted	   the	   five-­‐year	   residency	   requirement	  and	  added	  article	  5.1,	  
which	  defined	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘alien’	  (välismaalane)	  as	  ‘a	  person	  who	  is	  not	  a	  citizen	  of	  
the	  Republic	  of	  Estonia	  or	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  of	   the	  European	  Union’.	  These	  amendments	  did	  
not	   change	  much	   in	   practice:	   the	   five-­‐year	   residency	   requirement	  was	   a	   hindrance	   only	   for	   a	  
small	   number	   of	   non-­‐citizens	   (Riigikogu,	   20	   September	   2006),	   while	   the	   new	   article	   simply	  
reaffirmed	  the	  hitherto	  customary	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  opposition	  of	  
the	  nationalist	  parties	   Isamaa	  and	  Res	  Publica	  to	   lifting	  the	  five-­‐year	  residency	  requirement	  on	  
the	  grounds	  that	  the	  non-­‐citizens’	  loyalty	  cannot	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  (Riigikogu,	  20	  September	  
and	  11	  October	  2006),72	  the	  amendments	  were	  approved	  with	  practically	  no	  debate	  and	  did	  not	  
raise	   any	   interest	   in	   the	   media.	   At	   this	   stage,	   no	   Russophone	   party	   was	   represented	   in	  
parliament	  and	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  vote	  went	  mainly	  to	  the	  Centre	  Party,	  which	  also	  counted	  
almost	  all	  of	  the	  (admittedly	  few)	  Russian-­‐speaking	  MPs.	  
The	  virtual	  lack	  of	  parliamentary	  debate	  and	  media	  coverage	  on	  both	  the	  2002	  and	  2006	  
amendments	  to	  the	  Law	  on	  Local	  Elections	  testifies	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  non-­‐citizens’	  right	  to	  vote	  
in	  local	  elections	  is	  a	  broadly	  accepted	  fact	   in	  Estonia.	  As	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  cannot	  stand	  for	  
elections.	   Indeed,	  even	   if	   there	  were	  an	   interest	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  non-­‐citizens	   to	  be	  granted	  
the	   right	   to	   stand	   for	   local	   office,	   there	   would	   currently	   be	   no	   political	   force	   willing	   or	   in	   a	  
position	   to	   advocate	   for	   such	   a	   right.	   The	   decline	   of	   the	   Russophone	   parties	   (which	   have	   not	  
won	  Riigikogu	   seats	  since	  2003)	  means	  that	   they	  do	  not	  have	  a	  valid	  platform	  to	  advocate	   for	  
passive	  voting	  rights	  for	  all	  permanent	  residents.	  Moreover,	  the	  party	  that	  currently	  represents	  
most	  Russian-­‐speakers	  and	  (locally)	  non-­‐citizens,	  the	  Centre	  Party,	  seems	  to	  have	  little	  interest	  
in	  pursuing	  a	   reform	   that	   could	  potentially	   favour	   the	  emergence	  of	  new	  competitors	   in	   local	  
elections.	  With	  the	  question	  of	  active	  voting	  rights	  settled	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  passive	  voting	  rights	  
for	  non-­‐citizens	  is	  a	  non-­‐issue	  in	  Estonia.	  	  
3.1.2 Policymaking	  in	  the	  Latvian	  parliament	  
The	  Latvian	  constitution	  reserves	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  and	  stand	  for	  election	  in	  the	  local	  government	  
to	   Latvian	   citizens	   only,	   and,	   after	   EU	   accession,	   to	   all	   EU	   citizens	  who	   permanently	   reside	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  For	  example,	  in	  Narva	  –	  where	  94%	  of	  the	  residents	  are	  Russian-­‐speakers	  and	  less	  than	  half	  are	  citizens	  of	  Estonia	  
(Narva	  Department	   for	   Economic	  Development,	   2010)	  –	   the	  Centre	  Party’s	   share	  of	   the	  municipal	   vote	   increased	  
with	  every	  election	  –	  from	  	  12.6%	  in	  1996	  to	  76.6%	  in	  2009.	  
72	  They	  objected	  that,	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  five-­‐year	  residency	  requirement,	   ‘aliens’	  could	  change	  their	  municipal	  
residency	  at	  the	  time	  of	  elections	  in	  order	  to	  skew	  the	  results	  in	  targeted	  areas.	  Another	  argument	  was	  that	  ‘aliens’,	  
not	  being	  well	  integrated	  in	  their	  new	  municipality,	  would	  be	  easier	  to	  manipulate	  electorally.	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Latvia	  (art.	  101).	  As	  a	  result,	  about	  14%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  of	  Latvia	  –	  the	  non-­‐citizens	  –	  are	  
entirely	  disenfranchised.	  Three	  circumstances	  can	  explain	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Estonian	  
and	  Latvian	  constitutional	  provisions	  with	   regard	   to	   their	  permanent	   residents’	  political	   rights.	  
Firstly,	   in	   Latvia	   the	   1922	   constitution	   was	   reinstated	   after	   independence.	   Opportunities	   for	  
bargaining	  and	  for	  pragmatic	  considerations,	  provided	  in	  Estonia	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly,	  
were	  therefore	  decidedly	  restricted	   in	  Latvia.	  Secondly,	  demographic	  considerations	  dictated	  a	  
different	  strategy	  to	  the	  Latvian	  national	  elites	  (Pettai	  &	  Kreuzer,	  1998,	  p.	  171).	  While	  in	  Estonia	  
the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  population	   is	   concentrated	   in	   the	  northeast	   and	   in	  Tallinn	   (where	  ethnic	  
Estonians	  still	  constitute	  a	  majority),	  in	  Latvia	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  population	  is	  more	  dispersed	  
and	  constitutes	  a	  majority	  or	  a	  substantial	  minority	  in	  all	  the	  largest	  cities,	  including	  the	  capital	  
Riga.	   Finally,	   since	   inter-­‐war	   Latvia	   had	   a	   bigger	   Russian-­‐speaking	   community	   than	   inter-­‐war	  
Estonia,	  more	  Russian-­‐speakers	  acquired	   citizenship	  by	  birth	   in	   independent	   Latvia.	  Already	   in	  
1993,	  year	  of	   the	   first	  post-­‐independence	  elections,	  16%	  of	   the	  citizenry	  was	  Russian-­‐speaking	  
(Agarin,	  2010,	  p.	  94).	  Unlike	  in	  Estonia,	  therefore,	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  in	  post-­‐independence	  
Latvia	   there	   was	   a	   substantial	   Russian-­‐speaking	   electorate	   and	   ethnic-­‐Russian	   parties	   were	  
competing	  in	  elections.	  
In	  the	  first	  post-­‐independence	  Saeima	  20	  MPs	  were	  elected	  through	  Russophone	  parties	  
and	  12	  MPs	  were	  officially	  registered	  as	  non-­‐Latvian	  in	  the	  Saeima	  statistics.73	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  
first	   Latvian	   post-­‐independence	   parliament	   was	   not	   compactly	   ‘titular’	   had	   an	   important	  
implication.	   Having	   to	   compete	   in	   elections	   with	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   parties,	   the	   Latvian	  
national	  elite	  was	   in	  a	   less	  safe	  position	  than	  the	  Estonian	  elite,	  and	  was	   less	   inclined	  to	  make	  
concessions	   that	   would	   have	   favoured	   their	   competitors.	   This	   was	   especially	   so	   given	   that	  
control	  over	  Riga	  and	  the	  other	  four	  largest	  Latvian	  cities	  was	  at	  stake.74	  Consequently,	  while	  in	  
Estonia	  the	  question	  of	  granting	  voting	  rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens	  was	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  mostly	  
internal	   to	   the	   Estonian	   national	   elite	   (between	   the	   Estonian	   moderates	   and	   the	   Estonian	  
nationalists),	  in	  Latvia	  it	  was	  principally	  an	  issue	  of	  contention	  between	  the	  Latvian	  national	  elite	  
and	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  political	  elite.	  
The	  de	  facto	  disenfranchisement	  of	  about	  one	  sixth	  of	  the	  population	  of	  Latvia	  attracted	  
the	  attention	  of	  the	  international	  bodies	  that	  were	  monitoring	  Latvia’s	  democratisation	  process	  
and	   societal	   stability.	  Council	   of	   Europe,	  Organisation	   for	   Security	   and	  Co-­‐operation	   in	  Europe	  
(OSCE),	   United	   Nations	   and	   European	   Union	   (EU)	   all	   issued	   recommendations	   to	   the	   Latvian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Saeima	  official	  website,	   statistical	   information.	   Available	   at	  http://www.saeima.lv/lv/saeimas-­‐struktura/statistika-­‐1	  
(Last	  accessed	  24	  February	  2015).	  
74	  Non-­‐citizens	  are	  23.3%	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Riga	  and	  between	  17	  and	  20%	  in	  the	  other	  bigger	  cities	  (Data	  from	  2011	  
Census,	  Latvijas	  Statistika).	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government	  to	  grant	  local	  voting	  rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens.	  However,	  fears	  over	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  
Latvian	   nation	   inscribed	   in	   the	   national	   elite’s	   restorationist	   discourse	   (Agarin,	   2010,	   p.	   99),	  
added	   to	  more	   pragmatic	   demographic	   and	   political	   considerations,	  meant	   that	   there	  was	   no	  
incentive	   for	   the	   elite	   to	   accede	   to	   external	   pressures.	   The	   Latvian	   elite	   responded	   to	   any	  
mention	   of	   international	   demands	  with	   the	   legalistic	   observation	   that	   there	   cannot	   be	   legally	  
binding	   international	   standards	   to	   force	   a	   sovereign	   country	   to	   change	   its	   policy	   on	   political	  
participation	  (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  107).	  Later,	  after	  Latvia’s	  accession	  to	  the	  EU,	  pressures	  on	  the	  
Latvian	  government	   to	  comply	  with	   such	   recommendations	  decreased	  significantly.75	  This	   is	   in	  
keeping	  with	  what	  many	  observers	  have	  noted:	  after	  accession,	  the	  EU	  loses	  its	  main	  bargaining	  
chip	  (the	  accession	  conditionalities)	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  new	  member	  states’	  policies	  on	  matters	  
where	  the	  EU	  bodies	  cannot	  impose	  decisions	  decreases	  (Kelley,	  2004;	  Riedel,	  2009).	  Moreover,	  
few	  EU	  member	   states	   currently	   grant	   such	   right	   to	   their	   non-­‐citizen	   immigrant	   communities,	  
which	  possibly	  makes	  them	  less	  inclined	  to	  force	  the	  point	  with	  Latvia.	  	  
While	  international	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  has	  waned,	  the	  question	  of	  non-­‐citizens’	  voting	  
rights	  remains	  domestically	  salient.	  The	  proposal	  to	  grant	  local	  voting	  rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens	  was	  
advanced	  already	   in	   the	   first	  post-­‐independence	  parliament	   (Saeima,	  16	  December	  1993),	  and	  
similar	  proposals	  were	  regularly	  presented	  by	  the	  Russophone	  parliamentary	  opposition.76	  The	  
arguments	  put	   forward	  by	   the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	   in	   favour	  of	   such	  a	   reform	  developed	  
over	   time.	   In	   the	   first	   years	   after	   independence	   the	   proponents	   of	   non-­‐citizens’	   voting	   rights	  
appealed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  nationalists’	   exclusionary	   attitude	  was	  ungrateful	   towards	   those	  
non-­‐citizens	  who	  had	  fought	  for	  Latvia’s	  independence	  (Saeima,	  16	  December	  1993).	  Later,	  they	  
progressively	   acquired	   more	   pragmatic	   and	   rights-­‐based	   arguments.	   The	   non-­‐citizens	   were	  
presented	   as	   honest	   taxpayers	   who	   were	   being	   deprived,	   for	   mere	   political	   reasons,	   of	   the	  
fundamental	   right	   to	   have	   a	   say	   about	   their	   municipality’s	   administration.	   International	  
recommendations	   that	   claimed	   that	   participation	   in	   local	   politics	   has	   a	   positive	   effect	   on	  
integration	   were	   also	   often	   mentioned,	   alongside	   examples	   from	   ‘civilized	   Europe’,	   including	  
Estonia	   (Saeima,	  29	   June	  and	  11	  December	  2008).	  Similarly	   to	  Estonia,	  after	  2004	  the	  unequal	  
treatment	  of	  non-­‐citizens	  and	  EU	  permanent	  residents	  was	  another	  major	  argument	  to	  promote	  
non-­‐citizens’	  voting	  rights	  (Saeima,	  21	  October	  2004).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  The	  former	  Latvian	  Minister	  of	  Integration,	  Nils	  Muižnieks,	  noted	  that	  international	  pressures	  on	  Latvia	  to	  grant	  such	  
a	   right	  almost	   completely	   stopped	   after	   EU	   accession	   (LCHR,	   23	  November	  2010).	  The	   Latvian	   Centre	   for	  Human	  
Rights	  (LCHR)	  compiles	  a	  daily	   Integration	  Monitor	   in	  which	   it	  reports	  all	   the	  minority-­‐related	  news	  that	  appear	   in	  
Latvian	  newspapers.	  LCHR’s	   Integration	  Monitor	  database	  can	  be	  accessed	  at	  http://cilvektiesibas.org.lv/lv/.	  News	  
retrieved	   from	   the	   database	   will	   be	   referenced	   as	   LCHR,	   followed	   by	   the	   date	   the	   news	   was	   published	   in	   the	  
database.	  
76	  Up	  to	  2010	  there	  had	  been	  37	  such	  proposals	  (Buzaev,	  2010).	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While	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	  kept	  the	  pressure	  on	  this	   issue	  high,	  the	  nationalists	  
consistently	  opposed	   their	  proposals.	   The	   rhetoric	  of	  existential	   threat	   typically	  used	  by	   these	  
parties	   against	   granting	   voting	   rights	   to	   non-­‐citizens	   is	   exemplified	   by	   the	   reaction	   of	   Pēteris	  
Tabūns	   (TB/LNNK)	   to	   the	   insistence	   of	   Russophone	   party	   members	   that	   sooner	   or	   later	   the	  
government	  will	   have	   to	   give	   in	   on	   this	   issue:	   ‘You	   see	  what	   happens	  when	  we	   give	   in?	   They	  
[that	  is,	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers]	  have	  already	  taken	  fortress	  after	  fortress.	  They	  will	  not	  stop	  until	  
they	  gain	  power!’	  (Saeima,	  27	  January	  2000).	  
Moderate	  Latvian	  parties	  kept	  a	  more	  ambivalent	  attitude.	  The	  main	  moderate	  argument	  
against	  non-­‐citizens’	  voting	  rights	  has	  consistently	  been	  that	  such	  a	  provision	  would	  reduce	  the	  
incentives	   for	   non-­‐citizens	   to	   apply	   for	   naturalisation.	   Already	   in	   the	   seventh	   Saeima	   (1998–
2002),	   however,	   the	   small	   centrist	   party	   Jaunā	   Partija	   (New	   Party)	   and	   some	   respected	  
personalities	   from	   moderate	   parties	   had	   showed	   willingness	   to	   look	   for	   a	   compromise.	   This	  
forced	   the	   governing	   parties	   if	   not	   to	   approve	   the	   Russophone	   parties’	   proposals	   at	   least	   to	  
consider	   the	   question	   as	   legitimate.	   As	   Dzintars	   Ābiķis	   (People’s	   Party)	   stated	   in	   reply	   to	   a	  
TB/LNNK	  deputy:	  	  
I	   do	   not	   think	   [that	   the	   minority	   party’s	   FHRUL’s]	   proposal	   is,	   as	   you	   said,	   a	   joke,	  
because	  at	  present	  this	  proposal	  is	  supported	  not	  only	  by	  FHRUL,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  New	  
Party,	  that	  declared	  so	  in	  its	  conference.	  It	  was	  also	  supported	  in	  the	  previous	  Saeima,	  
the	  sixth,	  by	  one	  of	  the	  most	  distinguished	  social-­‐democratic	  politicians,	  Mr	  Ādamsons,	  
in	  the	  vote	  for	  the	  Law	  on	  Local	  Elections.	  Therefore,	  this	   is	  not	  a	   joke:	  this	   issue	  has	  
become	  rather	  serious	  (Saeima,	  6	  April	  2000).	  
The	   increasing	   electoral	   success	   of	   the	   Russophone	   party	   Harmony	   Centre	   also	   made	  
moderate	  Latvian	  parties	  consider	  the	  question	  more	  seriously.	  In	  2002	  the	  Union	  of	  Greens	  and	  
Farmers	   (ZZS)	  suggested	  that	  granting	  voting	  rights	   to	  non-­‐citizens	  was	  a	  EU	  requirement	  with	  
which	   Latvia	   would	   have	   to	   comply	   sooner	   or	   later	   (LCHR,	   22	   August	   2002).	   However,	   ZZS	  
deputies	  failed	  to	  vote	  accordingly	  in	  parliament.	  In	  2007,	  the	  union	  Latvia’s	  First	  Party/Latvian	  
Way	  (LPP/LC)	  proposed	  holding	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	  issue	  that	  would	  have	  settled	  it	  once	  and	  
for	  all	  (Saeima,	  26	  April	  2007).	  With	  this	  proposal	  LPP/LC	  broke	  the	  convention	  and	  became	  the	  
first	  governmental	  party	  to	  open	  the	  debate	  on	  non-­‐citizens’	  political	  rights.	  The	  party’s	  strong	  
results	   in	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  region	  of	  Latgale	   in	  2006	  likely	  motivated	  this	  choice.	  As	  Ainārs	  
Šlesers,	   the	   leader	   of	   LPP,	   put	   it:	   ‘Today	  we	   are	   not	   trying	   to	   grab	   new	   votes,	  we	   are	   simply	  
acting	  on	  the	  ideas	  supported	  by	  the	  voters	  that	  have	  already	  given	  their	  preference	  to	  us’.77	  By	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Quote	   reported	   by	   Abik	   Elkin,	   in	   ‘Edinstvennyi	   Vykhod	  –	   referendum	   po	   negrazhdanam!’	   (The	   only	  way	   out	   is	   a	  
referendum	   on	   the	   non-­‐citizens!),	   Vesti	   Segodnya	   12	   May	   2007.	   http://rus.delfi.lv/archive/edinstvennyj-­‐vyhod-­‐
referendum-­‐po-­‐negrazhdanam.d?id=17832249	  (Last	  accessed	  24	  February	  2015).	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proposing	   to	   entrust	   the	   choice	   to	   the	   people,	   the	   LPP/LC	   was	   trying	   to	   show	   interest	   in	   its	  
Russian-­‐speaking	   electorate,	   while	   keeping	   itself	   at	   safe	   distance	   from	   accusations	   of	   anti-­‐
Latvian	   behaviour.	   Moreover,	   its	   declining	   electoral	   success	   compelled	   LPP/LC	   to	   change	  
strategy	  and	  at	  the	  time	  the	  party	  was	  actively	  considering	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  centrist	  alliance	  that	  
would	  have	  included	  the	  increasingly	  popular	  Harmony	  Centre	  (LCHR,	  26	  January	  2007).	  
The	  1998	   referendum	  on	   the	  citizenship	   law	  had	   set	  an	  encouraging	  precedent:	  despite	  
the	  nationalist	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  referendum,	  the	  Latvian	  electorate	  had	  voted	  in	  
favour	   of	   granting	   citizenship	   to	   the	   Latvia-­‐born	   children	   of	   non-­‐citizens	   upon	   their	   parents’	  
request,	  and	  of	  abolishing	   the	  window	  mechanism	  that	  had	  been	  slowing	  down	  naturalisation	  
(Södergren,	  2000,	  pp.	  295–297).	  Indeed,	  on	  issues	  concerning	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority,	  the	  
Latvian	  general	  population	  has	  shown	  to	  be	  more	  liberal	  than	  the	  political	  elite	  (Bottolfs,	  2000,	  
p.	  99).	  Successive	  surveys	  suggest	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  granting	  more	  rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens	  was	  not	  
an	  exception	  (LCHR,	  27	  December	  2005;	  Makarovs	  and	  Dimitrovs,	  2009).78	  
In	   the	   event,	   the	   potential	   political	   utility	   of	   finding	   a	   compromise	   with	   what	   was	  
becoming	   one	   of	   the	   major	   parties	   in	   Latvia	   (Harmony	   Centre)	   was	   overcome	   by	   nationalist	  
pressures.	   The	   nationalist	   TB/LNNK	   maintained	   that	   it	   was	   ‘not	   normal’	   for	   a	   Latvian	   party	  
(LPP/LC)	   to	   ‘fraternise	   with	   the	   Russians’	   and	   pursue	   policies	   that	   would	   hand	   all	   the	   major	  
Latvian	   cities	  over	   to	   them	   (Saeima,	  26	  April	   2007).	   The	   fear	  of	   losing	   the	   trust	  of	   the	   Latvian	  
electorate	   to	   parties	  with	   stronger	   nationalist	   credentials,	   coupled	  with	   the	   taboo	   of	   creating	  
governmental	  alliances	  with	  the	  ‘Russian	  parties’,	  convinced	  LPP/LC	  to	  abandon	  the	  referendum	  
idea.	  The	  LPP/LC	  deputies	  kept	  voting	  against	  Harmony	  Centre’s	  proposals	  to	  amend	  the	  Law	  on	  
Local	   Elections.79	   According	   to	   a	   2007	   report	   on	   Latvian	   democracy,	   this	   was	   a	   missed	  
opportunity	   for	   the	  development	  of	   an	   inclusive	  political	   agenda,	   and	   ‘the	   fast	   substitution	  of	  
[LPP/LC’s]	  position	  with	  a	  less	  “difficult”	  one	  also	  indicates	  that	  the	  pressure	  against	  non-­‐citizen	  
participation	  in	  local	  level	  elections	  remains	  overwhelming’	  (Rozenvalds,	  2007,	  p.	  14).	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  governing	  parties	  to	  grant	  voting	  rights	  to	  
non-­‐citizens	  is	  not	  only	  (and	  not	  always)	  ideological.	  Undoubtedly,	  political	  considerations	  about	  
the	   voting	  behaviour	  of	   those	  potential	   300,000	  new	  voters	   also	  play	   a	   role.	   This	   is	   especially	  
true	  when	  considering	  Riga,	  the	  capital	  city,	  where	  over	  half	  of	  the	  non-­‐citizens	  live	  and	  where	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  This	  might	  have	  changed	  after	  the	  2012	  referendum	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Russian	  language,	  which	  had	  a	  polarising	  
effect	   on	   society.	   Reportedly,	   after	   the	   referendum	   the	   share	   of	   Latvian-­‐speakers	   opposed	   to	   non-­‐citizens’	   voting	  
rights	   rose	   from	   43%	   (Makarovs	   &	   Dimitrovs,	   2009,	   p.	   15)	   to	   71.6%.	   News	   of	   this	   survey	  was	   reported	   in:	   ‘50%	  
zhitelei	   khotiat	   razreshit	   negrazhdanam	   golosovat’	   (50%	   of	   the	   population	   wants	   to	   allow	   non-­‐citizens	   to	   vote),	  
Telegraf	   25	   March	   2012.	   http://www.telegraf.lv/news/50-­‐zhitelei-­‐za-­‐razreshenie-­‐negrazhdanam-­‐vybiraty-­‐
municipalitety	  (Last	  accessed	  19	  November	  2014).	  
79	  Eventually	  LPP/LC	  did	  enter	  a	  governmental	  coalition	  with	  Harmony	  Centre	  in	  the	  Riga	  City	  Council	  in	  2009.	  At	  that	  
point,	  however,	  the	  party	  had	  practically	  disappeared	  nationally.	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they	   constitute	   almost	   a	   quarter	   of	   the	   residents.	   The	   expectation	   that	   the	   great	  majority	   of	  
those	  votes	  might	  go	  to	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	   is	  a	  disincentive	  for	  the	  governing	  parties	  to	  
grant	   voting	   rights	   to	   non-­‐citizens.	   In	   reality,	   both	   the	   example	   of	   Estonia	   and	   the	   results	   of	  
surveys	   on	   Latvia’s	   non-­‐citizens	   indicate	   that	   non-­‐citizens’	   voting	   choices	   might	   be	   more	  
diversified	   than	   it	   is	   usually	   believed	   (Berglund,	   Ekman,	   &	   Aarebrot,	   2004,	   pp.	   105–107;	  
Golubeva	  &	  Akule,	  2012;	  Makarovs	  &	  Dimitrovs,	  2009;	  Volkov,	  2009,	  p.	  110).	  Surveys	  show	  that	  
most	  non-­‐citizens	  would	  actively	  make	  use	  of	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and,	  while	  ethnic	  
vote	  would	  be	  a	  persistent	   feature	  of	   their	  voting	  behaviour,	   their	  votes	  would	  not	  go	  only	   to	  
Russophone	  parties	  (Makarovs	  &	  Dimitrovs,	  2009,	  p.	  13).	  This	  argument	  was	  also	  used	  –	  to	  no	  
avail	   –	   by	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   parties	   to	   try	   to	   convince	  moderate	   parties	   to	   support	   their	  
proposals	  (Saeima,	  27	  January	  2000).	  	  
Alongside	   the	  parliamentary	  activities	  of	   the	  Russophone	  parties,	  NGOs	  and	  civil	   society	  
organisations	  have	  also	  promoted	  the	  political	  rights	  of	  Latvia’s	  non-­‐citizens.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  
this	   goal,	   civil	   society	   organisations	   have	   usually	   pursued	   one	   of	   three	   strategies:	   collecting	  
signatures	  to	  launch	  a	  referendum	  to	  change	  the	  constitution,	  petitioning	  Latvian	  institutions,	  or	  
lobbying	   international	   institutions	   to	   put	   more	   pressure	   on	   the	   Latvian	   government.	   In	   June	  
2013	   the	   grassroots	   organisation	   Congress	   of	   Non-­‐Citizens	   organised	   community	   elections	   to	  
elect	  a	  Parliament	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Represented,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  representation	  for	  Latvia’s	  
non-­‐citizens.	  While	   the	   role	   that	   this	   alternative	   institution	  will	   play	   in	   the	  debate	  about	  non-­‐
citizens’	   voting	   rights	   remains	   to	   be	   seen,	   this	   initiative	   (which	   is	   analysed	   in	   more	   detail	   in	  
Chapter	   7)	   and	   other	   civil	   society	   initiatives	   have	   so	   far	   succeeded	   to	   at	   least	   keep	   public	  
attention	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  non-­‐citizenship	  alive.	  
Increased	   grassroots	   activism	   is	   possibly	   a	   response	   to	   the	   diminished	   attention	   to	   this	  
issue	   by	   the	   parliamentary	   parties.	   Indeed,	   the	   latter	   have	   reasons	   to	   prefer	   the	   status	   quo.	  
Nationalist	  politicians	  can	  present	  their	  tough	  stance	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  non-­‐citizens’	  voting	  rights	  as	  
a	   success.	   The	   moderate	   mainstream	   parties	   can	   continue	   with	   their	   ambivalent	   policy	   on	  
minority	   issues	  and	  avoid	  the	  political	  risk	  of	  granting	  voting	  rights	  to	  the	  almost	  300,000	  non-­‐
citizens	  whom	  they	  have	  contributed	  to	  leave	  without	  franchise.	  Even	  Harmony	  Centre	  seems	  to	  
have	   at	   least	   unclear	   incentives	   to	   push	   for	   local	   voting	   rights	   for	   non-­‐citizens.	   By	   positioning	  
itself	   as	   a	  moderate	   party	   with	   an	   agenda	   that	   goes	   beyond	   solely	  minority	   issues,	   Harmony	  
Centre	  managed	  to	  keep	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  ‘Russian	  vote’,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  attracting	  a	  share	  
of	  the	  Latvian	  vote.	  Harmony	  Centre’s	  strategy	  of	  moderation	  was	  rewarded:	  in	  2009	  it	  won	  the	  
municipal	  elections	   in	  Riga	  and	  produced	   the	   first	  ethnic	  Russian	  mayor	  of	   the	  Latvian	  capital,	  
Nils	   Ušakovs.	   In	   the	   2010	   and	   2011	   parliamentary	   elections	   it	   registered	   impressive	   electoral	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results,	   and	   –	   although	   it	   eventually	   ended	   up	   in	   the	   opposition	   –	   in	   both	   cases	   there	   were	  
serious	   talks	   about	   including	   it	   in	   the	   governing	   coalition.	   In	   2014,	   although	   with	   a	   reduced	  
margin,	  it	  confirmed	  its	  lead	  as	  the	  biggest	  party	  in	  the	  Saeima.	  
Although	  the	  need	  to	  grant	  non-­‐citizens	   the	  right	   to	  some	  form	  of	  political	  participation	  
remains	  part	  of	  Harmony	  Centre’s	  electoral	  programme,80	  and	  it	  is	  regularly	  raised	  in	  parliament	  
by	  its	  MPs	  (e.g.	  Saeima	  6	  September	  2012;	  Saeima	  31	  January	  2013;	  LCHR,	  4	  August	  2014),	  the	  
party	  has	  had	  a	   somewhat	   fluctuating	  emphasis	  on	   this	   issue.	   In	  2012	  Nils	  Ušakovs	   reportedly	  
went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  affirm	  that	  it	  would	  be	  better	  for	  non-­‐citizens	  to	  ‘pass	  the	  naturalisation	  exam	  
instead	  of	  doing	  nothing	  and	  complaining’.81	  This	  was	  possibly	  the	  result	  of	  the	  fear	  that,	  were	  
the	  non-­‐citizens	  granted	  local	  voting	  rights,	  Harmony	  Centre	  would	  risk	  losing	  votes	  to	  the	  more	  
radical	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	  (FHRUL	  and	  For	  Native	  Language).	  As	  Andris	  Tolmačevs	  (FHRUL)	  
put	   it:	   ‘the	   granting	   of	   voting	   rights	   to	   non-­‐citizens	   will	   end	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   monopoly’.82	  
While	  this	  is	  most	  probably	  an	  overstatement,	  a	  more	  gradual	  process	  of	  acquisition	  of	  political	  
rights	  through	  naturalisation	  might	  indeed	  have	  been	  perceived	  as	  electorally	  safer	  for	  Harmony	  
Centre,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   short	   term.	   The	   results	   of	   the	   June	  2013	  municipal	   elections,	   however,	  
reinforced	   Ušakovs’s	   position	   in	   Riga	   and	   likely	   reduced	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   fears	   of	   being	  
ethnically	  outbid.	  Not	  only	  was	  Ušakovs	  confirmed	  as	  mayor	  of	  Riga	  with	  an	  ample	  majority,	  but	  
For	   Native	   Language	   –	   a	   more	   radical	   Russophone	   party	   that	   emerged	   after	   the	   2012	  
referendum	  on	  Russian	  as	  the	  second	  state	  language	  –	  got	  only	  0.3%	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  remained	  
out	  of	  the	  City	  Council.	  The	  2014	  parliamentary	  elections	  confirmed	  Harmony’s	  stable	  position,	  
while	  the	  more	  radically	  ethnic	  Latvia’s	  Russian	  Party	  (LRU)	  remained	  out	  of	  the	  Saeima	  with	  less	  
than	  2%	  of	  the	  vote.	  	  
3.2 Good	  outcome,	  bad	  process	  (and	  vice	  versa)	  
The	  comparison	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  policymaking	  processes	  with	  regard	  to	  non-­‐citizens’	  
voting	   rights	   illustrates	   the	   complex	   relationship	   between	  minority	   descriptive	   representation	  
(that	  is,	  the	  presence	  of	  minority	  representatives	  in	  political	  institutions),	  the	  minority’s	  effective	  
inclusion	   in	   the	  policy	  debate,	  and	  the	  actual	  policy	  outcome.	   In	  both	  countries	  national	  elites	  
were	  the	  gatekeepers	  that	  defined	  the	  terms	  for	  effective	  inclusion	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  For	  the	  section	  of	  Harmony’s	  2014	  electoral	  programme	  that	  deals	  with	  non-­‐citizens’	  issues,	  see	  the	  party’s	  official	  
website:	   http://saskanascentrs.lv/ru/programma/programma-­‐social-­‐demokraticheskoj-­‐partii-­‐soglasie/grazhdanstvo-­‐
i-­‐status-­‐negrazhdan	  (Last	  accessed	  20	  October	  2014).	  
81	  ‘Ushakov:	   luchshe	   sdat	   na	   grazhdanstvo,	   chem	   sidet	   i	   zhalovatsia’	   (Ušakovs:	   it’s	   better	   to	   sit	   the	   citizenship	   exam	  
than	  do	  nothing	  and	  complain),	  Delfi,	  May	  29,	  2012.	  http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/politics/ushakov-­‐luchshe-­‐sdat-­‐na-­‐
grazhdanstvo-­‐chem-­‐sidet-­‐i-­‐zhalovatsya.d?id=42391186	  (Last	  accessed	  20	  October	  2014).	  
82	  ‘Tolmačevs:	   Pilsonības	   piešķiršana	   nepilsoņiem	   izbeigtu	   SC	   monopolu’	   (Tolmačevs:	   granting	   citizenship	   to	   non-­‐
citizens	   would	   terminate	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   monopoly),	   Diena,	   1	   August	   2012.	  
http://www.diena.lv/latvija/viedokli/tolmacevs-­‐pilsonibas-­‐pieskirsana-­‐nepilsoniem-­‐izbeigtu-­‐sc-­‐monopolu-­‐13960437	  
(Last	  accessed	  20	  October	  2014).	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and,	  ultimately,	  determined	  the	  policy	  outcome.	  This	  is	  unsurprising,	  especially	  considering	  the	  
abundant	   literature	   on	   ethnic	   democracy	   and	   ethnic	   control	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   (Pettai	   &	  
Hallik,	  2002;	  Smooha	  &	  Järve,	  2005).	  There	  was,	  however,	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  in	  the	  way	  
this	  gatekeeping	  operated	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  This	  difference	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  level	  to	  which	  
the	  majority	  elites’	  gatekeeping	  role	  is	  challenged	  by	  minority	  representation.	  
In	   Estonia	   the	   titulars-­‐as-­‐gatekeepers	   arrangement	   extended	   to	   the	   whole	   political	  
process	  and	  left	  little	  or	  no	  room	  for	  Russian-­‐speaking	  voices	  to	  be	  heard	  in	  the	  political	  debate.	  
The	  question	  of	  voting	   rights	   for	  non-­‐citizens	  was	  not	  posed	   in	  ethnic	   terms,	  but	  was	   rather	  a	  
pragmatic	  decision	  of	  the	  national	  elites.	  Estonia’s	  non-­‐citizens	  acquired	  local	  voting	  rights	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  a	  debate	  that	  took	  place	  almost	  exclusively	  within	  the	  ethnic	  Estonian	  elite.	  After	  that,	  
the	   failure	  of	   the	  Russophone	  parties	   to	  establish	  a	   significant	   representative	  presence	  meant	  
that	   ethnic-­‐based	   demands	   were	   reabsorbed	   by	   the	   mainstream	   parties	   (predominantly	   the	  
Centre	  Party),	  and	  non-­‐citizens’	  political	  rights	  became	  a	  non-­‐issue.	  
This	  reveals	  a	  seeming	  contradiction.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  de-­‐ethnicisation	  of	   the	   issue	  
made	  it	  acceptable	  for	  the	  national	  elite	  to	  take	  a	   liberal	  stance,	  which	  resulted	  in	  all	  Estonian	  
permanent	  residents	  acquiring	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  local	  elections.	  Following	  this	  decision,	  parties	  
that	   want	   to	   compete	   in	   local	   elections	   in	   areas	   with	   a	   high	   proportion	   of	   Russian-­‐speaking	  
voters	   must	   take	   them	   into	   consideration,	   including	   non-­‐citizens	   and	   third-­‐country	   nationals.	  
The	  de-­‐ethnicisation	  of	  the	  issue	  also	  meant	  that	  radical-­‐nationalist	  statements	  usually	  failed	  to	  
spark	  heated	  debate	  and	  tended	  to	  be	  fewer	  (and	  generally	   less	  abusive)	   in	  the	  Riigikogu	  than	  
they	  were	  in	  the	  Saeima.	  The	  fact	  that	  lack	  of	  polarisation	  on	  this	  issue	  resulted	  in	  a	  liberal	  policy	  
that	   enfranchised	   non-­‐citizens	   locally	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   lending	   support	   to	   the	   polarisation	  
paradigm.	  That	  is,	  the	  low	  politicisation	  of	  ethnicity	  on	  this	  issue	  avoided	  an	  ethnically	  polarised	  
political	   climate	   and	   ultimately	   created	   the	   conditions	   for	   a	   liberal	   policy	   to	   be	   passed.	   Had	  
Russophone	  political	  voices	  been	   louder,	   this	  would	  have	  potentially	  polarised	   the	  debate	  and	  
could	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  different	  outcome.	  
However,	  while	   this	   is	  potentially	   true	   (especially	  when	  compared	   to	  Latvia),	   it	   captures	  
only	  half	  of	  what	  could	  be	  called	  the	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma.	  Indeed,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
arguable	  ‘openness’	  of	  the	  resulting	  policy	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  an	  equally	  open	  decision-­‐making	  
process.	  While	   the	   policy	   outcome	  was	   favourable	   for	   non-­‐citizens	   (and	   by	   extension	   for	   the	  
Russian-­‐speaking	  minority),	  this	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	  compromise	  but,	  rather,	  of	  a	  concession.	  
The	  de-­‐ethnicisation	  of	  the	  issue	  (which	  was	  presented	  in	  purely	  pragmatic	  terms)	  made	  such	  a	  
concession	  acceptable,	  but	  also	  meant	  that	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  were	  reduced	  to	  policy	  objects	  
and	  were	  not	  themselves	  recognised	  as	  actors	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  The	  ‘good’	  outcome	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came	   at	   the	   price	   of	   the	   almost	   complete	   exclusion	   of	   the	   minority	   from	   the	   policymaking	  
process.	   Somewhat	   paradoxically,	   Estonia’s	   non-­‐citizens	   acquired	   the	   right	   to	   vote	   (and,	  
therefore,	  to	  be	  represented)	  locally	  not	  in	  spite	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  lack	  of	  representation	  but	  
because	  of	  it.	  	  
Focusing	   only	   on	   the	   ‘good’	   outcome,	   therefore,	   hides	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   policymaking	  
process	   remained	   entirely	   under	   the	   control	   of	   the	  majority	   elite,	   and	   the	   arguably	  minority-­‐
friendly	  policy	  was	  not	  passed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  majority–minority	  democratic	  debate.	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	   ‘good’	  policy	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	   ‘good’	   (that	   is,	   inclusive)	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  On	  
the	   contrary,	   the	  acceptability	  of	   such	  a	  policy	  was	  based	  on	   the	  minority’s	  political	   exclusion	  
and	  came	  with	  the	  implied	  understanding	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  political	  rights	  to	  a	  larger	  portion	  
of	   the	  Russophone	   community	  was	  not	   tantamount	   to	   an	  extension	  of	   the	  minority’s	  political	  
power.	   Far	   from	   reflecting	   a	   shift	   in	   majority–minority	   relative	   power,	   the	   policy	   concession	  
upheld	   a	   status	   quo	   in	   which	   the	   majority	   elite	   are	   firmly	   in	   a	   position	   of	   democracy’s	  
gatekeepers.	   This	   reinforces	   the	   ‘ownership’	   of	   the	   state	   by	   the	   national	   elite,	   while	   leaving	  
minority	  voices	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  low	  polarisation	  
of	   the	  policymaking	  debate	   is	  not	   a	   guarantee	   for	   an	  equal	   access	   to	   the	  democratic	  process.	  
Rather,	  it	  can	  be	  the	  symptom	  of	  minority	  exclusion.	  	  
In	  Latvia	  the	  ethnic	  majority	  also	  acted	  as	  a	  gatekeeper	   in	  the	  policymaking	  process	  and	  
determined	   its	   outcome.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   Estonian	   case,	   however,	   the	   issue	   of	   non-­‐citizens’	  
voting	  rights	  was	  posed	  in	  explicitly	  ethnic	  terms	  from	  the	  very	  beginning,	  and	  the	  debate	  was	  
mainly	   between	   the	   Latvian	   national	   elite	   and	   the	   Russophone	   representatives.	   This	   reflected	  
the	  high	  level	  of	  politicisation	  of	  ethnicity	  in	  the	  Latvian	  party	  system	  and	  in	  the	  political	  debate	  
in	  general.	  Russophone	  representatives	  clearly	  framed	  the	  issue	  as	  a	  question	  of	  minority	  rights,	  
also	  appropriating	  the	  language	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  	  
The	   political	   representation	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	  minority	   by	   ethnic	   parties	   had	   two	  
major	   –	   and	   contradictory	   –	   implications	   in	   Latvia.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   strong	   Russian-­‐speaking	  
representation	   justified	   and	   reinforced	   the	   nationalist	   discourse	   of	   defending	   the	   nation	  
(Bennich-­‐Björkman	   &	   Johansson,	   2012,	   pp.	   15–16).	   The	   emergence	   of	   a	   strong	   Russophone	  
political	  representation	  early	  on	  pushed	  the	  Latvian	  national	  elites	  into	  a	  defensive	  position	  and	  
polarised	   the	   debate	   along	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   lines.	   This	   made	   compromise	   politically	   risky	   for	  
moderate	  Latvian	  parties,	  reducing	  the	  chances	  for	  the	  Russophone	  voice	  to	  be	  translated	  into	  a	  
liberal	   policy.	   Hence,	   notwithstanding	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   Russophone	   voice	   in	   the	   political	  
debate	  (or,	  rather,	  because	  of	   it),	  the	  outcome	  was	  unfavourable	  to	  the	  minority.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  
substantial	   share	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority	   remains	   disenfranchised	   to	   this	   day.	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Moreover,	   the	   confrontational	   tone	   of	   the	   debates	   could	   strengthen	   nationalist	   sentiments	  
rather	  than	  foster	  compromise.	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   the	   strong	   presence	   of	   minority	   representatives	   in	  
parliament	   gave	   them	   ‘clear	   agenda-­‐setting	   powers’	   (Muižnieks,	   2010,	   p.	   111).	   Russophone	  
representatives	  encouraged	  debate	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  non-­‐citizens’	  political	  rights	  and	  managed	  to	  
persuade	  part	  of	  the	  Latvian	  moderate	  elite,	  if	  not	  always	  to	  support	  their	  demands,	  at	  least	  to	  
consider	  them	  as	  legitimate	  and	  worthy	  of	  discussion.	  Therefore,	  the	  negative	  policy	  outcome	  is	  
only	  half	  of	   the	  picture.	   The	   status	  of	  minority	   representation	   in	   Latvia	   cannot	  be	  understood	  
without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  other	  half;	  that	  is,	  the	  lively	  debate	  on	  minority	  issues	  and	  the	  
increasingly	  independent	  and	  legitimate	  role	  that	  Russophone	  voices	  have	  played	  in	  it.	  In	  other	  
words,	  the	  ‘worse’	  policy	  outcome	  for	  the	  minority	  (compared	  to	  Estonia)	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
‘worse’	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	   less	   inclusive)	   policymaking	   process.	   Rather,	   although	   at	   the	   time	   of	  
writing	   the	   policy	   outcome	   is	   still	   negative	   for	   the	   minority,	   this	   is	   part	   of	   an	   on-­‐going	  
democratic	   debate	   in	  which	  minority	   voices	   take	   active	   part.	   This	   opens	   up	   the	   policymaking	  
process	   for	   minorities	   to	   actively	   question	   the	   majority	   elite’s	   position	   as	   democracy’s	  
gatekeepers	  and	   to	  claim	   their	   legitimate	  participation	  as	  equals	   in	   their	   country’s	  democratic	  
life.	   Seen	   from	   this	   perspective,	   Latvia	   offers	   an	   illustration	   of	   the	   same	   voice/polarisation	  
dilemma	  observed	  in	  Estonia,	  albeit	  in	  a	  diametrically	  opposite	  way.	  	  
3.3 Conclusions:	  The	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma	  
The	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  cases	   illustrate	  the	  two	  sides	  of	  a	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma.	  Strong	  
minority	  political	  presence	  does	  not	  necessarily	  guarantee	  a	  policy	  outcome	  that	  is	  favourable	  to	  
the	   minority.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   can	   hinder	   or	   delay	   such	   an	   outcome.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  
presence	   legitimises	   minority	   voices	   in	   the	   political	   debate	   and	   –	   perhaps	   more	   basically	   –	  
makes	   it	  possible	   for	  a	  majority–minority	  debate	   to	   take	  place	  at	  all.	  Conversely,	   low	  minority	  
presence	   (or	  absence)	   reduces	  the	  risk	  of	  polarisation.	  However,	  while	   lack	  of	  polarisation	  can	  
lead	   to	   favourable	   policies,	   it	   cannot	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   goal	   in	   its	   own	   right:	   far	   from	  necessarily	  
indicating	  inter-­‐ethnic	  accord,	  it	  can	  in	  fact	  reflect	  the	  minority’s	  exclusion	  from	  the	  democratic	  
process	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  
The	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma	  that	  emerges	  from	  comparing	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  reveals	  a	  
conundrum,	   which	   blurs	   the	   boundaries	   between	   competing	   theories	   of	   minority	   political	  
representation.	   A	   binary	   understanding	   of	   the	   politicisation	   of	   ethnicity	   (that	   is,	   bad	   in	   the	  
polarisation	   paradigm	   and	   good	   in	   the	   presence	   paradigm)	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   capture	   the	  
complexities	  of	  minority	   representation.	   In	   the	   cases	  of	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   the	   two	  paradigms	  
can	  each	  reveal	  only	  part	  of	  the	  picture.	  The	  presence	  paradigm	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  there	  has	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been	   a	   more	   lively	   majority–minority	   political	   debate	   on	   non-­‐citizens’	   voting	   rights	   in	   Latvia	  
(where	  Russian-­‐speakers	  are	   represented	  by	  an	  ethnic	  party)	   than	   in	  Estonia	   (where	   there	  are	  
no	  ethnic	  parties	   and	  descriptive	   representation	   is	   low).	  However,	   it	   excessively	  discounts	   the	  
effects	  of	  ethnic	  polarisation	  and	  is	  not	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  different	  policy	  outcomes	  in	  the	  two	  
countries.	  The	  polarisation	  paradigm	  can	  explain	  the	  different	  policy	  outcomes	  by	  pointing	  out	  
how	  ethnicised	   party	   systems	   lead	   to	   polarisation	   on	  minority	   policies	   and	  make	   compromise	  
difficult.	   However,	   it	   conflates	   the	   outcome	   with	   the	   process,	   by	   implying	   that	   lack	   of	  
polarisation	  per	  se	  must	  be	   the	  goal	  of	  ethnically-­‐divided	  democracies.	  Moreover,	   in	  Estonia	  –	  
where	  the	  policy	  result	  was	  positive	  for	  the	  minority	  –	  inter-­‐ethnic	  ‘tensions,	  perceived	  threats	  
and	  distance	  […]	  were	  considerable	  and	  have	  been	  consistently	  higher	  than	  in	  Latvia’	  (Bennich-­‐
Björkman	  &	   Johansson,	  2012,	  p.	  13).	   This	   shows	   that	   the	  de-­‐ethnicisation	  of	   the	  party	   system	  
does	  not	  imply	  the	  de-­‐politicisation	  of	  ethnicity	  in	  society	  or	  in	  the	  political	  discourse,	  nor	  does	  it	  
necessarily	  entail	  the	  equal	  representation	  of	  all	  sections	  of	  society	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  	  
While	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐citizens’	  local	  voting	  rights	  shows	  the	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma	  in	  
particularly	  stark	  terms,	  the	  same	  holds	  true	  (with	  the	  due	  differences	  of	  the	  specific	  cases)	  for	  
the	   other	  minority-­‐sensitive	   policies	   analysed	   in	   this	   study.	   For	   instance,	   policymaking	   on	   the	  
education	   reform	   in	   minority	   schools	   (analysed	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   Chapter	   5)	   confirms	   the	  
observation	   that	   the	   content	  of	   a	  policy	   is	   not	   a	   good	   indicator	  of	   the	   inclusive	  quality	  of	   the	  
process	  of	  making	   it.	   Indeed,	  while	   the	   two	   countries’	   policies	   on	   the	   language	  of	   teaching	   in	  
minority	   upper-­‐secondary	   schools	   are	   very	   similar,	   in	   Estonia	   this	   came	   about	   largely	   as	   a	  
pragmatic	  concession	  by	  the	  national	  elite,	  whereas	  in	  Latvia	  it	  resulted	  from	  majority–minority	  
negotiations,	  underpinned	  by	  mass	  minority	  mobilisation.	  
Whether,	   in	   the	   long	   term,	   policy	   concessions	  with	   low	  minority	   representation	   (like	   in	  
Estonia)	  or	  majority–minority	  debates	  and	  high	  minority	   representation	   in	  a	  polarised	  political	  
context	   (like	   in	   Latvia)	   are	   more	   beneficial	   to	   democracy	   and	   inter-­‐ethnic	   peace	   remains	   a	  
matter	   for	   debate.	   The	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   outlines	   the	   bases	   on	   which	   such	   debate	  









Pressures	   from	   international	   organisations	   have	   often	   been	   indicated	   as	   decisive,	   or	   at	   least	  
significant,	   in	   determining	   minority	   policies	   in	   CEE	   countries	   (Epstein	   &	   Sedelmeier,	   2008;	  
Hansson,	   2002;	   Kelley,	   2004;	   Schimmelfennig,	   2005).	   The	   assumption	   that	   international	  
pressures	  (especially	  when	  linked	  to	  accession	  conditionalities)	  are	  effective	  in	  achieving	  liberal	  
minority	  policies,	  however,	   is	  far	  from	  unquestioned.	  Doubts	  have	  been	  raised	  on	  whether	  the	  
impact	  of	  international	  pressures	  –	  arguably	  effective	  on	  economic	  policies	  –	  actually	  extends	  to	  
minority	  policies	  and	  inter-­‐ethnic	  relations	  (Agarin	  &	  Brosig,	  2009;	  Galbreath	  &	  McEvoy,	  2012).	  
Some	   authors	   have	   also	   questioned	   whether	   the	   liberalising	   effects	   of	   EU	   pressures	   extend	  
beyond	   formal	   compliance,	   and	   whether	   arguably	   positive	   liberalising	   pressures	   have	   long-­‐
lasting	  effects	   after	  EU	  accession	   (Agarin	  &	  Regelmann,	  2012;	   Sasse,	  2008;	   Schulze,	  2010).	  On	  
both	   sides	   of	   this	   debate,	   literature	   has	   focused	   on	   how	   governments	   responded	   to	  
international	  pressures.	  That	  is,	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  primarily	  on	  the	  majority	  elites,	  while	  effects	  
on	  minority	  political	  inclusion	  have	  been	  largely	  neglected.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  study’s	  approach	  to	  
minorities	  as	  political	  actors	  rather	  than	  mere	  policy	  objects,	  this	  chapter	  reframes	  the	  question	  
of	  the	  international	  pressures’	  effectiveness	  to	  include	  the	  effects	  of	  international	  pressures	  on	  
the	   minorities’	   role	   in	   the	   policymaking	   process.	   Did	   international	   involvement	   foster	  
inclusiveness	   and	   minority	   empowerment,	   or	   did	   it	   –	   somewhat	   paradoxically	   –	   promote	  
exclusion?	  
Strong	   pressures	   from	   international	   organisations	   on	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	  
governments	  to	  liberalise	  minority	  policies	  can	  be	  studied	  as	  a	  factor	  to	  explain	  policy	  outcomes,	  
through	   processes	   of	   bargaining,	   emulation,	   reinforcement	   and	   socialisation	   (Beyers,	   2010;	  
Checkel,	  2005;	  Schimmelfennig,	  Engert,	  &	  Knobel,	  2006;	  Schimmelfennig,	  2005).	  This	  has	  been	  
the	   most	   usual	   approach	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   this	   theme,	   with	   the	   main	   debates	   being	   on	  
whether	   international	  pressures	  are	  effective	   in	  pushing	   for	  specific	  policies	  and	  whether	   they	  
are	   the	   determining	   factor.	   This	   chapter	   takes	   a	   different	   approach,	   analysing	   international	  
pressures	  as	  a	  potential	  additional	  channel	  for	  minority	  voices	  to	  gain	  a	  stronger	  position	  in	  their	  
country’s	  state-­‐level	  policymaking	  process.	  International	  organisations	  can	  be	  powerful	  allies	  for	  
local	   minority	   representatives,	   they	   can	   be	   lobbied	   to	   exert	   indirect	   pressure	   on	   domestic	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governments,	   and	   they	   can	   provide	   additional	   legitimacy	   to	   minority	   demands	   by	   inscribing	  
them	  in	  the	  wider	  international	  discourse	  on	  minority	  rights.	  	  
The	  case	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia’s	  state-­‐language	  proficiency	  requirements	  for	  employment	  
offers	   the	   ideal	   access	   point	   into	   the	   topic	   of	   international	   impact	   over	   policymaking.	   Estonia	  
and	   Latvia	   share	   a	   similar	   political	   attitude	   towards	   language	   and	   have	   both	   established	  
language	   requirements	   for	   access	   to	   employment	   in	   the	   public	   and	   (more	   limitedly)	   private	  
sphere.	   In	  both	   cases	   the	  policy	  has	  discernibly	  evolved	  over	   time,	  which	  makes	   it	  possible	   to	  
trace	   the	   causal	   mechanisms	   behind	   this	   evolution	   and	   to	   assess	   the	   role	   of	   international	  
organisations	  and	  minority	  voices	  throughout.	  Language	  requirements	  have	  been	  at	  the	  centre	  
of	  international	  attention	  in	  roughly	  the	  same	  period	  in	  both	  countries,	  which	  corresponded	  to	  
EU	   accession	   negotiations.	   Debates	   about	   the	   language	   requirements	   for	   employment	   largely	  
revolved	   around	   international	   recommendations	   and	   the	   effect	   policy	   choices	   on	   this	   topic	  
would	   have	   had	   on	   the	   two	   countries’	   EU	   accession	   prospects.	   In	   both	   cases,	   international	  
organisations	   pushed	   for	   an	   easing	   of	   the	   language	   requirements,	   in	   line	   with	   what	  minority	  
representatives	   were	   advocating	   for	   in	   parliament.	   A	   case	   could	   be	   made,	   therefore,	   that	  
international	  pressures	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  policymaking	  on	  language	  requirements.	  But	  
did	  they	  also	  provide	  an	  alternative	  channel	  for	  minority	  voices	  to	  participate	  in	  policymaking	  on	  
this	  controversial	  issue?	  
In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  outline	  the	  significance	  of	  language	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  and	  
the	   implications	   of	   language	   management	   for	   the	   Russophone	   minority.	   Then	   I	   retrace	   the	  
making	  of	   the	  policy	  on	   language	  requirements	   for	  employment,	  with	  specific	  attention	  to	  the	  
role	   of	   international	   organisations.	   I	   conclude	   by	   analysing	   the	   effects	   of	   international	  
involvement	  on	  the	  political	  inclusion	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minorities.	  
4.1 The	  implications	  of	  language	  management	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  
Language	   is	  arguably	   the	  central	   factor	   in	  defining	  an	   in-­‐group	  and	  an	  out-­‐group	   in	  the	  ethno-­‐
linguistically	   divided	   democracies	   of	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   The	   key	   role	   of	   language	   in	   group	  
boundary-­‐making	  is	  enshrined	  in	  the	  prevailing	  use	  of	  the	  label	  ‘Russian-­‐speakers’	  to	  define	  the	  
minority,	   both	   as	   a	   category	   of	   analysis	   and	   as	   a	   category	   of	   practice	   (Laitin,	   1998,	   p.	   263).83	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  The	  locution	  ‘Russian-­‐speakers’	  is	  often	  favoured	  by	  scholars	  over	  terms	  like	  ‘ethnic	  Russians’,	  ‘Russians’	  or	  ‘Baltic	  /	  
Estonian	  /	  Latvian	  Russians’	  (e.g.	  Cheskin,	  2012b;	  Galbreath,	  2005;	  Solska,	  2011;	  T.	  Vihalemm	  &	  Masso,	  2003).	  The	  
label	  ‘Russian-­‐speakers’	  has	  at	  least	  three	  analytical	  advantages:	  it	  avoids	  suggesting	  a	  necessary	  identification	  of	  the	  
minority	  with	  the	  Russian	  Federation;	  it	  highlights	  the	  similar	  social	  position	  of	  all	  ethnic	  ‘non-­‐titulars’	  whose	  main	  
language	  of	   communication	   is	  Russian	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  ethnic	  majority;	   and	   it	   stresses	   the	   importance	  of	   language	   in	  
defining	  the	  group.	   It	  has	  also	  been	  noted	  that	  the	  spreading	  usage	  of	  the	   locution	  ‘Russian-­‐speakers’	  outside	  the	  
academic	  community	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘potentially	  truth-­‐creating,	  discursive	  mechanism’	  that	  
has	   the	   power	   to	   unite	   an	   otherwise	   diverse	   group	   into	   ‘an	   “imagined”,	   but	   relatively	   identifiable,	   community’	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Given	   the	   primarily	   language-­‐based	   definition	   of	   majority–minority	   boundaries,	   any	   policy	  
decision	   that	   regulates	   the	   use	   of	   language	   in	   society	   is	   bound	   to	   affect	   the	   minority.	   Such	  
policies	  are	  indeed	  typically	  drafted	  (either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly)	  with	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  
in	  mind.	  	  
Language	   legislation	   is	   doubly	   political	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   existing	  
political	  reality	  of	  inter-­‐group	  relations,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  itself	  contributes	  in	  shaping	  that	  
political	  reality	  by	  reinforcing	  inter-­‐group	  boundaries	  (Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  78).	  As	  such,	  Estonia’s	  and	  
Latvia’s	  language	  legislations	  define	  the	  social	  and	  political	  implications	  of	  the	  existing	  linguistic	  
boundary	  between	  majority	  and	  minority.	   It	   is	  not	  surprising,	   therefore,	   that	   the	   regulation	  of	  
language	   (in	   relation	   to	   citizenship,	   education,	   employment,	   communication	   with	   public	  
authorities,	  and	  as	  part	  of	  national	  integration	  strategies)	  has	  become	  a	  central	  battleground	  for	  
the	   definition	   of	   identity,	   political	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   inclusion,	   and,	   ultimately,	   power.	  
According	  to	  Kasekamp,	  in	  post-­‐independence	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  the	  Language	  Laws	  were	  ‘the	  
other	  instrument	  [together	  with	  the	  Citizenship	  Laws]	  through	  which	  Baltic	  nationalists	  tried	  to	  
reassert	  their	  dominance	  over	  the	  monolingual	  Russian	  settler	  community’	  (2010,	  p.	  185).	  Seen	  
from	   this	   perspective,	   language	   legislation	   served	   the	   purpose	   of	   ‘ethnic	   containment’	   (Järve,	  
2002,	   p.	   83)	   and	   ‘power	   redistributor’	   (Rannut,	   2004,	   p.	   6).	   Although	   the	   national	   elites’	  
aspirations	  have	  somewhat	  changed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  past	  twenty	  years,	  language	  remained	  
central	  in	  their	  policies	  regarding	  the	  Russophone	  minority.	  
In	   both	   countries	   the	   Language	   Laws	   impose	   restrictions	   on	   the	  use	   of	   languages	   other	  
than	  the	  official	  state	  language	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Restrictions	  apply	  for	  instance	  with	  regard	  
to	   the	   language	   of	   communication	   with	   public	   institutions,	   the	   language	   of	   banners	   and	  
billboards,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  state	  language	  proficiency	  required	  to	  work	  in	  the	  public	  sector.84	  In	  
the	  late	  1990s	  in	  both	  Latvia	  and	  Estonia	  language	  requirements	  were	  also	  imposed	  on	  election	  
candidates,	   who	   were	   required	   to	   provide	   language	   certificates	   at	   the	   highest	   level	   of	  
proficiency	   to	   run	   in	   state	   or	  municipal	   elections.	   After	   a	   case	   against	   Latvia	   arising	   from	   the	  
application	  of	  this	  law	  was	  successfully	  brought	  before	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  
yielding	   to	   mounting	   pressure	   on	   the	   part	   of	   several	   international	   bodies,	   Estonia	   repealed	  
language	   requirements	   for	   candidates	   in	   2001	   and	   Latvia	   did	   the	   same	   in	   2002	   (Adrey,	   2005,	  
p.	  459;	   Järve,	   2002,	   p.	   87;	   Taube,	   2003;	   Van	   Elsuwege,	   2004,	   pp.	   49–50).	   The	   parliamentary	  
debates	  about	  language	  requirements	  for	  election	  candidates	  show	  how	  the	  issue	  of	  language	  is	  
often	  actively	  linked	  by	  the	  national	  elites	  to	  that	  of	  the	  minority’s	  dubious	  loyalty	  to	  the	  state.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Cheskin,	  2012a,	  pp.	  326–7).	  
84	  For	  thorough	  analyses	  of	  the	  Estonian	  an	  Latvian	   language	  laws	  see	  Boris	  Tsilevich	  (2001),	  Priit	  Järve	  (2002),	  Mart	  
Rannut	  (2004),	  Jean-­‐Bernard	  Adrey	  (2005)	  and	  Timofey	  Agarin	  (2010,	  pp.	  209–248).	  
90	  
	  
Issues	  of	  loyalty	  and	  trust	  were	  routinely	  raised	  in	  parliamentary	  debates	  about	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  
Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  language	  policies.	  
The	  principle	  of	   language	  proficiency	  as	  a	  determinant	   for	  minority	   access	   to	   social	   and	  
political	  rights,	  which	  is	  already	  inscribed	  in	  the	  procedures	  for	  the	  acquisition	  of	  citizenship,	  is	  
further	   reinforced	   (and	   expanded	   beyond	   political	   rights)	   by	   the	   language	   requirements	   for	  
employment.	   As	   part	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   language	   legislation,	   access	   to	   a	   long	   list	   of	  
professions,	  both	  in	  the	  public	  and	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  is	  tied	  by	  law	  to	  specific	  levels	  of	  state	  
language	  proficiency.	  While	  a	  B1	  level	  is	  required	  in	  both	  countries	  to	  naturalise,	  higher	  levels	  of	  
proficiency	  are	  needed	  to	  hold	  public	  posts	  and	  some	  posts	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  
The	  requirements	  are	  implemented	  by	  specialised	  agencies:	  the	  Language	  Inspectorate	  in	  
Estonia	   and	   the	   State	   Language	   Centre	   in	   Latvia.	   Language	   inspectors	   are	   entrusted	   with	  
conducting	  checks	  and	  imposing	  sanctions.	  As	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  
requirements	   is	  unpopular	  among	  minority	   communities	  and	   the	   inspectorates	  are	   sometimes	  
disparagingly	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘language	   police’	   or	   ‘language	   inquisition’	   by	   the	   local	   Russian-­‐
language	  media.85	  The	  role	  of	  language	  inspectors	  has	  also	  been	  criticised	  by	  experts	  for	  creating	  
a	  discourse	  of	  violation,	  imposition	  and	  punishment	  rather	  than	  promoting	  positive	  incentives	  to	  
learn	  the	  state	  language	  (Zepa,	  2003,	  p.	  94).	  Other	  authors	  have	  noted	  that	  more	  emphasis	  and	  
consequently	  more	   resources	  have	   typically	  been	  put	  on	  enforcement	   and	  punishment	   rather	  
than	  on	  ‘softer’	  implementation	  strategies	  based	  on	  teaching	  and	  positive	  incentives	  (Diačkova,	  
2002,	  p.	  268;	  P.	  Vihalemm	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  pp.	  122–123).	  
While	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  language	  legislations	   is	  controversial	  from	  the	  minorities’	  point	  
of	   view,86	   the	   regulation	   of	   language	   in	   employment	   is	   particularly	   interesting	   as	   it	   affects	  
Russian-­‐speakers	  in	  multiple	  aspects	  of	  their	  lives.	  Language	  requirements	  have	  spin-­‐off	  effects	  
that	   can	  directly	  or	   indirectly	  affect	  minority	   livelihoods,	  minority	  political	   representation,	  and	  
the	  minority’s	   relationship	   with	   the	   state.	   By	   limiting	   the	  minority’s	   access	   to	   jobs,	   language	  
requirements	   can	   affect	   the	   minority’s	   socio-­‐economic	   status,	   its	   representation	   in	   the	   state	  
bureaucracy,	  and	  its	  trust	  towards	  state	  institutions.	  In	  particular,	  strict	  language	  requirements	  
put	   the	   minority	   in	   a	   position	   of	   disadvantage	   in	   the	   labour	   market,	   especially	   in	   the	   public	  
sector,	  where	  requirements	  are	  more	  stringent.	  	  
An	   argument	   could	   be	  made	   that	   language	   requirements	   translate	   into	   socio-­‐economic	  
exclusion,	   which	   in	   turn	   can	   reinforce	   political	   exclusion	   and	   estrangement	   from	   the	   state.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  For	  references	  to	  the	  language	  ‘inquisitors’	  on	  Russian-­‐language	  Latvian	  media	  see	  Ammon	  Cheskin	  (2012a,	  p.	  334).	  
For	  a	  study	  that	  highlights	  complaints	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Language	  Inspectorate	  in	  Estonia	  see	  Marju	  Lauristin	  and	  
Triin	  Vihalemm	  (2008).	  
86	  This	   includes	  the	  very	  principle	  of	  the	  single	  (‘titular’)	  state	   language,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  2012	  referendum	  in	  Latvia	  
about	  making	  Russian	  the	  second	  state	  language.	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Indeed,	   a	   group’s	   capacity	   for	   mobilisation,	   engagement	   in	   the	   political	   process,	   political	  
representation,	   and	  political	   empowerment	  have	  been	   found	   to	  be	   intimately	   related	   to	   their	  
socio-­‐economic	   position	   (Jacobs	   &	   Skocpol,	   2005).	   A	   socio-­‐economically	   marginalised	   group	  
tends	  to	  have	  less	  voice	  in	  the	  political	  process,	  even	  on	  issues	  that	  touch	  it	  directly.	  While	  there	  
is	   an	   intuitive	   connection	   between	   language-­‐based	   barriers	   to	   labour	   market	   access	   and	   an	  
ethno-­‐linguistic	  minority’s	   socio-­‐economic	   standing,	   however,	   there	   is	   no	   systematic	   study	   of	  
the	   socio-­‐economic	  effects	  of	   language	   requirements	  on	   the	  Russophone	  minorities	   in	  Estonia	  
and	  Latvia.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  –	  as	  explained	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  2	  	  –	  
socio-­‐economic	   inequality	   between	   Russian-­‐speakers	   and	   the	   ethnic	   majority	   is	   more	  
pronounced	  in	  Estonia	  than	  in	  Latvia	  (Rozenvalds,	  2007,	  p.	  37).	  This	  difference	  in	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  
economic	  inequality	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  language	  requirements	  (which	  are	  similar	  in	  the	  two	  
countries)	  do	  not	  by	  themselves	  determine	  the	  Russophone	  minorities’	  socio-­‐economic	  position.	  	  
Other	  dimensions	  apart	  from	  state-­‐imposed	  language	  requirements	  must	  be	   in	  action	  to	  
determine	  the	  minority’s	  socio-­‐economic	  status.	  The	  factors	  that	  are	  usually	  indicated	  to	  explain	  
the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  are:	  the	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  composition	  of	  the	  
soviet-­‐time	  Russian	  settlers	  –	  mostly	  blue-­‐collar	  in	  Estonia,	  mostly	  composed	  of	  skilled	  workers	  
in	   Latvia	   (Lieven,	   1993,	   p.	   187);	   the	   fact	   that,	   unlike	   Estonia,	   Latvia	   had	   a	   bigger	   Russophone	  
historical	  minority;	   the	  higher	  ethno-­‐linguistic	   spatial	   segregation	   in	  Estonia	   (Vetik	  &	  Helemäe,	  
2011,	   p.	   160);	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   Estonia’s	   Russian-­‐speakers	   were	   employed	   in	   industries	   that	  
suffered	  the	  structural	  transformations	  of	  the	  post-­‐soviet	  economy	  the	  most	  (Poleshchuk,	  2009,	  
p.	  99).	  	  
While	   professional	   language	   requirements	   arguably	   do	   not	   determine	   socio-­‐economic	  
stratification	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  Russian-­‐
speaking	   minorities.	   Undoubtedly,	   in	   both	   cases	   the	   regulation	   of	   language	   in	   employment	  
makes	   language	   a	   crucial	   factor	   in	   a	   person’s	   employment	   opportunities.	   By	   limiting	   Russian-­‐
speakers’	  access	   to	  a	  high	  number	  of	   jobs,	   the	   language	   requirements	   reinforce	   the	  economic	  
marginalisation	   of	   the	   sections	   of	   the	  Russophone	  minorities	   that	   are	   already	   in	   a	   position	   of	  
socio-­‐economic	  disadvantage.	  Russian-­‐speakers	  with	  a	   lower	  socio-­‐economic	  starting	  point	  are	  
in	   a	  weaker	  position	   to	   cope	  with	   the	  barriers	   imposed	  by	   the	   language	   requirements.	   This	   is	  
particularly	   relevant	   for	   Estonia,	   where	   the	   gap	   between	   minority	   and	   majority	   is	   more	  
pronounced,	  but	   it	   is	  also	  an	   issue	   for	  Latvia,	  where	   language	  still	   constitutes	   the	  main	   labour	  
market	  barrier	  faced	  by	  the	  minority	  (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  127).	  
In	   addition	   to	   this,	   in	   both	   countries	   strict	   language	   requirements	   in	   the	   public	   sector	  
contribute	  to	   the	  underrepresentation	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	  among	  civil	   servants.	  By	   linking	  the	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possibility	   of	   access	   to	   jobs	   in	   state	   and	   local	   bureaucracies	   to	   a	   citizen’s	   mother	   tongue,	  
language	   requirements	   contribute	   in	   entrenching	   the	   dominance	   of	   ‘titular’	   citizens	   in	   public	  
offices	  (Golubeva	  &	  Akule,	  2012;	  Hallik	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  This	  has	  two	  effects.	  First,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
state	  bureaucracy	   is	  overwhelmingly	   staffed	  by	  members	  of	   the	  ethnic	  majority	   reinforces	   the	  
impression	  that	   the	  state	  belongs	  to	  the	   ‘titular’	  nations.	  This	  carries	   the	  risk	  of	   increasing	  the	  
minorities’	   feeling	   of	   estrangement	   from	   the	   state.	   Second,	   minority	   underrepresentation	  
among	  civil	  servants	  can	  result	  in	  an	  ethnic	  bias	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  sensitive	  policies	  ‘even	  
if	   the	   laws	   are	   in	   no	   formal	   contradiction	   with	   international	   human	   rights	   standards’	   (Järve,	  
2002,	  p.	  91).	  	  
As	   for	   more	   practical	   effects	   on	   the	   minority’s	   attitude	   towards	   learning	   the	   state	  
language,	   existing	   research	   shows	   that	   these	   have	   been	   contradictory.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  
especially	  among	  the	  younger	  generations,	  language	  requirements	  can	  constitute	  an	  incentive	  to	  
learn	  the	  state	  language	  for	  career	  purposes	  (Hogan-­‐Brun,	  2005,	  p.	  275).	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  
Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  integration	  strategies,	  which	  put	  the	  focus	  on	  language	  acquisition	  as	  the	  
primary	  vehicle	   for	   integration.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	   the	   frequent	   language	  checks	  by	  
the	  Language	  Inspectorates	  for	  some	  professions	  (for	  example	  the	  teachers	  of	  minority	  schools)	  
can	  create	  mistrust	  towards	  the	  state	  and	  reinforce	  feelings	  of	  victimhood	  and	  alienation	  among	  
the	   Russian-­‐speakers.	   According	   to	   some	   researchers,	   language	   requirements	   did	   not	  
significantly	   improve	  the	  use	  of	  the	  state	   language	  among	  minorities,	  but	  they	  increased	  inter-­‐
ethnic	  tensions	  and	  minority	  alienation	  from	  the	  state	  (Diačkova,	  2003,	  pp.	  41–45).	  	  
The	   salience	   of	   language	   management	   for	   inter-­‐ethnic	   and	   minority–state	   relations	   in	  
Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   explains	   the	   heated	   parliamentary	   debates	   on	   the	   issue	   and	   the	   irritation	  
often	   displayed	   by	   the	  majority	   elites	   towards	   international	   interference	   on	   language-­‐related	  
topics.	  It	  is	  all	  the	  more	  surprising,	  then,	  that	  –	  at	  least	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it	  –	  international	  pressures	  
seem	   to	   have	   been	   effective	   in	   both	   countries	   in	   pushing	   for	   a	   liberalisation	   of	   language	  
requirements.	   The	   following	   analysis	   process-­‐traces	   policymaking	   on	   language	   requirements,	  
focusing	  on	  the	  effects	  that	  international	  involvement	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  had	  on	  the	  
political	  inclusion	  of	  the	  minorities.	  
4.2 The	  policymaking	  process	  on	  language	  requirements	  for	  employment	  
Language	  requirements	   for	  employment	   in	   the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  are	  enshrined	   in	   the	  
Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   Language	   Laws	   and	   further	   determined	   by	   governmental	   regulations.	  
Language	  Laws	  regulate	  all	  aspects	  of	  language	  usage	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  In	  both	  countries,	  the	  
main	   concern	   behind	   these	   laws	   had	   been	   that,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   appropriate	   regulations,	  
Russian	  would	  have	  substituted	  itself	  to	  the	  much	  smaller	  state	  languages	  as	  the	  main	  language	  
93	  
	  
of	   public	   and	   private	   communication.	   Imposing	   language	   requirements	   to	   access	   public	   and	  
private	   jobs	   was	   therefore	   seen	   as	   a	   way	   to	   strengthen	   the	   state	   language	   status	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
Russian	  (Interviews	  with	  policymakers,	  2013).	  
The	   Estonian	   Language	   Law	   was	   passed	   in	   1995.	   Among	   other	   language-­‐related	  
provisions,	  it	  envisaged	  Estonian	  language	  proficiency	  requirements	  for	  employment	  both	  in	  the	  
public	   and	   in	   the	   private	   sphere.	   The	   law	   established	   three	   levels	   of	   proficiency	   (basic,	  
intermediate	  and	  advanced).	  These	  were	  later	  substituted	  with	  a	  six-­‐level	  proficiency	  scale	  and	  
eventually	  harmonised	  with	  the	  EU	  standardised	  language	  proficiency	  levels.	  The	  law	  did	  not	  set	  
the	   requirements	   in	  detail	   but	   gave	   the	  government	   the	   task	  of	   establishing	   requirements	   for	  
‘institutions,	  enterprises	  and	  organisations,	  in	  work-­‐related	  dealings	  with	  the	  public’	  (art.	  5).	  The	  
requirements	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   were	   justified	   by	   the	   right	   of	   the	   consumers	   to	   Estonian-­‐
language	  information	  (art.	  16).	  
The	  1995	  draft	  law	  was	  prepared	  by	  the	  nationalist	  party	  Isamaa	  and	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  
way	   to	   protect	   the	   Estonian	   language	   and	   culture	   within	   a	   ‘unitary	   state	   with	   one	   state	  
language’	  and	   to	   rectify	   the	  asymmetric	  bilingualism	   that	  had	  emerged	  during	   the	  Soviet	   time	  
(Riigikogu,	   8	   February	   1995).	   Although	  more	  moderate	   voices	  were	   heard	   during	   the	   debate,	  
everyone	  in	  the	  Riigikogu	  agreed	  on	  the	  law’s	  goal	  to	  strengthen	  the	  status	  of	  the	  state	  language	  
in	   the	   public	   sphere.	   Possibly	   also	   because	   no	   Russophone	   parties	   were	   represented	   in	   the	  
parliament,	  which	  was	  at	  that	  point	  compactly	  ethnic	  Estonian,	  no	  objections	  were	  raised	  with	  
regard	   to	   the	   language	   requirements	   for	   employment	   during	   the	   parliamentary	   debate.	   Also	  
importantly,	  the	  law	  was	  passed	  shortly	  before	  the	  March	  1995	  general	  elections.	  Although	  the	  
nationalist	  Isamaa	  (until	  then	  in	  government)	  eventually	  lost	  those	  elections,87	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  
moderate	  parties	  (such	  as	  Reform	  Party	  and	  Coalition	  Party)	  felt	  that	  taking	  a	  liberal	  position	  on	  
the	  language	  issue	  would	  have	  been	  electorally	  risky.	  
Over	  the	  next	  fifteen	  years,	  the	  1995	  Language	  Law	  was	  amended	  many	  times,	  before	  it	  
was	   entirely	   re-­‐written	   in	   2011.	   One	   fundamental	   feature	   emerges	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  
parliamentary	   debates	   over	   these	   amendments:	   all	   the	   parties	   involved	   in	   the	   policymaking	  
process	   made	   continuous	   and	   extensive	   reference	   to	   the	   opinions	   and	   recommendations	   of	  
international	  organisations.	  Indeed,	  throughout	  the	  whole	  process	  of	  policymaking	  on	  language	  
requirements	   the	   OSCE,	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   several	   individual	  
Western	  countries	  invited	  Estonia	  to	  revise	  its	  Language	  Law,	  especially	  focusing	  their	  critiques	  
on	   language	   requirements	   in	   the	   private	   sector.	   These	   pressures	   could	   not	   be	   ignored	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Isamaa	  went	  from	  29	  to	  only	  8	  Riigikogu	  seats.	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policymakers	   –	  whether	   they	  were	   in	   favour	   or	   against	   strict	   language	   requirements	   for	   non-­‐
Estonians	  –	  as	  the	  country	  was	  involved	  in	  EU	  accession	  negotiations.	  
Proponents	   of	   strict	   language	   requirements	   from	   nationalist	   and	   moderate	   parties	  
appealed	   to	   the	   specificity	   of	   the	   Estonian	   situation	   to	   justify	   the	   ‘unusual’	   language	  
requirements	   in	   the	   private	   sphere	   (Riigikogu,	   23	   November	   1998).	   They	   also	   argued	   that	  
Estonian	  speakers’	  rights	  had	  to	  be	  guaranteed,	  and	  that	  usage	  of	  Estonian	  had	  to	  be	  bolstered	  
by	  law	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  its	  command	  among	  the	  population	  (Riigikogu,	  23	  November	  1998).	  
On	   the	  other	   side,	  Russophone	  MPs,88	  who	  opposed	   strict	   requirements,	  were	  able	   to	  bolster	  
their	   position	   by	   claiming	   international	   support	   and	   by	   adopting	   the	   international	  
recommendations’	   language	  and	  arguments.	  Time	  and	  again	  they	  reminded	  their	  colleagues	   in	  
the	  Riigikogu	  about	  the	  OSCE	  critiques	  and	  openly	  borrowed	  the	  international	  community’s	  free-­‐
market	  arguments	  against	  state	   interference	   in	   the	  private	  sphere	   (see,	   for	   instance,	  Riigikogu	  
18	   November	   1997	   and	   23	   November	   1998).	   They	   also	   criticised	   the	   blindness	   of	   the	   law	   to	  
Estonia’s	  regional	  specificities	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  law	  was	  vague	  and	  left	  the	  government	  with	  
nearly	   unbounded	   power	   to	   define	   the	   details.	   Government	   regulations	   would	   define	   the	  
professions	   to	  which	   language	  requirements	  applied,	   the	  extent	  of	   such	  requirements	  and	  the	  
mode	  of	  implementation.	  
Although	   they	   shared	   some	   of	   the	   same	   securitising	   concerns	   as	   the	   nationalists,	  
moderate	  MPs	  often	  voiced	  the	  fear	  that	  stubborn	  inflexibility	  on	  the	  language	  issue	  might	  put	  
Estonia	  in	  trouble	  with	  the	  OSCE	  and	  other	  international	  bodies	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Riigikogu	  18	  
November	   1997	   and	   9	   February	   1999).	   International	   pressures	   made	   the	   moderate	   Estonian	  
parties	   and	   the	   government	  more	   receptive	   to	   the	  need	   to	   soften	   some	  of	   the	   requirements.	  
Moderate	  MPs	  openly	  called	  their	  colleagues	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  compromise	  solution	  that	  might	  
satisfy	  all	  parties	  and,	  above	  all,	  the	  international	  community	  (Riigikogu	  18	  November	  1997	  and	  
9	  February	  1999).	  	  
Although	  the	  Russophone	  parliamentary	  faction's	  request	  that	  all	   language	  requirements	  
in	   the	   private	   sector	   be	   eliminated	   was	   deemed	   unacceptable,	   several	   of	   its	   proposals	   were	  
taken	   into	   account	   by	   the	   parliamentary	   Committee	   that	   was	   working	   on	   the	   law.	   The	  
Russophone	  faction	  in	  the	  Riigikogu	  applauded	  the	  compromise	  and	  praised	  the	  involvement	  of	  
the	  OSCE	  for	  having	  facilitated	  it	  (Riigikogu,	  9	  February	  1999).	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  ‘[o]nly	  after	  
the	   OSCE	   High	   Commissioner	   on	   National	   Minorities	   and	   the	   European	   Commission	   became	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	   In	   1995	   the	  Russophone	  party	  Our	  Home	   is	   Estonia	   gained	  6	   seats	   in	   the	  Riigikogu	  and,	   until	   2003,	   Russophone	  
parties	  managed	   to	   keep	   a	   small	   representation	   in	   parliament.	   After	   that,	   no	   Russophone	   party	   has	  managed	   to	  




actively	  involved,	  was	  a	  compromise	  achieved’	  (Tsilevich,	  2001,	  p.	  145).	  In	  such	  a	  crucial	  period	  
for	  Estonia’s	  ‘return	  to	  Europe’,	  therefore,	   it	  was	  the	  pressure	  from	  international	  organisations	  
that	   created	   the	   conditions	   for	   compromise.	   It	   is,	   however,	   unlikely	   that	   the	   Russophone	  
faction’s	   proposals	   would	   have	   been	   regarded	   as	   legitimate	   had	   they	   not	   been	   in	   line	   with	  
international	  recommendations.	  
Although	  it	  was	  spread	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time,	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Language	  Law	  in	  
Latvia	   shares	   many	   commonalities	   with	   the	   process	   in	   Estonia.	   The	   Latvian	   government	   had	  
adopted	  Regulations	  on	  State	  Language	  Proficiency	  Certification	   in	  May	  1992,	  which	  amended	  
the	   1989	   Law	   on	   Language.	   Mandatory	   language	   certification	   was	   stipulated	   for	   all	   public	  
officers	   and	   employees	   of	   publicly	   owned	   companies,	   whose	   job	   included	   contact	   with	   the	  
general	   public	   or	   official	   paperwork.	   Provisions	   for	   language	   exams	   were	   set	   out	   in	   1993	  
(Diačkova,	  2003,	  p.	  44).	  However,	  although	  amended	  in	  1992,	  the	  1989	  Language	  Law	  had	  been	  
passed	  by	  the	  Latvian	  Supreme	  Soviet	  and	  it	  was	  agreed	  that	  a	  new	  law	  had	  to	  be	  passed	  by	  the	  
parliament	  of	  independent	  Latvia.	  
The	   debate	   over	   the	   new	   Language	   Law	   started	   in	   1995	   and	  was	   long	   and	   heated.	   The	  
government’s	  agenda	  in	  drafting	  the	  new	  law	  focused	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Latvian	  language,	  
the	  weakening	  of	   the	   self-­‐sufficiency	  of	   the	  Russian	   language	   in	   Latvia,	   and	   the	   integration	  of	  
society	  through	  the	  state	  language,	  not	  least	  by	  requiring	  that	  everyone	  who	  wanted	  to	  live	  and	  
work	   in	   Latvia	   speak	   the	   state	   language	   (Diačkova,	   2003,	   p.	   39).	   Although	   liberal	   experts	  
recommended	  to	  stress	  positive	  incentives	  rather	  than	  coercion,	  the	  prevailing	  rationale	  (openly	  
expressed	   in	   the	   Saeima	   by	   the	   initiators	   of	   the	   law)	  was	   that	   the	   only	   effective	   incentive	   to	  
learn	  the	   language	  was	  the	   imposition	  of	  strict	   legal	  requirements	  (Diačkova,	  2003,	  p.	  42).	  The	  
heated	   discussion	   over	   the	   Language	   Law	  was	  mirrored	   in	   the	   press,	   where	   Latvian-­‐language	  
and	  Russian-­‐language	  newspapers	  promoted	  opposing	  views	  on	  the	  policy’s	  merits	  (Zepa,	  2006,	  
p.	  98ff.).	  
As	   in	   Estonia,	   the	   debate	   over	   the	   Language	   Law	   can	   be	   separated	   into	   three	   main	  
positions:	  the	  nationalists,	  the	  moderates	  and	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers.	  Like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Estonia,	  
their	   respective	   strategies	   and	   strengths	   were	   influenced	   by	   the	   pressures	   coming	   from	  
international	   bodies.	   The	   Latvian	   nationalists,	   represented	   by	   the	   party	   TB/LNNK,	   supported	  
strict	  language	  requirements	  in	  both	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.	  They	  tended	  to	  use	  securitising	  
arguments	   about	   the	   dangers	   for	   the	   survival	   of	   the	   Latvian	   language,	   and	   aggressive	   tones	  
towards	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  and	  their	  representatives.	  For	  example,	  while	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  
Language	   Law	  was	   continuing	   in	   the	   Saeima,	   a	   TB/LNNK	  member	   claimed	   on	   state	   TV	   that	   a	  
strict	   Language	   Law	   would	   force	   the	   Russophone	   ‘colonists’	   to	   leave	   the	   country	   (LCHR,	   27	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November	  1997).	  Nationalists	   tended	  to	  use	  heated	  tones	   (including	   fists	  banged	  on	  tables)	   in	  
order	  to	  intimidate	  their	  colleagues	  from	  the	  centrist	  parties	  (Saeima,	  18	  March	  1999).	  This	  was	  
particularly	   effective	   during	   inter-­‐party	   discussions	   to	   form	   governing	   coalitions.	   In	   general,	  
TB/LNNK	  were	  arguably	  successful	  in	  reducing	  the	  scope	  for	  discussion	  at	  the	  domestic	  level,	  by	  
rejecting	  any	  liberalising	  proposal	  as	  a	  concession	  that	  might	  weaken	  the	  state	  language,	  and	  by	  
actively	   opposing	   any	   proposal	   by	   the	   Russophone	   parties	   in	   parliament.	   For	   example,	   every	  
time	  a	  proposal	  by	  the	  Russophone	  parliamentary	  fraction	  For	  Human	  Rights	  in	  a	  United	  Latvia	  
(FHRUL)	  was	  (even	  partially)	  supported	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  Committee	  that	  was	  working	  on	  the	  
Language	  Law,	  TB/LNNK	  called	  for	  a	  vote	  in	  the	  Saeima	  plenum	  to	  reject	  it	  and	  the	  proposal	  was	  
consistently	  rejected.	  
The	  moderate	   Latvian	   parties	   –	   including	   Latvia’s	  Way,	   Latvia’s	   First	   Party	   and	   People’s	  
Party	  –	  found	  themselves	  squeezed	  between	  the	  nationalists’	  intransigence	  and	  the	  demands	  to	  
liberalise	  the	  Language	  Law	  coming	  from	  international	  bodies.	  Their	  strategy	  tended	  to	  oscillate	  
between	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  nationalists	  (and	  avoid	  losing	  votes	  to	  them)	  
and	   the	   need	   to	   appease	   the	   international	   institutions	   that	   were	   threatening	   Latvia	   with	  
accession	  delays	   (EU	  and	  NATO)	  and	  with	   the	  continuation	  of	   the	  humiliating	  OSCE	  mission	   in	  
Latvia.	  For	  example	  the	  centre-­‐right	  People’s	  Party	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  debates	  
on	  the	  Language	  Law	  went	  from	  opposing	  strict	  language	  requirements,	  to	  intransigent	  positions	  
close	  to	  TB/LNNK,	  to	  more	  moderate	  positions	  that	  recognised	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  some	  of	  OSCE’s	  
critiques.	  
Like	   in	   Estonia,	   Latvia’s	   Russophone	   representatives	   in	   parliament	   openly	   used	  
international	   recommendations	  and	  critiques	   to	   reinforce	   their	  own	  position.	  So	  much	  so	   that	  
members	  of	   the	  Russophone	  parliamentary	  group	  FHRUL	  defined	  their	  mission	  as	  bringing	  the	  
draft	  Language	  Law	  in	  line	  with	  international	  recommendations	  (LCHR,	  14	  November	  1998	  and	  
15	   September	   1999).	   As	   in	   Estonia,	   Russophone	   representatives	   followed	   international	  
institutions	   in	   focusing	   their	   critiques	   on	   language	   requirements	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   and	  
framing	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  freedom.	  At	  this	  stage,	  Russophone	  MPs	  in	  the	  Saeima	  seemed	  
particularly	   interested	   in	   gaining	   time	   as	   they	   counted	   on	   the	   sustained	   involvement	   of	  
international	  institutions	  to	  eventually	  force	  a	  breakthrough.	  FHRUL	  succeeded	  in	  prolonging	  the	  
debate	  on	   the	  Language	  Law	  by	  using	   stalling	   techniques	   in	   the	  Saeima.	   For	   instance,	   in	  1998	  
FHRUL	   MPs	   supported	   a	   high	   number	   of	   contradictory	   amendments	   coming	   from	   all	  
parliamentary	  forces:	  the	  resulting	  draft	  law	  became	  so	  inconsistent	  that	  it	  had	  to	  be	  sent	  back	  
to	   the	   Committee	   to	   be	   re-­‐written	   (LCHR,	   9	   October	   1998).	  While	   nearly	   all	   the	   Russophone	  
MPs’	  proposals	  for	  legislative	  amendments	  were	  rejected	  in	  the	  process,	  both	  the	  OSCE	  and	  the	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moderate	   Prime	   Minister	   Vilis	   Krištopans	   (under	   suggestion	   from	   international	   advisers)	  
presented	  similar	  liberalising	  proposals	  (LCHR,	  23	  April	  1999).	  
Differently	  from	  Estonia,	  the	  Russophone	  representatives	  in	  parliament	  could	  count	  on	  a	  
more	  mobilised	  civil	   society.	  Russophone	  NGOs	  appealed	   to	   international	  organisations	   to	  put	  
more	  pressure	  on	  Latvia	   to	  protect	  minority	   rights	   (LCHR,	  12	  November	  1997),	  and	  petitioned	  
the	  Latvian	  government	  to	  take	  into	  account	  international	  recommendations	  (LCHR,	  4	  December	  
1997	   and	   1	   April	   1998).	   Several	   pickets	   were	   organised	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Saeima	   at	   important	  
junctions	   in	   the	   parliamentary	   discussion	   of	   the	   law,	   which	   usually	   gathered	   a	   few	   hundred	  
people	  (LCHR,	  13	  March	  1998;	  5	  June,	  9	  July	  and	  10	  December	  1999).	  
International	   institutions	   (mainly	   the	  OSCE)	  were	  not	  only	   issuing	   recommendations	  but	  
were	   actively	   taking	   part	   in	   the	   drafting	   process	   by	   reviewing	   and	   commenting	   drafts	   before	  
they	  were	  put	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  Saeima.	  The	  reaction	  of	  the	  Latvian	  elite	  to	  these	  pressures	  tended	  
to	   swing	   between	   irritation	   for	   the	   excessive	   intrusion	   of	   international	   bodies	   in	   Latvian	  
domestic	  affairs,89	  and	  acceptance	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  international	  critiques	  had	  to	  be	  addressed	  if	  
Latvia	   was	   to	   be	   part	   of	   the	   ‘Western	   world’.	   As	   in	   Estonia,	   in	   the	   event	   the	   second	  
preoccupation	  tended	  to	  prevail.	  
On	  9	   July	  1999,	  after	  several	  drafts	  were	  discussed,	   repeatedly	  amended	  and	  eventually	  
discarded,	  the	  Saeima	  finally	  passed	  the	  Language	  Law,	  including	  most	  of	  the	  strict	  requirements	  
that	  both	  the	  Russophone	  MPs	  and	  the	  international	  community	  had	  criticised.	  While	  about	  two	  
hundred	  people	  protested	   in	   front	  of	   the	  parliament	  against	   this	  decision,	  both	   the	  OSCE	  and	  
the	  EU	  put	  pressure	  on	  president	  Vaira	  Vīķe-­‐Freiberga	  not	  to	  sign	  the	  law	  (Tugdar,	  2013,	  pp.	  44–
45).	   Under	   increasing	   international	   pressure	   (the	   European	   Commission	   clearly	   linked	   the	  
Language	  Law	  to	  Latvia’s	  EU	  accession)	  the	  president	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  law	  and	  sent	  it	  back	  to	  
the	  Saeima.	  She	  specifically	  asked	  the	  Latvian	  parliament	  to	  modify	  the	  part	  most	  criticised	  by	  
international	   institutions:	   the	   language	   requirements	   for	   employment	   in	   the	   private	   sector	  
(Diačkova,	  2003,	  p.	  40).	  	  
Understandably,	   the	   debate	   after	   Vīķe-­‐Freiberga	   sent	   the	   law	   back	   to	   the	   Saeima	   was	  
mainly	   focused	   on	   international	   requirements.	   After	   this	   unexpected	   victory,	   the	   Russophone	  
side	  –	   that	  had	  welcomed	  the	  president’s	  decision	  –	  showed	  willingness	   to	   find	  a	  compromise	  
solution	  to	  exit	  the	  legislative	  cul-­‐de-­‐sac.	  FHRUL	  proposed	  to	  regulate	  the	  language	  usage	  in	  the	  
private	  sector	  only	  when	  it	  concerns	  public	  and	  consumer	  safety,	  healthcare	  and	  administrative	  
supervision	   –	   thus	   softening	   their	   original	   demand	   that	   no	   requirements	   be	   imposed	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  For	  example	  a	  nationalist	  MP	  showed	  his	  irritation	  at	  OSCE’s	  pressures	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  OSCE	  High	  Commissioner	  
for	  National	  Minorities	  as	  ‘your	  Van	  der	  Stoel’	  when	  talking	  to	  the	  Russophone	  MPs	  (Saeima,	  29	  April	  1998).	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private	   sphere	   at	   all.	   This	   was	   in	   line	   with	   international	   recommendations,	   which	   had	   also	  
shifted	  from	  requesting	  no	  interference	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  demanding	  that	  this	  interference	  
be	  duly	  justified.	  	  
On	  9	  December	  1999	  the	  Saeima	  adopted	  a	  revised	  version	  of	   the	  Language	  Law.	  While	  
international	   recommendations	  had	  been	   taken	   into	  account	   in	  drafting	   the	  new	   law,	   this	  did	  
not	   entirely	   satisfy	   the	   Russophone	   representatives.	   Indeed,	   again	   virtually	   all	   their	   proposals	  
had	  been	  rejected.	  Moreover,	  the	  law	  gave	  the	  government	  (where	  the	  Russian	  parties	  were	  not	  
represented)	   full	   power	   to	  define	   all	   the	   important	  details,	   including	   the	   list	   of	   professions	   to	  
which	  language	  requirements	  applied	  and	  the	  level	  of	  proficiency	  required	  in	  the	  different	  cases.	  
According	   to	   one	   FHRUL	   MP,	   once	   again	   ‘[t]he	   views	   of	   Latvia's	   minorities	   were	   completely	  
ignored’	   (Saeima,	   9	   December	   1999).	   The	   nationalist	   hardliners	   were	   also	   dissatisfied.	   In	  
discussing	   the	   1999	   Language	   Law	   several	   years	   after	   it	   was	   passed,	   one	   MP	   from	   TB/LNNK	  
described	  it	  as	  a	  major	  step	  back	  in	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  Latvian	  language	  (Saeima,	  21	  September	  
2006).	  
The	  1999	  Latvian	  Language	  Law	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  its	  Estonian	  counterpart.	  It	  establishes	  six	  
levels	   of	   proficiency	   and	   requires	   public	   and	   private	   employees	   to	   hold	   appropriate	   language	  
certificates	   in	   line	  with	   governmental	   regulations.	   Paragraph	   six	   of	   the	   law	   prescribes	   that	   all	  
state	   employees	  must	   be	   fluent	   in	   Latvian	   ‘to	   the	   extent	   necessary	   for	   performance	   of	   their	  
professional	   duties	   and	   duties	   of	   office’.	   Private	   employees	   and	   self-­‐employed	   people	   must	  
speak	   the	   state	   language	   ‘if	   their	   activities	   affect	   the	   lawful	   interests	   of	   the	   public	   (public	  
security,	   health,	   morality,	   healthcare,	   protection	   of	   consumer	   rights	   and	   employment	   rights,	  
safety	  in	  the	  work	  place,	  supervision	  of	  public	  administration)’.	  	  
After	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   Language	   Laws	   were	   passed	   and	   all	   decision-­‐making	  
powers	  over	  the	  language	  requirements	  were	  shifted	  to	  the	  government,	  the	  minorities’	  chance	  
of	   having	   an	   impact	   on	   those	   decisions	   through	   parliament	   decreased	   significantly.	   Minority	  
representatives	  were	   not	   present	   in	   government,	   and	   they	  were	   not	   included	   in	   the	  working	  
groups	  to	  prepare	  regulations	  (Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  91).	  Notwithstanding	  this,	  the	  period	  between	  the	  
passing	  of	  the	  first	  Language	  Laws	  and	  EU	  accession	  in	  2004	  saw	  a	  relative	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  
policies	  and	  the	  related	  governmental	  regulations.	  For	  instance	  in	  Latvia,	  the	  2000	  governmental	  
regulations,	  which	  listed	  all	  the	  requirements	  by	  profession	  and	  which	  had	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  
protest	   by	   the	   Russophone	   community	   and	   criticism	   by	   international	   institutions	   (Hansson,	  
2002,	   p.	   19),	  were	   revised	   and	  made	   less	   stringent.	   The	   highest	   level	   of	   proficiency	   (that	   had	  
been	  criticised	   for	  being	  excessively	  demanding)	  was	  redefined,	  and	  more	  power	  was	  given	  to	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private	  employers	  to	   independently	  set	  the	  level	  of	  state	   language	  proficiency	  they	  demand	  of	  
their	  employees	  (Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  92).	  	  
In	   Estonia,	   1999	   amendments	   to	   the	   Language	   Law	   that	   had	   imposed	   requirements	   to	  
basically	   all	   private	   employees,	   were	   softened	   to	   exclude	   foreign	   experts	   and	   to	   include	   the	  
principles	  of	  proportionality	  and	  legitimate	  public	  interest	  as	  the	  only	  bases	  for	  the	  imposition	  of	  
language	   requirements	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   (Järve,	   2002,	   pp.	   87–88).	   This	   was	   clearly	   a	  
concession	   to	   international	   pressures	   to	   provide	   clear	   limits	   to	   the	   state’s	   interference	   in	   the	  
private	  sector.	  Although	   it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	   ‘legitimate	  public	   interest’	   is	  a	  generic	   formula	  
that,	   in	   its	   vagueness,	  helped	   to	  hide	  away	   (but	  not	  eliminate)	   ‘the	   tension	  between	  Estonia's	  
push	   to	   protect	   the	   state	   language	   and	   its	   international	   commitments	   regarding	   minorities’	  
(Poleshchuk,	  2002,	  p.	  4),	  this	  was	  praised	  by	  EU	  officials	  as	  a	  positive	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  
(Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  88).	  	  
The	   period	   after	   the	   OSCE	   mission	   left	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   and	   both	   countries	   became	  
members	  of	   the	   EU	  and	  NATO	   (that	   is,	   after	   2004)	   saw	  a	   reversal	   of	   this	   liberalising	   trend.	   In	  
Estonia,	   successive	   amendments	   to	   the	   Language	   Law	   reiterated	   the	   principles	   of	  
proportionality	  and	  public	   interest	  as	   the	  bases	   to	   impose	   language	  requirements,	  but	   left	   the	  
decision	  to	  the	  executive	  to	  define	  what	  is	  proportionate	  and	  what	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest.90	  At	  
the	  same	  time	  the	  law	  was	  amended	  to	  grant	  more	  powers	  to	  the	  Language	  Inspectorate.	  Both	  
the	  2007	  amendments	  and	   the	  new	  Language	  Law,	   rewritten	   in	  2011	   to	   rationalise	   the	  much-­‐
amended	   1995	   law,	   expanded	   the	   language	   inspectors’	   sanctioning	   powers.	   According	   to	   the	  
2011	  Language	  Law	  (in	  force	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing),	  Estonia’s	  language	  inspectors	  can	  check	  not	  
only	  that	  employees	  hold	  the	  required	  certificate,	  but	  also	  that	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  language	  
does	   indeed	  correspond	  to	  the	  certified	   level.	  Under	  these	  provisions,	   language	   inspectors	  can	  
refer	  an	  employee	  whose	  proficiency	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  unsatisfactory	  to	  retake	  the	  language	  
proficiency	   examination	   by	   a	   certain	   deadline,	   and	   can	   initiate	   procedures	   for	   revoking	   the	  
language	  certificate	  of	   the	  employee	  who	  cannot	  pass	   the	   repeat	  exam	   in	   time.	  They	  can	  also	  
impose	   fines	   and	   suggest	   to	   terminate	   a	   contract	  with	   any	   employee	   (public	   or	   private)	  who	  
does	   not	   speak	   the	   state	   language	   at	   the	   required	   level	   (art.	   31).	   This	   also	   includes	   Russian-­‐
speakers	   who	   have	   studied	   in	   Estonian-­‐language	   schools	   and	   are	   by	   law	   exempt	   from	   the	  
obligation	   of	   holding	   a	   language	   certificate	   (art.	   28.2).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Estonian	   Language	  
Inspectorate	   has	   wider	   powers	   than	   its	   Latvian	   counterpart,	   whose	   power	   to	   de	   facto	   re-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  For	  example	  article	  21.2,	  added	  in	  2007,	  states	  that	   language	  requirements	   in	  the	  private	  sector	  ‘shall	  be	  justified	  
and	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  objective	  being	  sought’.	  The	  objective,	  however,	  is	  not	  clearly	  defined	  in	  the	  law.	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examine	  certificate-­‐holders	  in	  the	  course	  of	  inspection	  was	  abolished	  after	  negative	  opinions	  by	  
the	  OSCE	  (Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  92).	  	  
Differently	   from	   the	   Estonian	   Language	   Law,	   the	   Latvian	   Language	   Law	   was	   never	  
amended	   since	   1999.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   post-­‐accession	   reversal	   of	   the	   liberalising	   trend	   is	  
evident	   in	   the	   governmental	   regulations	   that	   specify	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   language	  
requirements.	   While	   the	   initial	   regulations	   issued	   in	   2000	   were	   partially	   liberalised	   following	  
international	  pressures,	  after	  accession	  the	  Latvian	  government	  modified	  them	  again.	  The	  most	  
relevant	   change	  was	   in	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	   language	   requirements	   applied	   to	   the	  private	  
sphere.	  Although	   the	  principle	  of	   ‘legitimate	  public	   interest’	   remained,	   it	  was	   interpreted	   in	   a	  
progressively	   extensive	   manner.	   In	   2000	   the	   list	   of	   private	   professions	   to	   which	   proficiency	  
requirements	  applied	   included	   less	  than	  80	  entries,	   the	   list	  was	  expanded	   in	  2006	  to	  over	  one	  
thousand	  professions	  and	  again	  in	  2008	  to	  add	  250	  more	  professions.	  	  
A	  proposal	  to	  expand	  the	  list	  had	  already	  been	  advanced	  by	  the	  State	  Language	  Centre	  in	  
2002.	  After	  the	  OSCE	  expressed	  ‘interest’	  in	  this	  possible	  expansion	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  
Affairs	  warned	  that	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  list	  might	  have	  caused	  a	  negative	  international	  reaction,	  
the	  government	  rejected	  the	  State	  Language	  Centre’s	  proposal,	  whose	  then	  head	  Dzintra	  Hirsa	  
resigned	   in	   protest	   (LCHR,	   25	   April	   2002).	   After	   2004,	   the	   list	   was	   expanded	   notwithstanding	  
negative	   opinions	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   the	   Latvian	   Employers’	   Union.	  
Moreover,	  for	  some	  professions	  the	  required	  proficiency	  level	  was	  increased.	  After	  that,	  the	  list	  
of	  professions	  and	  relative	  requirements	   is	  amended	  periodically,	   following	  suggestions	  by	  the	  
ministries	  and	  comments	  by	   the	  Language	   Inspectorate	   (Interview	  with	  Māris	  Baltiņš,	  Head	  of	  
Latvian	  State	  Language	  Centre,	  17	  September	  2013).	  As	  for	  implementation,	  in	  2007	  the	  budget	  
of	  the	  Latvian	  State	  Language	  Centre	  was	  doubled	  and	  there	  are	  indications	  that	  its	  control	  and	  
enforcement	   activities	   increased	   both	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   (especially	   in	   Russian-­‐language	  
schools)	  and	   in	   the	  private	  sector,	  not	   least	  as	  part	  of	   the	  campaign	   ‘State	  Language	   in	  Shops’	  
(LCHR,	  2008,	  p.	  26).	  	  
4.3 The	  role	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minorities	  
The	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   policies	   on	   language	   requirements	   for	   employment	   moved	   along	  
similar	   trajectories.	   In	   both	   countries	   the	   initial	   drafts	   of	   the	   Language	   Law	  were	   based	   on	   a	  
nationalising	  discourse	  about	   language	   that	  did	  not	  make	  distinctions	  between	   the	  public	   and	  
the	   private	   sector	   and	   imposed	   similar	   language	   restrictions	   for	   both.	   Then,	   in	   both	   cases	  
international	   institutions	   put	   direct	   pressure	   on	   the	   policymakers	   to	   ease	   language	  
requirements,	  with	  special	  emphasis	  on	  requirements	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  which	  were	  deemed	  
contrary	   to	   European	   market	   freedom.	   International	   pressures	   succeeded	   in	   pushing	   for	   the	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easing	  of	  language	  requirements	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  After	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  were	  accepted	  as	  
full	  members	  of	   the	  EU	  and	  NATO,	  however,	   the	   language	   legislation	  was	  made	  stricter	  again.	  
This	  was	   justified	  by	  the	  same	  rhetoric	  of	   ‘titular’	   language	  survival	   that	  had	  characterised	  the	  
first	  drafting	  of	  the	  Language	  Laws.	  
This	  policy	  parabola	  closely	  mirrored	  the	  changing	  strength	  of	  international	  pressures	  and	  
the	   disappearance	   of	   the	   coercive	   element	   (that	   is,	   the	   accession	   conditionalities)	   that	   had	  
underpinned	   them	   up	   to	   2004.	   This	   trajectory	   is	   in	   keeping	   with	   what	   many	   observers	   have	  
noted:	  after	  accession,	  international	  bodies	  lose	  their	  main	  bargaining	  chip,	  and	  their	  influence	  
on	  their	  new	  member	  states’	  policies	  on	  matters	  where	  they	  cannot	  impose	  decisions	  decreases	  
substantially	   (Agarin	   &	   Brosig,	   2009;	   Kelley,	   2004).	   When	   the	   coercive	   element	   disappeared,	  
international	   pressures	   became	   decidedly	   less	   salient	   in	   shaping	   the	   policy	   outcome.	   In	   fact,	  
international	   organisations	   changed	   their	   demands	   over	   time,	   becoming	   considerably	   ‘softer’	  
once	  accession	  negotiations	  were	   coming	   to	  an	  end.	  Moreover,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  principles	  of	  
proportionality	   and	   legitimate	   public	   interest	   (both	   pushed	   forward	   by	   international	  
recommendations)	   were	   in	   both	   cases	   included	   in	   the	   policy	   but	   then	   interpreted	   very	  
extensively,	   supports	   the	   idea	   that	   formal	  compliance	  with	   international	  demands	  on	  minority	  
issues	   is	   not	   necessarily	   tantamount	   to	   a	   change	   in	   attitude	   towards	  minorities	   (Sasse,	   2008;	  
Schulze,	  2010).	  The	  complacent	  attitude	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  national	  elites	  with	  regard	  
to	   international	   recommendations	   was	   in	   line	   with	   what	   Will	   Kymlicka	   noted,	   that	   is,	   that	  
national	   elites	   in	   CEE	   tend	   to	   routinely	   misrepresent	   international	   recommendations	   as	   ‘a	  
maximal	  ceiling	  rather	  than	  a	  minimal	  floor’	  (2006,	  p.	  63).	  
While	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  governments	  to	  accede	  to	  international	  
pressures	  was	   the	   result	  of	   the	   ‘carrot	  and	  stick’	  of	  EU	  accession	  conditionalities,	   compromise	  
was	  also	   facilitated	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   language	   requirements	  are	  not	  a	   zero-­‐sum	  policy.	  That	   is,	  
concessions	   could	   be	   made	   without	   changing	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   policy.	   Moreover,	   the	  
moderate	   parties	   in	   government	   also	   tended	   to	   be	   economically	   liberal	   and	   were	   thus	  
predisposed	   to	   be	  more	   lenient	   on	   language	   requirements	   in	   the	  private	   sector.	   International	  
pressures	   gave	   them	   a	   way	   to	   relax	   the	   requirements	   without	   exposing	   themselves	   to	  
accusations	  by	  the	  nationalists,	  which	  could	  have	  been	  electorally	  damaging.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  law	  left	  the	  definition	  of	  all	  the	  important	  details	  to	  the	  government	  kept	  the	  
possibility	  open	  for	  all	  ministries	  (that	  can	  suggest	  revisions	  to	  the	  regulations)	  and	  the	  Language	  
Inspectorates	   (that	   have	   a	   bureaucratic	   interest	   in	   keeping	   the	   requirements	   significant)	   to	  
influence	  implementation.	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The	  role	  of	  the	  Inspectorates	   is	  particularly	   interesting,	  as	  they	  are	  not	  only	   in	  charge	  of	  
implementation	   but	   also	   provide	   expertise	   and	   can	   make	   suggestions	   and	   comments	   on	  
language	  requirements	  regulations	  (Interviews	  with	  the	  heads	  of	  Language	  Inspectorates,	  2013).	  
It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  in	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  the	  Language	  Inspectorates	  actively	  
participated	  in	  the	  policy	  debate	  on	  the	  Language	  Law,	  and	  in	  both	  cases	  they	  were	  close	  to	  the	  
nationalists’	   positions	   in	   supporting	   strict	   requirements	   and	   in	   resenting	   international	  
interference.	  
International	  pressures	  had	  effects	  beyond	  the	  policy	  outcome	  (or	  policy	  trajectory),91	  and	  
they	  did	  not	  affect	  only	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  majority	  elites.	  They	  also	  had	  important	  effects	  on	  
the	  minority	  elites	  and	  on	  the	  inclusiveness	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process	  in	  general.	  If	  we	  switch	  
the	  focus	  from	  the	  policy	  outcome	  to	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  and	  from	  the	  majority	  elite	  to	  
the	   minority	   elite,	   other	   questions	   become	   available.	   Namely,	   how	   did	   international	  
involvement	   in	   the	   policymaking	   process	   affect	   the	   minority	   representatives’	   role	   in	   it?	   Did	  
international	  intervention	  foster	  minority	  political	  inclusion	  or,	  instead,	  reinforce	  exclusion?	  
In	  both	  countries,	  minority	  MPs	  advocated	  for	  fewer	  and	  less	  stringent	  requirements	  and	  
a	  more	   liberal	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Russian	   language.	  As	   it	  became	  apparent	   in	  the	  analysis	  of	  
the	   policymaking	   process,	   however,	   Russophone	   representatives	   were	   not	   determinant	   in	  
shaping	  the	  Language	  Laws.	  Some	  level	  of	  compromise	  on	  the	  issue	  was	  made	  possible	  only	  by	  
the	  fact	  that	  international	  pressures	  were	  pushing	  in	  the	  same	  liberalising	  direction	  as	  minority	  
representatives.	   It	   has	   been	   noted	   that	   language	   legislation	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   de	   facto	  
established	  a	  dual	  structure	  of	  social	  and	  political	  exclusion	  based	  on	  mother	  tongue	  and	  state	  
language	  proficiency,	  and	  this	  creates	  collective	  privileges	  for	  the	  titular	  nations	  (Järve,	  2000,	  p.	  
7).	   Any	   change	   in	   language	   policies,	   therefore,	   is	   bound	   to	   have	   a	   strong	   impact	   on	   Russian-­‐
speakers’	   lives.	  Nevertheless,	   in	   both	   countries	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers	   found	   themselves	   at	   the	  
receiving	   end	  of	   a	   piece	  of	   legislation	   in	  whose	  development	   they	  had	  not	  had	   the	   chance	   to	  
contribute	  much.	  As	   it	  was	  the	  case	  for	  the	  non-­‐citizens’	  voting	  rights	  policy,	   the	  Estonian	  and	  
Latvian	  national	  elites	  remained	  the	  gatekeepers	  of	  policymaking	  throughout	  the	  entire	  process.	  
After	  the	  Language	  Laws	  were	  passed,	  the	  two	  governments	  were	  given	  the	  power	  to	  make	  all	  
the	   important	   decisions	   on	  who	  was	   going	   to	   need	   a	   language	   certificate,	   at	   what	   level,	   and	  
what	   the	   enforcement	   procedures	   were	   going	   to	   be.	   As	   in	   both	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   no	  
Russophone	  party	  was	  ever	  part	  of	  the	  governing	  coalition	  and	  no	  minority	  representatives	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




included	   in	   the	   government’s	  working	   groups	   to	   draft	   the	   governmental	   regulations,	   Russian-­‐
speakers	  had	  practically	  no	  formal	  channel	  to	  influence	  them.	  	  
While	   national	   elites	   stayed	   in	   control	   of	   the	   policymaking	   process,	   the	   debate	   on	  
language	   requirements	   was	   largely	   shaped	   by	   international	   pressures.	   The	   main	   question	   –	  
constantly	  repeated	  both	  in	  parliament	  and	  in	  the	  media	  –	  was:	   is	  this	  provision	  in	  compliance	  
with	  international	  recommendations?	  Representatives	  from	  moderate	  national	  parties	  discussed	  
this	  question	  pragmatically	  as	  they	  did	  not	  want	  the	  issue	  of	  language	  to	  create	  hurdles	  for	  their	  
countries’	  access	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO.	  When	  they	  accepted	  to	  ease	  some	  of	  the	  requirements,	  
they	  clearly	  framed	  these	  relative	  policy	  openings	  as	  a	  result	  of	  international	  negotiations	  rather	  
than	  of	  a	  domestic	  process	  of	  majority–minority	  compromise.	  On	  their	  part,	  nationalists	  rejected	  
international	   recommendations	   as	   an	   unwarranted	   intrusion	   into	   domestic	   affairs	   and	  
consistently	   framed	   language	   as	   a	   security	   issue.	   Minority	   representatives,	   on	   the	   contrary,	  
welcomed	  international	  pressures	  to	   liberalise	  the	  Language	  Laws	  and	  used	  these	  pressures	  to	  
underpin	   and	   legitimise	   their	   own	   proposals.	   They	   regularly	   opposed	   strict	   requirements	   by	  
arguing	   that	   governmental	   proposals	   to	   that	   effect	  were	  not	   in	   compliance	  with	   international	  
recommendations,	   and	   in	   general	   bolstered	   their	   position	   against	   language	   requirements	   by	  
reframing	  it	  as	  an	  (inescapable)	  international	  demand.	  	  
The	   (relative)	   correspondence	   between	   minority	   and	   international	   goals	   and	   the	  
Russophone	  representatives’	  reliance	  on	  support	   from	  the	   international	  community	  to	  achieve	  
policy	   liberalisation	   were,	   however,	   double-­‐edged.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   international	   pressures	  
opened	   some	   room	   for	   debate	   against	   the	   uncompromising	   attitude	   of	   the	   nationalists.	   This	  
meant	  that	  some	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  representatives’	  demands	  were	  satisfied	  (at	  least	  until	  
2004).	  Moreover,	   the	  overlap	  between	   international	   recommendations	  and	  minority	  demands	  
(accentuated	   by	   the	   Russophone	   representatives’	   tendency	   to	   mimic	   international	  
organisations’	   arguments)	   had	   the	   arguably	  positive	   effect	   of	   at	   least	   partially	   legitimising	   the	  
minority’s	   position	   on	   language	   requirements.	   Minority	   representatives’	   adoption	   of	  
international	   arguments	   also	   contributed	   in	   moderating	   minority	   demands.	   This	   moderation,	  
together	  with	  the	  international	  organisations’	  more	  or	  less	  explicit	  threats	  to	  the	  address	  of	  the	  
majority	   elites,	   created	   room	   for	   compromise.	   Furthermore,	   as	   noted	   above,	   differently	   from	  
the	  issue	  of	  non-­‐citizens’	  voting	  rights,	  language	  requirements	  are	  not	  zero-­‐sum	  in	  nature	  and	  a	  
number	  of	   intermediate	  positions	  between	  complete	  restriction	  of	  non-­‐state-­‐language	  use	  and	  
no	  requirements	  at	  all	  could	  be	  discussed.	  This	  also	  favoured	  compromise.	  
On	   the	  other	  hand,	  however,	   the	   reliance	  on	   international	   recommendations	  had	  also	  a	  
number	  of	  other	  consequences	  on	  minority	   representation	   that	  cannot	  be	  counted	  as	  entirely	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positive	   from	   the	  point	  of	   view	  of	  minority	  political	   empowerment.	   Indeed,	   a	   look	  at	   the	   role	  
played	  by	  Russophone	  representatives	  in	  the	  debates	  and	  at	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  compromises	  that	  
were	  reached	  thanks	  to	  the	  international	  involvement	  reveals	  a	  less	  encouraging	  picture.	  	  
First	  of	  all,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  Russophone	  representatives	  espoused	  pretty	  much	  all	  
the	  arguments	  brought	  forward	  by	  the	  international	  organisations.	  Russophone	  representatives’	  
demands	   and	   arguments	   changed	   over	   time,	   closely	   following	   the	   changing	   international	  
institutions’	   recommendations	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   language	   requirements.	   In	   fact,	   the	   minority	  
representatives’	  agenda	  often	  seemed	  dictated	  by	  the	  international	  organisations’	  agenda.	  This	  
was	   evident	   in	   Latvia,	   for	   instance,	   when	   the	   Russophone	   MPs	   (and	   some	   civil	   society	  
organisations)	  followed	  the	  OSCE	  in	  softening	  their	  demands	  from	  eliminating	  all	  requirements	  
in	  the	  private	  sphere	  to	  limiting	  requirements	  to	  well-­‐defined	  cases.	  Moreover,	  in	  both	  countries	  
the	   Russophone	   representatives	   shifted	   from	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   very	   principle	   of	   language	  
requirements	   for	   employment,	   to	   a	   more	   selective	   focus	   on	   eliminating	   the	   requirements	   in	  
private	   companies.	   This	   mirrored	   the	   international	   organisations’	   main	   concern	   with	   the	  
Language	   Laws	   as	   allowing	   for	   the	   state’s	   excessive	   interference	   in	   the	   private	   sector.	   As	   a	  
consequence	   of	   their	   adoption	   of	   the	   international	   argument	   of	   private	   sector	   freedom,	  
however,	   minority	   representatives	   were	   left	   with	   almost	   no	   arguments	   to	   turn	   to	   the	   public	  
sector	  once	   in	  both	  Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   language	   requirements	   in	   the	  private	   sphere	  had	  been	  
eased	   (at	   least	   temporarily).	   While	   it	   might	   have	   bred	   moderation,	   therefore,	   the	   minority	  
representatives’	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  international	  support	  also	  reduced	  their	  autonomy	  in	  defining	  
their	   own	   political	   agenda	   and	   left	   them	   with	   a	   much	   weaker	   case	   once	   international	  
organisations	  pulled	  out	  of	  the	  debate.	  
Moreover,	  and	  most	  crucially,	  minority	  representatives	  were	  mostly	  passive	  observers	  of	  
a	   debate	   that	   was	   primarily	   taking	   place	   between	   the	   majority	   elites	   and	   the	   international	  
organisations.	   Throughout	   the	   policymaking	   debate	   the	  main	   interlocutor	   of	   the	   international	  
organisations	   were	   the	   governing	   coalitions	   and	   not	   the	   Russophone	   representatives,	   who	  
remained	  marginal	   in	   the	  discussion.	  While	   some	  degree	  of	  policy	   liberalisation	  was	  obtained,	  
therefore,	   this	   did	   not	   significantly	   decrease	   the	   political	   marginalisation	   of	   the	   Russophone	  
minorities	  and	  did	  not	  challenge	  the	  control	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process	  by	  the	  majority	  elites.	  	  
On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   governing	   parties	   were	   negotiating	   the	   policy	   drafts	  
with	  OSCE	  emissaries	  provided	  the	  national	  elites	  with	  an	  additional	  tool	  to	  further	  marginalise	  
minority	  representatives.	  Since	  a	  debate	  on	  language	  requirements	  was	  already	  happening	  with	  
the	   international	   organisations	   –	   the	   argument	   went	   –	   there	   was	   no	   need	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  
domestic	   debate.	   The	   domestic	   debate	   was	   thus	   de	   facto	   superseded	   by	   the	   international	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negotiations.	   In	   the	   Latvian	   parliamentary	   committee’s	   debate	   over	   the	   Language	   Law,	   for	  
instance,	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   OSCE	   in	   the	   drafting	   procedure	   was	   openly	   used	   by	   the	  
governing	  parties	  to	  dismiss	  Russophone	  MPs’	  critiques	  (LCHR,	  10	  February	  and	  19	  March	  1999).	  
The	  fact	  that	  OSCE	  experts	  would	  take	  part	  in	  discussions	  about	  the	  government	  regulations	  was	  
also	  pointed	  out	  by	  the	  Latvian	  government	  as	  a	  guarantee	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  fairness	  of	  such	  
regulations,	   against	   Russophone	   representatives’	   objections	   (LCHR,	   27	   June	   2000).	  Moreover,	  
when	  the	  OSCE	  softened	  its	  recommendations	  to	  Latvia	  on	  language	  requirements	  in	  the	  private	  
sector,	  this	  was	  presented	  by	  the	  government	  as	  its	  own	  victory:	  the	  OSCE	  officials	  had	  engaged	  
in	  debate	  with	  them	  and	  had	  eventually	  yielded	  to	  their	  position	  (LCHR,	  16	  November	  1999).	  	  
Similarly,	   in	   his	   book	   about	   Estonian	   language	   policies,	   Ilmar	   Tomusk	   –	   head	   of	   the	  
Estonian	   Language	   Inspectorate	   since	   1995	   –	   describes	   the	   language	   requirements	   as	  
fundamentally	  in	  line	  with	  international	  recommendations	  and	  the	  process	  of	  policymaking	  as	  a	  
negotiation	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	   EU	   and	  OSCE	   advisors	   (2009,	   pp.	   23–33).92	   The	  
dominance	   of	   international	   negotiations	   over	   domestic	   debate	   also	   meant	   that	   any	   minority	  
demand	   that	   could	   not	   be	   backed	   by	   a	   corresponding	   international	   recommendation	   fell	  
automatically	  outside	  of	  the	  debate.	  
4.4 Conclusions:	  The	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  the	  international	  channel	  
While	   they	   shaped	   the	   trajectories	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   policies	   on	   language	  
requirements,	   international	  pressures	  had	  contradictory	  effects	  on	   the	  political	  empowerment	  
of	   the	   Russophone	   minorities.	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	   initial	   nationalising	   goals	   of	   the	   titular	  
policymakers	   were	   moderated	   by	   the	   incentives	   and	   constraints	   provided	   by	   international	  
organisations.	   Stricter	   interpretations	   of	   language	   management,	   however,	   re-­‐emerged	   after	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  had	  joined	  the	  EU	  and	  international	  pressures	  had	  significantly	  subsided.	  All	  
the	   while,	   the	   role	   of	   Russian-­‐speaking	   voices	   in	   the	   policymaking	   process	   was	   limited	   and	  
heavily	  reliant	  on	  international	  pressures	  to	  achieve	  policy	  liberalisation.	  Although	  international	  
pressures	   did	   bring	   to	   the	   easing	   of	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   language	  
legislations	  these	  gains	  were	  for	  the	  most	  part	  short-­‐lived.	  	  
It	   cannot	   be	   excluded	   that	   compliance	   with	   international	   and	   European	   norms	   –	   even	  
when	  it	  is	  initially	  only	  formal	  or	  partial	  –	  might	  in	  the	  long	  term	  lead	  to	  value	  change	  within	  the	  
majority	  elite,	   through	  socialisation	  and	   internalisation	   (Checkel,	  2005).	  Value	  change	  might	   in	  
turn	  open	  avenues	   for	  minority	   voices	   to	   acquire	  more	   relevance	   in	   the	  policymaking	  debate.	  
However,	   this	   deeper	   form	  of	   internalisation	   is	   extremely	  hard	   to	   identify	   empirically	   (Beyers,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	   In	   fact,	  Tomusk	  criticises	  Estonian	  politicians	   for	  giving	  up	   too	  quickly	   to	   international	  pressures,	  disregarding	   the	  
‘principles	  of	  language	  policy	  deriving	  from	  the	  constitution’	  (2009,	  p.	  33).	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2010).	   The	   policy	   trajectory	   observed	   in	   this	   chapter	   does	   not	   provide	   sufficient	   evidence	   to	  
claim	   that	   (partial)	   norm	  compliance	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	  was	  accompanied	  by	   value	   change.	  
Moreover,	  a	  change	  in	  attitude	  on	  the	  content	  of	  certain	  specific	  policies	  would	  not	  necessarily	  
be	   accompanied	   by	   a	   value	   change	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   attitude	   towards	   the	   minority’s	   role	   in	  
decision-­‐making.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  some	  observers	  ‘minimal	  policy	  change’	  during	  accession	  
can	   be	   used	   by	  majority	   elites	   to	   cement	   a	   status	   quo	   in	  which	   they	   are	   politically	   dominant	  
(Agarin	  &	  Regelmann,	  2012,	  p.	  458).	  
While	   the	   long-­‐term	   effects	   of	   international	   norms	   are	   difficult	   to	   evaluate,	   the	  
involvement	   of	   international	   organisations	   in	   the	   policymaking	   debate	   had	   other	   immediate	  
effects,	   which	   contradicted	   the	   stated	   aim	   of	   minority	   rights	   promotion.	   In	   particular,	   the	  
minority	  representatives’	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  international	  pressures	  to	  achieve	  their	  political	  goals	  
had	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   their	   agenda-­‐setting	   autonomy	   and	   did	   not	   reduce	   their	  
marginalisation	   within	   the	   domestic	   political	   debate.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   international	  
organisations’	   negotiations	   with	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   governments	   had	   the	   unintended	  
consequence	   of	   creating	   a	   justification	   for	  minority	   exclusion	   from	  decision-­‐making.	  Once	   the	  
OSCE	  mission	  had	  left	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  and	  both	  countries	  had	  entered	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO,	  the	  
Russophone	   representatives	  were	   left	   in	   a	   rather	  weak	   position.	   Not	   only	  were	   they	   losing	   a	  
precious	   ally,	   but	   the	  membership	  of	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   in	   all	   the	  main	  Western	   international	  
organisations	  was	  presented	  by	  the	  majority	  elites	  as	  an	  authoritative	  seal	  of	  approval	  over	  their	  
policies.	   This	   weakened	   any	   claim	   by	   the	   Russophone	   opposition	   that	   the	   two	   countries’	  
language	  policies	  must	  be	  revised	  further.	  
Also	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   international	   channel,	   therefore,	   the	   analytical	   focus	   on	   the	  
policymaking	   process	   provides	   a	   corrective	   for	   the	   ‘blind	   spots’	   of	   outcome-­‐focused	   analyses.	  
The	   impact	  of	   international	   involvement	  on	  minority	   politics	  must	  be	  evaluated	  not	  only	  with	  
reference	  to	  how	  effective	  it	  is	  in	  pushing	  for	  specific	  (minority-­‐friendly)	  policies,	  but	  also	  –	  and	  
more	   crucially	   –	   to	   the	   effect	   it	   has	   on	   the	   inclusiveness	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   This	  
observation	  is	  equally	  important	  both	  for	  academic	  studies	  and	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  international	  
policy	   interventions.	   By	   focusing	   solely	   on	   achieving	   a	   certain	   policy	   outcome,	   well-­‐meaning	  
international	  involvement	  can	  actually	  provide	  the	  majority	  elite	  with	  a	  legitimate	  substitute	  for	  
majority–minority	   debate.	   Negotiations	   between	   the	   majority	   elite	   and	   representatives	   of	  
international	   organisations	   can	   end	   up	   bypassing	   the	   minority	   elite,	   de	   facto	   justifying	   its	  
political	   exclusion.	   Even	   though	   the	  minority	   representatives’	   agenda	  might	   stand	  a	   chance	  of	  
being	  at	  least	  in	  part	  achieved	  through	  the	  international	  channel,	  this	  can	  come	  at	  the	  price	  of	  
entrenching	  minority	   exclusion	   rather	   than	   fostering	   inclusion.	   The	   analysis	   does	   not	   provide	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sufficient	   evidence	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   these	   negative	   effects	   will	   in	   the	   long	   term	   be	  
compensated	  by	  majority	  elite	  socialisation	  and	  norm	  internalisation.	  
	   	  
108	  
	  









In	   both	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   parties	   have	   been	   consistently	   excluded	   from	  
governing	  coalitions	  and	  very	  few	  Russian-­‐speakers	  have	  been	  appointed	  in	  ministerial	  positions.	  
Members	   of	   the	   minority,	   however,	   have	   acquired	   significant	   power	   positions	   in	   the	  
administrations	  of	  the	  two	  capital	  cities.	  City	  administrations	  could	  thus	  arguably	  function	  as	  an	  
alternative	   channel	   for	   minority	   voices	   to	   enter	   the	   policymaking	   process,	   especially	   at	   the	  
implementation	  stage.	  	  
This	   chapter	   looks	   at	   how	   the	   controversial	   reforms	   of	   minority	   schools	   were	  
implemented	  in	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga,	  to	  understand	  which	  role	  –	  if	  any	  –	  the	  ‘city	  channel’	  played	  in	  
empowering	  the	  Russophone	  minorities.	  While	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  education	  policies	  have	  
been	  extensively	  analysed	  (e.g.	  Silova,	  2006;	  Vihalemm	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  no	  academic	  attention	  has	  
been	  paid	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  policies	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  
first	   describe	   how	   minorities	   have	   gained	   representation	   in	   Tallinn	   and	   Riga,	   and	   provide	   a	  
background	  on	  the	  main	  issues	  regarding	  the	  education	  reforms	  at	  state-­‐level.	  Then	  I	  proceed	  to	  
analyse	   city-­‐level	   implementation	   and	   use	   this	   evidence	   to	   show	   how	   incorporation	   into	   city-­‐
level	  power	  structures	  can	  be	  both	  an	  opportunity	  and	  a	  ‘trap’	  for	  the	  minority.	  
5.1 Different	  trajectories	  of	  minority	  representation	  in	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  
Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  are	  by	  far	  the	  biggest	  cities	   in	  their	  respective	  countries,	  both	   in	  demographic	  
and	   economic	   terms.	  Most	   of	   Estonia’s	   and	   Latvia’s	  wealth	   as	  well	   as	   one	   third	   of	   their	   total	  
populations	   are	   concentrated	   in	   the	   capital	   cities	   (Mäeltsemees	   &	   Lõhmus,	   2008;	   Vesperis,	  
2011).	  Moreover,	  the	  largest	  local	  communities	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	  are	  also	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
capital	   cities:	   about	   43%	   of	   Estonia’s	   Russian-­‐speakers	   live	   in	   Tallinn,	   while	   46%	   of	   Latvia’s	  
Russian-­‐speakers	  live	  in	  Riga.	  Russian-­‐speakers	  constitute	  about	  46%	  and	  51%	  of	  the	  population	  
of	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	   respectively,	  making	   these	  cities’	  demography	  almost	  evenly	   split	  between	  
majority	  and	  minority.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  A	   version	   of	   this	   chapter	   was	   published	   as	   ‘Representing	  minorities	   in	   the	   city.	   Education	   policies	   and	  minority	  
incorporation	  in	  the	  capital	  cities	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia’	  in	  Nationalities	  Papers,	  42(6)	  2014,	  pp.	  981–1001.	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Not	   all	   those	   Russian-­‐speakers	   have	   the	   right	   to	   vote,	   as	   not	   all	   of	   them	   hold	   the	  
citizenship	   of	   their	   country	   of	   residence.	   In	   Tallinn,	   non-­‐citizens	   and	   third-­‐country	   nationals	  
compose	  22.8%	  of	  the	  city	  population.	  They	  have	  no	  voting	  rights	  at	  state	  level	  but	  can	  vote	  in	  
local	   elections.	   As	   a	   result,	   almost	   half	   of	   the	   electorate	   for	   Tallinn	   City	   Council	   is	   Russian-­‐
speaking.	  Latvia,	  instead,	  reserves	  voting	  rights	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  government	  to	  its	  citizens	  only.	  As	  
a	   result,	   27.5%	   of	   the	   population	   of	   Riga	   –	   overwhelmingly	   Russian-­‐speaking	   non-­‐citizens	   –	   is	  
completely	  disenfranchised.	  Notwithstanding	  this,	  about	  35%	  of	  the	  Riga	  electorate	   is	  Russian-­‐
speaking.	  
The	  municipalities	  of	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  share	  a	  number	  of	  other	  important	  characteristics.	  
Their	   local	   administrations	   have	   very	   similar	   competencies	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   education,	  welfare	  
and	   healthcare,	   culture,	   public	   utilities,	   environmental	   protection,	   transport	   and	   urban	  
development	  (Horváth,	  2000).	  They	  also	  have	  similar	  budget	  sources	  and	  a	  comparable	  budget	  
size	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  duties	  (Makarovs	  &	  Dimitrovs,	  2009,	  pp.	  8–10).	  Moreover,	  in	  both	  cities	  a	  
City	  Council	  (of	  79	  members	  in	  Tallinn	  and	  60	  in	  Riga)	  is	  elected	  every	  four	  years	  by	  proportional	  
representation	  (PR)	  with	  a	  5%	  threshold.	  The	  City	  Council,	  in	  turn,	  elects	  the	  members	  of	  the	  city	  
government.	  
There	   are,	   however,	   important	   differences	   that	   are	   largely	   reflection	   of	   the	   differences	  
between	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  party	  systems.	  In	  both	  cities	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  gained	  
a	   central	   position	   in	   the	   city	   government;	   however	   this	   happened	   through	   different	   paths.	   In	  
Tallinn,	   two	   parties	   explicitly	   represented	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minorities	   in	   the	   first	   local	  
elections	  of	  independent	  Estonia	  in	  1993:	  the	  moderate	  Estonian	  Russian	  Democratic	  Movement	  
and	  the	  Russian	   list	   ‘Revel’	   (the	  ancient	  Russian	  name	  for	  Tallinn).	  They	  gained	  respectively	  17	  
and	  10	  of	  the	  then	  64	  seats	  in	  the	  City	  Council.	  This	  initial	  success	  meant	  that	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  
parties	   were	   briefly	   included	   in	   city	   governments,	   although	   for	   short	   periods	   and	   in	   junior	  
positions.	  However,	  in	  the	  elections	  that	  followed	  the	  share	  of	  seats	  won	  by	  the	  ‘Russian	  parties’	  
fell	   steadily.	   After	   the	   2002	   elections,	   when	   they	   gained	   only	   three	   seats,	   Russian-­‐speakers’	  
parties	  have	  remained	  out	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  virtually	  disappeared.	  	  
The	   increasing	   attention	   of	   national	   parties	   for	   Tallinn	   elections,	   internecine	   squabbles	  
and	   leadership	  disputes,	   and	   the	  advancing	  popularity	  of	   the	  Centre	  Party	   among	   the	  Russian	  
speakers	  all	  contributed	  to	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	  (Mäeltsemees,	  2000,	  p.	  
78;	  Toots,	  2006).	  In	  this	  situation,	  Edgar	  Savisaar	  –	  arguably	  the	  most	  divisive	  figure	  in	  Estonian	  










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although	  he	   is	  himself	   an	  ethnic	   Estonian,	   Savisaar	   included	   several	  Russian-­‐speakers	   in	  
his	  electoral	   lists	  and	  (to	  a	  lesser	  but	  still	  significant	  extent)	  his	   local	  cabinets.	  Under	  Savisaar’s	  
mayorship	   at	   least	   one	   of	   the	   seven	  members	   of	   Tallinn	   city	   government	   has	   always	   been	   a	  
Russian	   speaker.	  Although	   this	   is	   considerably	   less	   than	   the	  proportion	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	   in	  
the	  Centre	  Party’s	  electorate,	  it	  is	  more	  than	  can	  be	  said	  of	  Tallinn	  city	  governments	  under	  other	  
parties.	   Importantly,	   since	   2010,	   the	   deputy	   mayor	   responsible	   for	   the	   Tallinn	   culture	   and	  
education	  department	  has	  been	  a	  Russian-­‐speaker	  (first	  Yana	  Toom	  and	  then	  Mihhail	  Kõlvart).	  
Minority	  representation	  in	  Riga	  followed	  a	  completely	  different	  trajectory.	  Although	  they	  
underwent	   several	   splits	   and	   mergers,	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   parties	   were	   increasingly	   electorally	  
successful	   in	  Riga	  Council	  elections.	  Following	  a	  course	  similar	  to	  that	  at	  the	  national	   level,	  the	  
Russophone	  political	   camp	   in	  Riga	  progressively	   consolidated	  and	  one	   strong	  moderate	  ethnic	  
party	   emerged,	   Harmony	   Centre,	  while	   the	  more	   radical	   ethnic	   parties	   lost	   electoral	   support.	  
The	   electoral	   strength	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   parties	   in	   Riga	   made	   them	   valuable	   coalition	  
partners	  first	  and	  coalition	  leaders	  later.	  In	  2001,	  the	  Russophone	  electoral	  alliance	  For	  Human	  
Rights	   in	   a	   United	   Latvia	   (FHRUL)	   entered	   Riga’s	   governing	   coalition	   and	   a	   Russian-­‐speaking	  
council	  member	  was	  nominated	  deputy	  mayor.	  In	  2009	  Harmony	  Centre	  won	  26	  out	  of	  60	  seats	  
in	   the	  Riga	   local	   elections	  and	   formed	  a	   coalition	  government	  with	  a	  moderate	  ethnic	   Latvian	  
party,	   Latvia’s	   First	   Party/Latvian	   Way	   (LPP/LC).	   Remarkably,	   this	   was	   a	   coalition	   between	   a	  
minority	  and	  a	  majority	  party	  where	  the	  former	  had	  the	  leading	  role.94	  Nils	  Ušakovs	  became	  the	  
first	   ethnic-­‐Russian	  mayor	   of	   Riga.	   The	  municipal	   elections	   in	   2013	   reconfirmed	   Ušakovs	   and	  
further	   entrenched	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   dominant	   position	   in	   Riga.	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   electoral	  
bloc	  with	  the	  local	  political	  party	  ‘Gods	  kalpot	  Rigai!’	  (Proud	  to	  serve	  Riga!,	  GKR)	  won	  58%	  of	  the	  
vote	  and	  39	  City	  Council	  seats	  out	  of	  60.95	  	  
In	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  the	  capital	  cities’	  mayors	  have	  become	  highly	  divisive	  political	  
figures.	   A	   commonly	   held	   understanding	   of	   Estonian	   politics	   places	   Edgar	   Savisaar	   as	   the	  
defining	  element	  of	   the	  Estonian	  party	  system:	  other	  parties	  must	  define	  themselves	  not	   least	  
by	   their	   (antagonistic	  more	   often	   than	   supportive)	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   him	   and	   his	   Centre	  
Party	  (Ritter,	  Gardner,	  &	  Druker,	  2003).	  Arguably,	  Nils	  Ušakovs	  is	  coming	  to	  play	  a	  similar	  role	  in	  
Latvian	  politics.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  LPP/LC’s	  declining	  support	  at	  the	  national	  level	  and	  the	  party’s	  generally	  moderate	  attitudes	  towards	  minority	  issues	  
might	  explain	  why	  it	  decided	  to	  become	  a	  junior	  partner	  to	  the	  rising	  Harmony	  Centre.	  




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This	   brief	   overview	   of	   party	   politics	   in	   Tallinn	   and	   Riga	   shows	   that	   the	   Russophone	  
minority	   was	   in	   both	   cases	   incorporated	   into	   the	   structures	   of	   local	   power.	   Enabled	   by	   the	  
capital	   cities’	   demography,	   Russian-­‐speaking	   politicians	   have	   been	   successful	   in	   gaining	  
important	  positions	  in	  city	  executives,	  while	  they	  are	  generally	  excluded	  from	  state	  government.	  
There	   is	  a	  key	  difference	   in	   the	  way	   this	   incorporation	   took	  place,	   though.	   In	  Tallinn,	  minority	  
incorporation	   happened	   through	   co-­‐optation	   into	   a	   mainstream	   Estonian	   party,	   the	   Centre	  
Party.	   Although	   a	   number	   of	   Russian-­‐speakers	   came	   to	   hold	   key	   posts	   in	   the	   local	  
administration,	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   party	   remains	   overwhelmingly	   ethnic	   Estonian.	   In	   Riga,	  
instead,	   minority	   incorporation	   happened	   through	   a	   moderate	   ethnic	   party	   and	   a	   Russian-­‐
speaking	  mayor.	  	  
The	  aim	  of	   this	  chapter	   is	   to	  determine	  whether	   these	  different	  modes	  of	   incorporation	  
made	  a	  difference	   in	   terms	  of	   how	   the	   controversial	   education	   reforms	  were	   implemented	   in	  
Tallinn	   and	   Riga,	   what	   kind	   of	   difference,	   and	   what	   this	   meant	   for	   minority	   empowerment.	  
Before	   entering	   into	   the	   details	   of	   implementation,	   however,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   provide	   a	  
background	  on	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  education	  reforms	  and	  the	  reasons	  why	  they	  were	  (and	  
in	  fact	  still	  are)	  particularly	  contentious	  for	  the	  Russophone	  minorities.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  topic	  of	  
the	  next	  section.	  
5.2 The	  education	  reforms:	  Conflict,	  policy	  ambiguity	  and	  minority	  disempowerment	  
In	   both	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   government-­‐led	   education	   reforms	   regarding	   the	   language	   of	  
teaching	   in	   Russian-­‐language	   schools	   have	   been	   initiated	   since	   the	   1990s.96	   Traditionally	   both	  
countries	   offer	   state-­‐funded	   pre-­‐school	   and	   school	   education	   in	   both	   the	   state	   language	   and	  
Russian.	  However,	   the	  Estonian	  and	   Latvian	   legislations	  do	  not	  offer	   any	   formal	   guarantee	   for	  
education	   in	   Russian,	   and	   there	   is	   a	   tendency	   among	   these	   countries’	  majority	   elites	   to	   view	  
Russian-­‐language	  schools	  as	  a	   remnant	   from	  the	  Soviet	  past.	  The	  aim	  of	   the	  education	  reform	  
was	   to	   significantly	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   hours	   taught	   in	   the	   state	   language	   in	   Russian-­‐
language	  schools.	  The	  advantages	  of	  such	  policy,	  according	  to	  its	  promoters,	  would	  be	  an	  end	  to	  
segregated	  school	  systems	  and	  improved	  societal	  integration,	  easier	  access	  to	  state	  universities	  
for	  Russian-­‐speaking	  students,	  and	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  higher	  competitiveness	  in	  the	  country’s	  job	  
market	  (Hogan-­‐Brun	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Silova	  2006;	  my	  interviews	  with	  policymakers).	  
In	   both	   cases	   the	   reform	   has	   encountered	   widespread	   opposition	   among	   the	   Russian-­‐
speaking	   community.	   Lack	   of	   adequate	   preparation	   of	   the	   transition	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  The	  Estonian	  Basic	   School	   and	  Upper	   Secondary	   School	  Act	   (all	   versions	  up	   to	   2013)	   is	   available	   in	   Estonian	   and	  
Russian	  at	  www.estlex.ee,	  and	  in	  English	  translation	  at	  http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxweest.htm	  (Last	  
accessed	  20	  February	  2014).	   The	   Latvian	   Law	  on	  Education	   (all	   versions	  up	   to	  2013)	   is	   available	   in	   Latvian	  and	   in	  
English	  translation	  on	  the	  Latvian	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  website:	  www.izm.gov.lv	  (Last	  accessed	  20	  February	  2014).	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Education,	   insufficient	  methodological	   and	   financial	   support	   to	   the	   schools,	   lack	  of	   specialised	  
material,	   insufficient	  number	  of	  teachers	  in	  Russian-­‐language	  schools	  able	  to	  teach	  in	  the	  state	  
language,	  disregard	  for	  the	  needs	  and	  aspirations	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minority,	  and	   insufficient	  
involvement	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process	  were	  broadly	  identified	  as	  the	  
reform’s	  main	  problems	  and	  the	  main	  hindrances	  to	  its	  implementation	  (Skerrett	  2013;	  Kello	  et	  
al.	  2011;	  Rannut	  2004;	  Silova	  2006;	  my	  interviews	  with	  anti-­‐reform	  activists).	  	  
The	  education	  reforms	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  developed	  along	  different	  timelines,	  but	  the	  
resulting	   policies	   are	   similar.	   In	   Latvia	   bilingual	   education	   was	   introduced	   in	   Russian-­‐medium	  
elementary	  and	  secondary	  schools	  already	  in	  the	  1990s,	  which	  means	  that	  minority	  schools	  up	  
to	  grade	  nine	  teach	  some	  of	  the	  subjects	   in	  Latvian.	   In	  1998	  the	  new	  Education	  Law	  stipulated	  
that	   by	   September	   2004	   all	   secondary	   education	   (grades	   ten	   to	   twelve)	   had	   to	   be	   taught	   in	  
Latvian	  only.	   This	   triggered	  a	   large	  protest	   campaign	  by	   the	  Russian-­‐speaking	   community	   that	  
brought	  tens	  of	  thousands	  Russian-­‐speakers	  to	  the	  streets	  between	  2003	  and	  2004.	  Eventually,	  
in	  February	  2004,	  only	  months	  before	  implementation	  was	  due	  to	  start,	  the	  parliament	  revised	  
the	   law,	   which	   now	   stipulates	   that	   a	   minimum	   of	   60%	   of	   teaching	   hours	   and	   all	   state	  
examinations	  must	  be	  in	  Latvian	  (Kello	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Poleshchuk,	  2009;	  Rozenvalds,	  2005,	  pp.	  26–
27;	  P.	  Vihalemm	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Implementation	  started	  in	  September	  2004	  as	  originally	  planned.	  
Estonia	   took	   a	   different,	   more	   gradualist	   approach.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   Estonian	   education	  
reform	   concerns	  only	   upper-­‐secondary	   schools	   (grades	   ten	   to	   twelve),	  while	   Russian-­‐language	  
basic	  schools	   (up	  to	  grade	  nine)	  have	  no	   formal	  obligation	  to	   teach	  subjects	   in	  Estonian,	  apart	  
from	  Estonian	   language.97	  The	  reform	  of	  upper-­‐secondary	  schools	  was	   first	   introduced	   in	  1993	  
and	  originally	  envisaged	  a	  switch	  to	  Estonian-­‐only	  teaching	  in	  grades	  ten	  to	  twelve	  by	  the	  year	  
2000.	   However	   it	   was	   later	   amended	   to	   a	   softer	   60/40	   requirement,	   with	   at	   least	   60%	   of	  
mandatory	   teaching	   in	   the	   state	   language.	   The	   implementation	   of	   the	   reform	  was	   postponed	  
several	  times,	  and	  it	  was	  started	  gradually	  only	   in	  2007,	  when	  schools	  were	  required	  to	  switch	  
one	  subject	  a	  year	  into	  Estonian-­‐language	  teaching,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  completing	  the	  transition	  to	  
60%	  by	  2011.98	  Although	  an	  anti-­‐reform	  organisation	  called	  Russian	  School	  in	  Estonia	  (RSE)	  was	  
created	   that	   actively	   lobbies	   against	   the	   switch,	   no	   mass	   protests	   of	   the	   size	   seen	   in	   Latvia	  
occurred	  in	  Estonia.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Basic	  schools	  can	  choose	  to	  introduce	  language	  immersion	  programmes	  or	  to	  teach	  more	  subjects	  in	  Estonian,	  and	  
have	  financial	  incentives	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  the	  academic	  year	  2009/2010	  about	  one	  fifth	  of	  all	  pupils	  in	  Russian-­‐language	  
elementary	  schools	  were	  enrolled	  in	  immersion	  classes	  or	  classes	  with	  in-­‐depth	  study	  of	  Estonian	  (Kello	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  
p.	  6).	  
98	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  identified	  five	  subjects	  that	  must	  be	  switched	  into	  Estonian	  to	  reach	  the	  60%	  requirement.	  
Schools	  that	  decide	  to	  switch	  additional	  subjects	  receive	  extra	  funding	  from	  the	  Ministry	  (Kirtsi	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  29ff.;	  
Skerrett,	  2013,	  pp.	  7–8).	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Although	  Estonia’s	  and	  Latvia’s	  policymaking	  processes	  followed	  different	  timelines,	  they	  
share	   three	   important	   characteristics:	   the	   education	   reform	   is	   a	   highly	   conflictual	   topic;	   the	  
resulting	   policies	   left	   ambiguities	   to	   be	   dealt	   with	   at	   implementation	   stage;	   and	   –	   as	   for	   the	  
other	   policies	   analysed	   so	   far	   –	   the	   majority	   elite	   was	   the	   decision-­‐making	   gatekeeper.	   The	  
conditions	   of	   state-­‐level	   policymaking	   determined	   the	   framework	   within	   which	   city-­‐level	  
implementation	  took	  place,	  and	  therefore	  warrant	  a	  closer	  analysis.	  
In	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	   the	   reform	  of	  Russian-­‐language	  schools	   is	  highly	   contentious,	  
with	  the	  two	  parties	  in	  the	  dispute	  clearly	  defined	  in	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  terms.	  There	  are,	  however,	  
fundamental	   differences.	   First	   of	   all,	   although	   in	   both	   countries	   the	   reform	   triggered	   heated	  
debates,	   in	   Latvia	   a	   strong,	   grassroots	   protest	   movement	   mobilised	   to	   oppose	   it.	   Grassroots	  
protests	   were	   instrumental	   in	   pushing	   the	   government	   to	   compromise	   and	   soften	   the	  
requirement	  from	  100%	  Latvian-­‐language	  teaching	  in	  minority	  schools	  to	  60%.99	  In	  Estonia,	  anti-­‐
reform	   organisations	   have	   so	   far	   failed	   to	   mobilise	   the	   Russophone	   community	   in	   significant	  
numbers.	   Although	   at	   the	   time	   of	   writing	   the	   anti-­‐reform	   RSE	   is	   arguably	   the	   most	   active	  
Russophone	   grassroots	   organisation	   in	   Estonia,	   its	   mobilising	   capabilities	   are	   rather	   limited.	  
Thus,	  the	  government’s	  decision	  to	  switch	  from	  the	  100%	  requirement	  to	  a	  softer	  60/40	  ratio	  in	  
Estonia	  cannot	  be	  ascribed	  to	  contentious	  politics	  dynamics.	  It	  was,	  rather,	  a	  pragmatic,	  within-­‐
elite	  decision.	  
Secondly,	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	  reform	  was	  structured	  differently	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  In	  
Latvia,	   the	  Russophone	   front	  was	  not	  homogenous,	  although	   the	  basic	  critiques	   to	   the	   reform	  
were	  shared.	  It	  distinctly	  had	  a	  more	  moderate,	  compromise-­‐prone	  component	  (represented	  by	  
the	   Latvian	   association	   for	   the	   support	   of	   Russian-­‐language,	   LAShOR)	   and	   a	   more	   radical	  
component	   (represented	  by	   the	  Headquarters	   for	   the	  defence	  of	  Russian	   schools,	   Shtab).	  This	  
diversification	   of	   approaches	  within	   the	   protest	  movement	  mirrored	   a	   similar	   split	  within	   the	  
union	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  parties	  FHRUL.	  In	  Estonia,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  differentiation	  within	  the	  
Russophone	  front.	  As	  analysed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  not	  only	  there	  is	  only	  one	  
grassroots	   organisation	   (RSE)	   that	   opposes	   the	   reform,	   but	   this	   is	   also	   highly	   dependent	   on	  
Tallinn	   city	   government	   for	   strategic	   support	   and	   visibility.	   This	   makes	   it	   difficult	   for	   a	  
differentiation	  of	  Russophone	  voices	   to	  emerge	   in	  Estonia,	   and	  places	  Tallinn	  city	  government	  
(and	  Tallinn	  Centre	  Party)	  in	  the	  leading	  role	  within	  the	  anti-­‐reform	  opposition.	  
In	   both	   countries	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   the	   education	   reform	   was	  
characterised	  by	  uncertainty	  and	  miscommunication	  on	  the	  reform’s	  final	  goals,	  the	  means	  for	  
implementation,	   and	   the	  margin	   of	   implementation	   freedom	   allowed	   to	   schools.	   In	   terms	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  The	  protests	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  7.	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goals,	  as	  it	  became	  clear	  in	  my	  interviews	  with	  both	  policymakers	  and	  opposition	  figures,	  in	  both	  
countries	   there	   is	   uncertainty	   on	   whether	   the	   60/40	   ratio	   is	   indeed	   the	   final	   aim	   of	   the	  
education	   reform	   or	   rather	   a	   step	   towards	   state-­‐language-­‐only	   education	   in	   all	   state	   schools.	  
Although	  such	  a	   radical	   reform	  seems	  unlikely,	   this	  uncertainty	  can	  easily	  be	  used	  by	  opposed	  
political	  parties	  to	  raise	   inter-­‐ethnic	  tensions	  and	  capitalise	  on	  the	   ‘ethnic	  card’.100	  Uncertainty	  
over	   goals	   fosters	   minority	   distrust	   towards	   the	   government,	   as	   the	   anti-­‐reform	   protests	   in	  
Latvia	  clearly	  illustrate.	  Indeed,	  these	  were	  characterised	  by	  a	  feeling	  among	  the	  opposition	  that	  
the	   government	   could	   not	   be	   trusted	   as	   a	   negotiation	   partner	   (Silova,	   2006,	   p.	   148ff.).	   This	  
distrust	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  protests	  went	  on	  even	  after	  the	  60/40	  arrangement	  had	  become	  
law	  and	  until	  the	  actual	   implementation	  started.	  Reforms	  were	  also	  ambiguous	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
means	   for	   implementation.	   While	   punitive	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   were	   put	   in	   place	   –	  
including	   frequent	   language	   checks	   by	   the	   Language	   Inspectorate	   in	   Russian-­‐language	   schools	  
(Silova,	   2006,	   pp.	   130–134;	   Skerrett,	   2013,	   pp.	   17–18)	   –	   lack	   of	   resources	   and	   of	   a	   clear	  
implementation	  methodology	  created	  a	   ‘disjunction’	  between	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  policymakers	  
and	  actual	  policy	  implementation	  (Silova,	  2002,	  2006,	  pp.	  140–141).	  	  
Finally,	  ambiguity	  also	  regarded	  the	  margin	  of	  manoeuvre	   individual	  schools	  are	  allowed	  
in	   implementing	   the	   reform.	   For	   instance,	   according	   to	   the	   Estonian	   legislation,	   schools	   can	  
teach	   more	   than	   40%	   of	   their	   topics	   in	   a	   language	   other	   than	   Estonian,	   provided	   that	   they	  
receive	  permission	  to	  do	  so	  by	  the	  government.	  This	  would	  in	  theory	  give	  schools	  a	  measure	  of	  
flexibility	   in	   implementing	  the	  reform.	  However,	  there	  are	  no	  clear	  criteria	  for	  the	  government	  
to	   base	   its	   decision	  on,	   and	   applications	   by	  Russian-­‐language	   schools	  were	   routinely	   rejected.	  
The	  head	  of	  General	  Education	  Department	  of	  the	  Estonian	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  admitted	  that	  
the	   decision	   not	   to	   approve	   applications	   from	   Russian-­‐language	   schools	   was	   largely	   political.	  
While	  pedagogically	   the	  Ministry	  did	  not	   see	  any	   reason	   to	  grant	  exceptions	   to	   schools	   that	   it	  
deemed	  generally	  ready	  for	  the	  switch,	  it	  also	  decided	  that	  it	  would	  have	  been	  a	  political	  risk	  to	  
start	   granting	   exceptions,	   as	   that	   would	   have	   created	   a	   precedent	   for	   all	   Russian-­‐language	  
schools	  not	   to	   implement	   the	   reform	  at	  all	   (Interview	  with	   Irene	  Käosaar,	  5	  September	  2013).	  
The	   government’s	   reluctance	   to	   allow	   schools	   the	   flexibility	   foreseen	   by	   the	   law	   has	   been	   a	  
central	  point	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  Estonian	  conflict	  over	  Russian-­‐language	  schools.	  	  
In	   both	   cases,	   policymaking	   was	   monopolised	   by	   the	   national	   political	   elites,	   and	   the	  
stakeholders’	  inclusion	  envisaged	  by	  the	  government	  was	  mainly	  symbolic	  (Rozenvalds,	  2005,	  p.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  For	  example,	  upon	  its	  formation,	  Latvia’s	  2014	  governing	  coalition	  announced	  intentions	  to	  switch	  to	  Latvian-­‐only	  
teaching	  in	  state	  schools	  by	  2018.	  For	  Russian-­‐language	  coverage	  of	  this	  news,	  see	  for	  example	  ‘Druviete	  podtverdila	  
plany	   po	   likvidatsii	   russkikh	   shkol’	   (Druviete	   confirmed	   plans	   for	   the	   liquidation	   of	   Russian	   schools),	   Delfi.lv,	   31	  
January	   2014.	   Available	   at:	   http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/politics/druviete-­‐podtverdila-­‐plany-­‐po-­‐likvidacii-­‐russkih-­‐
shkol.d?id=44093597	  (Last	  accessed	  9	  December	  2014).	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107;	  Silova,	  2006,	  pp.	  118–124).	  The	  minority	  was	  largely	  seen	  as	  the	  object	  of	  the	  policy	  rather	  
than	  a	  political	   actor	   in	   its	  own	   right.	   In	  both	   countries	   the	  governing	  parties	  and	   the	  officials	  
from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  have	  tended	  to	  respond	  to	  critiques	  to	  the	  education	  reform	  by	  
presenting	  the	  education	  policy	  as	  merely	  technical	  rather	  than	  political,	  and	  by	  portraying	  the	  
opposition	   as	   either	   too	   emotional	   or	   too	   radical	   to	   be	   included	   in	   the	   policymaking	   process	  
(Interviews	  with	  policymakers,	  2013).	  By	  depoliticising	  the	  issue,	  the	  policymakers	  attempted	  to	  
shift	  the	  focus	  from	  debating	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  policy	  to	  the	  technical	  sides	  of	  implementing	  a	  
policy	  that	  has	  already	  been	  decided.	  By	  presenting	  the	  opponents	  as	  emotional	  (the	  parents)	  or	  
radical	   (the	   Russophone	   activists	   and	   politicians)	   the	   policymakers	   tried	   to	   delegitimise	   and	  
cancel	  out	   their	  demands.	   Even	   in	   Latvia,	  where	   the	  protest	  movement	  arguably	   imposed	   the	  
presence	  of	   Russophone	   voices	   in	   the	  policy	   debate,	   the	   government	   refused	   to	   admit	   to	   the	  
fact	   that	   the	   60/40	   solution	   was	   the	   result	   of	   compromise.	   This,	   according	   to	   Russophone	  
activists	  and	  representatives	  who	  took	  part	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  did	  not	  contribute	  in	  creating	  an	  
atmosphere	  of	  mutual	  cooperation	  and	  understanding	  (Galbreath	  &	  Galvin,	  2005,	  p.	  456).	  	  
Because	  of	  minority	  control	  over	   the	  education	  departments	  of	   the	  two	  capital	  cities,	   in	  
both	   countries	   the	   conflict	   over	   the	   education	   policy	   had	   both	   a	   local	   and	   a	   state-­‐wide	  
dimension.	   Uncertainty	   over	   the	   policy’s	   goals	   and	   means	   can	   surely	   create	   distrust	   and	  
misunderstandings,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  create	  entry	  points	  for	  intervention	  by	  actors	  further	  down	  in	  
the	   implementation	   chain,	   most	   importantly	   municipal	   administrations.	   If	   the	   ends	   and	   the	  
means	   of	   the	   reform	   are	   unclear,	  municipalities	   have	   ample	   space	   to	   redefine	   and	   transform	  
them.	   This	   can	  potentially	   allow	  a	  measure	  of	  minority	   re-­‐empowerment	   after	   their	   exclusion	  
from	  state-­‐level	  policymaking.	  
5.3 Implementing	  the	  education	  reform	  in	  Riga	  and	  Tallinn	  
The	  choice	  of	  the	  education	  reform	  as	  policy	  case	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  based	  on	  two	  main	  reasons.	  
Firstly,	  differently	  from	  other	  urban	  policies	  (like	  transport	  and	  planning),	  education	  policies	  are	  
of	   direct	  minority	   interest.	   Issues	   surrounding	   language	   of	   instruction	   in	  minority	   schools	   are	  
highly	  contested	  and	  political	  debates	  on	  those	  issues	  have	  a	  strong	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  component.	  
Secondly,	   city-­‐level	   implementation	   of	   state-­‐wide	   education	   policies	   is	   not	   a	   purely	  
administrative	  function	  but	  a	  policymaking	  function	  in	  its	  own	  right	  (Barrett	  &	  Hill,	  1984,	  p.	  220).	  
The	   powers	   of	   Tallinn	   and	   Riga	   administrations	   over	   schools	   concern	   mostly	   facilities,	  
maintenance	   and	   logistics,	   and	   do	   not	   extend	   to	   school	   curricula,	   which	   are	   the	   direct	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education.	  However,	  the	  procedure	  for	  selecting	  school	  directors	  
is	   managed	   by	   the	   City	   Council,	   a	   number	   of	   City	   Council	   members	   are	   themselves	   school	  
directors	  or	  teachers,	  and	  City	  Council	  members	  take	  part	   in	  school	  board	  meetings	  and	  are	   in	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regular	  contact	  with	  school	  administrations.	  This	  means	  not	  only	  that	  city	  governments	  are	  more	  
aware	  of	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  realities	  of	  policy	  implementation	  than	  the	  Ministry,	  but	  that	  they	  also	  
have	   more	   direct	   links	   to	   the	   schools	   in	   order	   to	   formally	   and	   informally	   influence	  
implementation.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  lack	  of	  resources	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  state	  policy	  
(Silova,	   2006;	   Soós	   &	   Zentai,	   2005)	   forced	   the	   city	   administrations	   to	   find	   practical	   solutions	  
which	  may	  have	  de	  facto	  transformed	  the	  state-­‐level	  policy.	  
It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  studying	  cities	  gives	   the	  possibility	  –	   impracticable	   in	  state-­‐level	  
analyses	  –	   to	   collect	  extensive	  data	   that	   take	   into	  account	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  actors,	   factors	  and	  
processes	   (Stroschein,	  2012,	  p.	  49).	  Thus,	   local-­‐level	  analyses	  offer	  valuable	  data	   for	   inference	  
about	   the	   policy	   process	   at	   state	   level	   (Dahl,	   1961;	   Horak,	   2007).	   While	   this	   is	   a	   valid	  
perspective,	   the	   analysis	   of	   city-­‐level	   policy	   process	   can	   be	   more	   than	   a	   mere	   surrogate	   for	  
state-­‐level	  analysis.	  A	  city-­‐level	  perspective	   is	  crucial	   for	  a	   thorough	  understanding	  of	  minority	  
representation	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  democracies	  for	  at	  least	  five	  reasons.	  	  
Firstly,	   urban	   studies	   literature	   identifies	   ethnically-­‐split	   cities	   as	   primary	   sites	   of	  
contentious	   politics	   and	   identity	   conflicts	   (Davis	   &	   Libertun	   de	   Duren,	   2011;	   Parker,	   2011).	  
Exactly	   because	   they	   are	   primary	   sites	   for	   inter-­‐group	   conflict,	   however,	   cities	   are	   also	   likely	  
laboratories	  for	  inter-­‐group	  negotiation	  and	  compromise	  (Bollens,	  2011;	  Browning	  et	  al.,	  1990).	  
This	   suggests	   that	  dynamics	  of	  majority–minority	   relations	   in	  city	  politics	  not	  only	  might	  differ	  
from	   those	   at	   state	   level,	   but	   can	   also	   interact	  with	   them	   to	   shape	   the	  minority’s	   role	   in	   the	  
democratic	   process.	   Secondly,	   it	   has	   been	   noted	   that	  minorities	   that	   are	   excluded	   from	   state	  
power	  find	  it	  easier	  to	  gain	  local	  representation	  (Bird,	  2004,	  p.	  182).	  Residential	  concentration,	  
the	   lower	  costs	  of	   local	  participation	  and	  local	  electoral	  campaigns,	  and	  the	  more	  flexible	   local	  
party	   structure	   all	   contribute	   to	   this	   (Bird,	   2004,	   p.	   184).	   Cities	   administrations	   can	   therefore	  
offer	   an	   additional	   site	   of	   power	   and	   representation	   (Coulson	   &	   Campbell,	   2006,	   p.	   548),	  
potentially	   creating	   alternative	   avenues	   for	   minorities	   to	   enter	   the	   policymaking	   process.	  
Exclusionary	  policies	  decided	  at	  state	  level	  have	  a	  chance	  of	  being	  (at	   least	  partially)	  redressed	  
through	   city-­‐level	   decision-­‐making	   (Jørgensen,	   2012,	   p.	   266).101	   Birnir	   (2007)	   and	   Ishiyama	  
(2009)	   both	   point	   at	   access	   to	   central	   government	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   as	   key	   in	   determining	   a	  
minority’s	   attitude	   towards	   the	   political	   process.	   They	   warn	   that	   prolonged	   exclusion	   of	   the	  
minority	   from	   executive	   power	   risks	   reducing	   the	   incentives	   for	   it	   to	   seek	   representation	  
through	   institutional	   means.	   Yet,	   this	   prediction	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   local-­‐level	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	   The	   reverse	   is	   also	   possible:	   city-­‐level	   policies	   can	   restrict	   rights	   provided	   for	   by	   state-­‐level	   policies	   (Miller	   &	  
Nicholls,	  2013,	  pp.	  457–458).	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representation	   and	   the	   role	   it	   can	   play	   in	   defining	   the	  minority’s	   role	   in	   a	   country’s	   political	  
landscape.	  
Thirdly,	   ethnically	   diverse	   cities	   have	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   daily	   management	   of	   diversity,	  
which	  makes	  their	  administration	  potentially	  more	  sensitive	  to	  pragmatic	  problem	  solving	  than	  
to	  the	  symbolic	  policy	  framing	  often	  prevalent	  at	  state	  level	  (Jørgensen,	  2012,	  p.	  253).	  Local	  level	  
implementation	  may	  therefore	  create	  an	  alternative	  ‘room	  for	  negotiation’,	  providing	  a	  chance	  
to	   reframe	   highly	   symbolic	   state-­‐level	   policies	   in	   more	   pragmatic	   terms	   (Jørgensen,	   2012,	  
p.	  266–267).	  Fourthly,	  local-­‐level	  policy	  implementation	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  process.	  
The	   issues	   encountered	   by	   local	   administrations	   in	   implementing	   state	   policies	   enter	   the	  
feedback	  mechanism	   for	   policy	   change	   at	   state	   level.	  Moreover,	   local	   administrations	   do	   not	  
simply	   receive	   policies	   from	   the	   state,	   but	  make	   specific	   decisions	   on	   how	   to	   put	   state-­‐wide	  
policies	  into	  action.	  Policies	  can	  be	  de	  facto	  modified	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  implementation,	  which	  
gives	  a	  chance	  to	  groups	  that	  were	  unable	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  state-­‐level	  stage	  of	  policymaking	  to	  
intervene	  in	  this	  second	  stage	  (Barrett	  &	  Hill,	  1984,	  p.	  226).	  This	  might	  be	  particularly	  important	  
in	  ethnically	  divided	  societies	  like	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  
Finally,	  the	  fact	  that	  Riga	  and	  Tallinn	  are	  capital	  cities	  has	  additional	  symbolic	  and	  practical	  
implications.	   At	   a	   symbolic	   level,	   capital	   cities	   ‘bear	   the	   burden	   of	   representing	   the	   nation’	  
(Davis	   &	   Libertun	   de	   Duren,	   2011,	   p.	   196).	   For	   Riga	   and	   Tallinn,	   whose	   demography	   is	   split	  
between	  the	  titular	  nation	  and	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority,	  this	  is	  of	  particular	  consequence.	  
Indeed,	  they	  are	  at	  the	  same	  time	  both	  the	  centre	  of	  their	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  biggest	  centre	  (in	  
terms	   of	   demographic	   distribution)	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority.	   This	   creates	   a	   symbolic	  
tension	  that	  is	  reflected	  on	  city	  politics,	  especially	  around	  municipal	  elections.	  
At	   a	   more	   practical	   level,	   state	   and	   local	   institutions	   are	   usually	   both	   situated	   in	   the	  
capital	   city,	   often	   not	   far	   from	   each	   other	   (Davis	   &	   Libertun	   de	   Duren,	   2011,	   p.	   196).	   This	  
geographical	  coincidence	  of	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  reinforces	  the	  ‘tension	  between	  local	  
autonomy	   and	   central	   control’	   typical	   of	   local	   democracy	   (Devas	   &	   Delay,	   2006,	   p.	   687).	   In	  
Tallinn	  and	  Riga,	  the	  spatial	  overlap	  between	  state	  and	  city	   levels	   is	  particularly	  consequential.	  
Firstly,	  they	  are	  the	  capitals	  of	  small	  countries,	  where	  a	  great	  share	  of	  the	  population	  and	  of	  the	  
national	  wealth	  is	  concentrated,	  making	  their	  political	  weight	  particularly	  felt	  in	  national	  politics.	  
Secondly,	   the	  political	  orientation	  of	  the	  national	  government	  and	  that	  of	  the	  city	  government	  
have	  been	  opposed,	  with	  the	  ethnic	  issue	  being	  part	  of	  this	  opposition.	  This	  gives	  city	  politics	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  local	  and	  state-­‐wide	  relevance.	  
Notwithstanding	  all	  these	  reasons	  to	  take	  into	  account	  city-­‐level	  minority	  representation,	  
this	  has	  been	  largely	  overlooked	  by	  the	  academic	  literature	  on	  CEE	  countries.	  However,	  the	  US	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debate	  on	  political	   incorporation	   (reviewed	   in	  Chapter	  1)	  offers	   important	   conceptual	   tools	   to	  
analyse	   majority–minority	   power	   distribution	   in	   ethnically	   split	   cities.	   Incorporation	   is	   ‘the	  
extent	   to	   which	   [a	   group]	   is	   represented	   in	   a	   coalition	   that	   dominates	   city	   policy	   making	   on	  
issues	  of	  greatest	  concern	  to	  that	  group’	  (Browning	  et	  al.,	  1990,	  p.	  9),	  and	  can	  range	  from	  total	  
exclusion	  to	  total	  control.	  Significant	  incorporation	  into	  the	  power	  structures	  of	  the	  capital	  city	  
can	   arguably	   give	   the	  minority	   a	  major	   platform	   to	   influence	   policies	   and	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	  
wider	   political	   debate	   on	   issues	   that	   concern	   it	   directly.	   The	   US	   literature	   on	   incorporation,	  
however,	  disagrees	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  minority’s	  city-­‐level	  political	  presence	  and	  
its	  actual	  political	  power.	  City-­‐level	  representation	  in	  executive	  positions	  can	  either	  be	  a	  useful	  
platform	  for	  minorities	  to	  gain	  a	  political	  voice	  and	  influence	  policies,	  or	  can	  be	  a	  palliative	  that	  
‘traps’	  minority	  voices	  at	  the	  local	  level	  with	  no	  chance	  of	  acquiring	  an	  autonomous	  voice	  at	  the	  
state	   level.	  My	   analysis	  will	   follow	   the	   insights	   from	   the	  US-­‐focused	   debate,	   asking	   this	   same	  
question	  with	   regard	   to	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga.	  The	   implementation	  of	   the	  education	   reform	   in	  Riga	  
and	  Tallinn	  offers	  the	  ideal	  vantage	  point	  to	  provide	  an	  answer.	  
Riga	  and	  Tallinn	  were	  both,	  if	  in	  different	  ways,	  at	  the	  very	  centre	  of	  the	  political	  debate	  
on	   the	   reform	  of	  Russian-­‐language	   schools.	  Many	  of	   the	   schools	   interested	  by	   the	   reform	  are	  
located	   in	  the	  two	  capital	  cities.	   In	  Tallinn	  there	  are	  65	  schools,	  of	  which	  25	  (about	  40%)	  have	  
Russian-­‐language	  teaching.	  These	   include	  21	  schools	  with	  gymnasium-­‐level	  classes	   (grades	  10–
12),	   which	   fall	   under	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   education	   reform.	   In	   Riga	   there	   are	   119	  
comprehensive	   schools,	   of	   which	   46	   use	   a	   Russian-­‐Latvian	   bilingual	   model	   and	   9	   have	   both	  
Latvian-­‐only	   and	   bilingual	   streams.	   This	   means	   that	   over	   45%	   of	   Riga’s	   schools	   have	   at	   least	  
partial	   education	   in	   Russian	   and	   cater	   to	   the	   Russophone	   community.	   The	   high	   number	   of	  
minority	   schools,	   the	   size	  of	   their	   resident	  Russophone	  community,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	  Russian-­‐
speaking	   representatives	   were	   in	   positions	   of	   power	   in	   the	   municipality	   all	   contributed	   to	  
making	   the	   education	   reform	  a	  primary	   concern	   for	   the	   city	   governments	   of	   Riga	   and	   Tallinn.	  
The	  three	  conditions	  of	  state-­‐level	  policymaking	  analysed	  above	  (conflict,	  policy	  uncertainty,	  and	  
minority	  disempowerment)	  created	  the	  context	  in	  which	  city-­‐level	  implementation	  took	  place.	  
While	   in	   both	   Riga	   and	   Tallinn	   conflict	   is	   prevalent	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  
municipality	  and	  the	  central	  government,	  their	  conflict	  over	  the	  education	  reform	  developed	  in	  
markedly	   different	   ways.	   In	   its	   dispute	   with	   the	   Latvian	   central	   government,	   Riga’s	   local	  
government	  played	  the	  double	  role	  of	  the	  opposition	  and	  of	  the	  pragmatic	  mediator	  both	  during	  
the	  protest	   period	   in	   2003–2004	  and,	   later,	   under	  Ušakovs’s	  mayorship.	   The	  dispute	  between	  
Tallinn	   and	   the	   Estonian	   central	   government	   is	   more	   clearly	   on	   symbolic	   issues,	   and	   the	   city	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government	  has	  framed	  its	  opposition	  to	  the	  reform	  in	  terms	  of	  minority	  rights	  and	  survival	  of	  
the	  Russian	  culture	  in	  Estonia.	  	  
In	   Latvia,	   a	   measure	   of	   conflict	   and	   competition	   is	   characteristic	   of	   the	   relationship	  
between	   the	   central	   government	   and	   the	   capital	   city.	   In	   the	  words	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   head	   of	  
Riga’s	  Education	  department,	  Guntis	  Helmanis:	  
A	   big	   city	   is	   always	   rather	   independent	   –	   and	   there	   is	   this	   feeling	   in	   the	  Ministry	   of	  
Education	  that	  we	  don’t	  hang	  from	  their	  mouth	  and	  don’t	  wait	  for	  their	  commands	  but	  
we	   work	   independently.	   Of	   course	   Riga	   has	   very	   good	   possibilities	   for	   co-­‐financing	  
compared	  to	  other	  local	  administrations,	  and	  here	  there	  is	  a	  little	  bit	  of	  jealousy	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  government.	  (Interview	  with	  Guntis	  Helmanis,	  27	  June	  2013)	  
Since	  Ušakovs’s	  mayorship	  started	  in	  2009,	  this	  tension	  between	  the	  city	  and	  the	  central	  
government	  has	  overlapped	  with	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  divisions.	  This	  becomes	  particularly	  evident	  at	  
election	   times,	  when	  openly	  ethnic	  appeals,	   especially	   from	  Latvian	  nationalist	  parties,	   are	   far	  
from	  rare.	  However,	  the	  heightened	  tones	  of	  the	  electoral	  campaigns	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  
in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  attitudes	  and	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  of	  diversity	  in	  the	  city.	  Indeed,	  
the	   attitude	   of	   the	   Riga	   city	   government	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   education	   reform	   has	   been	  
consistently	  pragmatic.	  	  
During	   the	   period	   of	   anti-­‐reform	   protests	   FHRUL	   was	   a	   junior	   partner	   in	   the	   Riga	  
government,	   in	   a	   rather	   complex	   situation	   in	   which	   the	   leading	   social-­‐democratic	   party	   had	  
appointed	  two	  deputy	  mayors,	  one	  from	  the	  nationalist	  TB/LNNK	  and	  one	  from	  FHRUL,	  and	  had	  
separate	   agreements	   with	   both	   parties.	   Notwithstanding	   their	   institutional	   position,	   several	  
members	   of	   FHRUL	   were	   directly	   involved	   in	   organising	   the	   anti-­‐reform	   protests	   and	   some	  
FHRUL	   city	   councillors	   were	   members	   of	   the	   protest	   organisation	   Shtab.	   The	   multiplicity	   of	  
voices	   (from	   more	   moderate	   to	   more	   maximalist	   ones)	   that	   was	   evident	   within	   the	   protest	  
movement	  was	  also	  mirrored	  within	  FHRUL.102	  This	  put	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  party	  both	  in	  the	  
frontlines	  of	  the	  protest	  and	  in	  a	  position	  to	  mediate	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  Russian-­‐language	  schools.	  	  
With	  anti-­‐reform	  agitations	   in	   the	  streets	  of	  Riga	  becoming	   increasingly	  prominent,	  Riga	  
City	  Education	  Department	  (with	  the	  support	  of	  FHRUL	  representatives)	  took	  upon	  itself	  the	  role	  
of	   mediator	   between	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Education	   and	   the	   Russophone	   community.	   Riga	   City	  
promoted	   and	   organised	   a	   series	   of	  meetings	   with	   the	   participation	   of	  Ministry	   of	   Education	  
officials,	  school	  directors,	  experts,	  City	  Education	  Department	  officials,	  representatives	  from	  the	  
anti-­‐reform	   organisation	   LAShOR	   (considered	   moderate),	   and	   FHRUL	   members	   of	   the	   more	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  Not	  least	  because	  of	  the	  differences	  that	  had	  emerged	  during	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  anti-­‐reform	  campaigns,	  FHRUL	  later	  split	  into	  its	  




radical	   Shtab.	   Riga	   provided	   an	   arena	   for	   debate,	   in	   which	   the	   different	   sides	   of	   the	   dispute	  
could	   confront	   each	   other	   and	   discuss	   potential	   compromise	   solutions.	   Moreover,	   the	  
department	  organised	   several	  meetings	  with	  parents,	   teachers	  and	  pupils	  of	  Russian-­‐language	  
schools,	   and	   produced	   reports	   identifying	   the	  main	   problems	   and	   critiques	   that	   had	   emerged	  
from	  them.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  discussion	  meetings	  held	  in	  the	  Riga	  Council	  building,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  
parliamentary	  Education	  Committee	  thanked	  Riga	  for	  having	  initiated	  the	  dialogue	  with	  parents	  
and	  children,	  and	  added:	   ‘The	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  will	   start	   to	  talk	   to	  people.	  You	  should	  be	  
proud	  to	  have	  been	  the	  first	  to	  start,	  and	  now	  the	  Ministry	  will	  follow	  you’.103	  
Under	   the	   Russophone	   mayor	   Ušakovs	   this	   pragmatic	   attitude	   towards	   the	   education	  
policy	  continued.	  Many	  of	   the	  same	  people	  who	  had	  been	  managing	  education	   in	  Riga	  before	  
2009	   retained	   their	   post	   –	   most	   notably	   the	   head	   of	   the	   City	   Government	   Education	  
Department.	  This	  ensured	  continuity	   in	  Riga’s	   school	  policies.	   In	  addition	   to	   this,	  more	  budget	  
resources	  have	  been	  allocated	  to	  education,	  not	   least	   to	  compensate	   for	   reduced	  government	  
transfers	   and	   to	   facilitate	   schools’	   management	   of	   the	   reform	   (Interviews	   with	   city	   officials,	  
2013).	  Thus,	  Riga	  City	  acted	  during	  the	  tense	  period	  of	  the	  anti-­‐reform	  protests	  as	  compromise	  
broker.	  Riga	  functioned	  as	  a	  bridge	  to	  foster	  mutual	  understanding	  between	  the	  two	  sides	  in	  the	  
contention,	  and	  to	  facilitate	  some	  form	  of	  compromise	  on	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  education	  bill	  
and	   in	   its	   implementation.	   After	   that,	   under	   a	   Russophone	   mayor,	   it	   provided	   additional	  
resources	  to	  facilitate	  the	  transition	  of	  Russian-­‐language	  schools	  to	  partial	  Latvian	  teaching	  and	  
kept	  the	  symbolic	  rhetoric	  down.	  
In	   Tallinn,	   the	   city	   government	   took	   a	   markedly	   different	   approach.	   Prominent	   figures	  
within	  Tallinn	   city	   government	  are	   conducting	  a	  head-­‐on	  attack	  against	   the	  education	   reform,	  
which	   led	  to	  a	  heated	  conflict	  with	  the	  central	  government.	  A	  high	  ranking	  public	  servant	  who	  
has	  been	  working	  in	  Tallinn	  city	  administration	  for	  over	  ten	  years	  observed	  that	  this	  maximalist	  
attitude	   towards	   the	  education	   reform	  corresponded	   to	   the	  ascent	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	   to	   the	  
post	  of	  deputy	  mayors	  overlooking	  education.	  The	  public	   servant	  described	   the	   role	  of	  Tallinn	  
City	   before	   then	   as	   working	   together	   with	   the	   Education	   Ministry	   to	   facilitate	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  reform.	  When	  the	  new	  deputy	  mayors	  took	  a	  strong	  anti-­‐reform	  stance,	  
the	  conflicting	  messages	  coming	  from	  Tallinn	  City	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  meant	  that	  ‘not	  
even	  the	  schools	  understood	  what	  kind	  of	  policy	   they	  should	  have	   implemented,	  and	  some	  of	  
them	  went	  back	  [in	  terms	  of	  their	  readiness	  to	  switch	  to	  Estonian-­‐language	  teaching]’	  (Interview	  
with	  Tallinn	  civil	  servant,	  2013).	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  Consultative	  meeting	  held	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  transcripts	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  were	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One	  of	   the	  most	   controversial	   steps	   taken	  by	   Tallinn	  municipality	   in	   2013	  was	   to	   try	   to	  
circumvent	   the	   reform	   by	   creating	   a	   municipally	   funded	   Russian-­‐language	   private	   school.	   By	  
virtue	   of	   it	   being	   formally	   private,	   this	   school	   would	   not	   have	   had	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   60/40	  
ratio.	  This	  initiative	  was	  eventually	  blocked	  by	  the	  governing	  parties	  through	  the	  amendment	  of	  
the	  Law	  on	  Private	  Schools.	  This	  controversy	  developed	  in	  the	  months	  before	  the	  2013	  municipal	  
elections	   and	   gained	   extensive	   coverage	   in	   the	   local	   and	   national	   news,	   embittering	   the	  
positions	  on	  both	  sides.	  
Tallinn	  City’s	  militant	  approach	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  education	   reform	   is	  embodied	  by	   the	  
deputy	  mayor	   responsible	   for	  education,	  Mihhail	  Kõlvart.	  There	  are	  widespread	  suggestions	   in	  
the	  media	   and	   in	  my	   interviews	   with	   city	   officials	   that	   the	   deputy	  mayor	   is	   allegedly	   putting	  
pressure	   on	   Russian-­‐language	   schools	   to	   resist	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   reform.	   Although	  
there	   is	  not	  enough	  evidence	   to	  either	  confirm	  or	  dispel	   these	  suggestions,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	  
expect	   that	   the	   attitude	   to	   the	   reform	   taken	   by	   the	   city	   government	   has	   an	   effect	   on	   school	  
directors	   and	   teachers.	   The	  militant	   stance	   of	   the	   deputy	   mayor	   is	   reflected	   in	   his	   choice	   of	  
words	  in	  comparing	  the	  situation	  in	  Latvia	  to	  that	  in	  Estonia:	  	  
[I]n	  Latvia	  both	  directors	  and	   teachers	  were	   for	   the	  defence	  of	  Russian	  schools;	  here	  
we	  have	  very	  few	  of	  those	  directors	  –	  almost	  no	  one,	  only	  some	  exceptions	  stand	  up	  
for	   the	   defence	   of	   Russian	   schools,	   the	   others	   think	   more	   at	   their	   post.	   And	   as	   for	  
teachers,	   here	   teachers	   stay	   completely	   silent	   –	   they	   are	   definitely	   not	   a	   category	  
that’s	  ready	  to	  fight.	  (Interview	  with	  Mihhail	  Kõlvart,	  18	  June	  2013)	  
The	  vocabulary	  used	  by	  Kõlvart	  is	  in	  line	  with	  that	  used	  by	  the	  anti-­‐reform	  activists	  of	  RSE,	  
of	  which	  he	  is	  a	  member.	  While	  also	  in	  Latvia	  –	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  protests	  –	  there	  was	  some	  
overlap	   between	   grassroots	   movements	   and	  minority	   institutional	   representatives,	   in	   Estonia	  
this	  overlap	  is	  almost	  complete.	  Indeed,	  the	  Estonian	  anti-­‐reform	  protest	  movement	  is	  not	  only	  
smaller	  than	  its	  Latvian	  counterpart,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  less	  internally	  differentiated.	  The	  movement	  is	  
highly	  reliant	  on	  Tallinn	  City	  and	  the	  Centre	  Party.	  While	  RSE	  has	  its	  own	  strategy	  and	  a	  measure	  
of	   organisational	   independence,	   it	   counts	   on	   Tallinn	   city	   government’s	   initiatives	   for	   visibility	  
and	   support,	   and	   its	   activists	   point	   to	   the	   inclusion	   of	   Centre	   Party	   in	   state	   government	   as	   a	  
possible	   solution	   to	   their	   problems	   (Interviews	   with	   RSE	   activists,	   2013).	   The	   Tallinn	   local	  
elections	  of	  2013	  might	  have	  reinforced	  this	  dependency:	  the	  Centre	  Party	  included	  a	  number	  of	  
previously	   unaffiliated	   RSE	   activists	   in	   its	   party	   lists,	   however	   none	   of	   them	   received	   enough	  
votes	  to	  make	  it	  into	  the	  Council.104	  Kõlvart,	  however,	  was	  re-­‐elected,	  not	  least	  on	  the	  strength	  
of	  his	  credentials	  as	  major	  defender	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  rights.	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Therefore,	  a	  different	  scenario	  developed	  in	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  around	  the	  implementation	  
of	   the	   education	   reform.	   In	   Riga	   the	   city	   government	   actively	   took	   part	   in	   the	   policy	   debate,	  
played	  the	  role	  of	  compromise	  broker,	  and	  provided	  both	  opposition	  and	  policy	  feedback	  to	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Education.	  Riga	  City	  provided	  a	  stable	  arena	  for	  debate	  between	  the	  different	  sides	  
of	  the	  dispute,	  produced	  reports	  about	  the	  situation	   in	  the	  schools	  and	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  
reform,	  proposed	  legislative	  changes,	  and	  started	  a	  debate	  with	  teachers,	  families,	  and	  pupils	  at	  
a	   time	   when	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Education	   was	   still	   very	   timid	   with	   meaningfully	   engaging	   the	  
stakeholders	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   Later,	   under	   a	   Russophone	   mayor,	   it	   kept	   a	  
pragmatic	  attitude	  on	  education	  issues.	  In	  Tallinn,	  contrary	  to	  expectations	  that	  at	  the	  local	  level	  
pragmatic	   problem	   solving	   takes	   the	   place	   of	   symbolic	   policy	   framing	   (Jørgensen,	   2012),	   the	  
issue	  of	  Russian-­‐language	  schools	  has	  become	  a	  battlefield	  for	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  Centre	  
Party	  and	  the	  governing	  parties.	  What	  is	  particularly	  striking	  is	  that	  Russian-­‐speaking	  politicians	  
of	   the	  Estonian	   ‘mainstream’	  Centre	  Party	  were	  more	  militant	   than	   those	  of	  Harmony	  Centre,	  
which	  –	  although	  moderate	  –	  is	  a	  Russophone	  ethnic	  party.	  
5.4 Explaining	  conflict	  vs.	  pragmatism	  in	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  
The	   highly	   ethnicised	   state-­‐level	   debate	   around	   the	   education	   reform	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	  
contributed	  to	  the	  drafting	  of	  strongly	  symbolic	  policies,	  which	  left	  room	  for	  ambiguity	  both	  in	  
terms	  of	  final	  goals	  and	  of	   implementation	  methodology.105	  Riga	  and	  Tallinn	  municipalities	  had	  
therefore	  some	  room	  for	  redefining	  the	  policy	  at	  the	  implementation	  stage.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  
Riga	  City	  had	  managed	  to	  carve	  out	  for	  itself	  the	  role	  of	  compromise	  broker	  already	  during	  the	  
policymaking	  stage.	  When	  the	  protests	  ceased	  and	  the	  education	  reform	  was	  fixed	  in	  law,	  Riga	  
City	  was	  expected	  to	  implement	  it.	  First	  of	  all,	  Riga	  had	  to	  recognise	  the	  practical	  constraints	  to	  
implementing	   the	   60/40	   switch	   in	   the	   time	   period	   foreseen	   by	   the	   law.	   Lack	   of	   financial	  
resources,	  shortage	  of	  qualified	  teachers	  that	  could	  teach	  in	  Latvian	  in	  Russian-­‐language	  schools,	  
and	  the	  typical	  resistance	  to	  change	  in	  complex	  institutions	  like	  schools	  also	  had	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  
account	  by	  the	  municipality.	  On	  top	  of	  this,	  the	  soured	  mood	  within	  the	  Russophone	  community	  
after	  a	  season	  of	  street	  protests	  and	  their	  suspiciousness	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  government’s	  real	  
goals	  had	  also	  to	  be	  dealt	  with.	  	  
In	  order	   to	  make	   implementation	  possible,	  Riga’s	  Education	  Department	  met	  repeatedly	  
with	   all	   the	   schools	   interested	   by	   the	   reform.	   These	   meetings	   were	   not	   simply	   aimed	   at	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   Available	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explaining	  the	  reform	  and	  its	  requirements,	  which	   is	  what	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  tended	  to	  
do	   in	   its	   efforts	   to	   reach	   out	   to	   the	   Russophone	   community.	   Riga’s	   Education	   Department	  
concentrated	   on	   understanding	   the	   problems	   schools	   were	   facing	   and	   the	   reasons	   for	  
opposition	   to	   the	   reform,	   and	   it	   made	   clear	   that	   there	   will	   be	   practical	   help,	   additional	  
resources,	  and	  –	  most	  importantly	  –	  that	  there	  will	  be	  flexibility	  in	  implementation.	  In	  the	  words	  
of	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Riga	  City	  Education	  Department:	  
We	  showed	  that	   there	  will	  be	  also	  a	  positive	  aspect,	   that	   there	  will	  be	  help	   from	  us,	  
that	   we	   won’t	   punish	   anybody,	   that	   we	   won’t	   control	   every	   single	   step	   like	   in	   a	  
totalitarian	   regime	   […]	  We	   immediately	   understood	   that	   there	  would	  be	   a	   transition	  
period	   and	   all	   the	   time	   we	   must	   help	   people.	   That	   was	   and	   remains	   our	   position.	  
(Interview	  with	  Guntis	  Helmanis,	  27	  June	  2013)	  
This	  approach	  was	  kept	  under	  mayor	  Ušakovs.	  Flexibility	  in	  implementation	  means	  that	  a	  
measure	  of	  difference	  between	  schools’	  formal	  compliance	  with	  the	  law	  and	  their	  actual	  work	  is	  
understood	   as	   normal	   by	   the	  municipality	   (Interview	  with	   Riga	   civil	   servants,	   2013).	   This	   is	   in	  
contradiction	  with	  the	  government’s	  initial	  view	  of	  this	  policy	  as	  a	  blanket	  reform	  founded	  on	  a	  
securitised	   understanding	   of	   the	   Latvian	   language	   (Galbreath	  &	   Galvin,	   2005).	   Thus,	   Riga	   City	  
was	  able	   to	  use	   the	  space	  of	  ambiguity	   left	  by	   the	  state	  policy	   in	  order	   to	   re-­‐prioritise	  and	  de	  
facto	  modify	  the	  policy	  at	  the	  implementation	  stage.	  
Ambiguity	  was	  also	  characteristic	  of	  Estonia’s	  decision-­‐making	  process	  with	  regard	  to	   its	  
Russian-­‐language	   schools.	   The	   repeated	   postponements	   of	   the	   deadline	   for	   implementation	  
probably	   avoided	  mass	  mobilisation	   against	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   kind	   seen	   in	   Latvia,106	   but	   also	  
meant	   that	   schools	   were	   getting	   conflicting	   messages	   on	   whether	   they	   should	   take	   steps	  
towards	   switching	   to	   Estonian,	   and,	   if	   so,	   what	   kind	   of	   steps.	   The	   attitude	   of	   Tallinn’s	   local	  
politicians	   towards	   the	   education	   reform	   added	   to	   the	   ambiguity.	   Initially	   Tallinn’s	   education	  
department	   was	   concerned	   with	   facilitating	   the	   switch	   to	   partial	   Estonian-­‐language	   teaching	  
foreseen	  by	  the	  reform.	  They	  explained	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  reform	  to	  the	  schools	  and	  helped	  with	  
teachers	   training.	   Because	   few	   Russophone	   voices	   were	   heard	   at	   the	   time	   and	   those	   were	  
typically	   dismissed	   as	   radical,	   however,	   Tallinn	   City	   did	   not	   act	   as	  mediator	   but	   rather	   as	   the	  
local-­‐level	  extension	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education.	  	  
Later,	   when	  militant	   Russian-­‐speaking	   politicians	   from	   the	   Centre	   Party	   got	   the	   post	   of	  
deputy	   mayors	   with	   responsibility	   for	   education,	   those	   facilitating	   activities	   were	   allegedly	  
‘frozen’	   (Interview	   with	   Tallinn	   civil	   servant,	   2013).	   Interestingly,	   while	   the	   deputy	   mayor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Some	  of	  my	  respondents	  suggested	  that	  this	  was	   in	  fact	  a	  conscious	  decision	  by	  the	  ruling	  elites	  to	  avoid	  –	  or	  at	  
least	  defer	  –	  protest.	  It	  must	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  postponements	  were	  advocated	  for	  by	  Centre	  Party	  MPs	  to	  at	  
least	  partially	  satisfy	  their	  constituents’	  demand	  for	  policy	  change.	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responded	   to	   the	  government’s	  push	   to	   finally	   implement	   the	  education	   reform	  by	  2011	  with	  
open	   resistance,	   not	   all	   his	   fellow	   Centre	   Party	   City	   Council	   members	   agreed	   with	   his	  
initiatives.107	  Moreover,	  some	  civil	  servants	  within	  the	  city	  government	  comment	  negatively	  on	  
the	   tense	   atmosphere	   that	   has	   been	   created	   around	   the	   issue	   of	   Russian-­‐language	   schools	  
(Interviews	  with	  Tallinn	  civil	  servants,	  2013).	  	  
The	   effects	   of	   the	  high	   symbolic	   politicisation	  of	   the	   education	   reform	   in	   Tallinn	  on	   the	  
actual	  implementation	  of	  the	  policy	  are	  still	  unclear.	  The	  different	  timings	  of	  the	  implementation	  
in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   could	  mean	   that	   Tallinn	   city	   government	  might	   enter	   a	   pragmatic	   phase	  
comparable	   to	   Riga’s	   in	   the	   future.	  However,	   in	   Riga,	   already	   during	   the	   very	   tense	   period	   of	  
street	   protests,	   there	   was	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   voices	   among	   the	   Russophone	   activists	   and	  
representatives	   –	   the	   interplay	   between	  more	  moderate	   and	  more	   radical	   Russophone	   voices	  
was	  central	   in	  creating	  room	  for	  constructive	  opposition,	  mediation	  and	   internal	  debate	   in	  the	  
Russophone	   community.	   After	  Harmony	  Centre	   became	   the	   only	  minority	   party	   in	   parliament	  
and	   in	   the	   Riga	   Council,	   internal	   differentiation	   of	   the	   Russophone	   political	   voice	   has	   been	  
ensured	  by	  a	   lively	  and	   independent	  Russophone	  civil	   society.	  No	  such	  differentiation	  exists	   in	  
Tallinn;	  and	  the	  political	  gains	  to	  be	  had	  from	  a	  head-­‐to-­‐head	  conflict	  might	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  
such	  differentiation	  to	  emerge.	  
In	  general,	  the	  expectation	  that	  city	  administrations	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  pragmatic	  problem	  
solving	  on	  policies	  with	  a	  highly	  symbolic	  content	  is	  confirmed	  in	  Riga	  but	  not	  in	  Tallinn.	  This	  is	  
counterintuitive	   given	   that	   in	   Tallinn	   Russian-­‐speakers	   are	   represented	   by	   a	   moderate	  
mainstream	   party	   and	   the	   mayor	   is	   an	   ethnic	   Estonian,	   whereas	   in	   Riga	   Russian-­‐speakers	  
achieved	   executive	   positions	   first	   through	   FHRUL	   (that	   included	   both	   moderate	   and	   radical	  
components)	  and	  then	  through	  the	  moderate	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  party	  Harmony	  Centre	  and	  the	  
ethnic-­‐Russian	  mayor	  Nils	  Ušakovs.	  	  
One	  compelling	  explanation	  for	  this	  apparent	  incongruity	  comes	  from	  looking	  at	  the	  two	  
parties	   that	   represent	   the	   Russian	   speakers	   and	   are	   in	   power	   in	   Tallinn	   and	   Riga:	   the	   Centre	  
Party	  and	  Harmony	  Centre.	  Although	   these	   two	  parties	  are	  comparable	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  nearly	  
monopolistic	   support	   they	   receive	   from	   the	   Russophone	   community	   and	   their	   generally	  
moderate	  ethnic	  appeal,	   they	   came	   to	   their	  position	   from	  markedly	  different	   trajectories.	   The	  
Centre	  Party	  is	  an	  Estonian	  mainstream	  party	  that	  increasingly	  came	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  Russophone	  
electorate.	  Considered	  ‘non-­‐coalitionable’	  by	  the	  rightist	  parties	  –	  not	  least	  for	  the	  bigger-­‐than-­‐
life	  persona	  of	  its	  leader	  Savisaar	  –	  the	  Centre	  Party	  was	  included	  in	  governing	  coalitions	  only	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  This	   is	  evident	   from	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	   transcripts	  of	  Tallinn	  City	  Council	  discussions,	  where	  a	  number	  of	  Centre	  
Party	  members	  voiced	  dissent	  with	  the	  deputy-­‐mayor’s	  militant	  approach.	  Transcripts	  of	  Tallinn	  City	  Council	  debates	  
are	  available	  in	  Estonian	  at:	  https://aktal.tallinnlv.ee.	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brief	   periods	   and	   became	   a	   fixture	   of	   the	   opposition	   and	   a	   ‘champion	   for	   the	   “losers”	   of	   the	  
economic	   transformation’	   (Ritter	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   In	   virtue	   of	   this,	   and	   of	   Savisaar’s	   consistently	  
progressive	   views	   with	   regard	   to	  minority	   issues,	   the	   Centre	   Party	   increasingly	   attracted	   and	  
eventually	  monopolised	  the	  votes	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers.	  Although	  it	  did	  not	  lose	  all	  its	  ethnic	  
Estonian	   support,	   the	   Centre	   Party	   came	   to	   be	   increasingly	   associated	   with	   the	   Russophone	  
community	   and	   to	   be	   electorally	   reliant	   on	   their	   votes.	   Moreover,	   while	   it	   maintained	   an	  
overwhelmingly	  ethnic	  Estonian	  leadership,	  the	  Centre	  Party	  became	  the	  preferential	  route	  for	  
ambitious	   Russophone	   politicians	   to	   make	   a	   career.	   Harmony	   Centre	   is	   instead	   a	   Russian-­‐
speakers’	  party,	  with	  an	  overwhelmingly	  (though	  not	  exclusively)	  Russophone	  leadership.	  It	  has	  
increasingly	   adopted	   a	   non-­‐ethnic	   discourse	   and,	   while	   maintaining	   a	   near	   monopoly	   of	   the	  
Russophone	  vote,	  is	  starting	  to	  attract	  the	  votes	  of	  ethnically	  progressive	  and	  left-­‐leaning	  ethnic	  
Latvians	   (Dudzińska,	   2011,	   p.	   97).	   These	   different	   trajectories	   inform	   the	   Centre	   Party’s	   and	  
Harmony	  Centre’s	  incentives	  in	  dealing	  with	  minority	  issues.	  
For	  the	  Centre	  Party	  in	  general	  and	  for	  Savisaar	  in	  particular	  keeping	  control	  of	  Tallinn	  is	  
fundamental	   to	  maintaining	   a	   level	   of	   bargaining	   (and	   personal)	   power	   in	   the	   Estonian	   party	  
system.	  This	  control	  depends	   largely	  on	  the	  Russophone	  community,	  not	   least	  because	  almost	  
20%	  of	  Tallinn’s	  population	   is	  composed	  of	  citizens	  of	   the	  Russian	  Federation	  and	  Russophone	  
non-­‐citizens,	  who	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  only	  in	  local	  elections.	  Since	  the	  Centre	  Party	  is	  usually	  
not	   included	   in	   government,	   it	   has	   little	   chance	   to	   deliver	   on	   the	   promises	   made	   to	   their	  
Russian-­‐speaking	   electorate,	   and	   to	   significantly	   change	   the	   ethnic	   balance	   in	   the	   Estonian	  
legislation.	  Thus,	  the	  Centre	  Party	  has	  a	  clear	  incentive	  to	  use	  the	  ‘ethnic	  card’	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  
the	  Russophone	  electorate	   faithful	   and	  dependent.	   In	   the	  words	  of	   Estonian	  political	   scientist	  
Vello	  Pettai:	  	  
[The	  Centre	  Party]	  are	  left	  with	  working	  at	  the	  Tallinn	  level,	  including	  education,	  that	  is	  
something	  that	  is	  tangible	  and	  they	  can	  try	  and	  fight	  for	  and	  see	  what	  it	  comes	  to.	  But	  
that	   is	  part	  of	   the	  point:	   they	  want	   to	  keep	   [the	  Russian-­‐speakers’]	   support	  and	  they	  
have	  a	  captive	  audience,	  too.	  (Interview	  with	  Vello	  Pettai,	  3	  May	  2013)	  	  
It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  dispute	  on	  the	  education	  reform	  closely	  followed	  
the	   timing	  of	  parliamentary	  and	  municipal	  elections	  and	  that,	   therefore,	   the	  heightened	  tones	  
over	   this	  policy	   can	  be	   seen	  as	   ‘part	  of	   the	  electoral	   cycle’	   (Interview	  with	  Raivo	  Vetik,	  7	  May	  
2013).	   Indeed,	   the	   dispute	   over	   Russian-­‐language	   schools	  may	   bring	   electoral	   returns	   to	   both	  
the	  Centre	  Party	  –	  that	  can	  cast	  itself	  as	  the	  only	  defendant	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  interests	  –	  
and	  the	  nationalists,	  who	  can	  easily	  present	  Tallinn	  City’s	  highly	  visible	  Russophone	  personalities	  
to	  their	  electorate	  as	  the	  ‘Russian	  bogeyman’.	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Quite	  differently,	  control	  over	  Riga	  is	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Harmony	  Centre	  to	  show	  to	  the	  
Latvian	  electorate	  and	  to	  the	  moderate	  Latvian	  parties	  that	  Russian-­‐speakers	  can	  be	  trusted	   in	  
power.	  It	  is	  a	  chance	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  political	  maturity;	  to	  show	  their	  capacity	  to	  mediate	  
on	  ethnic	  issues	  and	  to	  govern	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  all,	   irrespective	  of	  ethnicity	  or	  mother	  tongue.	  
By	   promoting	   a	   non-­‐ethnic	   discourse	   in	   Riga	   and	   taking	   an	   openly	   pragmatic	   approach	   on	  
minority-­‐sensitive	  issues,	  Harmony	  Centre	  can	  attempt	  to	  ease	  its	  way	  into	  central	  government.	  
The	   attitude	   of	   Tallinn	   and	  Riga	   city	   governments	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   education	   reform,	  
therefore,	   is	   possibly	   more	   the	   function	   of	   the	   aspirations	   of	   the	   Centre	   Party	   and	   Harmony	  
Centre	  and	  of	  their	  position	  in	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  party	  systems	  than	  a	  reflection	  of	  their	  
level	  of	   responsiveness	   to	   the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  electorate.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	   that	  
these	   different	   representative	   dynamics	   have	   no	   bearing	   on	   the	   empowerment	   of	   the	  
Russophone	   minorities	   and	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   their	   voices	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   While	   party	  
trajectories	  provide	  a	   valid	  explanation	   for	   the	  different	  approaches	   taken	  by	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  
city	  governments,	  they	  have	  wider	  implications	  for	  minority	  representation.	  Namely,	  on	  whether	  
city-­‐level	   incorporation	   can	   be	   an	   alternative	   channel	   for	   minority	   representation	   and	  
empowerment	  or	  it	  is	  rather	  a	  palliative	  that	  ‘traps’	  minority	  voices	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  This	  will	  be	  
the	  topic	  of	  the	  next,	  concluding,	  section.	  
5.5 Conclusions:	  The	  two	  faces	  of	  city	  incorporation	  
The	  analysis	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  Riga	  and	  Tallinn	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  education	  reform	  showed	  
that	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  contentious	  state-­‐level	  policies	  creates	  room	  for	  city-­‐level	  policymakers	  to	  
enter	   the	   debate	   and	   either	   challenge	   or	   reinterpret	   the	   law	   during	   its	   implementation.	   This	  
confirms	  the	  importance	  of	  including	  local-­‐level	  implementation	  in	  the	  study	  of	  policymaking	  on	  
minority	  issues.	  	  
The	  comparison	  between	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  cases	  suggests	  two	  important,	  general	  
points.	  Firstly,	  contrary	  to	  widespread	  expectations	  (Diamond	  &	  Gunther,	  2001,	  p.	  24;	  Rabushka	  
&	  Shepsle,	  1972;	  Reilly,	   2006),	   ethnic	  party	   representatives	  are	  not	  necessarily	  more	  prone	   to	  
enter	  into	  conflict	  on	  minority-­‐sensitive	  policies	  than	  minority	  representatives	  from	  mainstream	  
or	  multi-­‐ethnic	  parties.	  While	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Centre	  Party	  opted	  for	  a	  conflictual	  strategy	  and	  
Harmony	  Centre	  opted	  for	  a	  consensual	  one	  does	  not	  prove	  that	  an	  ethnic	  party	  is	  always	  more	  
prone	  than	  a	  non-­‐ethnic,	  minority-­‐friendly	  one	  to	  choose	  accommodation	  over	  conflict,	   it	  does	  
suggest	   caution	   with	   sweeping	   generalisations	   about	   ethnic	   parties’	   propensity	   for	   conflict.	  
Secondly,	  the	  choice	  of	  strategy	  (conflictual	  or	  consensual)	  on	  minority-­‐sensitive	  issues	  does	  not	  
depend	   on	   whether	   a	   party	   is	   ethnic	   or	   not,	   but	   rather	   on	   the	   party’s	   position	   in	   the	   party	  
system.	   Different	   positions	   and	   expectations	   regarding	   future	   party	   system	   developments	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inform	  different	  incentives	  on	  whether	  to	  use	  the	  ‘ethnic	  card’	  or	  deploy	  a	  non-­‐ethnic,	  inclusive	  
language.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Tallinn	   and	   Riga,	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   and	   Centre	   Party’s	   divergent	  
trajectories	   in	   their	   countries’	   party	   systems	   determined	   the	   different	   incentives	   they	   had	   in	  
approaching	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  controversial	  education	  reform.	  
The	  implications	  of	  these	  party	  trajectories,	  however,	  go	  well	  beyond	  mere	  party	  politics.	  
Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  present	  us	  with	   two	  different	  models	  of	   the	   role	   that	   incorporation	   into	   city-­‐
level	  power	  structures	  can	  play	  for	  a	  minority	  that	  is	  routinely	  excluded	  from	  power	  at	  the	  state	  
level.	  Tallinn	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  minority	  incorporation	  into	  city	  government	  as	  a	  palliative,	  
or	  a	  ‘trap’	  –	  based	  on	  the	  implicit	  understanding	  that	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  can	  ‘have	  their	  share’	  
locally,	  but	  cannot	  hope	  to	  influence	  state	  policies.	  With	  no	  minority	  party	  in	  the	  political	  scene,	  
a	   generally	   demobilised	   minority	   community,	   and	   a	   small	   and	   dependent	   grassroots	   protest	  
movement,	   the	   heated	   local-­‐level	   debate	   about	   minority-­‐sensitive	   policies	   acquires	   a	   mostly	  
electoral	   significance.	   Tallinn’s	   conflict	   with	   the	   central	   government	   keeps	   minority	   voters	  
faithful	   to	  the	  Centre	  Party,	  which	   in	  exchange	  can	  provide	  career	  possibilities	   for	  Russophone	  
politicians	   and	   some	   recognition	   for	   the	   specific	   concerns	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority.	  
Although	   this	   is	   more	   than	   the	   other	   Estonian	   parties	   are	   able	   (and	   willing)	   to	   guarantee,	   it	  
resembles	  more	  a	  palliative	  than	  a	  channel	  for	  minority	  empowerment.	  The	  local	  level	  remains	  a	  
separate	   locus	   for	   minority	   representation	   and	   party	   politics,	   but	   does	   not	   provide	   direct	  
avenues	  towards	  state-­‐level	  influence.	  
As	  a	  non-­‐ethnic	  party	   in	  the	  Estonian	  highly	  ethnicised	  political	  environment,	   the	  Centre	  
Party	   has	   an	   ambiguous	   role	   as	   patron	   (rather	   than	   necessarily	   representative)	   of	   the	  
marginalised	   Russophone	   minority.	   Incorporating	   some	   visible	   Russophone	   personalities	   is	  
useful	  for	  the	  Centre	  Party’s	  electoral	  strategy,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  credible	  legitimising	  and	  
empowering	  avenue	  for	  the	  minority.	  Incorporation	  in	  city	  government	  and	  co-­‐optation	  into	  the	  
Centre	   Party	   can	  offer	   some	   limited	   gains	   to	   Tallinn’s	   Russian-­‐speakers,	   but	   it	   can	   also	   in	   fact	  
contribute	   to	   demobilise	   rather	   than	   empower	   the	   minority,	   functioning	   as	   a	   mechanism	   of	  
containment	   of	   minority	   voices.	   This	   form	   of	   patronage,	   from	   which	   some	   minority	   voices	  
emerge	  as	  part	  of	   the	  Centre	  Party’s	   strategy	   to	  keep	  power	   in	  Tallinn,	  does	  not	  promote	   the	  
recognition	   of	   minority	   voices	   as	   autonomous	   and	   legitimate	   participants	   in	   the	   country’s	  
democratic	  debate.	  
Conversely,	   Riga	   is	   an	   example	   of	   how	   city-­‐level	   representation	   can	   be	   an	   alternative	  
channel	  for	  minority	  empowerment.	  Incorporation	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  policy	  influence	  at	  the	  
implementation	  stage,	  through	  pragmatic	  problem	  solving	  and	  the	  exploitation	  of	  state	  policies’	  
ambiguities.	  More	   crucially,	   through	   its	   position	   of	   power	   in	   the	   capital	   city,	   Harmony	   Centre	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(and	   FHRUL	   in	   the	   2001–2005	   city	   government)	   is	   able	   to	   impose	   Russian-­‐speaking	  
representatives	  as	  necessary	  interlocutors	  for	  the	  majority	  elite.	  In	  a	  context	  of	  heated	  national	  
debate	  on	  minority	  issues,	  this	  can	  potentially	  normalise	  the	  presence	  of	  minority	  voices	  in	  the	  
Latvian	  political	   sphere.	  While	   there	   is	  no	  guarantee	   that	  minority	  presence	  directly	   translates	  
into	  actual	  policies	   (especially	  until	  Harmony	  Centre	   is	  kept	  out	  of	  government),	  ethnic	  party’s	  
city-­‐level	  power	  establishes	  Russophone	  voices	  in	  the	  Latvian	  political	  context	  as	  legitimate	  and	  
independent.	  	  
These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  minority	  incorporation	  into	  city-­‐level	  power	  structures	  is	  not	  a	  
sufficient	   indicator	   of	   minority	   political	   inclusion,	   as	   –	   under	   different	   conditions	   –	   it	   can	   be	  
either	   a	   channel	   for	   minority	   empowerment	   or	   a	   potentially	   disempowering	   palliative.	   The	  
analysis	  above	  reveals	  some	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  determine	  which	  one	  of	  these	  models	  is	  likely	  
to	  prevail.	  The	  minority’s	  mobilising	  capacity	  and	  its	  level	  of	  internal	  differentiation	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
defining	  the	  strength	  of	  its	  political	  voice.	  However,	  the	  kind	  of	  party	  (or	  parties)	  that	  represent	  
it	  seems	  to	  be	  decisive	  in	  determining	  whether	  minority	  presence	  in	  municipal	  power	  structures	  
can	  be	  a	   step	   towards	   further	  empowerment	  or	  a	  palliative	   (and	  potentially	  a	   ‘trap’).	   In	  other	  
words,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  minority	  incorporation	  in	  city-­‐level	  
power	  structures	  through	  a	  non-­‐ethnic	  party	  and	  minority	  representation	   in	  city	   institutions	  by	  
an	  ethnic	  party.	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The	  previous	  chapters	  focused	  on	  different	  formal	  channels	  for	  minority	  access	  to	  policymaking.	  
This	   and	   the	   next	   chapter	   look	   beyond	   formal	   political	   representation	   and	   party	   politics,	   to	  
assess	   the	  potential	   for	  minority	  voices	   to	  enter	   the	  policymaking	  process	   through	  alternative,	  
civil	  society	  channels.	  Discussions	  of	  civil	  society	  inclusion	  into	  the	  policymaking	  process	  usually	  
fall	   under	   the	  analytical	   bracket	  of	  participation,	   rather	   than	   representation.	  Participation	  and	  
representation	   are	   often	   understood	   as	   two	   distinct	   spheres	   of	   minority	   inclusion	   in	   the	  
democratic	   process,	   one	   pertaining	   to	   the	   civil	   society	   and	   the	   other	   to	   the	   ‘political	   society’,	  
that	  is,	  to	  official	  representative	  institutions	  (Foley	  &	  Edwards,	  1996,	  pp.	  37–38).	  The	  conceptual	  
boundary	   between	   participation	   and	   representation,	   however,	   is	   at	   best	   blurry,	   and	  minority	  
representation	   in	   state	   institutions	  has	  also	  been	  seen	  as	  an	   institutionalised	   form	  of	  minority	  
participation	  (Ghai,	  2003,	  p.	  12).	  	  
This	  thesis	  follows	  Foley	  and	  Edwards	  (1996)	  in	  rejecting	  apolitical	  understandings	  of	  the	  
‘civil	  society’	  that	  see	  it	  as	  clearly	  distinct	  from	  the	  ‘political	  society’.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  also	  rejects	  a	  
clear	  division	  between	  minority	  participation	  and	  minority	  representation	  as	  two	  distinct	   fields	  
of	  study.	  Applying	  such	  a	  distinction	  would	  artificially	  cut	  through	  processes	  that	  are	  intimately	  
interlinked	   and	   would	   risk	   depoliticising	   issues	   of	   participation.	   Indeed,	   according	   to	   Sarah	  
White,	   ‘participation	   is	   a	   political	   issue.	   There	   are	   always	   questions	   to	   be	   asked	   about	  who	   is	  
involved,	   how,	   and	   on	   whose	   terms’	   (1996,	   p.	   14).	   Civil	   society	   consultations	   and	   minority	  
grassroots	  activism	  –	  which	  fall	  in	  the	  grey	  area	  between	  political	  representation	  and	  civil	  society	  
participation	   –	   cannot	   be	   understood	   separately	   from	   parliamentary	   representation,	   the	  
lobbying	  of	  international	  organisations,	  and	  city-­‐level	  representation.	  They	  are	  all	  potential	  (and	  
interacting)	  channels	  for	  minority	  voices	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  debates	  and	  influence	  policy.	  
There	  is	  no	  clear	  hierarchy	  between	  these	  channels,	  and	  –	  taken	  together	  –	  they	  determine	  the	  
minority’s	   role	   in	   the	  democratic	  process.	   This	   chapter	  analyses	   institutionalised	  opportunities	  
for	   minority	   civil	   society	   participation	   in	   decision-­‐making,	   while	   the	   next	   will	   look	   at	   extra-­‐
institutional,	  grassroots	  initiatives	  and	  their	  potential	  to	  affect	  policies.	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6.1 Consultations	  and	  effective	  participation	  
The	   idea	   that	   minority	   participation	   in	   public	   life	   must	   be	   promoted	   and	  minorities	   must	   be	  
included	   in	   democratic	   processes	   has	   long	  been	   acknowledged	  by	   international	   institutions.108	  
For	   example,	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe’s	   Framework	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   National	  
Minorities	   poses	   minorities’	   ‘effective	   participation’	   as	   one	   of	   the	   central	   goals	   that	   its	  
signatories	   should	   strive	   for.	   This	   idea	   is	   inscribed	  within	   the	  widely	   agreed-­‐upon	   assumption	  
that	  an	  active	  civil	  society	  is	  good	  for	  democracy	  and	  that	  divided	  democracies	  should	  foster	  civil	  
society	   participation	   across	   ethnic	   boundaries	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   conflict	   and	   guarantee	  
democratic	   quality.109	   Although	   minority	   participation	   in	   a	   country's	   political	   life	   is	   widely	  
recognised	  as	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  democracy,	  however,	  there	  is	  no	  agreement	  –	  both	  in	  
academia	   and	   among	   policymakers	   –	   on	  what	   ‘effective	   participation’	   implies	   in	   practice	   and	  
what	  kind	  of	  activities	  fall	  under	  its	  definition	  (Ghai,	  2003,	  p.	  3).	  
The	  question	  arises,	  therefore,	  on	  how	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  institutionalised	  consultation	  
mechanisms	  guarantee	  effective	  participation	  to	  the	  minority.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  
members	   of	   the	   minority	   in	   consultative	   councils	   or	   other	   consultation	   mechanisms	   is	   not	  
enough.	  Sherry	  Arnstein	  argues	  that	  ‘citizen	  participation	  is	  a	  categorical	  term	  for	  citizen	  power’	  
(1969,	  p.	  216),	  and	  thus	  effective	  participation	  implies	  a	  power	  shift:	  those	  who	  were	  previously	  
excluded	   from	  decision-­‐making	  power	  are	  now	   included.	  Similarly,	  McGarry	  and	  Agarin	   (2014)	  
propose	  a	  useful	  distinction	  between	  participation	  as	  presence,	   as	  voice,	   and	  as	   influence.	  The	  
physical	  presence	  of	  minority	  members	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  is	  a	  necessary	  first	  step	  to	  
include	   the	   minority,	   but	   by	   itself	   does	   not	   signal	   empowerment.	   Voice	   occurs	   when	   the	  
participatory	  mechanisms	   also	   allow	   the	  minorities	   to	   independently	   and	   freely	   express	   their	  
needs	  and	  opinions,	  but	  this	  also	  gives	  no	  guarantees	  that	  minority	  voices	  will	  be	  heeded.	  Only	  
when	   participation	   comes	   with	   influence	   does	   the	   minority	   have	   ‘a	   degree	   of	   control	   over	  
institutions	  and	  policies	  which	  affect	  them’	  (McGarry	  &	  Agarin,	  2014,	  p.	  4).	  	  
Following	  this	  distinction,	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  institutionalised	  consultation	  mechanisms	  at	  
a	  minimum	  always	   guarantee	   the	  presence	   of	  minority	  members	   in	   the	  policymaking	  process.	  
Consultations	   are	   arguably	   also	   a	   vehicle	   for	   minority	   voice(s)	   to	   be	   expressed.	   The	   question	  
remains,	  however,	  of	  whether	  such	  mechanisms	  also	  guarantee	  actual	  minority	  influence	  on	  the	  
policymaking	  process.	  Therefore,	  as	   it	   is	   the	  case	   for	   formal	  minority	   representation,	  presence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  For	  a	  list	  of	  the	  international	  instruments	  that	  refer	  to	  minority	  participation	  see	  Yash	  Ghai	  (2003,	  pp.	  29–30).	  For	  a	  
review	   of	   the	   international	   standards	   that	   apply	   to	   minority	   participation,	   including	   the	   OSCE	   Lund	  
Recommendations,	  see	  Aidan	  McGarry	  and	  Timofey	  Agarin	  (2014,	  pp.	  1–2).	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  European	  norms	  
on	  the	  right	  to	  participation	  see	  also	  Will	  Kymlicka	  (2006).	  
109	   For	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   ‘civil	   society	   argument’	   and	   its	   relationship	   with	   democracy	   and	   democratisation	   see	  
Michael	  Foley	  and	  Bob	  Edwards	  (1996).	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(descriptive	  representation)	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  voice	  (substantive	  representation),	  and	  voice,	  in	  
turn,	   does	   not	   guarantee	   influence.	   Following	   this	   logic,	   consultation	   mechanisms	   can	   be	  
considered	   an	   effective	   channel	   for	   minority	   inclusion	   if	   they	   increase	   the	   minority’s	   policy	  
impact	  and,	  more	  generally,	   if	   they	  create	   the	  conditions	   for	  minority	  political	  empowerment.	  
Consultations	  guarantee	  policy	  impact	  when	  views	  from	  minority	  voices	  are	  included	  in	  the	  final	  
policy	  draft.	  They	  guarantee	  minority	  political	  empowerment	  when	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  are	  
not	   present	   as	  mere	   objects	   of	   policy	   but	   as	   fully	   legitimate	   participants	   in	   the	   policymaking	  
debate.	  
A	  range	  of	  mechanisms	  for	  consulting	  the	  minority	  during	  the	  policymaking	  process	  have	  
been	  implemented	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  The	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  Integration	  Programmes	  are	  
the	   best-­‐suited	   policy	   cases	   for	   analysing	   whether	   these	   mechanisms	   guaranteed	   effective	  
minority	  participation,	  as	  they	  are	  the	  policies	  in	  which	  minority	  consultations	  were	  used	  more	  
broadly	  and	  more	  consistently.	  Moreover,	  the	  Integration	  Programmes	  are	  mid-­‐period	  strategies	  
that	  must	   be	   periodically	   rewritten.	   The	   fact	   that	   policy	   drafting	   and	   consultations	   happened	  
more	   than	   once	   in	   both	   countries	   reduces	   the	   risk	   that	   contingent	   circumstances	   are	   to	   be	  
blamed	  (or	  credited)	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  certain	  consultation	  mechanism	  at	  a	  certain	  point	  
in	  time.	  
The	   promotion	   of	   minority	   participation	   is	   one	   of	   the	   main	   goals	   of	   the	   Integration	  
Programmes,	   and	   their	   drafting	   procedures	   explicitly	   envisage	   mechanisms	   for	   including	   the	  
minority	   in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  These	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  roughly	  grouped	   into	  three	  
types:	  background	  research,	  expert	  groups,	  and	  feedback.	  Firstly,	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  were	  
asked	   to	   take	   part	   in	   surveys,	   focus	   groups	   and	   other	   background	   research,	   which	   was	  
conducted	   by	   entrusted	   experts	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   collecting	   stakeholders’	   opinions.	   Secondly,	  
discussions	  on	  the	   integration	  policy	  were	  also	  held	  by	  expert	  groups	  that	  sometimes	   included	  
representatives	  from	  minority	  NGOs.	  And	  thirdly,	  the	  drafting	  procedure	  included	  occasions	  for	  
popular	  discussion	  and	  feedback.	  The	  latter	  were	  especially	  in	  the	  form	  of	  public	  presentations	  
of	  the	  Programmes’	  drafts,	  and	  –	  more	  importantly	  –	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  final	  draft	  in	  advance	  
to	  its	  approval	  in	  order	  to	  give	  time	  for	  any	  person	  to	  give	  feedback	  and	  suggest	  amendments.	  In	  
the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  briefly	  review	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  Integration	  
Programmes	   up	   to	   2014,	   and	   then	   discuss	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   participatory	  mechanisms	  
included	   in	   the	   programmes’	   drafting	   procedure	   offered	   the	  minority	   an	   effective	   channel	   to	  
influence	  the	  policymaking	  process.	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6.2 Drafting	  the	  Integration	  Programmes	  
Since	  the	  early	  2000s	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  have	  adopted	  Integration	  Programmes	  aimed	  at	  dealing	  
with	   issues	   concerning	   their	   large	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minorities.	   The	   Integration	   Programmes	  
detail	  the	  government’s	  mid-­‐to-­‐long-­‐term	  strategy	  for	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  minority,	  but	  have	  
no	   actual	   binding	   power	   over	   other	   policies.	   Governmental	   and	   international	   funds	   for	  
integration	  activities	  are	  distributed	  according	  to	  the	   Integration	  Programmes’	   implementation	  
strategy,	  which	   is	  broadly	  based	  on	   the	  Programmes’	  objectives.	  Notwithstanding	   their	   largely	  
declarative	  nature,	   the	  Programmes	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  catalysts	   for	   the	  debate	  about	   the	  desired	  
direction	  that	  minority	  integration	  should	  take	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  It	  is	  important,	  therefore,	  to	  
assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  is	  effectively	  included	  in	  this	  debate	  and	  can	  
have	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   final	   wording	   of	   the	   Programmes.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  
Integration	   Programmes	   offer	   a	   chance	   to	   investigate	   the	   process	   through	   which	   the	   official	  
understanding	  of	  the	  minority’s	  role	  in	  the	  wider	  society	  is	  defined,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
minority	  is	  included	  in	  it.	  
In	   both	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   pressures	   from	   international	   organisations	   were	   central	   in	  
pushing	  the	  government	  to	  draft	  comprehensive	  policy	  strategies	  for	  minority	  integration	  and	  to	  
create	  Integration	  Foundations	  that	  could	  gather	  and	  distribute	  governmental	  and	  international	  
funds	  (Golubeva,	  2010,	  p.	  35;	  Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  94).	  While	  this	  external	  drive	  is	  largely	  accountable	  
for	   the	   form	   these	   documents	   and	   the	   related	   Integration	   Foundations	   took,	   their	   content	   –	  
including	  the	  very	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘integration’	  –	  was	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  at	  the	  centre	  
of	   a	   heated	   domestic	   debate.	   In	   both	   cases,	   moreover,	   the	   Integration	   Programmes	   were	  
approved	   by	   the	   government,	   without	   parliamentary	   intervention.	   Formal	   minority	  
representation	  in	  parliament,	  therefore,	  played	  a	  marginal	  role	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  This	  
does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  Russian-­‐speakers	  were	  completely	  excluded,	  as	  the	  Programmes’	  
drafting	  procedure	  explicitly	  involved	  minority	  consultation	  mechanisms.	  
In	  Estonia	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  need	  for	  an	  integration	  framework	  was	  started	  within	  the	  
inter-­‐university	  research	  group	  Vera.	  The	  suggestions	  of	  the	  group	  –	  entirely	  composed	  of	  ethnic	  
Estonians	   (Agarin,	   2010,	   p.	   275)	   –	   were	   then	   taken	   up	   by	   the	   newly-­‐established	   post	   of	   the	  
Minister	  for	  Population	  Affairs,	  which	  proceeded	  to	  draft	  the	  framework	  programme	  Integration	  
in	  Estonian	  Society	  2000–2007	   (hereafter	   IPE2000).	  Although	   it	   formally	   included	  a	  measure	  of	  
popular	   consultations,	   the	   drafting	   process	   was	   mostly	   driven	   by	   the	   government	   with	   no	  
significant	   representation	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   community	   (Pettai	   &	   Hallik,	   2002,	   p.	   521).	  
Two	   prominent	   Russian-­‐speaking	   MPs	   from	   the	   Centre	   Party	   were	   initially	   included	   in	   the	  
IPE2000	  expert	   committee	  but	   they	   left	   it	   in	   protest,	   denouncing	   the	  ethnocentric	   framework	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the	  committee	  was	  expected	  to	  work	  within	  (Brosig,	  2008,	  p.	  6;	  Laitin,	  2003,	  p.	  203).	  The	  final	  
version	  of	  IPE2000	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  Estonian	  government	  on	  14	  March	  2000	  and	  was	  mainly	  
received	   with	   scepticism	   by	   both	   the	   ethnic	   Estonian	   and	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   parts	   of	   the	  
population	   (Hallik,	   Poleshchuk,	   &	   Semjonov,	   2006,	   p.	   58).	   A	   year	   later,	   the	   Integration	  
Foundation	  was	  created	  to	  coordinate	  the	  implementation	  of	  integration-­‐related	  projects.	  
IPE2000	   formally	   recognised	   integration	   as	   a	   two-­‐way	   process	   and	   identified	   its	   goal	   as	  
harmonising	   society	   while	   recognising	   diversity.	   It,	   however,	   proposed	   an	   Estonian	   model	   of	  
multiculturalism	  that	  was	  strongly	  based	  on	  Estonian	   language	  and	  culture	   (Brosig,	  2008,	  p.	  3;	  
Järve,	   2002,	   p.	   95).	   The	   Programme	   defines	   the	   Estonian	   version	   of	  multiculturalism	   as	   being	  
based	  on	   ‘the	  principles	  of	  cultural	  pluralism,	  a	  strong	  common	  core	  and	  the	  preservation	  and	  
development	   of	   the	   Estonian	   cultural	   domain’	   (IPE2000,	   p.	   5).	   Within	   this	   framework,	   the	  
Programme	   operates	   a	   conceptual	   separation	   between	   the	   public	   and	   the	   private	   spheres,	  
wherein	  minority	  cultures	  belong	  to	  the	  private	  domain	  while	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  understood	  as	  
ethnoculturally	   Estonian.	   The	   minority	   is,	   therefore,	   expected	   to	   integrate	   into	   the	   (ethnic)	  
Estonian	   public	   sphere	   while	   given	   the	   chance	   to	   preserve	   its	   cultural	   distinctiveness	   in	   the	  
private	  sphere.110	  	  
The	  largest	  section	  of	  IPE2000	  was	  dedicated	  to	  linguistic	  integration	  and	  about	  half	  of	  the	  
entire	  budget	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  linguistic	  section’s	  goals	  (Brosig,	  2008,	  pp.	  8–9;	  Kallas,	  2012,	  p.	  
134).	   Problems	   in	   the	   other	   two	   dimensions	   of	   integration	   covered	   in	   the	   Programme	   (socio-­‐
economic	  and	  political)	  were	  also	  generally	  understood	  as	  deriving	  primarily	  from	  the	  minority’s	  
lack	   of	   state	   language	   knowledge	   and	   poor	   understanding	   of	   ‘local	   culture’	   (IPE2000,	   p.	   18).	  
According	   to	   one	   reading,	   IPE2000’s	   focus	   on	   language	   as	   the	   main	   vehicle	   for	   integration	  
reflected	  the	  Estonian	  government’s	  agenda	  aimed	  at	  ‘[continuing]	  the	  previous	  citizenship	  and	  
language	  policies	   in	  order	  to	  control	  the	  access	  of	  non-­‐titular	  groups	  to	  political	  power’	   (Järve,	  
2002,	  p.	  106).	  Unconvinced	  by	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  Integration	  Programme,	  minority	  representatives	  
denounced	  it	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  assimilation	  rather	  than	  integration	  (Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  97).	  
A	   similar	   process	   took	   place	   in	   Latvia	   during	   roughly	   the	   same	   period.	   Following	  
international	   pressures,	   a	  working	   group	   for	   the	  development	  of	   a	   comprehensive	   integration	  
programme	  was	  created	   in	  March	  1998	  (Muižnieks	  &	  Rozenvalds,	  2012,	  p.	  208).	  As	   in	  Estonia,	  
the	  debate	  was	  driven	  by	   the	   (mostly	   ethnic	   Latvian)	   research	   community,	  which	  had	  warned	  
the	  Latvian	  political	  leadership	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  deep	  social	  divisions	  and	  was	  called	  in	  to	  help	  with	  
the	  drafting	  of	  an	  integration	  framework.	  A	  draft	  document	  was	  released	  for	  public	  discussion	  in	  
March	   1999,	   and	   reportedly	   about	   25,000	   people	   took	   part	   in	   public	   discussions	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  For	  similar	  readings	  of	  IPE2000	  see	  Priit	  Järve	  (2002),	  Malte	  Brosig	  (2008,	  p.	  7),	  and	  Timofey	  Agarin	  (2010,	  p.	  184).	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Programme,	  mostly	  organised	  by	  foreign	  NGOs	  and	   international	  organisations	  (Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  
97).	  	  
As	   in	   Estonia,	  minority	   representatives	  were	  neither	   satisfied	  with	   the	  process	   nor	  with	  
the	  document	   itself	   (Diačkova,	   2002,	   p.	   305).	  Notwithstanding	   the	   relatively	   large	   civil	   society	  
participation,	  discussions	  were	  based	  on	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  that	  had	  been	  decided	  by	  the	  
government	   and	   all	   the	   final	   decisions	   rested	   with	   government	   officials.	   Although	   minority	  
experts	   participated	   in	   the	   drafting	   process,	   their	   input	   was	   eventually	   neglected	   in	   the	   final	  
version	  of	  the	  document,	  the	  state	  programme	  Social	   Integration	  in	  Latvia	   (hereafter	  IPL2001).	  
For	  example,	   the	   formula	   ‘to	  establish	  a	   stable	  multicultural	  and	  multilingual	   society’	   that	  had	  
been	   agreed	   by	   the	   expert	   committee	  was	   changed	   into	   ‘to	   establish	   a	   stable	   society’	   in	   the	  
document	  adopted	  by	  the	  policymakers	  (Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  97).	  Similar	  to	  the	  Estonian	  document,	  
IPL2001	   put	  most	   of	   its	   stress	   on	   the	   state	   language,	   whose	   protection	   and	   promotion	   were	  
understood	  as	  the	  main	  bases	  for	  integration	  (Diačkova,	  2003,	  p.	  55).	  	  
Although,	   differently	   from	   IPE2000,	   IPL2001	   also	   included	   a	   long	   section	   on	   socio-­‐
economic	   integration,	   this	   identified	   as	   its	   main	   target	   group	   the	   (overwhelmingly	   ethnic	  
Latvian)	  impoverished	  rural	  population.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  this	  section	  was	  not	  a	  way	  to	  approach	  
minority	   integration	   from	   different	   points	   of	   view	   (beyond	   language-­‐learning),	   but	   rather	   an	  
attempt	   at	  widening	   the	   concept	   of	   integration	   beyond	   the	   Russophone	  minority,	   in	   order	   to	  
make	  it	  more	  palatable	  for	  a	  wider	  portion	  of	  society	  and	  of	  Latvia’s	  political	  forces	  (Muižnieks	  &	  
Rozenvalds,	  2012,	  p.	  209;	  Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  54;	  Rajevska,	  2010,	  pp.	  34–36;	  Silova,	  2006,	  p.	  89).	  
A	   broad	   definition	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   integration	   guaranteed	   enough	   support	   to	   pass	   an	  
Integration	   Programme	   that	   had	   been	   under	   discussion	   for	   over	   two	   years.	   Moreover,	   the	  
vagueness	  of	   the	   framework	  and	  the	   lack	  of	  a	  specific	   implementation	  plan	  meant	   that	  a	  very	  
wide	   range	   of	   activities	   could	   be	   placed	   under	   its	   umbrella.	   Subsequent	   Ministers	   for	   Social	  
Integration	  Affairs	   (entrusted	  with	   implementation)	   could	   therefore	   reinterpret	   their	   priorities	  
differently,	   de	   facto	   shifting	   the	   focus	   (and	   the	   funding)	   from	   minority	   integration	   to	   non-­‐
minority	   issues	   like	   the	   development	   of	   rural	   civil	   society	   organisations	   and	   support	   to	   the	  
Latvian	  diaspora	  (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  pp.	  55–56).	  
The	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  Integration	  Programmes	  were	  meant	  as	  mid-­‐term	  strategies	  and	  
both	  expired	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  The	  first	  Estonian	  Integration	  Programme	  expired	  in	  2007	  and	  a	  
new	   round	   of	   consultations	   and	   policy	   drafting	   started	   that	   year.	   Subsequent	   integration	  
monitoring	   reports	   (yearly	   scholarly	   publications	   that	   evaluate	   Estonia’s	   progress	   with	  
integration)	  had	  pointed	  to	  the	  IPE2000’s	  focus	  on	  language	  as	  a	  limitation	  and	  had	  reported	  on	  
the	   increasing	   socio-­‐economic	   gap	   between	   majority	   and	   minority	   communities	   as	   a	   major	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hindrance	   to	   integration	   (Hallik	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Pavelson	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  monitoring	   reports	   set	  
the	  ground	   for	   the	  drafting	  of	   the	  new	   Integration	  Programme,	   the	  State	   Integration	   Strategy	  
2008–2013	   (hereafter	   IPE2008),	   where	   it	   was	   agreed	   that	   more	   attention	   had	   to	   be	   paid	   to	  
socio-­‐economic	  integration	  (Kallas,	  2012,	  p.	  134).	  	  
The	  riots	  of	  April	  2007	  happened	  during	  the	   IPE2008	  drafting	  process	  and	   in	  many	  ways	  
influenced	  it.111	  After	  the	  Bronze	  Night,	  consultations	  with	  the	  major	  political	  parties	  and	  some	  
NGOs	  were	  held	  and	  it	  was	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  restart	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  Programme	  anew,	  
although	   at	   that	   point	   the	   new	   Programme	  was	   already	   at	   an	   advanced	   stage	   of	   preparation	  
(Lauristin,	  2008,	  p.	  6;	  Interview	  with	  integration	  experts,	  2013).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  April	  2007	  
events	   prompted	   a	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   integration	   policies	   had	   been	  
successful.	  The	  riots	  had	  come	  as	  a	  shock	  for	  a	  political	  elite	  that	  had	  up	  to	  that	  point	  tended	  to	  
see	   the	   Russophone	   minority	   as	   largely	   passive	   and	   quietly	   (if	   slowly)	   integrating	   into	   the	  
Estonian	  society	  (Ehala,	  2009).	  Suddenly	  the	  integration	  policy,	  which	  in	  the	  previous	  years	  had	  
slipped	   down	   in	   the	   government’s	   priorities,	   was	   back	   on	   top	   of	   the	   agenda	   (Brüggemann	  &	  
Kasekamp,	  2008,	  p.	  436;	  Heidmets,	  2008,	  p.	  47).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  the	  shock	  of	  the	  
Bronze	  Soldier	  crisis	  also	  determined	  a	  re-­‐securitisation	  of	  minority	   issues.	   It	  rekindled	  feelings	  
of	  existential	  threat	  and,	  with	  them,	  the	  centrality	  of	  identity	  politics	  within	  the	  ethnic	  Estonian	  
community	  (Lauristin	  &	  Vihalemm,	  2009,	  p.	  22).	  
After	   the	  Bronze	  Night,	  Russian-­‐speaking	  MPs	  had	  tried	   to	   re-­‐establish	  a	  central	   role	   for	  
the	   Riigikogu	   on	   integration	   matters,	   arguing	   that	   the	   parliament	   would	   have	   been	   the	  
institution	  best	  positioned	  to	  guarantee	  a	  broad	  and	  inclusive	  discussion	  on	  such	  a	  controversial	  
issue.	   Indeed,	   the	   previous	   Programme	   had	   not	   been	   discussed	   in	   parliament	   and	   its	  
implementation	   and	   monitoring	   were	   also	   out	   of	   the	   parliament’s	   control.	   Opposition	   MPs	  
proposed	   to	  establish	  a	  permanent	  parliamentary	   committee	  on	   integration	   issues	   that	  would	  
have	   been	   directly	   involved	   with	   the	   drafting	   of	   future	   Integration	   Programmes	   and,	   more	  
generally,	  would	  have	  been	  responsible	  for	  monitoring	  developments	  with	  minority	  integration	  
in	  Estonia.	  The	  proposal,	  however,	  was	  rejected	  (Riigikogu,	  14	  May,	  9	  October	  and	  10	  October	  
2007).	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  drafting	  of	  IPE2008,	  like	  that	  of	  the	  previous	  Programme,	  was	  headed	  by	  
the	  government.	  Focus	  groups	  and	  feasibility	  analyses	  were	  conducted	  and	  an	  expert	  group	  was	  
entrusted	  with	  overseeing	  the	  drafting	  process.	  The	  expert	  group	  was	  composed	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  
members	   –	   including	   representatives	   from	   minority	   NGOs	   and	   Russian-­‐speaking	   experts	   on	  
integration	  issues	  –	  and	  was	  supported	  by	  a	  seven-­‐member	  working	  group,	  which	  worked	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  The	  riots,	  known	  as	  the	  Bronze	  Night,	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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actual	   draft.	   Selected	   research	   organisations	   were	   contracted	   to	   conduct	   specific	   background	  
studies,	  and	  all	  the	  ministries	  were	  officially	  involved	  in	  the	  drafting	  process.	  The	  final	  draft	  was	  
then	   made	   public	   and	   opened	   to	   discussion,	   amendment	   proposals	   and	   feedback.	   Two	  
presentations	   were	   organised	   –	   one	   in	   Tallinn	   and	   one	   in	   north-­‐east	   Estonia	   –	   during	   which	  
participants	   could	   propose	   amendments.	   Finally,	   after	   consultations	   with	   the	   major	   political	  
parties,	  the	  government	  approved	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  Programme	  in	  August	  2008.112	  	  
Conceptually,	  the	  second	  Integration	  Programme	  dropped	  the	  stress	  on	  Estonian	  cultural	  
dominance	   and	   made	   more	   concessions	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   other	   cultures	   in	   the	   country.	  
However,	   it	   still	   understood	   the	   Estonian	   culture	   as	   hierarchically	   above	   minority	   cultures	  
(Agarin,	  2010,	  p.	  170ff.),	  and	  still	  defined	  the	  country’s	  public	  space	  as	  ethnoculturally	  Estonian.	  
Language	  was	  again	  the	  central	  preoccupation	  of	  the	  Programme	  and	  language	  teaching	  its	  main	  
direction	  of	  intervention.	  The	  main	  goal	  of	  IPE2008	  was	  defined	  as	  fostering	  ‘a	  culturally	  diverse	  
society	  with	  a	  strong	  Estonian	  state	  identity	  […],	  sharing	  common	  democratic	  values	  in	  which,	  in	  
the	   public	   sector,	   permanent	   residents	   communicate	   in	   Estonian’	   (IPE2008,	   p.	   3).	   IPE2008	  
recognised	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  persistent	  socio-­‐economic	  gap	  between	  majority	  and	  minority,	  as	  
suggested	  by	  the	  previous	  integration	  monitoring	  reports.	  Socio-­‐economic	  inequality,	  however,	  
was	   framed	   as	   primarily	   the	   result	   of	   the	   minority’s	   state	   language	   deficiencies,	   and	   the	  
Programme	   argued	   that	   ‘offering	   special	   assistance	   depending	   on	   ethnicity	   is	   not	   justified,	   as	  
that	  would	  promote	  ethnicity-­‐based	  stigmatisation’	  (IPE2008,	  p.	  23).	  In	  essence,	  the	  recognition	  
of	   a	   worrying	   socio-­‐economic	   minority–majority	   gap	   did	   not	   result	   in	   a	   different	   policy	   of	  
integration.	  
In	  Latvia,	  disagreements	  between	  parties	  meant	  that	  three	  successive	  attempts	  at	  drafting	  
a	   new	   framework	   for	   integration	   failed	   and	   no	   new	   programme	   was	   approved	   for	   over	   ten	  
years.	  The	  first	  attempt	  at	  writing	  a	  new	  programme	  was	  undertaken	  in	  2007	  by	  a	  working	  group	  
that	   included	  minority	   representatives	   and	  NGOs.	   The	   resulting	   draft	  was	   soon	   dropped	   after	  
the	  Minister	  of	  Culture	  objected	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  multiculturalism	  in	  the	  document	  
(Muižnieks	  &	  Rozenvalds,	  2012,	  p.	  216).	  The	  campaign	  against	  multiculturalism	  launched	  by	  the	  
Latvian-­‐language	  newspaper	  Latvijas	  Avīze	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  key	  in	  mobilising	  the	  Minister	  
and	  a	  number	  of	  conservative	  MPs	  against	  multiculturalist	   ideas	  and	  thus	   in	  aborting	  the	  2007	  
draft	  (Golubeva,	  2010,	  p.	  61;	  Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  57).	  	  
Other	   two	   drafts	  were	   shelved	   between	   2007	   and	   2010,	  which	   contained	   a	  more	   open	  
understanding	  of	  the	  Latvian	  society	  than	  the	  one	  that	  was	  eventually	  approved	  in	  October	  2011	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




(Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  58).	  These	  drafts	  all	  fell	  victim	  to	  lack	  of	  political	  consensus	  about	  the	  very	  
essence	   of	   integration	   and,	   concurrently,	   to	   the	   budget	   cuts	   with	   which	   the	   government	  
responded	  to	  the	  economic	  crisis	  that	  severely	  hit	  Latvia	  in	  2008.	  The	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  Special	  
Assignments	   Minister	   for	   Social	   Integration	   Affairs	   –	   created	   in	   2002	   to	   coordinate	   the	  
integration	  policy	  –	  was	  the	  first	  to	  succumb	  to	  the	  cuts	  (Muižnieks	  &	  Rozenvalds,	  2012,	  p.	  212).	  
Its	  functions	  were	  absorbed	  by	  the	  Ministry	  for	  Children,	  Families	  and	  Social	  Integration	  Affairs.	  
Later,	   when	   that	   ministry	   was	   also	   disbanded,	   they	   were	   transferred	   first	   to	   the	   Ministry	   of	  
Justice	  and	  then,	  since	  2010,	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Culture.	  This	  reallocation	  of	  responsibilities	  was	  
accompanied	  by	  considerable	  budget	  and	  staff	   cuts	   (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  58).	  Among	   the	   tasks	  
that	  were	  reallocated	  during	  these	  repeated	  transfers	  of	  responsibilities	  was	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  
new	  Integration	  Programme.	  This	  contributed	  to	  the	  delays	  and	  reduced	  the	  transparency	  of	  the	  
drafting	  process.	  
The	  new	  Guidelines	  on	  National	  Identity,	  Civic	  Participation	  and	  Society	  Integration	  Policy	  
2012–2018	   (hereafter	   IPL2012)	   were	   finally	   approved	   at	   the	   end	   of	   2011.	   This	   followed	   a	  
drafting	  process	   that	  had	  been	  guided	  by	   the	   then	  Minister	  of	  Culture	   Sarmīte	  Ēlerte	  and	  had	  
seen	  the	  formal	  involvement	  of	  an	  advisory	  council	  of	  experts	  and	  a	  month	  of	  public	  discussions	  
and	   consultations.	   The	   document	   prepared	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Culture	  was	   very	   controversial.	  
Breaking	   away	   from	   IPL2001’s	   vocabulary	   of	   civic	   nationalism	   and	   decidedly	   rejecting	   the	  
vocabulary	   of	   multiculturalism,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Culture	   opted	   for	   a	   strong	   ethnonationalist	  
language,	  introducing	  terms	  like	  ‘nation	  state’	  and	  ‘constituent	  nation’,	  and	  using	  the	  expression	  
‘long-­‐term	  immigrants’	  to	  refer	  to	  Latvia’s	  non-­‐citizens.	  Ēlerte	  and	  her	  team	  were	  widely	  seen	  as	  
having	   unilaterally	   defined	   the	   content	   and	   terminology	   of	   the	   new	   Programme,	   and	   IPL2012	  
was	   harshly	   criticised	   both	   by	   the	   Latvian	   liberal	   elite	   and	   by	   representatives	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐
speaking	  community.113	  On	  27	  September	  2011	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Non-­‐Governmental	  
Organisations	   of	   Latvia	   approved	   a	   resolution	   to	   reject	   IPL2012	   and	   to	   offer	   its	   help	   to	   the	  
Ministry	   of	   Culture	   to	   draft	   a	   new,	  more	   inclusive	   programme.114	  Objections	   and	   amendment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  The	  Russophone	  MP	  Boriss	  Cilevičs	   referred	   to	   IPL2012	  as	   ‘Ēlerte’s	  programme’	  and	  criticised	   it	   for	  expressing	  a	  
Stalinist	  understating	  of	  ethnic	  questions	  while	  repackaging	  it	  with	  some	  ‘European’	  language,	  in	  ‘Novaia	  programma	  
integratsii:	   zavetam	  Stalina	   verny?’	   (The	  new	   Integration	  Programme:	   faithful	   to	   Stalin’s	   legacy?),	  Delfi.lv,	   13	  April	  
2011.	   Available	   at:	   http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/versions/boris-­‐cilevich-­‐novaya-­‐programma-­‐integracii-­‐zavetam-­‐
stalina-­‐verny.d?id=37989171	   (Last	  accessed	  29	  May	  2014).	  The	  political	   researcher	  and	  commentator	   Iveta	  Kažoka	  
talked	   of	   the	   document	   as	   a	   ‘monument	   to	   the	   Nineteenth	   century’	   in	   her	   article	   ‘Alternatīvā	   integrācija’	   (The	  
alternative	  integration),	  politika.lv,	  29	  March	  2011.	  Available	  at:	  http://politika.lv/article/alternativa-­‐integracija	  (Last	  
accessed	  29	  May	  2014).	  Her	  words	  were	  echoed	  by	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe’s	  Commissioner	   for	  Human	  Rights	  Nils	  
Muižnieks	   in	   his	   interview	   with	   Didzis	   Melbiksis	   and	   Dita	   Arāja,	   politika.lv,	   1	   February	   2012.	   Available	   at:	  
http://politika.lv/article/prognozejams-­‐un-­‐vel-­‐profesionalis	  (Last	  accessed	  29	  May	  2014).	  
114	   ‘Latvia:	   The	   program	  of	   “integration”	   is	   insulting	   and	   unacceptable	   for	   all	   national	  minorities’,	  Baltic	   Review,	   23	  
November	   2011.	   Available	   at:	   http://baltic-­‐review.com/2011/11/latvia-­‐the-­‐program-­‐of-­‐“integration”-­‐is-­‐insulting-­‐
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proposals	  coming	   from	  experts,	  minority	  and	  human	  rights	  NGOs,	  and	  some	  state	   institutions,	  
however,	  were	  largely	  ignored	  and	  did	  not	  bring	  to	  any	  change	  to	  the	  policy	  (LCHR,	  2013,	  p.	  16).	  
After	  the	  programme	  was	  passed,	  the	  popularly	  initiated	  2012	  referendum	  on	  Russian	  as	  a	  
second	  state	  language	  took	  place.	  The	  referendum	  revived	  popular	  and	  political	  attention	  to	  the	  
integration	  process,	   serving	  as	  a	   ‘shocking’	  event	   similar	   to	   the	  Bronze	  Soldier	  crisis	   in	  Estonia	  
(Interview	  with	  Latvian	  integration	  expert,	  2013).	  As	  in	  Estonia,	  increased	  attention	  to	  issues	  of	  
minority	   integration	   came	   together	   with	   a	   re-­‐securitisation	   of	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   Russian-­‐
speaking	   minority.	   In	   particular,	   the	   2012	   referendum	   was	   seen	   as	   proof	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐
speakers’	   disloyalty	   to	   the	   Latvian	   state.115	   Although	   the	   renewed	   attention	   to	   minority	  
integration	   issues	  meant	   that	   the	  government	  made	  extra	   funding	  available	   to	   the	   Integration	  
Foundation,	   the	   planned	   activities	   were	   mainly	   focused	   on	   Latvian	   language	   training,	  
strengthening	   of	   Latvian	   culture,	   and	   reconnecting	   with	   the	   ethnic	   Latvian	   diaspora	   (Latvian	  
Centre	   for	  Human	  Rights,	  2013,	  pp.	  17–18;	   Interview	  with	   integration	   implementer,	  2013).	  No	  
significant	  policy	  change,	  thus,	  resulted	  from	  these	  events.	  
While	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  IPL2011	  is	  the	  last	  Integration	  Programme	  for	  Latvia,	  Estonia	  
started	  a	  new	   round	  of	  drafting	   in	  2012.	  The	  new	  drafting	  process	   took	  place	  after	   the	  global	  
economic	   crisis	   had	  hit	   Estonia	  hard,	  with	   significant	   effects	  on	   the	   integration	  policy	   and	   the	  
resources	  devoted	  to	  it.	  In	  particular,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Latvia,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  institutions	  to	  
fall	   victim	   to	   the	   budget	   cuts	   was	   the	   post	   and	   office	   of	   the	  Minister	   for	   Population	   Affairs,	  
entrusted	  with	  overseeing	  the	  integration	  process.	  The	  official	  explanation	  that	  the	  ministry	  had	  
to	  be	  disbanded	  for	  budget	  reasons	  was	  taken	  critically	  by	  experts	  (Vetik,	  2010,	  p.	  46),	  and	  it	  was	  
seen	  as	  having	  strong	  symbolic	  connotations	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  policies	  the	  government	  judged	  
necessary	   and	   which	   superfluous	   (Kallas,	   2012,	   p.	   127).	   The	   ministry’s	   competencies	   were	  
redistributed	   to	   other	   ministries,	   and	   were	   mostly	   absorbed	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Culture’s	  
Department	   of	   Diversity.	   This	   ministry	   led	   the	   effort	   for	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   new	   Integration	  
Programme.	  
With	  the	  Bronze	  Night	  events	  safely	   in	  the	  past,	  the	  political	   interest	   in	  the	  drafting	  of	  a	  
new	   Programme	  was	   rather	   low.	   In	   the	  words	   of	   one	   of	   the	   experts	   involved	   in	   the	   drafting	  
process:	  ‘The	  attention	  level	  is	  back	  to	  non-­‐existent	  again.	  It	  kind	  of	  feels	  that	  we	  are…	  that	  it’s	  a	  
group	   of	   fans	   of	   this	   topic	   drafting	   the	   strategy’	   (Interview	   with	   integration	   expert,	   2013).	  
Notwithstanding	  this,	  expert	  groups	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  drafting,	  and	  several	  focus	  groups	  with	  
non-­‐citizens	   and	   third-­‐country	   nationals	   were	   held,	   in	   one	   of	   the	   most	   ambitious	   outreach	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and-­‐unacceptable-­‐for-­‐all-­‐national-­‐minorities/	  (Last	  accessed	  29	  May	  2014).	  
115	  The	  2012	  referendum	  and	  the	  reactions	  it	  elicited	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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attempts	   in	   either	   Estonia	   or	   Latvia.	   A	   preliminary	   draft	   of	   the	   new	   Integration	   Programme,	  
Integrating	   Estonia	   2020	   (hereafter	   IPE2014),	   was	   eventually	   approved	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	  
Culture	  and	  released	  for	  public	  feedback	  and	  amendment	  proposals	  on	  30	  April	  2014.	  	  
Similar	  to	  the	  previous	  documents,	  the	  draft	  of	  IPE2014	  that	  is	  being	  discussed	  at	  the	  time	  
of	  writing	  starts	  from	  an	  ethnocentric	  understanding	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  integration.	  It	  sets	  as	  its	  
main	   ‘future-­‐oriented’	   goal	   ‘[to]	   ensure	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   Estonian	   nation	   and	   culture’	  
(IPE2014,	   p.18).	   Moreover,	   like	   the	   last	   Latvian	   Integration	   Programme,	   IPE2014	   involves	   a	  
notable	   shift	   from	   the	   vocabulary	   of	   minority	   protection	   to	   that	   of	   dealing	   with	   immigrant	  
settlers.	  In	  the	  text,	  the	  category	  of	  ‘residents	  with	  foreign	  background’	  is	  understood	  as	  distinct	  
from	  ‘minorities’	  and	  the	  word	  ‘minority’	   is	  not	  explicitly	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  
population.	  Although	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  step	  forward	  from	  the	   initial	  2012	  draft	  that	  talked	  
about	  ‘residents	  with	  immigrant	  background’	  (emphasis	  added),	  it	  is	  still	  a	  considerable	  linguistic	  
step	   back	   from	   the	   wording	   of	   previous	   integration	   documents,	   which	   talked	   mostly	   about	  
integrating	  an	  ‘ethnic	  minority’.116	  	  
6.3 The	  consultative	  mechanisms	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  pressures	  from	  international	  bodies	  were	  key	  in	  pushing	  the	  Estonian	  and	  
Latvian	   governments	   to	   approve	   integration	   strategies,	   create	   Integration	   Foundations,	   and	  
regularly	  monitor	   the	   progress	  with	  minority	   integration	   in	   their	   societies	   (Brosig,	   2008,	   p.	   5;	  
Golubeva,	  2010,	  p.	  35;	  Järve,	  2002,	  p.	  94).	  Both	  countries	  were	  on	  route	  to	  joining	  the	  EU	  and	  in	  
both	   cases	   there	   were	   pressures	   to	   address	   ethnolinguistic	   divisions	   as	   part	   of	   the	   accession	  
process	   (Kallas,	   2012,	   p.	   130).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Integration	   Programmes	   had	   a	   double	   export-­‐
oriented	   and	   domestic-­‐oriented	   nature.	   While	   pressures	   from	   the	   international	   community	  
constituted	   the	  main	  drive	  behind	   the	  decision	   to	  write	   comprehensive	   integration	   strategies,	  
domestic	  debates	  shaped	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  the	  Programmes,	  and	  party	  politics	  and	  coalition	  
agreements	  determined	  who	  was	  made	  responsible	  for	  their	  drafting	  and	  implementation.	  	  
Traumatic	   domestic	   events	   (the	   Bronze	   Soldier	   crisis	   in	   Estonia	   and	   the	   language	  
referendum	   in	   Latvia)	   also	   had	   the	   (time-­‐limited)	   effect	   of	   pushing	   integration	   up	   the	  
governments’	  agenda.	  However,	  when	  both	  international	  and	  domestic	  incentives	  were	  lacking,	  
little	   political	   attention	   was	   devoted	   to	   the	   drafting	   of	   a	   document	   that	   has	   no	   immediate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Disagreements	  within	  the	  governing	  coalition	  about	  the	  new	  draft	  meant	  that	  no	  final	  version	  of	  IPE2014	  has	  been	  
approved	  at	   the	  time	  of	  writing.	   In	  particular,	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  –	   led	  by	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  member	  of	  
SDE	  Jevgeni	  Ossinovski	  –	  rejected	  the	  draft,	  not	  least	  for	  its	  disproportionate	  focus	  on	  new	  immigrants	  (a	  relatively	  
minor	  issue	  in	  Estonia).	  This	  brought	  the	  drafting	  procedure	  to	  a	  stall,	  as	  all	  ministries	  must	  agree	  on	  the	  Programme	  
and	  cooperate	   in	   its	   implementation.	   It	   is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  solution	  will	  be	  found	  before	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  




bearing	   (if	   not	   symbolic)	   over	   actual	   legislation.	   The	   double	   export-­‐oriented	   and	   domestic-­‐
oriented	   nature	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   resulted	   in	   conceptual	   inconsistencies.	   The	  
documents	   resulting	   from	   this	   tension	   tend	   to	   pay	   lip-­‐service	   to	   international	   organisations’	  
understandings	   of	   integration	   and	   minority	   rights,	   while	   retaining	   a	   strong	   ethnocentric	  
conception	  of	  the	  state	  (Agarin,	  2010,	  p.	  184;	  Hallik	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  p.	  8;	  Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  64).	  	  
This	   same	   contradictory	  nature	  was	   reflected	   in	   the	  drafting	  process.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  
the	  drafting	  process	  was	  strictly	  under	  governmental	  control.	  The	  Integration	  Programmes	  were	  
discussed,	   decided	   and	   approved	   by	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   governments	   and	  were	   seldom	  
even	  mentioned	   in	  parliament.	  This,	   given	   the	  consistent	  exclusion	  of	  Russophone	  parties	  and	  
Russian-­‐speaking	  representatives	  from	  government,	  meant	  that	  a	  major	  arena	  for	  discussing	  and	  
influencing	  the	  integration	  framework	  was	  closed	  to	  the	  minority.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  
other	  forms	  of	  minority	  participation	  were	  envisioned	  in	  the	  drafting	  procedure,	  which	  at	  least	  
on	   paper	   fulfilled	   the	   principle	   of	   stakeholders’	   participation	   as	   prescribed	   by	   international	  
recommendations.	  
The	   inclusion	  of	  minority	  opinions	   through	  surveys	  and	   focus	  groups,	  and	   the	  possibility	  
for	   the	  minority	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  drafting	  process	   through	  public	  discussions	  and	   feedback	  
mechanisms	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   effective	   substitute	   for	   political	   representation	   in	   decision-­‐
making	   bodies.	   This	   possibility	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe’s	   Handbook	   on	   Minority	  
Consultative	   Mechanisms,	   which	   states	   that	   ‘minority	   consultation	   becomes	   particularly	  
important	  where	  minorities	  are	  not	  directly	   represented	  at	  points	  of	  political	  decision-­‐making’	  
(Council	  of	  Europe,	  2006,	  p.	  9).	  The	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  policymakers	  and	   integration	  experts	  
followed	   this	   rationale	   and	   presented	   the	   needs	   and	   feasibility	   studies	   and	   the	   feedback	  
mechanisms	   included	   in	   the	   Programmes’	   drafting	   procedure	   as	   a	   way	   of	   ‘empowering	   the	  
target	  groups’	  (Lauristin	  &	  Vihalemm,	  2008,	  p.	  16).	  The	  question	  remains,	  however,	  of	  whether	  
this	  empowering	  potential	  was	  actualised	  in	  practice.	  
The	  mechanisms	  for	  minority	  inclusion	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  Integration	  Programmes	  can	  
be	   roughly	   divided	   into	   three	   types:	   inclusion	   in	   expert	   and	   working	   groups;	   surveys	   and	  
feasibility	   studies;	   and	   occasions	   for	   direct	   feedback	   and	   input.	   These	   three	   mechanisms	   for	  
minority	   inclusion	   afford	   a	   different	   potential	   for	   the	   minority’s	   effective	   participation	   in	  
decision-­‐making	   and	  were	   implemented	   to	   a	   different	   extent	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   For	   these	  
reasons,	   and	   although	   there	   is	   admittedly	   a	   measure	   of	   overlap	   between	   them,	   these	   three	  
types	  of	  participatory	  mechanisms	  will	  be	  looked	  at	  separately	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section.	  
Several	  studies	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  consultative	  bodies	  that	  have	  been	  
instituted	   at	   different	   times	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   to	   professedly	   include	   the	   Russophone	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minority	   in	   decision-­‐making	   on	   policies	   that	   concerned	   it	   directly.	   Permanent	   and	   ad	   hoc	  
consultative	   bodies	   were	   established	   since	   the	   very	   first	   years	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	  
democracies.	   These	   include	   the	   Estonian	   Presidential	   Roundtable	   on	   National	   Minorities	  
(created	  in	  1993	  and	  de	  facto	  discontinued	  since	  the	  early	  2000s),	  the	  Nationalities	  Consultative	  
Council	  of	  the	  President	  of	  Latvia	  (created	  in	  1996	  but	  rarely	  convened	  after	  1999),	  the	  Latvian	  
Advisory	   Board	   on	   Minority	   Education	   Issues	   in	   Latvia	   (created	   in	   2001	   to	   help	   with	   the	  
education	  reform),	  and	  a	  number	  of	  smaller,	  policy-­‐specific	  advisory	  bodies	  (LCHR,	  2008,	  pp.	  43–
46;	  Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  54;	  Poleshchuk,	  2009;	  Silova,	  2006,	  pp.	  118–124).	  	  
The	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  consultative	  bodies	   in	  granting	  Russian-­‐speakers	  actual	  access	  
to	  decision-­‐making	  has	  been	  widely	  questioned.	  In	  particular,	  scholars	  have	  highlighted	  the	  fact	  
that	  these	  consultative	  bodies	  are	  convened	  irregularly,	  have	  unclear	  tasks	  and	  procedures,	  and	  
lack	  decision-­‐making	  powers	  or	  any	  significant	  influence	  on	  the	  policy	  agenda	  (Agarin,	  2011,	  pp.	  
190–191;	  Kallas,	  2008,	  p.	  8;	  LCHR,	  2008,	  p.	  43;	  Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  117).	  Moreover,	  the	  methods	  
for	  selecting	  the	  advisory	  bodies’	  participants	  have	  been	  found	  to	  lack	  in	  transparency,	  and	  the	  
co-­‐optation	  of	  minority	  NGOs	  into	  these	  bodies	  has	  been	  often	  selective	  and	  dependent	  on	  their	  
docility	   (Agarin,	   2010,	   p.	   186ff.,	   2011;	   LCHR,	   2008;	   Rozenvalds,	   2007,	   p.	   16).	   Not	   even	   the	  
presence	  of	  critical	  elements	  in	  some	  of	  these	  bodies	  guaranteed	  effective	  participation.	  So,	  for	  
example,	  the	  Advisory	  Board	  on	  Minority	  Education	  Issues	  in	  Latvia	  did	  include	  representatives	  
from	  anti-­‐reform	  organisations	  but	  it	  was	  composed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  government	  could	  be	  
sure	  that	  any	  proposal	  contrary	  to	  its	  wish	  would	  be	  voted	  out	  (Rozenvalds,	  2005,	  p.	  107).	  
The	   limitations	   to	   effective	  minority	   inclusion	   observed	   for	   consultative	   bodies	   like	   the	  
presidential	   roundtables	   were	   for	   the	   most	   part	   replicated	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Integration	  
Programmes’	  expert	  committees	  and	  working	  groups.	  In	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
Russian-­‐speakers	   in	   the	   programmes’	   expert	   and	   working	   groups	   has	   been	   generally	   low,	  
participant	  selection	  procedures	  were	  not	  always	   transparent,	   the	  representativeness	  of	   those	  
who	   were	   invited	   to	   participate	   was	   sometimes	   dubious,	   and	   even	   when	   more	   significant	  
presence	   of	   minority	   members	   was	   guaranteed	   their	   engagement	   was	   expected	   to	   happen	  
within	   the	   framework	   established	   by	   the	  majority	   elite	   (Agarin	   &	   Brosig,	   2009,	   pp.	   226–227;	  
Brosig,	  2008,	  p.	  13;	  Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  53).	  	  
Several	  of	  the	  Russophone	  civil	  society	  activists	  I	  interviewed	  for	  this	  research	  pointed	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  policymakers	  tended	  to	  prefer	  participation	  of	  non-­‐political	  or	  compliant	  minority	  
representatives	   (what	   they	  often	  called	  karmannye	   russkie,	   ‘pocket	  Russians’,	   that	   is,	  Russians	  
that	   are	   ‘in	   the	   pocket’	   of	   the	   government)	   over	   more	   critical	   elements.117	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	   An	   illustration	   of	   this	   feeling	   was	   provided	   by	   Russophone	   activists	   in	   Latvia	   when	   they	   protested	   after	   the	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IPE2014,	   for	   instance,	  only	  one	  minority	  organisation	   is	   listed	   (in	   the	  December	  2014	  draft)	  as	  
part	   of	   the	   Programme’s	   steering	   group:	   the	   Ida-­‐Virumaa	   Integration	   Centre.118	   The	   Centre,	  
however,	  is	  hardly	  an	  independent	  representative	  of	  the	  Russophone	  community:	  its	  website	  is	  
only	  in	  Estonian,	  it	  mostly	  organised	  folk	  events	  and	  Integration	  Programme	  meetings	  funded	  by	  
the	  government,	  and	  its	  strategy	  for	  promoting	  minority	  integration	  repeats	  almost	  verbatim	  the	  
integration	  concept	  of	  the	  government’s	  integration	  programmes.119	  	  
Surveys,	  interviews	  with	  minority	  members,	  focus	  groups	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  background	  
research	  provide	  another	  route	  for	  minority	  inclusion	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  Research	  that	  
directly	   involves	  minority	   respondents	   is	  expected	   to	  give	  policymakers	  a	  picture	  of	   the	  needs	  
and	   opinions	   of	   the	  minority,	  which	   can	   then	   constitute	   the	   basis	   for	   drafting	   an	   appropriate	  
integration	  strategy.	  This	  is,	  however,	  a	  highly	  mediated	  form	  of	  participation,	  as	  minority	  input	  
is	   filtered	  at	  multiple	  points	   in	   the	  process:	   through	   the	   research	  design,	   through	   the	  analysis	  
made	   by	   the	   researchers	   (typically	   belonging	   to	   the	   ethnic	   majority),	   and	   finally	   through	   the	  
policymakers’	  decision	  on	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  research	  results.	  Most	  experts	  involved	  in	  the	  
programmes’	   background	   research	   admitted	   that	   they	  were	   not	   sure	   of	   how	   the	   government	  
was	  going	  to	  use	  the	  data	  produced	  in	  their	  studies,	  and	  that	  the	  final	  choice	  rested	  ultimately	  
with	   the	   governing	   parties	   (Interviews	   with	   minority	   experts,	   2013).	   Therefore,	   this	   filtered,	  
mediated	   form	  of	  minority	  participation	  hardly	   compensates	   for	   the	  near	   absence	  of	  minority	  
members	  in	  the	  core	  group	  of	  decision-­‐makers.	  	  
A	  third,	  more	  intensive,	  form	  of	  minority	  inclusion	  is	  provided	  by	  public	  discussions,	  public	  
consultations	  and	  the	  gathering	  of	  amendment	  suggestions.	  These	  inclusion	  methods	  potentially	  
allow	   for	   the	   minority	   to	   participate	   directly	   in	   the	   policymaking	   process	   by	   providing	   their	  
feedback	  and	  by	  suggesting	  amendments.	  Seen	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  direct	  democracy,	   this	  
form	   of	   direct	   participation	   might	   even	   be	   more	   legitimate	   and	   valuable	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	  
representation	  because	   it	   involves	   the	  stakeholders	  directly,	  without	   the	  mediation	  of	  political	  
parties	   or	   other	   representatives.	   In	   the	   practice	   of	   drafting	   the	   Integration	   Programmes	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
government	  had	  passed	   IPL2001	  with	  banners	   like	   ‘Whom	  do	  Kostenecka	   and	  Gavrilov	   represent?’,	   criticising	   the	  
lack	  of	  transparency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  government	  in	  selecting	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  who	  were	  invited	  to	  speak	  at	  a	  
conference	  about	  the	  Programme	  (BNS	  -­‐	  Baltic	  News	  Service,	  11	  May	  2001).	  
118	  This	  is	  an	  umbrella	  organisation,	  which	  includes	  twenty	  smaller	  minority	  NGOs.	  From	  an	  internet	  research	  on	  their	  
activities	  it	  appears	  that	  most	  of	  them	  are	  not	  very	  active,	  they	  are	  mostly	  dedicated	  to	  organising	  folk	  events	  and	  all	  
but	  two	  have	  the	  same	  contact	  person,	  who	  is	  also	  the	  chairman	  of	  Ida-­‐Virumaa	  Integration	  Centre.	  The	  list	  of	  the	  
member	   organisations	   can	   be	   found	   on	   the	   Centre’s	   website:	   http://integratsioonikeskus.ee/	   (Last	   accessed	   7	  
January	  2015).	  
119	   The	   Centre’s	   integration	   strategy	   can	   be	   found	   on	   its	   website,	   at:	  
http://integratsioonikeskus.ee/index.files/Page499.htm	  (Last	  accessed	  7	  January	  2015).	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Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  however,	   this	   form	  of	  participation	  has	  also	  been	  far	   from	  empowering	   for	  
the	  minority.	  	  
First	  of	  all,	  the	  Programmes	  were	  presented	  to	  the	  public	  towards	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  their	  
drafting;	   that	   is,	   when	   the	   documents’	   conceptual	   framework	   and	  most	   of	   their	   content	   had	  
already	  been	  decided.	  Even	  discounting	  those	  public	  discussions	  in	  which	  the	  policymakers	  were	  
simply	  presenting	  a	  practically	  finished	  document	  to	  the	  public,	  the	  room	  for	  actual	  debate	  and	  
negotiation	  on	  the	  core	   issues	  of	   integration	  was	  decidedly	   limited.	  Even	  when	  they	  were	  well	  
designed	  on	  paper,	  outreach	  efforts	  were	  often	  less	  than	  successful.	  For	  instance,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
2014	  –	  after	  eight	  months	  since	  its	  launch	  –	  the	  online	  feedback	  database	  for	  IPE2014	  features	  
only	   two	   comments	   from	  members	   of	   the	   public.120	   In	   addition	   to	   these	   deficiencies,	   popular	  
feedback	  and	  amendment	  suggestions	  –	  although	  on	  paper	  they	  guarantee	  a	  rather	  open	  access	  
to	   the	  policy	  process	  –	  can	  be	  affected	  by	   the	  same	  selection	  bias	   that	  has	  been	  observed	   for	  
other	  kinds	  of	  minority	  consultation	  mechanisms.	  
This	   point	   is	   best	   illustrated	   by	   what	   is	   arguably	   the	   most	   advanced	   form	   of	   minority	  
inclusion	   in	   the	  drafting	  process	  of	  an	   integration	  strategy,	   that	   is,	   the	  citizens’	  panels	  created	  
during	   the	   latest	   round	   of	   integration	   strategy	   drafting	   in	   Estonia	   in	   2013–2014.	   The	   citizens’	  
panels	  were	  composed	  of	  non-­‐citizens	  and	  third	  country	  nationals	  and	  were	  called	  to	  discuss	  the	  
strategy’s	  priorities	  and	  suggest	  possible	  solutions	  to	  existing	  problems.	  Panels	  were	  composed	  
of	  about	  30	  to	  40	  people	  selected	  randomly	  to	  guarantee	  a	  roughly	  representative	  sample.	  Each	  
panel	   autonomously	   selected	   a	   number	  of	   priority	   discussion	   topics	   from	  a	   list	   that	   had	  been	  
prepared	  in	  advance	  by	  experts	  based	  on	  opinion	  surveys.	  Divided	  in	  smaller	  groups,	  the	  panel	  
members	   discussed	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   problems	   faced	   by	   their	   group,	   and	   suggested	  ways	   of	  
approaching	  them	  in	  the	  Integration	  Programme.121	  According	  to	  a	  report	  on	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  
citizens’	  panels,	  this	  method	  ‘lets	  policy	  makers	  implement	  involvement	  processes	  from	  start	  to	  
finish:	   start	   by	   determining	   problems	   and	   attitudes,	   gather	   opinions	   and	   then	   move	   on	   to	  
working	  out	  solutions.	  All	  this	  is	  done	  alongside	  and	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  relevant	  people’	  (Uus	  &	  
Kaldur,	  2013,	  p.	  6).	  
To	  a	  closer	  analysis,	  however,	  also	  this	  mechanism	  of	  inclusion	  was	  at	  core	  tokenistic.	  First	  
of	  all,	  it	  also	  was	  a	  heavily	  mediated	  process,	  as	  non-­‐minority	  experts	  led	  the	  entire	  process	  and	  
then	   summarised	   the	   results	   in	   reports	   and	   recommendations	   to	   the	   policymakers.	   The	   same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  The	  three-­‐language	  (Estonian,	  Russian	  and	  English)	  website	  www.integratsioon.ee	  provides	  information	  about	  the	  
drafting	  procedure	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  send	  comments	  and	  feedback	  on	  the	  draft.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  
that,	  although	  comments	  and	  feedback	  to	  IPE2014	  can	  be	  sent	  in	  Estonian,	  Russian	  or	  English,	  the	  online	  feedback	  
system	  provides	  the	  Programme	  draft	  only	  in	  Estonian.	  No	  official	  translation	  of	  the	  draft	  into	  Russian	  is	  provided.	  
121	  For	  a	  thorough	  description	  of	  the	  Citizens’	  Panels	  organised	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Estonian	  IPE2014	  drafting	  see	  Maiu	  Uus	  
and	  Kristjan	  Kaldur	  (2013).	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multiple	   filtering	  observed	   for	  other,	   less	  participative	   forms	  of	   research,	   therefore,	  applied	  to	  
the	   case	   of	   the	   citizens’	   panels.	   Moreover,	   this	   mechanism	   allowed	   for	   the	   same	   selective	  
approach	   to	   feedback	   that	   has	   been	   noted	   in	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   other	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	  
Programmes	  (Agarin	  &	  Brosig,	  2009,	  pp.	  216–217).	  For	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  experts	  that	  led	  the	  
citizens’	  panels	  commented	  that	  	  
In	  Ida-­‐Virumaa,	  [panel	  participants	  were]	  definitely	  extremely	  radical	  and	  I	  don’t	  think	  
anybody	   will	   even	   consider	   discussing	   anything	   about	   Russian	   as	   a	   second	   state	  
language	  or	  reversing	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  Russian	  schools,	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  is	  going	  to	  be	  
considered	  (Interview	  with	  integration	  expert,	  2013).	  	  
The	   framework	  within	  which	  discussion	  on	   integration	   could	  be	  had	  was	   thus	  pre-­‐determined	  
and	   rather	   rigid.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   another	   expert	   involved	   in	   the	   drafting	   process,	   in	   the	  
Integration	   Programme’s	   mechanisms	   for	   minority	   participation	   ‘there	   are	   walls	   and	   ceilings	  
around	   you	   and	   you	   can	   use	   only	   that	   small	   bit	   of	   the	   feedback’	   (Interview	   with	   integration	  
expert,	  2013).	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	  even	  in	  cases	  when	  the	  experts	  involved	  in	  conducting	  the	  preliminary	  
phases	   of	   programme	   drafting	  would	   be	   inclined	   to	   accommodate	   the	   opinions	   expressed	   by	  
minority	   participants,	   they	   must	   mediate	   with	   the	   parties	   in	   government	   in	   order	   for	   those	  
opinions	   to	  be	   included	   in	   the	   integration	  strategy.	  One	  of	   the	  Estonian	  experts	  described	  this	  
work	  of	  ‘internal	  advocacy’	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  	  
Of	  course	  the	  backside	  that	  the	  public	  couldn’t	  see	  and	  we	  couldn’t	  let	  them	  see	  is	  how	  
to	  tell	  those	  changes	  to	  the	  political	  level.	  We	  had	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  politicians	  
a	   lot	  and	  explain	  and	  explain	  and	  explain	  why	  it’s	  smart	  and	  important	  to	  include	  the	  
feedback	   to	   the	   strategy	  and	  why	   it’s	   important	   to	  hear	  what	   the	  people	  are	   saying.	  
(Interview	  with	  integration	  expert,	  2013)	  
The	   issue	  of	   ‘internal	   advocacy’	   and	   the	  possibility	   of	   discrepancy	  between	   the	   experts’	  
suggestions	   and	   the	   policymakers’	   interests	   emerged	   also	   in	   the	   Latvian	   case.	   For	   instance,	   a	  
Latvian	   policymaker	   involved	   with	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   IPL2001,	   explained	   that	   some	   of	   the	  
suggestions	   coming	   from	   the	   integration	   experts	   were	   ‘too	   left	   wing’	   and	   so	   the	   parties	   in	  
government	   had	   to	   revise	   the	   Programme’s	   draft	   to	  make	   it	  more	   acceptable	   (Interview	  with	  
policymaker,	  2013).	  In	  any	  case,	  therefore,	  the	  parties	  in	  government	  had	  the	  last	  word	  on	  what	  
was	   included	   in	   the	   Integration	  Programmes,	   regardless	  of	   the	  extensiveness	  and	   inclusivity	  of	  
the	  consultation	  mechanisms.	  	  
Even	   in	   the	   Estonian	   case	   that	   included	   the	  most	   extensive	   form	   of	   outreach,	   IPE2014,	  
once	   again	   the	   minority’s	   input	   was	   mediated	   by	   the	   ethnic	   Estonian	   experts,	   and	   all	   the	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decisions	   about	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   within	   which	   the	   discussion	   could	   take	   place	   and	  
about	   what	   actually	   entered	   the	   proposed	   Integration	   Programme	   rested	   with	   those	   experts	  
and,	  ultimately,	  with	  the	  parties	  in	  government	  (Interview	  with	  integration	  experts,	  2013).	  In	  the	  
words	  of	  one	  of	  the	  experts	  involved	  in	  the	  drafting	  process	  of	  IPE2014:	  	  
There	  is	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  Estonian	  authorities,	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Culture,	  to	  invite	  as	  
many	  Russians	  as	  possible.	  But	  of	  course	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  much	  really	  they	  
are	  engaged,	  included	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making.	  They	  are	  invited	  to	  discussions,	  but	  it	  is	  
not	   clear	  how	   the	  decisions	  are	  made,	   they	  are	  not	  of	   course	   in	   this	   core	  where	   the	  
decisions	  are	  made	  […]	  There	  are	  different	  players,	  but	  of	  course	  I	  think	  that	  in	  the	  end	  
the	  coalition	  parties	  will	  just	  figure	  out	  what	  is	  good	  for	  them.	  And	  this	  brings	  me	  to	  my	  
point	  that	  we’re	  doing	  a	  senseless	  thing.	  Because	  the	  issue	  is	  so	  politicised,	  this	  is	  just	  
to	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  something	  is	  going	  on,	  that	  the	  public	  opinion	  is	   involved.	  
(Interview	  with	  integration	  expert,	  2013)	  
The	   three	   different	   mechanisms	   for	   minority	   inclusion	   implemented	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
Integration	  Programmes	  drafting	  procedure	  (even	  the	  most	  advanced	  ones),	  therefore,	  present	  
the	  same	  set	  of	  shortcomings,	  which	  closely	  resemble	  those	  that	  have	  been	  highlighted	  for	  other	  
forms	  of	  minority	  consultation.	  Inclusion	  through	  advisory	  bodies,	  surveys,	  focus	  groups,	  public	  
discussions	   and	   consultations	   did	   not	   compensate	   for	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	  minority	   from	   the	  
decision-­‐making	   core.	   These	   alternative	   inclusion	   mechanisms	   were	   heavily	   mediated	   by	   the	  
government	  in	  terms	  of	  who	  was	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  discussion,	  the	  framework	  within	  
which	  the	  discussion	  could	  take	  place,	  and	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  inputs	  and	  feedbacks	  that	  could	  
be	   included	   as	   useful	   and	   acceptable.	   This	   made	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   inclusion	   in	   the	   decision-­‐
making	  process	  at	  best	  mediated	  and	  often	  only	  formal	  and	  tokenistic,	  with	  no	  possibility	  to	  re-­‐
discuss	  or	   challenge	   the	   fundamental	   tenets	  of	   the	  government’s	   integration	  agenda.	  Russian-­‐
speakers	   were	   asked	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   process	   but	   strictly	   within	   the	   terms	   decided	   by	   the	  
majority	  elite,	  while	  no	  effective	  channel	  for	  minority	  impact	  on	  decision-­‐making	  was	  provided.	  
6.4 The	  gap	  between	  the	  principle	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  consultations	  
Minority	  participation,	  when	  intended	  in	  its	  more	  general	  meaning	  as	  mere	  presence,	  should	  not	  
be	  understood	  as	  a	  goal	  per	  se,	  but	  –	   if	  anything	  –	  as	  potentially	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  process	  of	  
inclusion	   (McGarry	   &	   Agarin,	   2014,	   p.	   16).	   Consultative	   mechanisms	   hold	   in	   principle	   the	  
potential	   to	  engender	   such	   inclusion.	   The	  analysis	  of	   the	   Integration	  Programmes’	  drafting,	   as	  
well	   as	   previous	   analyses	   of	   other	   advisory	   mechanisms	   like	   the	   presidential	   roundtables,	  
however,	  has	  shown	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  participation	  as	  applied	  in	  Estonia	  and	  
Latvia.	   When	   they	   participated	   in	   consultations,	   minorities	   were	   asked	   to	   validate	   the	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government’s	  agenda	  rather	  than	  to	  take	  actual	  part	  in	  the	  policymaking	  debate	  (Agarin,	  2011;	  
Kallas,	   2008,	   p.	   8;	   LCHR,	   2008,	   p.	   44;	  Muižnieks,	   2010,	   p.	   117;	   Poleshchuk,	   2009;	   Rozenvalds,	  
2007,	  p.	  16).	  That	  is,	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  be	  present	  but	  they	  were	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  influential.	  
The	   scarce	   effectiveness	   of	   consultative	   mechanisms	   in	   ensuring	   the	   minority’s	   impact	   over	  
policymaking,	   however,	   is	   only	   one	   aspect	   of	   the	   consultations’	   failure	   to	   ensure	   effective	  
minority	   participation.	   Seen	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   minority	   empowerment,	   in	   Estonia	   and	  
Latvia	   consultation	   mechanisms	   and	   advisory	   bodies	   were	   not	   only	   an	   insufficient	   form	   of	  
minority	  inclusion,	  but	  they	  actually	  reinforced	  exclusion.	  
Mechanisms	   for	  minority	  participation	   crystallised	  minority	  political	  exclusion	  by	   serving	  
as	   a	   legitimising	   device	   for	   policies	   that	   were	   in	   fact	   shaped	   and	   decided	   by	   ethnic	   majority	  
experts	   and	   politicians.	   Allowing	   for	   the	   tokenistic	   participation	   of	   the	   minority	   served	   the	  
purpose	   of	   legitimising	  what	  were	   in	   effect	  majority-­‐elite-­‐driven	   policies	   via	   the	   civil	   society’s	  
‘seal’.	   According	   to	   Arnstein’s	   typology	   of	   citizens	   participation,	   in	   tokenistic	   forms	   of	  
participation	   (which	   include	   informing	   and	   consultation)	   the	   stakeholders	   can	   ‘hear	   and	   be	  
heard’	  but	  this	  does	  not	  result	  in	  influence	  on	  decision-­‐making,	  which	  rests	  solidly	  in	  the	  hands	  
of	  the	  policymakers	  (1969,	  p.	  217).	  These	  forms	  of	  participation	  are	  ‘empty	  rituals’	  in	  which	  the	  
minority	   is	   asked	   to	   ‘participate	   in	   participation’	   (Arnstein,	   1969,	   p.	   219).	   It	   is	   ‘participation	  
without	   redistribution	   of	   power	   […that]	   allows	   the	   power-­‐holders	   to	   claim	   that	   all	   sides	  were	  
considered’	  while	  in	  fact	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo	  (Arnstein,	  1969,	  p.	  216).122	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  participation	   in	  consultation	  mechanisms	  did	  not	  open	  
effective	  avenues	   for	   the	  minority	   to	  enter	   the	  policymaking	  process.	   Instead	  –	   in	  a	  context	   in	  
which	  majority	  elites	  are	  unwilling	   to	  redefine	  the	  meanings	  of	   integration	  and	  the	  role	  of	   the	  
Russian-­‐speakers	   in	   society	   –	   the	   existence	   of	   consultations	   contributed	   in	   justifying	   the	  
exclusion	  of	  the	  minority	  from	  the	  political	   ‘control	  room’	  (what	  one	  of	  my	  respondents	  called	  
the	   ‘core’).	   This	   justification	   is	   directed	   both	   externally	   and	   internally.	   Externally,	  mechanisms	  
for	   (tokenistic)	   participation	   served	   as	   a	   box-­‐ticking	   exercise	   to	   satisfy	   international	  
organisations	   (and	   donors).	   Internally,	   the	   existence	   of	  mechanisms	   for	  minority	   participation	  
functioned	   as	   a	   way	   to	   delegitimise	   critiques.	   This	   was	   especially	   apparent	   in	   the	   discourse,	  
common	  among	  the	  policymakers	  I	  interviewed,	  according	  to	  which	  those	  who	  complain	  about	  
the	  Integration	  Programmes	  were	  given	  all	  the	  opportunities	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
process	  but	  were	  either	  too	  apathetic	  or	  too	  cynical	  to	  take	  them	  up.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	   Sarah	  White	  made	   the	   similar	   point	   that	   ‘[s]haring	   through	   participation	   does	   not	   necessarily	  mean	   sharing	   in	  
power’	  (1996,	  p.	  6).	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In	   addition	   to	   this,	   by	   bureaucratising	   and	   technicising	   minority	   involvement	   in	   the	  
decision-­‐making	   process,	   consultative	   mechanisms	   also	   responded	   to	   the	   majority	   elites’	  
inclination	  to	  depoliticise	  minority	  policies,	  that	  is,	  to	  present	  them	  as	  not	  politically	  contested.	  
Through	  the	  stress	  on	  expert	  opinion,	  on	  quantifiable	   indicators	  of	  minority	  needs	  (via	  surveys	  
and	  feasibility	  studies),	  and	  on	  finding	  solutions	  to	  discrete	  problems,	  consultation	  mechanisms	  
tended	   to	   turn	   the	   politically	   charged	   issue	   of	   integration	   into	   a	   technical	   one.	   Policymakers	  
tended	  to	  conceive	  of	  minority	  participation	  as	  a	  way	  for	  minority	  members	  to	  discuss	  solutions	  
to	  discrete	  problems	  within	  a	  given	  conceptual	  framework,	  rather	  than	  to	  participate	  in	  shaping	  
the	  framework	  itself.	  Therefore,	  while	   it	  could	  appear	  as	  a	  pragmatic,	  matter-­‐of-­‐fact	  approach,	  
the	   focus	  on	  solutions	  was	  consistent	  with	   the	  exclusion	  of	  minority	  voices	   from	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  core.	  As	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  were	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  policy	  process	  strictly	  
within	   the	   framework	   set	   by	   the	  majority	   elite,	   critical	  minority	   actors	   that	   complained	   about	  
the	  strictures	  of	   this	   framework	  were	  routinely	  dismissed	  as	   ‘politicised’,	   ‘only	  concerned	  with	  
politics’,	  and	  not	  interested	  in	  solving	  problems	  for	  the	  good	  of	  their	  community	  but	  in	  their	  own	  
political	  gain	  (Interviews	  with	  policymakers	  and	  integration	  experts,	  2013).	  
Depoliticisation	   as	   a	   mechanism	   of	   exclusion	   could	   be	   observed	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  
Integration	  Programmes,	  but	  also	  emerged	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  other	  sensitive	  minority	  policies.	  
For	  example,	  a	  policymaker	  within	  the	  Estonian	  General	  Education	  Department	  at	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   Education	   used	   the	   same	   depoliticising	   (and,	   thus,	   delegitimising)	   discourse	  with	   regard	   to	  
minority	   opposition	   to	   the	   education	   reform.	   The	   high-­‐ranking	   official	   claimed	   that	   a	  
compromise	  on	  the	  education	  policy	  was	  highly	  unlikely	  because	  	  
‘[the	  anti-­‐reform	  opposition’s]	  political	  games	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  pedagogical	  
process	  [….]	  all	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  speak	  their	  mind	  in	  seminars,	  all	  understand	  that	  the	  
political	  decision	  was	  such	  that	   it	  doesn’t	  make	  sense	  to	  fight	  against	  something	  that	  
you	   cannot	   change,	   but	   we	   can	   all	   work	   to	   improve	   the	   process’.	   (Interview	   with	  
policymaker,	  2013)	  
6.5 Conclusions:	  Consulting	  minorities	  while	  excluding	  them	  
The	   depoliticising	   and	   technicising	   of	   the	   debate	   on	   contested	   minority	   policies	   significantly	  
limited	   the	   space	   for	   the	   Russophone	   minorities	   to	   re-­‐discuss	   the	   essence	   of	   policies	   that	  
concern	  them	  directly	  and	  kept	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  safely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  governing	  
majority.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   in	  allowing	  the	  performance	  of	  participation,	  the	  policymakers	  put	  
themselves	  beyond	  the	  reproach	  of	  their	  international	  partners,	  and	  –	  domestically	  –	  legitimised	  
the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  minority’s	  political	  representatives	  from	  decision-­‐making	  by	  bypassing	  them	  
to	   address	   ‘directly’	   the	   minority	   civil	   society.	   The	   analysis	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   for	   minority	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participation	   in	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   Integration	   Programmes,	   however,	  
shows	  how	   these	   forms	  of	  managed	  participation	   are	  no	  actual	   substitute	   for	   the	   inclusion	  of	  
minority	  voices	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  ‘core’.123	  
It	   has	   already	   been	   noted	   by	   several	   authors	   that	   mechanisms	   for	   institutionalised	  
minority	  participation	  are	  often	   insufficient	   to	  guarantee	   the	  minority’s	  effective	  participation.	  
My	  argument	  goes	   further:	   institutionalised	  participatory	  mechanisms	  are	  not	  only	   inadequate	  
to	   guarantee	   minority	   inclusion,	   but	   –	   when	   they	   are	   merely	   tokenistic	   –	   they	   can	   in	   fact	  
contribute	   in	   validating	   minority	   exclusion.	   This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   given	   international	  
organisations’	   tendency	   to	   promote	   participatory	  mechanisms	   as	   a	   good	   practice	   to	   ensure	   a	  
measure	   of	   minority	   inclusion	   in	   cases	   in	   which	   representation	   in	   the	   policymaking	   core	   is	  
lacking.	  Rather	  than	  a	  good	  practice,	  the	  risk	  is	  in	  fact	  to	  promote	  and	  validate	  smokescreens	  for	  
minority	  exclusion.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	   It	   must	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   problem	   of	   tokenistic	   inclusion	   does	   not	   pertain	   only	   to	   the	   minority.	   Citizen	  
consultations,	   as	  mechanism	   for	   civil	   society	   inclusion,	   are	   always	   at	   risk	   for	   tokenism	   as	   policymakers	   are	   rarely	  
inclined	   to	   relinquish	   their	   control	   over	   the	   policy	   agenda,	   especially	   on	  major	   reforms	   or	   sensitive	   policies.	   The	  
focus	   on	  minority	   political	   exclusion	   here	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   other	   consultations	  –	   directed	   to	   other	   groups	   of	  
citizens	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  –	  have	  always	  been	  genuinely	  inclusive.	  Rather,	  this	  chapter	  wants	  to	  critically	  address	  
the	  contention	  that	  consultation	  mechanisms	  are	  particularly	  suitable	  to	  include	  minorities	  in	  policymaking	  on	  issues	  








Differently	  from	  consultation	  mechanisms,	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  potentially	  offers	  more	  room	  
for	   an	   excluded	  minority	   to	   push	   the	   political	   debate	   beyond	   the	   boundaries	   imposed	   by	   the	  
majority	   elite.	   Spontaneous	   minority	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   is	   not	   under	   the	   control	   of	   the	  
government	   and	   is	   not	   constrained	   within	   the	   same	   fixed	   frameworks	   as	   consultation	  
mechanisms.	  As	  Sherrill	   Stroschein	   found	   in	  her	  analysis	  of	  Hungarian	  minority	  mobilisation	   in	  
Slovakia,	   Romania	   and	   Ukraine,	   minority	   protest	   and	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   can	   have	   a	  
deliberative	   role	   by	   including	   ethnic	   minorities	   in	   the	   democratic	   debate	   and	   giving	   them	   a	  
backdoor	  way	   to	   access	   decision-­‐making	   (Stroschein,	   2012).	  Without	   this	   ‘alternative	   route	   to	  
formal	  institutions’	  the	  majoritarian	  principle	  of	  democracy	  would	  relegate	  minorities	  to	  the	  role	  
of	   permanent	   losers	   (Stroschein,	   2012,	   p.	   248).	  My	   analysis	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   cases	  
confirms	   the	   potential	   for	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   to	   empower	   minorities,	   but	   places	   it	   in	  
relation	   to	  minority	   formal	   representation,	  which	   contributes	   in	   shaping	   the	  minority’s	   role	   in	  
the	   political	   debate	   and	   in	   determining	   the	   chances	   for	   minority	   mobilisation	   to	   be	   heeded	  
rather	  than	  (only)	  dismissed	  or	  securitised.	  	  
Minority	   mobilisation	   does	   not	   happen	   in	   a	   vacuum.	   It	   takes	   place	   within	   a	   specific	  
political	   context,	   characterised	   by	   the	   specific	   features	   of	  minority	   and	  majority	   communities	  
and	   of	   their	   interactions,	   and	   by	   specific	   levels	   of	   official	   minority	   representation	   in	   public	  
institutions.	  Mobilisation	  stands	  in	  a	  two-­‐way	  relationship	  with	  this	  political	  context.	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	   the	  context	   shapes	   the	   incentives	   for	   the	  minority	   to	  mobilise	  and	  defines	   the	  potential	  
for	  minority	  mobilisation	  to	  successfully	  influence	  policymaking.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  (and	  at	  the	  
same	  time),	  the	  minority’s	  capacity	  for	  mobilisation	  contributes	  to	  shaping	  that	  same	  context.124	  
It	  is	  this	  complex	  interaction	  –	  which	  involves	  minority	  representatives,	  minority	  grassroots,	  and	  
majority	  representatives	  and	  grassroots	  –	  that	  defines	  the	  role	  of	  minority	  voices	  in	  a	  country’s	  
democracy.	  	  
Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   offer	   an	   interesting	   comparative	   testing	   ground	   to	   understand	   the	  
complex	   relationship	   between	  minority	   formal	   representation	   and	   grassroots	   mobilisation.	   In	  
both	   cases	   the	   ‘grassroots	   channel’	  was	   not	   independent	   from	   formal	   representation	   in	   state	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	   For	   a	   convincing	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	   understanding	   incremental	   and	   path-­‐dependent	   processes	   as	   inherently	  
endogenous	  see	  Stroschein	  (2012,	  pp.	  34–35).	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and	   local	   institutions.	   Rather,	   it	   interacted	   with	   it	   through	   feedback	   and	   accountability	  
mechanisms,	   and	   via	   the	   frequent	   overlap	   between	   institutional	   and	   grassroots	   actors.	   In	   the	  
rest	   of	   this	   chapter	   I	   analyse	   different	   forms	   of	   minority	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   that	   have	  
emerged	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   and	   their	   potential	   as	   alternative	   channels	   to	   influence	  
policymaking.	   I	   conclude	  by	  highlighting	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma	   that	  
exists	  at	  the	  level	  of	  party	  politics	  also	  manifests	  itself	  for	  grassroots	  mobilisation.	  
7.1 Civil	  society	  mobilisation	  as	  channel	  for	  political	  inclusion	  
The	  development	  of	  an	  active	  civil	   society	   in	  Latvia	  and	  Estonia	   is	  quite	   limited	   (Bartkowsky	  &	  
Jasińska-­‐Kania,	   2004;	   Heidmets,	   2008,	   pp.	   59–61;	   Rozenvalds,	   2005,	   p.	   140ff.,	   2007,	   p.	   91),	   a	  
feature	   that	   they	   share	  with	  most	   post-­‐communist	   countries	   (Howard,	   2003;	   Kostelka,	   2014).	  
However,	   there	   are	   considerable	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	   In	   Estonia	   the	  
Russophone	  civil	  society	  is	  particularly	  weak,	  there	  are	  very	  few	  examples	  of	  mass	  mobilisation	  
by	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers,	  and	  in	  general	  Estonia’s	  Russophone	  community	  has	  been	  described	  as	  
isolated,	  organisationally	  weak,	  with	  a	   low	  self-­‐esteem,	  and	  politically	  passive	   (Berg,	  2001,	  pp.	  
18–19;	  Daatland	  &	  Svege,	  2000,	  p.	  260;	  Heidmets,	  2008,	  p.	  60;	  Lagerspetz,	  Rikmann,	  &	  Ruutsoo,	  
2002,	   pp.	   77,	   82).125	   A	   substantial	   difference	   in	   participation	   between	   the	   majority	   and	   the	  
minority	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   groups	   is	   recognised	   also	   in	   the	   Estonian	   Integration	   Strategy	   2008–
2013,	  which	  lists	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  ethnic-­‐based	  participation	  gap	  as	  one	  of	  its	  goals.	  	  
Differently	  from	  Estonia,	  Latvia	  has	  experienced	  a	  surge	  in	  political	  activism	  in	  the	  2000s	  
(Kažoka	   &	   Akule,	   2009,	   p.	   4),	   which	   has	   involved	   (although	   not	   exclusively)	   the	   Russophone	  
community.	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  capabilities	  for	  mass	  mobilisation	  in	  Latvia	  were	  apparent	  during	  
the	  school	  reform	  protests	  of	  2003–2004	  and	  in	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  referendum	  for	  Russian	  as	  a	  
second	  state	   language	   in	  2012.	  Both	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  As	   for	  civil	   society	  organisations,	  
there	  are	  more	  similarities	  than	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  countries	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  type	  of	  
minority	   organisations	   that	   emerged	   and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   state	   institutions	   approach	   them	  
(Agarin,	  2011,	  p.	  190).	  
A	  caveat	  is	  important	  here.	  If	  minority	  mobilisation	  is	  found	  to	  be	  ineffective	  in	  influencing	  
policies,	  this	  does	  not	  automatically	  mean	  that	  specific	  mechanisms	  of	  minority	  exclusion	  are	  in	  
place.	   Indeed,	   it	   might	   be	   the	   case	   that	   –	   in	   countries	   in	   which	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Reasons	   for	   the	   inability	  of	  Estonia’s	  Russian-­‐speakers	   to	  consistently	  act	  as	  a	  collective	   force	  are	  multiple.	  Most	  
often	   observers	   highlight	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   group	   is	   not	   ethnically	   homogenous,	   that	   Russian-­‐speakers	   arrived	   in	  
Estonia	   in	  different	  waves	  of	   immigration,	   that	  they	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  weak	  sense	  of	  roots,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  mostly	  
urbanised	   which	   adds	   to	   their	   atomisation	   (Daatland	   &	   Svege,	   2000,	   p.	   260;	   Poleshchuk,	   2009,	   p.	   17).	   These	  
characteristics,	   however,	   apply	   also	   to	   Latvia,	   where	   they	   did	   not	   bring	   to	   the	   same	   results.	   Lower	   political	  
participation	  among	  Estonia’s	  Russian-­‐speakers	  might	  be	  linked	  to	  their	  lower	  average	  socio-­‐economic	  status.	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tends	   to	   be	   rather	   closed	   and	   top-­‐down	   (Lagerspetz,	   2001,	   p.	   411;	   Smooha	  &	   Järve,	   2005,	   p.	  
113)	  –	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  mobilisation	  is	  simply	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  top-­‐down	  policy	  process	  and	  
thus	  common	  to	  the	  entire	  civil	  society,	  including	  the	  ethnic	  majority.	  While	  this	  is	  an	  important	  
caveat,	   it	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   discount	   the	   possibility	   that	   –	   excluded	   from	   formal	   channels	   of	  
decision-­‐making	  power	  –	  minority	  activists	  can	  turn	  to	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  as	  an	  alternative	  
channel	   to	   influence	   policymaking.	   Russophone	   minority	   activists	   have	   in	   different	   ways	  
organised	   to	   redress	   minority	   under-­‐representation	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   and	   have	  
actively	   framed	   their	   activities	   as	   a	   potential	   alternative	   channel	   to	   access	   the	   democratic	  
process	  of	   their	   countries.	   Their	   actual	   impact	  on	   the	  policy	  debate	   and	  policymaking	  process	  
must	   be	   assessed	   in	   order	   to	   complete	   the	   picture	   of	   minority	   democratic	   representation	   in	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  
It	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   chapter	   to	   exhaustively	   retrace	   the	   development	   of	  
Russophone	  civil	   society	  activism	   in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	   The	  Russophone	  minorities’	   grassroots	  
mobilisation	   has	   attracted	   considerable	   attention	   among	   the	   academic	   community	   and	   there	  
have	  been	  several	  studies	  of	  both	  its	  general	  development	  and	  specific	  episodes.126	  While	  I	  will	  
extensively	   refer	   to	   these	   studies’	   data	   and	   analysis,	   this	   chapter	   focuses	   specifically	   on	   the	  
potential	  for	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  to	  be	  an	  alternative	  channel	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  access	  the	  
policymaking	  process.	  
For	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  analysis	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  divide	  minority	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  into	  the	  
four	   different	   forms	   that	   it	   has	   taken	   in	   the	   two	   countries.	   Namely,	   advocacy	   organisations,	  
attempts	   at	   reshaping	   representation	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   alternative	   institutions,	   protest	  
and	   the	  exploitation	  of	   constitutional	  avenues	   for	  direct	  democracy	   (that	   is,	   referenda).	   There	  
are	   of	   course	   considerable	   overlaps	   between	   these	   different	   forms	   of	  mobilisation,	   especially	  
given	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   same	  minority	  organisation	  can	  be	  engaged	   in	  more	   than	  one	  of	   them	  
over	  time	  or	  even	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  distinction,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  primarily	  
analytical,	  as	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  explore	  how	  different	  forms	  of	  minority	  grassroots	  activism	  can	  have	  
an	  impact	  on	  the	  policymaking	  process	  and	  it	  also	  helps	  to	  highlight	  differences	  between	  Estonia	  
and	  Latvia.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  See,	   for	  example,	  Timofey	  Agarin	  on	   civil	   society	   in	   the	  Baltic	   states	   (2011),	  Mikko	  Lagerspetz	  et	   al.	   on	  Estonian	  
NGOs	  (2002),	  Juris	  Rozenvalds	  (2005)	  and	  Inese	  Šūpule	  (2005)	  on	  minority	  activism	  and	  participation	  in	  Latvia,	  and	  
more	  specific	  analyses	  on	  the	  protests	  against	  the	  education	  reform	  (Bogushevich,	  2013)	  and	  the	  2012	  referendum	  
on	  Russian	  as	  a	  second	  state	  language	  in	  Latvia	  (Hanov	  &	  Tçraudkalns,	  2012;	  Lublin,	  2013;	  Šūpule,	  2012),	  and	  of	  the	  
Bronze	  Soldier	  riots	  in	  Estonia	  (Brüggemann	  &	  Kasekamp,	  2008;	  Ehala,	  2009;	  Haukkala,	  2009;	  D.	  J.	  Smith,	  2008).	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7.1.1 Minority	  civil	  society	  organisations	  and	  advocacy	  
In	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  the	  right	  to	  establish	  and	  be	  a	  member	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  is	  
open	  to	  all,	  regardless	  of	  citizenship	  status.	  These	  organisations	  are,	  of	  course,	  regulated	  by	  law,	  
must	   be	   registered	   in	   a	   central	   register	   of	   non-­‐profit	   organisations	   (NGOs),	   and	   can	   be	  
disbanded	   if	   they	  pursue	   illegal	   aims.	  Other	   than	   this,	   there	  are	  no	   formal	   restrictions	   to	   civic	  
participation	   either	   on	   the	   population	   in	   general	   or	   on	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority	   in	  
particular.	  Although	  membership	  in	  such	  organisations	  has	  been	  consistently	  low	  in	  Estonia	  and	  
Latvia	   among	   both	   the	   majority	   and	   the	   minority,	   a	   number	   of	   minority	   civil	   societies	  
organisations	  have	  emerged	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  
Russophone	   cultural	   and	   folkloristic	   organisations,	   although	   they	   do	   promote	   minority	  
culture	   and	   are	   relevant	   to	   the	  minority’s	   civil	   society	   life,	   do	   not	   directly	   deal	   with	  minority	  
policies	  and	  typically	  do	  not	  see	  policy	  impact	  as	  one	  of	  their	  goals.	  This	  section,	  therefore,	  will	  
concentrate	  on	  NGOs	  that	  explicitly	  tackle	  minority	  policies	  and	  actively	  lobby	  for	  policy	  change	  
in	   areas	   of	   interest	   for	   the	   Russophone	   minority.	   These	   advocacy	   organisations	   typically	   use	  
campaigning,	   lobbying	   (directed	   both	   at	   their	   country’s	   institutions	   and	   at	   international	  
organisations),	  petitions,	  litigation	  and	  consultancy	  as	  tools	  to	  affect	  policymakers’	  decisions	  and	  
to	   respond	   to	  policies	   they	   see	   as	  detrimental	   to	  minority	   rights.	   Some	  of	   them	  also	  organise	  
protest	   actions,	   but	   this	   mobilisation	   tool	   will	   be	   analysed	   separately.	   In	   general,	   minority	  
advocacy	   organisations	   adopt	   strategies	   aimed	   at	   ‘changing	   the	   beliefs	   and	   preferences	   of	  
decision-­‐makers’	   (Schnellbach,	   2012,	   p.	   501),	   providing	   information	   on	   minority	   needs	   and	  
critical	   feedback	   on	   governmental	   policies.	   Especially	   in	   Latvia,	  minority	   advocacy	   NGOs	   have	  
been	  particularly	  vocal	  (Agarin,	  2011,	  p.	  192).	  
In	  terms	  of	  impact	  over	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  minority	  NGOs	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  state	  
institutions’	   willingness	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   their	   critiques	   and	   suggestions.	   A	   recent	  
analysis	  of	  minority	  NGOs	  in	  the	  Baltics	  showed	  that	  the	  responsiveness	  of	  state	  institutions	  to	  
Russian-­‐speakers’	  NGOs	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  is	  generally	  low	  and	  is	  mostly	  conditional	  on	  their	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  governmental	  agenda	  on	  minorities	  (Agarin,	  2011).	  This	  was	  amply	  confirmed	  
by	   my	   interviews	   with	   members	   of	   minority	   advocacy	   NGOs	   and	   with	   policymakers	   in	   both	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  Minority	  NGOs	  face	  similar	  barriers	  as	  those	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  
about	   institutionalised	  civil	  society	  consultation	  mechanisms.	  First	  of	  all,	  state	   institutions	  tend	  
to	  apply	  a	  selective	  bias	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  organisations	  they	  involve	  in	  the	  policy	  process.	   In	  the	  
words	  of	  a	  Russophone	  NGO’s	  senior	  member	  in	  Latvia,	  when	  there	  is	  a	  requirement	  either	  by	  
law	  or	   because	   of	   international	   pressures	   to	   consult	  minority	  NGOs	   ‘the	   government	   goes	   on	  
shopping’	  (Interview	  with	  Boris	  Koltchanov,	  LCHR,	  16	  April	  2013).	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  also	  in	  cases	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when	   critical	   organisations	   are	   involved,	   their	   input	   tends	   to	   be	   significantly	   diluted	   in	   a	  
policymaking	  process	  that	  remains	  mostly	  top-­‐down.	  
In	  general,	   state	   institutions	   tend	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  civil	   society	  organisations	  as	  
service	  providers	  rather	  than	  policy	  partners	  (Agarin,	  2011,	  p.	  188;	  Lagerspetz	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  p.	  75).	  
Therefore	  NGOs’	  participation	   in	  the	  policy	  process	  tends	  to	  be	  depoliticised,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  
they	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  discuss	  policymaking.	  Rather,	  state	  institutions	  typically	  set	  the	  agenda	  
independently	  of	  the	  minority	  civil	  society	  and	  then	  expect	  minority	  organisations	  to	  cooperate	  
in	  implementing	  it.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  member	  of	  a	  leading	  Russophone	  NGO	  in	  Estonia:	  	  
Politicians	   understand	   discussion	   and	   debate	   with	   minorities	   not	   as	   a	   debate	   on	  
possible	   solutions	   and	  possible	   changes	   of	   policy,	   but	  mostly	   as	   a	   debate	  on	  how	   to	  
implement	  their	  decisions	  in	  the	  best	  possible	  way.	  (Interview	  with	  Vadim	  Poleshchuk,	  
LICHR,	  2	  May	  2013)	  
The	   scarce	   resources	   NGOs	   can	   count	   on	   and	   their	   dependence	   on	   state	   funding	   pose	  
another	  limit	  to	  the	  policy	  impact	  of	  minority	  advocacy.	  Dependency	  on	  state	  financial	  support	  
drastically	   reduces	  minority	  NGOs’	   incentives	   to	   challenge	   the	   state	   agenda	   and	   consequently	  
limits	  their	  policymaking	  impact	  (Agarin,	  2011,	  pp.	  191–192).	  Two	  notable	  exceptions	  to	  this	  are	  
the	   Legal	   Information	   Centre	   for	   Human	   Rights	   (LICHR)	   in	   Estonia	   and	   the	   Latvian	   Centre	   for	  
Human	  Rights	   (LCHR)	   in	  Latvia.	  Both	  managed	  to	  retain	   their	  minority	  advocacy	  role	   thanks	   to	  
funding	  and	  support	   from	  Western	  partners,	  and	  both	  concentrate	  their	  activity	   in	   the	   field	  of	  
minority	  advocacy	  and	  minority	  rights,	  and	  provide	   legal	  expertise	  and	  counselling	  on	  minority	  
issues.	  However,	  while	  they	  have	  sometimes	  managed	  to	  provide	  effective	  policy	  input	  (Agarin,	  
2011,	  p.	  192),	  their	  direct	  impact	  on	  policymaking	  is	  at	  best	  limited	  (Interviews	  with	  LICHR	  and	  
LCHR	  members).	   Even	   LCHR,	   that	   has	   better	   resources	   than	   its	   Estonian	   counterpart	   and	   saw	  
one	   of	   his	   (ethnic	   Latvian)	   founders,	   Nils	   Muižnieks,	   become	   Latvia’s	   Minister	   for	   Social	  
Integration	   and	   Minorities	   and	   later	   Council	   of	   Europe	   Commissioner	   for	   Human	   Rights,	  
achieved	  only	   limited	  substantial	  policy	   results.	  For	   instance,	  LCHR’s	  Second	  Alternative	  Report	  
on	   the	   Implementation	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   Framework	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	  
National	  Minorities	  in	  Latvia	  (an	  independent	  response	  to	  Latvia’s	  official	  report),	  was	  presented	  
as	  part	  of	  a	   two-­‐day	  public	  meeting	   in	  2013	   that	   saw	   the	  participation	  of	   several	  high-­‐ranking	  
Latvian	   policymakers.	  While	   this	   level	   of	   exposure	   does	   guarantee	   a	  measure	   of	   voice	   to	   this	  
NGO,	   it	  did	  not	   result	  –	  at	   least	   in	   the	  short-­‐to-­‐middle	   term	  –	   in	  any	  significant	   impact	  on	   the	  
policymakers’	  political	  outlook	  or	  on	  policy	  outcomes.127	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	   The	   low	   level	   of	   responsiveness	   by	   the	   Latvian	   public	   officials	   in	   that	   occasion	   was	   confirmed	   by	   my	   own	  
observations	   while	   taking	   part	   in	   the	   event	   and	   by	   the	   impressions	   of	   the	   minority	   NGO	   members	   I	   contacted	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In	   addition	   to	   this,	   lack	   of	   funding	   makes	   money	   coming	   from	   the	   Russian	   Federation	  
through	   its	   ‘compatriots’	   programmes	   appealing	   for	   cash-­‐stripped	   organisations.	   However,	  
receiving	  money	   from	  Russia	  contributes	   to	  a	  downward	  spiral	  of	  delegitimation	   that	  makes	   it	  
more	  difficult	  for	  those	  organisations	  to	  receive	  public	  funding	  in	  the	  future	  and	  to	  have	  access	  
to	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  This	  ends	  up	  making	  them	  even	  more	  dependent	  on	  funding	  from	  
Russia.	   The	   Estonian	   LICHR	   is	   a	   case	   in	   point.	   It	   traditionally	   received	   funding	   from	  Western	  
partners	   to	   support	   its	   advocacy,	   research	   and	   counselling	   activities.	   However,	   it	   became	  
increasingly	  ostracised	  in	  Estonia	  especially	  after	  the	  Bronze	  Night	  events	  (Agarin,	  2011,	  p.	  196)	  
and	   was	   discredited	   by	   its	   mention	   in	   the	   Estonian	   secret	   services’	   annual	   report.	   Later	   on,	  
having	  lost	  a	  considerable	  portion	  of	  its	  funding,	  LICHR	  decided	  to	  accept	  money	  made	  available	  
by	  Russia	   for	  projects	  providing	   legal	  defence	  to	  Russian	  citizens.	  This	  did	  not	   improve	  LICHR’s	  
standing	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Estonian	  policymakers.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  of	  its	  main	  members:	  ‘receiving	  
money	   from	   Russia	   is	   a	   blanket	   justification	   for	   bad	   treatment’	   (Interview	   with	   Vadim	  
Poleshchuk,	  LICHR,	  2	  May	  2013).	  
While	  the	  top-­‐down	  character	  of	  policymaking	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  means	  that	  minority	  
organisations	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  to	  face	  difficulties	   in	  accessing	  the	  policy	  process,	  minority	  
NGOs	   face	   additional,	   minority-­‐specific	   barriers.	   Minority	   NGOs	   that	   are	   involved	   in	   political	  
advocacy	   tend	   to	   be	   seen	  with	   suspicion	   by	   the	   central	   government	   and	   often	   feature	   in	   the	  
secret	   services’	   yearly	   reports.	   This	   contributes	   in	   marginalising	   their	   contribution	   to	   the	  
policymaking	   process	   and	   in	   making	   government’s	   responsiveness	   to	   their	   suggestions	   and	  
critiques	  more	  unlikely.	  Indeed,	  some	  minority	  activists	  noted	  that	  their	  country’s	  government	  is	  
readier	   to	   respond	   to	   demands	   from	   the	   ‘titular’	   civil	   society	   than	   from	  Russian	  organisations	  
(Interviews	  with	  Russophone	  NGO	  members,	  2013).	  On	   this	   regard,	   an	  Estonian	  activist	  noted	  
that	  the	  36,000	  signatures	  gathered	  by	  the	  Russophone	  NGO	  Russian	  School	   in	  Estonia	  against	  
the	  education	  reform	  were	  ignored	  by	  the	  same	  government	  that	  quickly	  responded	  to	  the	  call	  
for	   constitutional	   reform	   initiated	   by	   seventeen	   Estonian	   intellectuals	   and	   undersigned	   by	  
17,000	  people.128	  ‘That	  for	  the	  Estonian	  powers	  was	  a	  signal:	  when	  Estonians	  send	  a	  signal	  it	   is	  
received,	  when	  Russians	  send	  a	  signal	   it	   is	  not	  received’	  (Interview	  with	  Mstislav	  Rusakov,	  RSE,	  
17	  June	  2013).129	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
afterwards	  on	  this	  regard.	  
128	  This	   initiative	   is	  known	  as	   ‘Charter	  12’.	   For	  details	  about	   this	   initiative	  see	  Ahto	  Lobjakas,	   ‘Charter	  12	  –	  Estonia’s	  
stab	  at	  direct	  democracy’,	  estonian	  world.	  Available	  at:	  http://estonianworld.com/opinion/charter-­‐12-­‐estonias-­‐stab-­‐
at-­‐direct-­‐democracy/	  (Last	  accessed	  9	  January	  2015).	  
129	   For	   news	   of	   the	   government’s	   response	   to	   RSE’s	   petition,	   in	   which	   the	   soundness	   of	   the	   education	   reform	   is	  
reiterated,	   see	   ‘Minobr	   otvetil	   na	   petitsiiu	   o	   cokhranenii	   russkogo	   iazika	   obucheniia’	   (The	   Education	   Ministry	  
responded	   to	   the	   petition	   on	   the	   preservation	   of	   Russian	   as	   teaching	   language),	   Delfi.ee,	   7	   August	   2012.	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The	  activities	  of	  minority	  advocacy	  NGOs	  can	  also	  result	  in	  unintended	  consequences	  that	  
go	   in	   the	  opposite	  direction	   than	   the	  policy	   changes	   they	  advocate	   for.	   For	   instance,	  minority	  
NGOs’	   legal	  advisers	  provided	  examples	  of	   instances	   in	  which	  governments	   learnt	   from	  NGOs’	  
successful	  legal	  challenging	  of	  allegedly	  discriminatory	  policies	  (or	  policy	  application),	  but	  not	  in	  
the	  way	  intended	  by	  these	  NGOs.	  Indeed,	  somehow	  perversely,	  successful	  legal	  challenges	  also	  
triggered	   policy	   amendments	   that	   closed	   the	   loopholes	   that	   had	   made	   the	   NGOs’	   challenge	  
possible	  in	  the	  first	  case.	  This	  was	  for	  example	  the	  case	  when	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  was	  
successfully	  used	  to	  legally	  challenge	  sanctions	  based	  on	  language	  requirements	  in	  Estonia:	  this	  
experience	   was	   useful	   for	   the	   Language	   Inspectorate	   and	   the	   legislators	   to	   make	   the	   new	  
legislation	   on	   language	   requirements	   less	   susceptible	   to	   such	   legal	   challenges	   (Interview	  with	  
Vadim	  Poleshchuk,	  LICHR,	  2	  May	  2013).	  
Another	  avenue	  available	  to	  minority	  NGOs	  is	  lobbying	  international	  organisations.	  This	  is	  
actively	   used	   by	   all	   the	   minority	   organisations	   I	   came	   in	   contact	   with	   during	   my	   research.	  
However,	  while	  especially	  before	  2004	  minority	  NGOs	  managed	  to	  achieve	  a	  certain	  measure	  of	  
leverage	   through	   international	  partners,	   this	  did	  not	  guarantee	  policy	   impact	   (Agarin,	  2011,	  p.	  
195;	  Poleshchuk,	  2001).	  Interestingly,	  according	  to	  several	  Russophone	  activists	  in	  both	  Estonia	  
and	   Latvia,	   after	   2004	   minority	   NGOs	   do	   not	   lobby	   international	   organisations	   because	   they	  
expect	   them	   to	   do	   something	   to	   solve	  minority	   problems	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   Rather,	   they	  
lobby	   them	   in	   order	   to	   shame	   their	   own	   governments	   into	   revising	   exclusionary	   policies	  
(Interviews	  with	  minority	   activists,	   2013).	   In	   conclusion,	   while	   it	  might	   have	   some	   effect,	   the	  
advocacy	  avenue	  to	  influence	  the	  policy	  process	  –	  whether	  directed	  at	  domestic	  or	  international	  
institutions	   –	   is	   once	   again	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   the	   policymakers’	   willingness	   to	   include	  
minority	  voices	  in	  the	  policy	  debate	  and	  to	  accommodate	  their	  opinions.	  
7.1.2 Alternative	  elections	  
In	   recent	   years,	   in	   both	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority	   activists	   have	  
experimented	   with	   alternative	   political	   representation.	   Starting	   from	   the	   premise	   that	   the	  
Russian-­‐speaking	  minority	   is	   not	   adequately	   represented	   in	   state	   institutions,	   activists	   in	   both	  
countries	  held	   informal,	  within-­‐community	  elections	  with	   the	  aim	  to	  select	   legitimate	  minority	  
representatives	  and	  create	  new	  representative	  bodies.	  The	  Parliament	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Represented	  
(PNR)	   in	   Latvia	   and	   the	   Russkii	   Zemskii	   Sovet	   (RZS)	   in	   Estonia	   are	   the	  more	   or	   less	   successful	  
results	   of	   these	   attempts.130	   These	   organisations	   share	   significant	   similarities	   with	   the	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://rus.delfi.ee/daily/estonia/minobr-­‐otvetil-­‐na-­‐peticiyu-­‐o-­‐sohranenii-­‐russkogo-­‐yazyka-­‐obucheniya?id=64787924	  
(Last	  accessed	  2	  February	  2015).	  
130	  RZS’s	  official	  website	  links	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  name	  generally	  to	  the	  European	  historical	  tradition	  of	  elected	  citizens’	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minority	   NGOs	   analysed	   above,	   especially	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   policy	   advocacy	   practices.	  
However,	  their	  different	  genesis	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  at	  sending	  a	  wider	  political	  message	  
regarding	  the	  place	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  in	  the	  democratic	  debate.	  This	  sets	  them	  apart	  
from	  other	  minority	  NGOs.	  
Although	   they	   have	   not	   been	   the	   object	   of	   comprehensive	   theorisation,	   alternative	  
elections	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  alternative	  institutions	  are	  part	  of	  protest	  movements’	  repertoire	  
all	  over	  the	  world.131	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  recognise	  a	  common	  double	  rationale	  behind	  the	  creation	  
of	   these	   alternative	   representative	   institutions,	  which	   includes	   both	   a	   negative	   and	   a	   positive	  
element.	   By	   claiming	   that	   alternative	   elections	   or	   alternative	   institutions	   are	   needed,	   activists	  
call	   into	   question	   the	   fairness	   of	   formal	   elections	   and	   the	   representativeness	   of	   formal	   state	  
institutions.	  However,	  alongside	  this	  negative,	  critical	  function,	  alternative	  institutions	  have	  also	  
a	   more	   positive,	   constructive	   aspect.	   By	   providing	   a	   platform	   for	   the	   articulation	   and	  
representation	   of	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   un(der)represented,	   they	   aspire	   to	   participate	   in	   the	  
democratic	  process.	  Therefore,	  while	  alternative	  institutions	  stand	  as	  a	  reproach	  to	  the	  existing	  
formal	   institutions	   for	   their	   incapacity	   or	   unwillingness	   to	   represent	   certain	   social	   or	   ethnic	  
groups,	  they	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  interlocutors	  for	  formal	  institutions	  to	  find	  compromise	  solutions	  
to	  the	  questions	  raised	  by	  those	  groups.	  	  
Of	   course,	   different	   contexts	   present	   a	   different	   balance	   of	   these	   positive	   and	   negative	  
components.	  In	  extreme	  cases,	  alternative	  institutions	  can	  try	  to	  operate	  a	  substitution,	  that	  is,	  
to	   replace	   themselves	   for	   the	   existing	   institutions	   they	   denounce	   as	   illegitimate.	   More	   often	  
(and	   more	   typically	   in	   democratic	   regimes)	   alternative	   institutions	   position	   themselves	   as	  
compensating	   for	   a	   group’s	   lack	   of	   representation	   in	   formal	   institutions.	   They	   do	   not	   aim	   to	  
substitute	   themselves	   to	   exiting	   institutions	   but	   exist	   alongside	   them,	   as	   an	   ulterior,	   informal	  
channel	   for	   the	   representation	   of	   interests	   that	   are	   otherwise	   marginalised,	   and	   as	   an	  
interlocutor	  for	  formal	  institutions	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  those	  interests.	  The	  Latvian	  PNR	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bodies,	   and	   more	   specifically	   to	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   Eastland	   Land	   Council	   that	   was	   instrumental	   in	   securing	  
Estonia’s	   independence	   in	   1918.	   Available	   at:	   www.ruszemsovet.eu	   (Last	   accessed	   17	  October	   2014;	   the	   site	   has	  
been	  disabled	  since	  end	  of	  2014).	  
131	   Some	   examples	   are	   the	  Women’s	   Shadow	   Parliament	   in	   Kenya	   (Ponge,	   2013);	   the	   (women’s)	  Model	   Parliament	  
Project	   in	   Palestine	   (Moghadam,	   2007,	   p.	   37ff.);	   the	   alternative	   local	   governments	   of	   indigenous	   communities	   in	  
Ecuador	  (Wolff,	  2007);	  opposition-­‐led	  attempts	  at	  creating	  alternative	  parliaments	  in	  Myanmar	  (Rieffel,	  2010,	  p.	  35),	  
Jordan	   (AmmonNews,	  6	   June	  2012),	   Syria	   (Aljazeera,	  6	  May	  2012),	   and	   Egypt	   (AFP,	   13	  December	  2010),	   and	   the	  
People’s	  Rada	  in	  Ukraine	  (EuromaidanPR,	  23	  January	  2014).	  Interestingly,	  two	  notable	  examples	  of	  this	  strategy	  are	  
to	  be	  found	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  The	  Congress	  of	  Estonia	  and	  the	  Citizens’	  Congress	  of	  Latvia	  were	  both	  created	  in	  
the	  1980s	  by	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  activists	   through	  grassroots	  elections	  as	  part	  of	   the	   struggle	   for	   independence	  
from	  the	  USSR.	  They	  were	  central	   in	  determining	  the	  direction	  state-­‐building	  took	  after	  1991	  (Agarin,	  2011,	  p.	  88;	  
Mole,	   2012).	   Also	   importantly,	   in	   Latvia	   the	   League	   of	   Non-­‐Citizens	   operated	   throughout	   the	   1990s;	   this	   was	   an	  
alternative	   elected	   body	   for	   the	   representation	   of	   the	   non-­‐citizens	   and	   was	   mainly	   focused	   on	   reducing	   the	  
differences	  in	  rights	  between	  citizens	  and	  non-­‐citizens.	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Estonian	   RZS	   followed	   this	   same	   double	   rationale.132	   Although	   the	   negative	   element	   is	   quite	  
prominent	   in	   the	   motivations	   given	   by	   their	   initiators,	   their	   strategy	   is	   more	   one	   of	  
compensation	   than	   substitution.	   This	   puts	   them	   in	   the	   category	   of	   alternative	   institutions	   in	  
terms	  of	  their	  underlying	  rationale,	  but	  also	  means	  that	  they	  are	  comparable	  to	  other	  advocacy	  
NGOs	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  actual	  practice.	  
In	  both	  cases,	  Russophone	  activists	  organised	  grassroots	  elections	  to	  alternative,	  minority-­‐
led	   representative	   bodies.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   the	   PNR,	   61	   candidates	   balloted	   for	   the	   30	   available	  
seats,	  and	  about	  15,000	  people	  participated	  in	  the	  vote	  that	  took	  place	  between	  25	  May	  and	  11	  
June	  2013.133	  Voting	  took	  place	  both	  through	  the	  Internet	  and	  in	  pop-­‐up	  polling	  stations	  around	  
the	  country	   (but	  overwhelmingly	   in	  Riga).	  The	  alternative	  parliament	  started	   its	  activities	  soon	  
after	   the	   elections,	   and	   it	   adopted	   formal	   regulations	   and	   a	   statute.	   The	   regulations	   foresee	  
regular	   meetings	   of	   the	   PNR	   plenary	   and	   meetings	   of	   standing	   committees	   on	   a	   number	   of	  
relevant	  themes,	  all	  held	   in	  the	  organisation’s	  offices	   in	  the	  centre	  of	  Riga.134	  The	  candidacy	  of	  
Vladimir	  Linderman	  and	  Evgenii	  Osipov	  was	  seen	  as	  problematic	  by	  some	  (also	  within	  the	  same	  
PNR)	   as	   the	   two	   –	   who	   had	   been	   involved	   in	   launching	   the	   2012	   referendum	   on	   Russian	  
language	   and	   afterwards	   founded	   the	   Russophone	   party	   Zarya	   –	   are	  widely	   regarded	   as	   toxic	  
personalities	   in	   the	   Latvian	  political	   landscape.135	  However,	   although	   they	  did	  win	   seats	   in	   the	  
PNR,	  Linderman	  and	  Osipov	  are	  far	  from	  being	  the	  most	  prominent	  voices	  within	  the	  alternative	  
parliament.	   All	   my	   interviewees	   from	   PNR	   identified	   a	   split	   between	   a	   moderate	   and	   a	  
maximalist	   component	   among	   the	   election	   candidates,	   with	   the	   first	   being	   by	   far	   the	   most	  
prominent	  (Interviews,	  2013).	  The	  difference	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  preferring	  a	  gradual	  or	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐
nothing	   approach	   to	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	   non-­‐citizenship	   issue,	   and	   their	   willingness	   to	  
cooperate	  with	  formal	  institutions.	  	  
The	  RZS	  was	  much	  less	  successful	  than	  its	  Latvian	  counterpart.	  The	  initiative	  of	  creating	  an	  
alternative	  institution	  was	  taken	  in	  May	  2010	  by	  some	  of	  the	  members	  of	  Nochnoy	  Dozor	  (ND),	  
an	  organisation	   that	  had	  emerged	  around	   the	   ‘Bronze	  Soldier’	   crisis.	   The	  election	  went	  on	   for	  
over	   a	   year	   in	   pop-­‐up	   polling	   stations	   mainly	   in	   Tallinn	   and	   (more	   marginally)	   in	   north-­‐east	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Interestingly,	  some	  the	  initiators	  openly	  referred	  to	  the	  experiences	  of	  Estonians	  and	  Latvians	  during	  their	  struggle	  
for	  independence	  as	  inspiration	  (Interviews	  with	  initiators,	  2013).	  
133	   The	   election	   period	   was	   chosen	   to	   correspond	   with	   the	   Latvian	   local	   elections	   in	   order	   to	   maximise	   visibility	  
(Interviews	  with	   initiators,	   2013).	   15,000	   is	   about	   5%	   of	   the	   adult	   non-­‐citizen	   population,	   but	   citizens	   were	   also	  
allowed	  to	  vote.	  
134	  The	  PNR	  internal	  regulations	  were	  made	  available	  to	  me	  by	  PNR	  members	  during	  the	  second	  plenary	  session	  of	  the	  
alternative	  parliament,	  which	  I	  was	  kindly	  invited	  to	  attend.	  
135	   For	   instance,	   while	   admitting	   that	   several	   people	   would	   probably	   vote	   for	   Osipov,	   another	   candidate	   to	   PNR	  
elections	  expressed	  the	  fear	  that	  ‘if	  a	  person	  like	  that	  enters	  the	  parliament	  it	  would	  discredit	  it’	  (Interview,	  2013).	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Estonia.	  About	  4,000	  people	  voted	  and	  seven	  candidates	  were	  elected	  to	  form	  the	  RZS,136	  none	  
of	   whom	   were	   ND	   members.	   Indeed,	   RZS’s	   initiators	   were	   aware	   that	   their	   militancy	   in	   ND	  
would	  have	  been	  toxic	  for	  the	  new	  organisation	  and	  consciously	  decided	  to	  distance	  themselves	  
from	  the	  organisation	  they	  had	  contributed	  to	  create,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  transferring	  ND’s	  stigma	  
of	  radicalism	  to	  the	  new	  initiative	  (Interviews	  with	  RZS	  initiators,	  2013).	  No	  official	  regulations	  or	  
statute	   were	   adopted,	   and	   the	   elections	   were	   not	   followed	   by	   regular	   meetings	   of	   the	   RZS,	  
which	  has	  no	  official	  headquarters.	  In	  order	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  elections’	  low	  numbers	  and	  
the	  lack	  of	  legitimacy	  they	  signify,	  the	  RZS	  invited	  representatives	  from	  other	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  
organisations	   to	   join	   forces	   under	   the	   name	   of	   Representative	   Assembly	   of	   the	   Russian	  
Community	   in	   Estonia,	   that	   met	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   May	   2013.	   Alongside	   RZS,	   the	   more	  
prominent	  Russian	  School	  in	  Estonia	  (RSE)	  and	  representatives	  from	  a	  number	  of	  smaller	  cultural	  
organisations	   took	   part	   in	   the	   meeting.137	   After	   that,	   the	   RZS	   activities	   have	   mostly	   been	   in	  
support	  of	  RSE	  initiatives.	  
It	  must	  be	  noted	   that	   the	   constituencies	   addressed	  by	   these	   two	  projects	   are	  different.	  
Although,	  both	  citizens	  and	  non-­‐citizens	  could	  vote	  and	  be	  elected	  in	  the	  PNR	  elections,	  the	  PNR	  
clearly	   identifies	   the	   excluded	   group	   they	   seek	   to	   represent	   as	   Latvia’s	   non-­‐citizens.	   Although	  
PNR	   members	   often	   frame	   the	   issue	   of	   non-­‐citizenship	   in	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   Latvia’s	  
Russophone	  community,	  non-­‐citizenship	  remains	  PNR’s	  central	  issue	  and	  the	  non-­‐citizens	  are	  its	  
specific	  constituency.	  In	  Estonia,	  RZS	  took	  the	  entire	  Russian-­‐speaking	  community	  as	  the	  group	  it	  
is	  aiming	  to	  represent,	  without	  making	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  citizens	  and	  non-­‐citizens.	  This	  
can	  be	  explained	  by	  two	  factors,	  one	  political	  and	  one	  legislative,	  that	  differentiate	  Estonia	  and	  
Latvia.	  First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  no	  Russophone	  party	  in	  Estonia,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  Russian-­‐speaking	  
MPs	   in	   the	  Estonian	  parliament	  has	   consistently	  been	  disproportionately	   low.	  Differently	   from	  
Latvia,	   where	   a	   prominent	   Russophone	   party	   exists,	   the	   question	   of	   minority	   political	  
representation	  in	  Estonia	  can	  thus	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  question	  of	  minority	  under-­‐representation	  
in	   general	   rather	   than	   a	   question	   of	   non-­‐citizens’	   non-­‐representation	   in	   particular	   (Interviews	  
with	   RZS	   initiators,	   2013).	   Secondly,	   in	   Estonia	   non-­‐citizens	   have	   the	   right	   to	   vote	   in	   local	  
elections.	  This	  to	  some	  extent	  blurs	  the	  distinction	  between	  Russian-­‐speaking	  citizens	  and	  non-­‐
citizens,	  which	  is	  instead	  more	  clearly	  defined	  in	  Latvia.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  actual	  political	  practice,	  PNR	  and	  RZS	  do	  not	  constitute	  an	  absolute	  novelty	  in	  
the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  grassroots	  panorama.	  In	  explaining	  their	  strategy,	  initiators	  emphasised	  
PNR	  and	  RZS’s	  role	  as	  interlocutors	  for	  state	  institutions,	  and	  their	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  4,000	  people	  are	  about	  1%	  of	  the	  adult	  Russophone	  population	  of	  Estonia.	  
137	  Information	  from	  RZS’s	  official	  website:	  www.ruszemsovet.eu.	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them	   in	   finding	   solutions	   to	   the	  problems	  of	   their	   constituencies.138	   In	  both	  cases	   the	  primary	  
tasks	   identified	   by	   the	   initiators	   are	   lobbying	   local,	   state	   and	   international	   institutions,	   and	  
cooperating	  with	  the	  elements	  of	   the	  existing	   institutions	  that	  are	  willing	  to	  do	  so	  (Interviews,	  
2013;	   PNR	   Statute).	   Petitions,	   open	   letters	   (and,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   PNR,	   meetings	   with	  
representatives	  of	  formal	  institutions)	  are	  the	  main	  activities	  that	  these	  bodies	  have	  undertaken	  
since	  their	  formation.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess	  the	  policy	  impact	  of	  these	  initiatives,	  both	  because	  
they	  are	  recent	  and	  because	  their	  aims	  are	  rather	  broad.	  Nevertheless,	  PNR	  and	  RZS’s	  activities	  
closely	  match	  those	  undertaken	  by	  other	  minority	  NGOs	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  
that	  they	  will	  encounter	  similar	  barriers.	  Most	  of	  all,	  their	  policy	  impact	  will	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  
policymakers’	  willingness	   to	  allow	   these	  organisations	  as	   legitimate	  voices	   in	   the	  policymaking	  
debate.	  
However,	  the	  remit	  of	  these	   initiatives	  goes	  beyond	  the	  discrete	  policies	  they	  address	   in	  
their	  daily	  practices.	  By	  asserting	  that	  the	  Russophone	  (or	  non-­‐citizen)	  communities	  need	  such	  
an	  alternative	  channel	  of	   representation,	   the	   initiators	  propose	  a	   radical	   critique	   to	  what	   they	  
call	  ‘ethnocracy’	  (Interviews,	  2013)	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  minority’s	  exclusion	  from	  power.	  The	  broader,	  
non	  policy-­‐specific	  aim	  of	  these	  initiatives	  is	  therefore	  to	  reclaim	  the	  minority’s	  legitimate	  place	  
as	  part	  of	   the	  democratic	  polity.	  While	   this	  goal	   is	   too	  broad	  to	  be	  assessed	   in	   terms	  of	  policy	  
impact,	  these	  initiatives’	  implied	  challenge	  to	  the	  existing	  structures	  of	  minority	  representation	  
elicited	   responses	   that	   offer	   interesting	   illustrations	   of	   the	   perceived	   legitimacy	   of	   minority	  
voices	  in	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  public	  debate.	  The	  reactions	  from	  the	  national	  elites	  to	  these	  
initiatives	   can	   shed	   some	   light	   on	   the	   level	   of	   rigidity	   of	   the	   existing	   boundaries	   to	   the	  
democratic	   debate	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   minority	   grassroots	   initiatives	   can	   successfully	  
challenge	  them.	  Therefore,	  while	  PNR	  and	  (particularly)	  RZS	  are	  small-­‐scale	  initiatives	  and	  might	  
not	   have	   much	   political	   impact	   (and	   actually	   might	   not	   last	   for	   a	   long	   time),	   they	   provide	  
interesting	   illustrations	   of	   the	   room	   for	   effective	   minority	   political	   participation	   through	  
grassroots	  mobilisation	  available	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  
A	   review	  of	  Estonian-­‐language	  and	  Latvian-­‐language	  news	  databases	   shows	   that	   in	  both	  
countries	  minority	  grassroots	  mobilisation	   is	  often	   labelled	  as	  radical;	  especially	   initiatives	  that	  
contest	  the	  existing	  citizenship	  and	  language	  arrangements	  tend	  to	  automatically	  fall	  under	  the	  
‘radical’	   label.	   It	   is	   therefore	   not	   surprising	   that	   the	   label	   was	   widely	   used	   in	   state-­‐language	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	   In	   general,	   in	   both	   cases	   willingness	   to	   cooperate	   with	   existing	   institutions	   was	   stressed,	   together	   with	   their	  
recognition	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  as	  independent	  states	  and	  as	  their	  own	  homeland.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  initiators	  of	  RZS	  
put	   it:	   ‘We	   want	   integration,	   we	   want	   to	   be	   here,	   I	   was	   born	   here,	   this	   is	   my	   fatherland.	   I	   am	   not	   a	   [Russian]	  
nationalist.	   I	  want	   to	  be	   a	  Russian	   in	   a	  normal,	   democratic	   country’	   (Interview,	   2013).	   Similar	   self-­‐descriptions	   as	  
moderate	  members	   of	   society	  who	   simply	  want	   democracy	  and	   a	  model	   of	   integration	   that	   is	   respectful	   of	   their	  
ethno-­‐linguistic	  identity	  were	  voiced	  by	  my	  respondents	  from	  PNR	  (Interviews,	  2013).	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media	   and	   by	   national	   elites	   to	   describe	   the	   PNR	   and	   the	   RZS	   initiatives.	   These	   were	   often	  
referred	  to	  as	  too	  radical	  to	  be	  accepted	  within	  the	  mainstream	  democratic	  debate,	  and	  more	  or	  
less	  veiled	  references	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  was	  behind	  their	  organisers	  
were	   also	   voiced.	   The	   implication	   was	   that	   if	   PNR	   and	   RZS’s	   initiators	   are	   representatives	   of	  
Moscow’s	  interests	  in	  the	  Baltics,	  their	  demands	  and	  voices	  have	  no	  legitimate	  space	  within	  the	  
Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  democratic	  debate.	  	  
Numerous	   examples	   of	   this	   can	   be	   found	   in	   both	   countries.	   For	   example,	   in	   Latvia,	   the	  
then	  foreign	  minister	  Artis	  Pabriks	  argued	  that	  Latvia	  must	   ‘defend	  its	  democratic	  values’	  from	  
this	  kind	  of	   initiatives	  and	  that	   the	  non-­‐citizens’	  alternative	  elections	  show	  disrespect	   for	  both	  
the	  Latvian	  state	  and	  the	  people	  of	  Latvia.139	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Russophone	  grassroots	  initiative	  is	  
presented	  not	  only	  as	  being	  outside	  of	  the	  democratic	  process,	  but	  also	  as	  an	  actual	  threat	  to	  it.	  
Similarly,	  and	  explicitly	  underlying	  the	  expected	  boundaries	  of	  Latvia’s	  democratic	  debate,	  Unity	  
MP	   Sarmīte	   Ēlerte	   described	   the	   PNR	   project	   as	   a	   product	   of	   ‘Russia’s	   political	   ideologues,	  
Harmony	  Centre,	   and	   Linderman's	  people’	   and	   concluded	   that	   ‘by	  questioning	   the	  doctrine	  of	  
continuity,	  PNR	  alienates	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  dialogue:	  you	  must	  recognise	  the	  country	  you	  live	  in	  
before	   a	   dialogue	   can	   take	  place’.140	  Members	   of	   parliament	   also	   asked	   the	   security	   police	   to	  
ascertain	  PNR’s	  potential	  ties	  with	  Moscow	  and	  whether	  this	  was	  not	  in	  fact	  an	  illegal	  attempt	  to	  
overthrow	  Latvia’s	  legitimate	  state	  structures	  (LCHR,	  9	  July	  2013).	  
In	   Estonia,	   RZS	  was	  much	   less	   visible	   in	   the	  media,	   not	   least	   due	   to	   its	   limited	   success.	  
However,	   mentions	   of	   this	   initiative	   always	   stressed	   its	   origins	   from	   the	   ‘Kremlin-­‐friendly	  
Nochnoy	   Dozor’.	   Having	   been	   accused	   of	   having	   organised	   the	   April	   2007	   riots	   (and	   then	  
acquitted),	  ND	  is	  routinely	  presented	  in	  the	  Estonian	  press	  as	  a	  radical	  agent	  of	  Russia’s	  foreign	  
policy.141	   Although	   ND	   was	   disbanded	   in	   2011,	   it	   was	   still	   listed	   among	   the	   extremist	  
organisations	  in	  the	  Estonian	  security	  police	  website	  in	  2014.142	  Therefore,	  notwithstanding	  ND	  
members’	  efforts	  to	  distance	  the	  two	  initiatives	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  RZS’s	  active	  members	  are	  not	  
former	  ND	  members,	  association	  with	  ND	  automatically	  delegitimised	  the	  new	  initiative	  as	  pro-­‐
Kremlin.	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   ‘Negrazhdane	   stolknuli	   lbami	   Pabriksa	   s	   Urbanovichem’	   (Pabriks	   and	   Urbanovich	   argue	   on	   the	   non-­‐citizens).	  
Telegraf,	   26	   June	   2013.	   Available	   at:	   http://www.telegraf.lv/news/pabriks-­‐nado-­‐zashtitity-­‐demokratiyu-­‐ot-­‐
negrazhdan	  (Last	  accessed	  13	  February	  2015).	  
140	   	   ‘Sarmīte	   Ēlerte:	   'Nepilsoņu	   kongresa'	   marginālās	   spēles’	   (Sarmīte	   Ēlerte:	   The	   Non-­‐Citizens	   Congress	   marginals’	  
games).	   Delfi.lv,	   24	   March	   2013.	   Available	   at:	   http://www.delfi.lv/news/comment/comment/sarmite-­‐elerte-­‐
nepilsonu-­‐kongresa-­‐marginalas-­‐speles.d?id=43171826	  (Last	  accessed	  13	  February	  2015).	  
141	  For	  example,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Bronze	  Night	  a	  major	  Estonian-­‐language	  newspaper	  titled:	  ‘Äärmuslaste	  aktsioonide	  
tagant	  paistab	  Vene	  diplomaatide	  vari’	   (Behind	   the	  extremists'	  actions	   there	   is	   the	   shadow	  of	  Russian	  diplomats).	  
Postimees,	  25	  April	  2007.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.postimees.ee/1653973/aarmuslaste-­‐aktsioonide-­‐tagant-­‐paistab-­‐
vene-­‐diplomaatide-­‐vari	  (Last	  accessed	  13	  February	  2015).	  
142	  The	  Estonian	  Security	  police’s	  official	  website	  can	  be	  accessed	  at:	  www.kapo.ee	  (Last	  accessed	  13	  February	  2015).	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It	   is	  worth	  noting	  here	   that	  delegitimation	  by	  association	  with	  ND	   is	  not	  unique	   to	  RZS.	  
Although	  ND	  was	  disbanded	  in	  2011,	  media	  reports	  of	   links	  with	  former	  ND	  members	  seem	  to	  
be	  often	  used	  to	  discredit	  other	  organisations	  or	  political	   figures.	  For	   instance,	  Estonian	  media	  
reported	  on	   alleged	   links	   between	   some	   former	  ND	  members	   and	   the	  NGO	  Russian	   School	   in	  
Estonia	  (RSE)	  and	  concluded	  that	  RSE	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  ND’s	  Kremlin-­‐backed	  new	  strategy	  to	  
destabilise	  Estonian	  politics	  after	  the	   issue	  of	  the	  Bronze	  Soldier	  has	  run	  out	  of	  steam.143	  Links	  
between	  Russophone	  politicians	  and	  ‘extremist	  group	  Nochnoy	  Dozor’	  are	  regularly	  mentioned	  
in	   the	   Estonian	   security	   police’s	   reports,	   also	   after	   2011.144	   And	   as	   recently	   as	   October	   2013,	  
Tallinn	   mayor	   Edgar	   Savisaar	   was	   asked	   to	   deny	   links	   with	   ND	   during	   his	   municipal	   election	  
campaign.145	  
While	   in	  both	   cases	   securitisation	  and	  delegitimation	  of	  PNR	  and	  RZS	  as	   extremist,	   pro-­‐
Kremlin	   activities	  were	  widespread	   and	   partially	   justified	   by	   links	  with	   ‘toxic’	   personalities,	   in	  
Latvia	  the	  fencing-­‐off	  of	  this	  minority	  grassroots	  initiative	  from	  the	  democratic	  debate	  was	  less	  
all-­‐encompassing	   than	   in	   Estonia.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   PNR	   not	   all	   reactions	   were	   univocally	  
demonising.	   Harmony	   Centre	   did	   not	   claim	   ownership	   of	   the	   project	   (although	   some	   PNR	  
members	  are	  close	   to	   the	  party)	  but	  portrayed	   it	  as	  a	   legitimate	  civil	   society	   initiative	   that,	  by	  
opening	   up	   the	   discussion	   on	   non-­‐citizenship	   and	   giving	   non-­‐citizens	   an	   autonomous	   voice,	  
could	   only	   be	   positive	   for	   Latvia’s	   democracy.146	   The	   Latvian	   President	   responded	   to	   the	  
announcement	   of	   the	   alternative	   elections	   by	   stressing	   that	   the	   question	   of	   non-­‐citizenship	  
raised	   by	   this	   initiative	   must	   be	   a	   priority	   of	   his	   presidency.147	   Moreover,	   state	   and	   local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	   Sulev	   Vedlev:	   ‘Võitlus	   venekeelse	   hariduse	   eest	   algas	   Kremli	   rahaga’	   (The	   fight	   for	   Russian-­‐language	   education	  
started	   with	   Kremlin	   money).	   Eesti	   Ekspress,	   22	   March	   2012.	   	   Available	   at:	  
http://ekspress.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/voitlus-­‐venekeelse-­‐hariduse-­‐eest-­‐algas-­‐kremli-­‐rahaga.d?id=64107843	  
(Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	  
144	  The	  reports,	   issued	  once	  a	  year	  by	  the	  Security	  Police,	  are	  available	  on	  the	  Police’s	  official	  website:	  www.kapo.ee	  
(Last	  accessed	  23	  February	  2015).	  
145	   ‘Linnapeakandidaadid	  kogunesid	  valimisstuudios:	  Edgar	  Savisaar	  eitas	  sidet	  Öise	  Vahtkonnaga’	   (Mayor	  candidates	  
gathered	   in	   the	   election	   studios:	   Edgar	   Savisaar	   denied	   links	   with	   Nochnoy	   Dozor).	   Delfi.ee,	   11	   October	   2013.	  
Available	   at:	   http://eestielu.delfi.ee/eesti/archive/linnapeakandidaadid-­‐kogunesid-­‐valimisstuudios-­‐edgar-­‐savisaar-­‐
eitas-­‐sidet-­‐oise-­‐vahtkonnaga.d?id=66888919	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	  
146	  See,	   for	   example:	   ‘Negrazhdane	   stolknuli	   lbami	   Pabriksa	   s	  Urbanovichem’	   (Pabriks	   and	  Urbanovičs	   argue	  on	   the	  
non-­‐citizens).	   Telegraf,	   26	   June	   2013.	   Available	   at:	   http://www.telegraf.lv/news/pabriks-­‐nado-­‐zashtitity-­‐
demokratiyu-­‐ot-­‐negrazhdan	   (Last	   accessed	   16	   February	   2015).	   See	   also:	   ‘Urbanovich:	   Problemu	   negrazhdan	   ne	  
reshit,	  poka	  na	  etu	  ne	  ukazhut	  SShA	  i	  ES’	  (Urbanovičs:	  The	  problem	  of	  non-­‐citizens	  won’t	  be	  solved	  until	  the	  EU	  and	  
USA	   demand	   it).	   RuBaltic.ru,	   14	   June	   2013.	   	   Available	   at:	   http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-­‐i-­‐
obshchestvo/urbanovich-­‐problemu-­‐negrazhdan-­‐ne-­‐reshit-­‐poka-­‐na-­‐eto-­‐ne-­‐ukazhut-­‐ssha-­‐i-­‐es14062013/	   (Last	  
accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	  
147	   ‘Delfi	  v	  Rige:	  Prezident	  Latvii	   rasskazal,	   kak	  emu	  rabotaetsia	  v	   strane,	  gde	  300	   tysiach	  negrazhdan’	   (Delfi	   in	  Riga:	  
Latvia’s	  President	  told	  how	  he	  manages	  to	  work	  in	  a	  country	  with	  300,000	  non-­‐citizens).	  Delfi.ee,	  28	  February	  2013.	  
Available	   at:	   http://rus.delfi.ee/daily/estonia/delfi-­‐v-­‐rige-­‐prezident-­‐latvii-­‐rasskazal-­‐kak-­‐emu-­‐rabotaetsya-­‐v-­‐strane-­‐
gde-­‐300-­‐tysyach-­‐negrazhdan.d?id=65753876	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	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institutions	   received	  PNR	  members	   in	  official	  meetings,	   de	   facto	   recognising	   them	  as	   (at	   least	  
potentially)	   legitimate	   interlocutors	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   non-­‐citizenship.	   Already	   in	   February	   2013,	  
soon	  after	   the	   formation	  of	   the	  Non-­‐Citizens’	  Congress	  and	   its	  announcement	   that	  alternative	  
elections	  were	  going	  to	  take	  place,	  the	  parliamentary	  committee	  on	  societal	  integration	  invited	  
Congress	   members	   to	   attend	   their	   meeting.	   The	   head	   of	   the	   committee	   (a	   member	   of	   the	  
nationalist	  party	  TB/LNNK)	  reportedly	  commented	  that,	  although	  the	  zero-­‐option	  on	  citizenship	  
was	   out	   of	   the	   question,	   the	   committee	   should	   anyway	   take	   the	   problem	   of	   non-­‐citizenship	  
seriously.148	  Furthermore,	  a	  number	  of	   local	  administrations	  –	   including	  Riga	  –	  conducted	  talks	  
with	  PNR	  about	   initiating	  formal	  cooperation	  and	  allowing	  PNR	  representatives	   in	  a	  number	  of	  
local	  council	  committees	  (Interviews	  with	  PNR	  members,	  2013;	  PNR	  second	  plenary	  session,	  14	  
September	  2013).	  
	  Alongside	  these	  formal	  or	  de	  facto	  recognitions	  of	  legitimacy,	  some	  Latvian	  public	  figures	  
openly	  challenged	  the	  automatic	  dismissal	  of	  PNR	  as	  radical.	  They	  did	  this	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  
this	   initiative	   signals	   a	   serious	   problem	   that	   the	   government	   is	   guilty	   of	   minimising,149	   and	   –	  
more	   straightforwardly	   –	   that	   if	   every	   activity	   that	   brings	   together	   people	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
ethnicity	   is	   to	  be	   seen	  as	  dangerous	  by	   the	   Latvian	   security	   services,	   then	  also	   the	  nationalist	  
parties	   in	   parliament	   should	   be	   put	   under	   scrutiny.150	   More	   in	   general,	   my	   analysis	   of	   the	  
Latvian-­‐language	  newspapers’	   coverage	  of	  PNR	  does	   reveal	  many	   instances	  of	   securitising	  and	  
delegitimising.	  However,	  coverage	  was	  rather	  extensive,	  which	  insured	  a	  relatively	  high	  level	  of	  
public	  visibility	  to	  PNR,	  and	  it	  included	  much	  neutral-­‐to-­‐positive	  coverage,	  especially	  interviews	  
with	  PNR	  members	  and	  reprinting	  of	  PNR	  press	  releases.	  	  
While	   it	   was	   not	   always	   depicted	   as	   a	   benevolent	   (and	   desirable)	   expression	   of	   civic	  
activism,	  PNR	  was	  at	  least	  regarded	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  minority	  discontent	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with.	  
This	   applied	   to	   the	   majority	   elite,	   who	   was	   reminded	   of	   the	   persistent	   problem	   of	   non-­‐
citizenship.	  But	  it	  also	  applied	  to	  the	  Russophone	  representatives	  in	  formal	  institutions.	  As	  one	  
of	  PNR	  initiators	  put	  it:	  	  
I	   am	   a	   member	   of	   Harmony	   Centre	   (HC),	   but	   in	   this	   case	   I	   think	   that	   civil	   society	  
activism	  will	  be	  more	  effective:	  firstly,	  as	  a	  party	  we	  will	  need	  some	  years	  to	  get	  to	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  ‘Vybory	  “parlamenta	  negrazhdan”:	  politiki	  bstrevozhilis’	  (Elections	  for	  the	  “non-­‐citizens’	  parliament’:	  politicians	  are	  
worried).	   Delfi.lv,	   28	   February	   2013.	   Available	   at:	   http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/politics/vybory-­‐parlamenta-­‐
negrazhdan-­‐politiki-­‐vstrevozhilis.d?id=43102806	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	  
149	   	   ‘Dainis	   Lemešonoks:	   Nepilsoņu	   eksistences	   jēga’	   (Dainis	   Lemešonoks:	   the	   sense	   of	   the	   non-­‐citizens’	   existence).	  
Delfi.lv,	   29	   November	   2012.	   Available	   at:	   http://www.delfi.lv/news/comment/comment/dainis-­‐lemesonoks-­‐
nepilsonu-­‐eksistences-­‐jega.d?id=42868478	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	  
150	   Iveta	   Kažoka:	   ‘Recenzija	   Drošības	   policijas	   2012.gada	   pārskatam’	   (Review	   of	   the	   Security	   Police	   2012	   report).	  
Politika.lv,	   13	   May	   2013.	   Available	   at:	   http://politika.lv/article/recenzija-­‐drosibas-­‐policijas-­‐2012-­‐gada-­‐parskatam	  
(Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	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problem;	  secondly,	  we	  see	  a	  possibility	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  through	  civil	  society;	  thirdly,	  
it’s	  possible	  that	  also	  HC	  sometimes	  needs	  society	  to	  remind	  them	  that	   this	  question	  
must	  be	   solved,	   that	   they	  cannot	   leave	   it	  behind	  or	   forget	   it.	   So	   civil	   society	   can	  put	  
pressure	  on	  HC,	   so	   that	   in	   the	  process	   of	   creating	   compromise	   agreements	  with	   the	  
other	  parties	  this	  question	  does	  not	  fall	  behind.	  (Interview	  with	  Elisaveta	  Krivtsova,	  23	  
September	  2013)	  
Having	  a	  vaguer	  constituency	  and	  fewer	  votes,	  RZS	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  impose	  itself	  as	  a	  
legitimate	   voice	   in	   Estonia’s	   public	   debate	   and	  was	   easily	   dismissed	   as	   another	   expression	   of	  
pro-­‐Kremlin	   radicalism.	   In	   Latvia,	   PNR	   was	   slightly	   more	   successful	   in	   terms	   of	   mobilisation,	  
although	   not	   to	   an	   extent	   that	   necessarily	   justifies	   the	   attention	   it	   received.151	   Its	   appeal	   to	  
redraw	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Latvia’s	  democratic	  debate,	  however,	   resonated	  more	   in	   the	  Latvian	  
political	  context	  in	  which	  Russophone	  voices	  are	  harder	  to	  ignore.	  PNR’s	  experience	  –	  whether	  it	  
will	   eventually	   be	   successful	   or	   not	   –	   illustrates	   how	   the	   positive	   trend	   of	   minority	  
representation	   and	  mobilisation	   in	   Latvia	   has	   created	   room	   for	   Russian-­‐speaking	   activists	   and	  
representatives	  (and	  for	  liberal	  voices	  within	  the	  ethnic	  Latvian	  community)	  to	  actively	  negotiate	  
the	  borders	  of	  legitimate	  political	  action.	  While	  this	  does	  not	  guarantee	  policy	  impact	  and	  might	  
in	   fact	   backlash	   by	   triggering	   stronger	   nationalist	   reactions,	   it	   also	   creates	   a	  more	   favourable	  
climate	   for	   the	   engagement	   of	   minority	   voices	   in	   the	   democratic	   (although	   often	   heated)	  
debate.	  
7.1.3 Protest	  
Protest,	  as	  a	  non-­‐violent	  form	  of	  contentious	  politics,	  is	  part	  of	  ‘the	  repertoire	  of	  ‘voice’	  that	  the	  
democratic	  citizen	  has	  at	  its	  disposal	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  political	  elite’	  (Kopecký	  &	  Mudde,	  
2003,	   p.	   10).	   According	   to	   Sherrill	   Stroschein,	   minority	   grassroots	   protest	   constitutes	   an	  
important	   avenue	   for	   minorities	   to	   enter	   the	   democratic	   process	   from	   which	   they	   would	  
otherwise	   be	   excluded	   by	   democracy’s	  majoritarian	   bias	   (Stroschein,	   2012).	  Minority	   protests	  
can	   therefore	   potentially	   constitute	   an	   alternative	   channel	   for	   the	   minority	   to	   influence	  
policymaking.	  
In	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  the	  education	  reform	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  major	  catalysts	   for	  
minority	   mobilisation	   and	   protest.	   However,	   this	   happened	   with	   different	   intensities	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Although	  PNR’s	  15,000	  voters	  are	  considerably	  more	  than	  RZS’s	  4,000,	  Latvia	  has	  about	  300,000	  non-­‐citizens	  and	  
the	   legitimacy	  of	  PNR	  to	   represent	   them	  all	  was	  not	  a	  given	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  alternative	  elections.	  For	  an	  early	  
article	  that	  points	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  PNR	  initiative	  see,	  for	  example,	  Aivars	  Ozoliņš:	  ‘Nepārstāvošo	  kongress’	  (The	  
Congress	   of	   the	   Non-­‐representing).	   IR,	   13	   June	   2013.	   Available	   at:	  
http://www.delfi.lv/news/comment/comment/aivars-­‐ozolins-­‐ir-­‐neparstavoso-­‐kongress.d?id=43400141	   (Last	  
accessed	  9	  	  January	  2015).	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different	   levels	   of	   success.	   In	   Latvia	   the	   education	   reform	   was	   due	   to	   be	   implemented	   in	  
minority	   schools	   starting	   in	   September	   2004,	   and	   the	   years	   2003–2004	   saw	   a	   series	   of	   street	  
protests	  (especially	  in	  Riga)	  in	  which	  thousands	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	  openly	  rejected	  the	  reform’s	  
goals	   and	   implementation	   plans.152	   In	   Estonia	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   similar	   reform	   was	  
postponed	   several	   times	   and	   then	   started	   gradually	   only	   in	   2007.	   A	   number	   of	   small-­‐scale	  
protests	  and	  sit-­‐ins	  were	  organised	  against	  it	  by	  the	  Russophone	  NGO	  Russian	  School	  in	  Estonia.	  
Anti-­‐reform	  grassroots	  efforts	  achieved	  markedly	  different	  success	   in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  
both	   in	  terms	  of	  their	  mobilisation	  capabilities	  and	  of	  their	  policy	   impact.	   In	  both	  cases,	  ethnic	  
majority	   elites	  were	   the	   gatekeepers	   of	   the	   policymaking	   process.	  However,	   in	   Latvia	   the	   size	  
and	   duration	   of	   the	   protests	   pushed	   the	   government	   to	   compromise.	   My	   interviews	   with	  
policymakers	  and	  anti-­‐reform	  activists	  reveal	  that	  there	  are	  different	  accounts	  of	  the	  chronology	  
of	  the	  events,	  namely	  on	  whether	  the	  softening	  of	  the	  requirements	  from	  100%	  to	  60%	  Latvian-­‐
language	  teaching	   in	  minority	  schools	  was	  a	  response	  to	  the	  protests	  or	  dictated	  by	  pragmatic	  
considerations	  that	  pre-­‐dated	  the	  mass	  demonstrations	  (namely,	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  resources	  
to	   implement	  a	   total	   language	  switch).	  Although	  some	  of	   the	  biggest	  protests	   took	  place	  after	  
the	   government’s	   decision	   to	   amend	   the	   law,	   a	   close	   analysis	   of	   the	   events	   suggests	   that	   the	  
minority’s	   activism	   against	   the	   reform	   was	   instrumental	   in	   pushing	   the	   government	   to	  
compromise.153	  	  
The	  Latvian	  government	  engaged	   in	  dialogue	  with	   the	  Russophone	  opposition	  only	  after	  
the	   latter	   had	   started	  mobilising	   for	   protest	   (Rozenvalds,	   2005,	   p.	   28).	   Then,	  when	   it	   realised	  
that	  the	  protests	  were	  slow	  to	  subside,	  the	  government	  adopted	  a	  strategy	  to	  defuse	  tensions	  
that	   envisaged	   concessions	   to	   what	   it	   considered	   the	   moderate	   Russophone	   activists,	   while	  
discouraging	   the	   more	   maximalist	   elements	   (Muižnieks,	   2009,	   p.	   76).	   This	   strategy	   was	  
implemented	   in	  a	   less	  than	   linear	  manner	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	   there	  was	  a	  diffused	  feeling	  among	  
the	  minority	  opposition	  that	  the	  government	  could	  not	  be	  trusted	  as	  a	  negotiation	  partner.	  At	  
different	   junctures	   the	  government	  broke	   its	  promises,	  generating	  distrust	   for	   the	  authenticity	  
of	  its	  will	  to	  compromise	  (Silova,	  2006,	  p.	  148ff.).	  This	  distrust	  likely	  explains	  why	  protests	  went	  
on	   even	   after	   the	   60/40	   arrangement	   had	   become	   law	   and	   until	   the	   actual	   implementation	  
started.	  Although	   the	   final	   policy	  was	  not	   considered	   ideal	   by	   all	   the	   activists,	   the	   2003–2004	  
experience	   of	   mobilisation	   was	   a	   clear	   signal	   of	   Latvia’s	   Russophone	   minority’s	   capacity	   to	  
mobilise	  en	  masse.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	   For	   a	   thorough	   summary	   of	   the	   2003–2004	   protest	   actions	   and	   an	   analysis	   of	   their	   rationale,	   see	   Tatjana	  
Bogushevich	  (2013).	  	  
153	  For	  a	  chronology	  of	  the	  events,	  see	  Iveta	  Silova	  (2006,	  pp.	  176–89).	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Another	  important	  feature	  that	  distinguished	  Latvia’s	  Russophone	  community’s	  response	  
to	   the	  education	   reform	   from	  Estonia’s	  was	   the	   level	  of	   internal	  differentiation	  of	   the	  protest	  
movement.	   In	   Latvia,	  although	   the	  basic	   critiques	   to	   the	   reform	  were	  shared,	   the	  Russophone	  
front	   was	   not	   homogenous.	   It	   had	   a	   more	   moderate,	   compromise-­‐prone	   component	  
(represented	   by	   the	   Latvian	   association	   for	   the	   support	   of	   Russian-­‐language,	   LAShOR)	   and	   a	  
more	  radical	  component	  (represented	  by	  the	  Headquarters	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  Russian	  schools,	  
Shtab).	  This	  diversification	  of	  approaches	  within	  the	  protest	  movement	  –	  that	  mirrored	  a	  similar	  
split	  within	  the	  union	  of	  Russophone	  parties	  FHRUL	  –	  arguably	  facilitated	  compromise.	   Indeed,	  
internal	  differentiation	  meant	   that	   the	  policymakers	  were	  presented	  with	  a	   range	  of	  positions	  
from	   the	  protest	   front,	  which	  made	   it	   politically	   acceptable	   to	   at	   least	   partially	   accommodate	  
the	  minority	  voices	  they	  considered	  more	  moderate.	  
In	   Estonia,	   there	   was	   no	   such	   differentiation	   within	   the	   Russophone	   anti-­‐reform	   front.	  
First	   of	   all,	   there	   is	   only	   one	   grassroots	   organisation	   (Russian	   School	   in	   Estonia,	   RSE)	   that	  
opposes	   the	   reform.	   Moreover,	   although	   it	   has	   its	   own	   strategies	   and	   a	   measure	   of	  
organisational	  independence,	  RSE	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  Tallinn	  city	  government	  (especially	  the	  
deputy	   mayor	   Mihhail	   Kõlvart)	   for	   strategic	   support	   and	   visibility.	   While	   a	   more	   thorough	  
analysis	   of	   Tallinn	   city	   government’s	   role	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority	   has	   been	  
provided	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  here	  it	   is	  sufficient	  to	  note	  that	  reliance	  on	  a	  specific	  political	  party	  and	  
lack	  of	  internal	  differentiation	  make	  the	  anti-­‐reform	  movement	  in	  Estonia	  less	  independent	  and	  
more	  vulnerable	  to	  exogenous	  party	  interests.	  The	  movement	  is	  thus	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
policy	  partner	  by	  the	  Estonian	  policymakers.	  
Moreover,	  given	  its	  relatively	  low	  capacity	  for	  popular	  mobilisation,	  RSE	  tends	  to	  use	  the	  
same	   tools	   of	   other	  minority	   advocacy	   NGOs	   (petitions	   and	   lobbying)	   and	   encounters	   similar	  
barriers.	  So,	  for	  example,	  RSE	  members	  met	  representatives	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  the	  
Ministry	  of	   Culture	   (responsible	   for	  minority	   issues).	  However,	   these	  meetings	  had	  hardly	   any	  
policy	   impact.	   The	   Head	   of	   General	   Education	   Department	   at	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Education	  
described	  her	  meetings	  with	  RSE	  representatives	  in	  this	  way:	  
We	   sat	  here	   and	   talked,	  but	  we	  don’t	   have	  any	   substantial	  work	  with	   them	  because	  
they	  don’t	  have	  proposals	  regarding	  the	  pedagogical	  process.	  They	  are	  only	  concerned	  
with	   politics;	   they	   are	   not	   concerned	   with	   high-­‐quality	   education.	   Their	   slogans	   are	  
also…always	  about	  some	  rights,	  some	  “minority	  rights”.	  (Interview	  with	  Irene	  Käosaar,	  
5	  September	  2013)	  
Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   eventually	   passed	   a	   very	   similar	   school	   reform	   that	   foresees	   at	   least	  
60%	   state-­‐language	   teaching	   in	   upper-­‐secondary	  minority	   schools,	   although	  with	   a	   significant	  
170	  
	  
difference	   in	   terms	   of	   implementation	   timing	   (much	   earlier	   in	   Latvia).	   Notwithstanding	   the	  
similar	  policy	  outcome,	   there	  was	  a	   fundamental	  difference	  between	  Latvia	  and	  Estonia	   in	   the	  
process	  through	  which	  this	  outcome	  was	  achieved.	  In	  Latvia	  the	  minority,	  by	  mobilising,	  took	  an	  
active	   part	   in	   the	   policy	   debate.	   In	   Estonia	   the	   policy	   shift	   took	   the	   form	   of	   a	   pragmatic	  
concession	  rather	  than	  being	  the	  result	  of	  a	  deliberative	  process	  that	  included	  the	  minority.	  All	  
Estonia’s	  minority	  activists	  and	  minority	  NGO	  advocates	  I	   interviewed	  described	  their	  access	  to	  
the	   policymaking	   debate	   as	   practically	   null.	   They	   understood	   the	   government’s	   gradualist	  
approach	  to	  the	  reform	  as	  a	  ‘cunning’	  way	  to	  deter	  minority	  opposition.	  While	  this	  is	  arguably	  its	  
own	  form	  of	  response	  to	  minority	  opinions	   (it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	  government	  moderated	   its	   line	  
not	   least	  to	  avoid	   large-­‐scale	  protests),	   it	   is	  one	  that	  denies	  the	  minority	  any	  active	  role	   in	  the	  
policymaking	  debate.	  
Moreover,	  while	  in	  Estonia	  at	  the	  local	  level	  the	  conflict	  on	  school	  reform	  implementation	  
has	   taken	   harsh	   tones,	   in	   parliament	   the	   discussion	   is	   mostly	   about	   the	   speed	   of	   the	  
implementation	   rather	   than	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   reform.	   The	   Centre	   Party,	   particularly	   by	   the	  
initiative	   of	   some	   of	   its	   Russophone	   MPs,	   managed	   to	   postpone	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
reform	  a	  number	  of	  times.	  The	  lack	  of	  significant	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  on	  this	  issue,	  however,	  
meant	  that	  the	  Centre	  Party’s	  Russophone	  MPs	  had	  little	  backing	  for	  their	  claims	  that	  the	  reform	  
goes	  counter	  to	  minority	  rights	  and	  needs.	  
Given	   the	   low	   success	   with	   mobilising	   mass	   protest	   around	   the	   education	   reform	   in	  
Estonia,	  some	  observers	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  2003–2004	  protests	  in	  Latvia	  are	  better	  compared	  
to	  Estonia’s	  Bronze	  Soldier	  riots	  in	  2007	  (Interview	  with	  Vadim	  Poleshchuk,	  LICHR,	  2	  May	  2013).	  
In	   fact,	   direct	   comparison	  with	   the	   Latvian	   anti-­‐reform	   protests	   is	   at	   least	   problematic	   as	   the	  
riots	   of	   Aril	   2007	   were	   a	   one-­‐off,	   spontaneous	   revolt	   rather	   than	   policy-­‐oriented,	   politically	  
organised	  protests.	  Nochnoy	  Dozor	  (Night	  Guard,	  ND)	  –	  the	  small	  grassroots	  organisation	  that,	  in	  
the	   months	   preceding	   the	   removal	   had	   organised	   regular	   sit-­‐ins	   at	   the	   statue	   –	   had	   not	  
organised	  the	  riots	  and	  did	  not	  subsequently	  capitalise	  on	  the	  mass	  mobilisation	  spurred	  by	  the	  
removal.	  ND’s	  activities	  were	  in	  many	  respects	  more	  an	  instance	  of	  ‘fire	  fighting’	  rather	  than	  any	  
longer-­‐term	  minority	  political	  mobilisation.154	  However,	  while	  they	  cannot	  be	  easily	  compared	  to	  
Latvia’s	  mass	  political	  protests,	  or	  rather	  because	  they	  cannot	  be	  compared	  to	  them,	  the	  Bronze	  
Night	   riots	   serve	   as	   a	   useful	   illustration	   of	   how	   the	   visibility	   granted	   by	   minority	   mass	  
mobilisation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  guarantee	  voice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  Nochnoy	  Dozor	  militants	  described	  their	  protest’s	  aim	  to	  me	  as	  strictly	  confined	  to	  the	  monument	  issue;	  once	  that	  
was	  ‘solved’	  the	  reason	  to	  protest	  was	  also	  eliminated	  (Interviews	  with	  former	  ND	  militants,	  2013).	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In	   April	   2007,	   the	   Estonian	   government	   decided	   to	   remove	   a	   Soviet-­‐era	   WWII	   statue	  
(known	  as	  the	  Bronze	  Soldier)	  from	  the	  centre	  of	  Tallinn,	  triggering	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐
speaking	   community	   for	  which	   that	   statue	  had	  acquired	  a	  high	   symbolic	  meaning.155	   The	   riots	  
that	  accompanied	  the	  removal	  resulted	   in	  the	  death	  of	  one	  protester,	  over	  a	  hundred	  injuries,	  
and	   one	   thousand	   arrests	   (Kaiser,	   2012,	   p.	   1053).	   These	   events	   came	   as	   a	   shock,	   especially	  
considering	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  had	  hitherto	  been	  seen	  as	  largely	  passive	  and	  
on	  a	  quiet	  path	  towards	  social	  integration	  (Ehala,	  2009).	  The	  Bronze	  Night,	  however,	  was	  also	  an	  
isolated	   event,	   and	   it	   did	   not	   signal	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   new	   period	   of	   heightened	   minority	  
activism	   in	   Estonia.	   ND,	   after	   successfully	  mobilising	   protesters	   to	   oppose	   the	   removal	   of	   the	  
statue,	  failed	  to	  transform	  this	   into	  any	  sort	  of	  political	  capital.	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  civic	  activism	  
has	   remained	   low	  after	   the	  Bronze	  Night,	   disproving	  early	  prediction	   that	   these	  events	  would	  
represent	   a	   watershed	   for	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   civic	   political	   engagement	   (Brüggemann	   &	  
Kasekamp,	  2008,	  pp.	  440–441).	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  direct	  effectiveness	  on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  (the	  removal	  of	  the	  statue),	  the	  sit-­‐ins	  
organised	  by	  ND	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  some	  Russophone	  MPs	  as	  mediators	  were	  unsuccessful.	  
The	  riots	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  this	  lack	  of	  voice	  rather	  than	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  minority	  to	  
influence	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  wider	  effects	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  minority	  grassroots	  
voices,	  the	  riots	  had	  a	  negative	  impact.	  The	  debate	  following	  the	  Bronze	  Night	  events	  reinforced	  
suspicion	  around	  the	  Russophone	  minority,	  and	  securitising	  discourses	  of	  Russia’s	  ‘fifth	  column’	  
were	   common	   (Kaiser,	   2012,	   p.	   1054).	   Moreover,	   as	   it	   has	   been	   noted	   for	   the	   case	   of	   the	  
banlieues	   riots	   in	   France	   (Lentin	   &	   Titley,	   2011,	   p.	   59),	   also	   in	   Estonia	   the	   discussion	   that	  
followed	  the	  riots	  tended	  to	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  rioters	  as	  ‘failed	  integrants’	  and	  did	  not	  bring	  to	  a	  
reconsideration	   of	   integration	   policies	   or	   of	   the	   role	   of	   Russophone	   voices	   in	   the	   democratic	  
process.	  	  
In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  protest,	  the	  2008	  feasibility	  report	  for	  the	  Integration	  Programme	  
decried	   the	   tendency	   to	   see	   the	   Bronze	   Night	   rioters	   as	   ‘the	   “embodiment”	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐
speaking	   population’	   and	   proposed	   an	   ‘integration	   index’	   that	   divided	   Russian-­‐speakers	  
according	   to	   their	   degree	   of	   integration	   and	   ‘positive	   connection’	   with	   Estonia	   (Lauristin	   &	  
Vihalemm,	   2008,	   pp.	   17–18).	   The	   rioters	   were	   at	   the	   bottom	   of	   this	   ‘integration	   hierarchy’.	  
Similarly,	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  public	  official,	  contrasted	  the	  ‘drunk	  criminals’	  that	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  
in	  2007,	   to	   the	   ‘thinking	  Russians	   [who]	  were	  ashamed	   for	  what	  happened’	   (Interview,	  2013).	  
While	   this	   narrative	   of	   the	   events	   allows	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   ‘our	   Russian-­‐speaking	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  For	  accounts	  of	  the	  Bronze	  Night	  and	  of	  the	  events	  that	  preceded	  it,	  including	  early	  instances	  of	  vandalism	  against	  
the	  Bronze	  Soldier	  and	  Nochnoy	  Dozor’s	  sit-­‐ins	  to	  protect	  it,	  see	  David	  Smith	  (2008)	  and	  Martin	  Ehala	  (2009).	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compatriots’	  (those	  who	  ‘are	  ashamed’)	  as	  a	  legitimate	  part	  of	  society,	  the	  distinction	  between	  
‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’	  Russian-­‐speakers	  has	  also	  a	  disciplining	  function	  (Kaiser,	  2012,	  p.	  1055).	  Indeed,	  
according	  to	  Robert	  Kaiser’s	  reading,	  this	  distinction	  carries	  the	  implication	  that	  ‘“our	  Russians”	  
know	  their	  place	  and	  are	  happy	  with	  it,	  are	  loyal	  to	  the	  state,	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  or	  protest	  and	  
certainly	   do	   not	   riot	   against	   it’	   (2012,	   p.	   1055).	   Therefore,	   even	   if	   it	   was	   probably	   meant	   as	  
inclusive,	  this	  discourse	  ends	  up	  delegitimising	  protest	  as	  a	  democratic	  form	  of	  minority	  political	  
expression.	  
The	  comparison	  between	  protest	  episodes	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  suggests	  that	  protest	  can	  
potentially	   be	   an	   alternative	   avenue	   for	   the	   minority	   to	   enter	   the	   democratic	   process	   of	  
decision-­‐making,	   but	   under	   certain	   conditions.	   Effective	   mobilisation	   –	   in	   terms	   of	   size	   and	  
duration	   of	   the	   protests	   –	   was	   key	   in	   Latvia	   to	   impose	  minority	   voices	   as	   participants	   in	   the	  
policymaking	   debate.	   Small	   or	   one-­‐off	   events	   of	   the	   type	   seen	   in	   Estonia	   have	   arguably	   less	  
chances	  of	   successfully	  pushing	  policymakers	   to	   compromise	  and	  might	   instead	  elicit	   negative	  
responses.	   Clear	   policy	   goals	   and	   a	   clear	   articulation	   of	   them	   by	   at	   least	   some	   of	   the	  
organisations	   involved	   in	   the	   protests	   were	   also	   important,	   but	   they	   were	   effective	   only	   in	  
Latvia,	  where	  they	  were	  backed	  by	  substantial	  mobilisation.	  	  
This	   is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   the	   protest	   route	   to	   the	   policy	   process	   (even	   when	  
successful)	   is	   in	  any	  way	   linear.	   Indeed,	  even	   in	   Latvia,	  where	   the	  protest	  movement	  arguably	  
imposed	  the	  presence	  of	  Russophone	  voices	  in	  the	  debate,	  the	  government	  refused	  to	  admit	  to	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	  60/40	   solution	  was	   the	   result	  of	   compromise.	  This,	   according	   to	  Russophone	  
activists	  and	  representatives	  who	  took	  part	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  did	  not	  contribute	  in	  creating	  an	  
atmosphere	   of	  mutual	   cooperation	   and	   understanding	   and	  made	   the	   resulting	   policy	   a	   bitter	  
victory	  (Galbreath	  &	  Galvin,	  2005,	  p.	  456).	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	   in	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  there	  was	  no	  clear-­‐cut	  distinction	  between	  
civil	  society	  activists	  and	  minority	  politicians,	  which	  makes	  unpacking	  the	  relationships	  between	  
the	  two	  rather	  difficult.	   In	  Latvia	   this	  partial	  overlap	  reflected	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  positions	  within	  
the	  Russophone	  community.	   In	  Estonia,	   instead,	  the	  overlap	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  RSE	  resembles	  
co-­‐optation	   by	   the	   Centre	   Party.	   Internal	   differentiation	   of	   the	   protest	   movement	   can	   be	   a	  
facilitating	   condition	   for	   protest	   to	   become	   an	   alternative	   channel	   for	   minority	   access	   to	  
policymaking.	   Indeed,	   it	   strengthens	   the	   position	   of	   minority	   activists	   and	   minority	   political	  
representatives	   that	   are	   willing	   to	   enter	   into	   a	   dialogue	   with	   the	   policymakers,	   which	  makes	  
compromise	  more	   likely.	  Co-­‐optation,	   instead,	  can	  mean	  that	   the	  protest	  movement	  comes	  to	  
be	  associated	  with	  the	  political	  interests	  of	  a	  party	  or	  of	  individual	  politicians.	  Even	  being	  seen	  as	  
related	  to	  specific	  party	  interests	  can	  delegitimise	  activists	  as	  potential	  policy	  partners.	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7.1.4 The	  2012	  referendum	  on	  Russian	  as	  a	  second	  state	  language	  in	  Latvia	  
While	   referenda	   have	   become	   a	   recurrent	   feature	   of	   Latvia’s	   political	   life,	   they	   play	   a	   very	  
marginal	  role	  in	  Estonia.	  In	  Estonia	  only	  the	  Riigikogu	  has	  the	  right	  to	  initiate	  a	  referendum	  and	  
so	  far	  –	  not	  counting	  the	   independence	  referendum	  and	  the	  one	  on	  the	  constitution	  –	  Estonia	  
held	  only	  one	  (in	  2003	  for	  the	  EU	  accession).	  The	  Latvian	  constitution,	   in	  contrast,	  provides	  for	  
more	   opportunities	   for	   holding	   referenda.	   The	   president	   can	   call	   a	   referendum	   for	   the	  
dissolution	   of	   the	   Saeima	   and	   there	   is	   also	   the	   possibility	   of	   popular	   initiative	   referenda.	  
Excluding	  the	   independence	  referendum,	  Latvia	  has	  so	  far	  held	  eight	  referenda	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  
issues.	   Among	   those,	   two	   had	   specific	  minority-­‐related	   content:	   the	   1998	   referendum	   on	   the	  
Citizenship	  Law	  and	  the	  unsuccessful	  2012	  referendum	  on	  Russian	  as	  a	  second	  state	  language.	  	  
This	   last	   case	   is	   particularly	   interesting,	   as	   it	   was	   initiated	   by	   Russophone	   grassroots	  
activists	  and	  managed	  to	  mobilise	  a	   large	  portion	  of	   the	  minority	  community.	  The	  referendum	  
question	  asked	  that	  Russian	  be	  made	  the	  second	  state	   language	  of	  Latvia,	  giving	   it	  equal	   legal	  
status	  to	  Latvian.	  This	  was	  an	  extremely	  controversial	  issue,	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  Latvian	  as	  Latvia’s	  only	  
state	   language	   had	   been	   from	   the	   very	   beginning	   a	   fundamental	   tenet	   of	   the	   country’s	   post-­‐
independence	   rebuilding.	   The	   language	   referendum	   was	   a	   response	   to	   another	   referendum	  
initiative	  –	  this	  time	  promoted	  by	  the	  nationalist	  party	  National	  Alliance	  –	  to	  make	  Latvian	  the	  
only	   language	   of	   instruction	   in	   public	   schools	   (Šūpule,	   2012,	   p.	   123).	   While	   the	   nationalist	  
signature	   collection	  was	  unsuccessful,	   it	   had	   the	  effect	   of	   increasing	   support	   for	   the	   language	  
referendum	  initiative	  among	  Russian-­‐speakers	  (Lublin,	  2013,	  p.	  386).	  
In	   2012,	   launching	   a	   referendum	   in	   Latvia	   implied	   a	   two-­‐stage	   process	   of	   signature	  
gathering:	  10,000	   signatures	  had	   to	  be	   independently	  gathered	   in	  order	   to	  access	   the	   second,	  
state-­‐funded	  stage	  of	  signature	  collection.	  One	  tenth	  of	  the	  eligible	  voters	  (154,379	  in	  2011)	  had	  
to	  sign	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  for	  the	  Central	  Electoral	  Commission	  to	  call	  a	  referendum.	  In	  the	  case	  
of	   the	   2012	   referendum,	   the	   activists	   –	   coordinated	   by	   the	   grassroots	   organisations	   United	  
Latvia	   and	   For	   Mother	   Tongue	   (later	   constituted	   into	   the	   party	   Zarya)	   –	   collected	   12,353	  
signatures	   in	   the	   first	   stage	   and	   187,378	   in	   the	   second	   (Lublin,	   2013,	   p.	   386),	   and	   then	  
successfully	   mobilised	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   electorate	   to	   vote	   in	   favour	   of	   it	   on	   18	   February	  
2012.	  
The	   referendum	   initiative	   triggered	   a	   counter-­‐mobilisation	   in	   defence	   of	   the	   Latvian	  
language,	  led	  by	  the	  Latvian	  majority	  elite	  which	  presented	  it	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  very	  foundations	  
of	  the	  Latvian	  state	  (Lublin,	  2013,	  pp.	  386–387).	  In	  fact,	  a	  similar	  discourse	  of	  endangered	  nation	  
was	  voiced	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  dispute,	  as	  both	  the	  referendum	  campaigners	  and	  the	  national	  
elites	  mobilised	  their	  communities	  presenting	  the	  issue	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  national	  survival	  (Hanov	  &	  
174	  
	  
Tçraudkalns,	   2012,	   p.	   20).156	   The	   heated	   debate	   around	   the	   referendum	   resulted	   in	   a	   turnout	  
that	   is	   very	   high	   for	   Latvia	   (70.9%).	   The	   result	   of	   the	   referendum,	   however,	   was	   predictably	  
negative,	   as	   only	   about	   25%	   of	   the	   voters	   were	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   proposed	   constitutional	  
amendments.	   This	   roughly	   corresponds	   to	   the	   share	   of	   Russian-­‐speakers	   in	   the	   electorate	  
(Šūpule,	  2012,	  p.	  124).	  	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  negative	  result,	  the	  2012	  referendum	  was	  a	  successful	  experience	  in	  
minority	  mobilisation.	  After	   the	  2003–2004	  protests,	   the	  2012	  referendum	  was	  a	  confirmation	  
of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   community’s	   capability	   for	   mobilising	   on	   sensitive	   issues	   and	   can	   be	  
seen	   as	   part	   of	   an	   upward	   trend	   in	   civic	   activism	   within	   the	   minority.	   Soon	   after	   the	   2012	  
referendum,	  its	  initiators	  started	  collecting	  signatures	  for	  a	  new	  referendum	  to	  grant	  automatic	  
citizenship	   to	   all	   Latvian	   non-­‐citizens.	   However,	   this	   time	   the	   referendum	   was	   judged	  
unconstitutional	  by	  the	  Central	  Electoral	  Commission.157	  This	  spurred	  yet	  another	  initiative:	  the	  
alternative	  elections	   to	   the	  Parliament	  of	   the	  Non-­‐Represented,	  which	  has	  been	  analysed	   in	  a	  
previous	  section.	  
The	   referendum	   also	   provided	   an	   illustration	   of	   how	   successful	   minority	   grassroots	  
mobilisation	   can	   affect	   the	   position	   of	   mainstream	   minority	   representatives.	   When	   the	   first	  
campaign	   to	   collect	   signatures	  was	   launched,	   initially	  Riga	  mayor	  Nils	  Ušakovs	   and	   the	   rest	  of	  
Harmony	   Centre	   leadership	   were	   against	   the	   initiative.	   The	   party	   was	   in	   favour	   of	   some	  
recognition	  of	  Russian,	  but	  as	  a	  minority	  or	  regional	  language	  rather	  than	  a	  state	  language	  at	  the	  
same	  level	  as	  Latvian.	  However,	  when	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  pro-­‐referendum	  campaign	  was	  
gaining	  steam,	  Ušakovs	  announced	  that	  he	  was	  going	  to	  sign	  the	  petition	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  
signature	   collection.	   This	   move	   was	   presented	   not	   as	   a	   change	   of	   mind	   but	   as	   a	   principled	  
response	  to	  nationalist	  ministers’	  reactions	  to	  the	  initiative	  that,	  according	  to	  Ušakovs,	  ‘separate	  
the	  country’s	  citizens	  into	  right	  or	  wrong	  ones’.158	  Many	  observers	  saw	  Ušakovs’s	  support	  for	  the	  
initiative	   as	   key	   in	   boosting	   mobilisation	   and	   gathering	   more	   than	   the	   necessary	   number	   of	  
signatures	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  pro-­‐referendum	  campaigning.159	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  A	  difference	  has	  been	  noted,	  however,	   in	   the	  discourse	  used	  by	  ethnic	  Latvian	  and	  ethnic	  Russian	   internet	  users	  
who	  commented	  on	  the	  referendum:	  while	  the	  former	  typically	  used	  ethnonationalist	  discourses	  to	  portray	  Russian-­‐
speakers	  as	  an	  ethnic	  threat,	  the	  latter	  tended	  to	  focus	  attacks	  against	  the	  Latvian	  government	  and	  the	  national	  elite	  
rather	  than	  on	  Latvians	  as	  a	  nation	  (Šūpule,	  2012,	  p.	  131).	  	  
157	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  this	  decision	  is	  being	  disputed	  in	  court	  (LCHR,	  2013,	  pp.	  46–48).	  
158	   ‘Ušakovs	   pulls	   an	   about-­‐face’,	   The	   Baltic	   Times,	   9	   September	   2011.	   Available	   at:	  
http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/29933/#.U-­‐H_5lbqJg0	  (Last	  accessed	  5	  August	  2014).	  
159	   ‘Dva	   goda	   nazad	   v	   Latvii	   sostoialsia	   skandalnyi	   referendum	  o	   gosiazyke’	   (Two	   years	   ago	   in	   Latvia	   took	   place	   the	  
scandalous	   referendum	   on	   the	   state	   language),	   Delfi.lv,	   18	   February	   2014.	   Available	   at:	  
http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/politics/dva-­‐goda-­‐nazad-­‐v-­‐latvii-­‐sostoyalsya-­‐skandalnyj-­‐referendum-­‐o-­‐
gosyazyke.d?id=44224151	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	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The	   referendum	  had	  also	  unintended	   results.	   First	   of	   all,	   like	  with	   the	  Bronze	   Soldier	   in	  
Estonia,	   much	   of	   the	   debate	   after	   Latvia’s	   2012	   referendum	   was	   preoccupied	   with	   Russian-­‐
speakers	   as	   ‘failed	   integrants’	   and	   the	   securitisation	  of	  minority	   issues	  was	   also	   given	  a	  boost	  
(Hanov	  &	  Tçraudkalns,	  2012,	  p.	  21;	  Šūpule,	  2012).	  A	  reading	  of	  the	  events	  emerged	  in	  the	  public	  
sphere	  that	  framed	  Russian-­‐speakers	  who	  voted	  ‘yes’	  as	  traitors	  (Hanov	  &	  Tçraudkalns,	  2012,	  p.	  
21),	   and	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   referendum	   campaign	   as	   confirmation	   of	   its	  
unsuitability	   for	   government	   (Lublin,	   2013,	   p.	   387).	   Perhaps	   responding	   to	   this	   framing	   as	   a	  
radical	  party,	  Harmony	  Centre	  subsequently	  refused	  to	  support	  the	  new	  referendum	  campaign	  
promoted	  by	  Russophone	  activists	  to	  grant	  automatic	  citizenship	  to	  all	  non-­‐citizens.	  Nils	  Ušakovs	  
explained	  this	  decision	  by	  arguing	  that	  such	  an	  initiative	  will	  only	  play	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  nationalist	  
parties,	   while	   giving	   governing	   parties	   a	   useful	   distraction	   tool	   to	  move	   attention	   away	   from	  
their	  own	  mistakes.160	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   referendum	   triggered	   a	   debate	   about	   the	   necessity	   to	   make	   popular	  
initiative	   more	   difficult	   in	   order	   to	   save	   public	   money	   and,	   in	   the	   words	   of	   former	   Saeima	  
speaker	  Solvita	  Āboltiņa	   (Unity	  party),	   ‘so	   that	   the	  minority	   is	  not	  able	   to	  dictate	   rules	   for	   the	  
majority	   in	   a	  democratic	   country’.161	   The	  amendments	   to	   the	   Law	  on	  Referenda	  presented	  by	  
the	   governing	   parties	   soon	   after	   the	   2012	   referendum	   were	   openly	   aimed	   at	   thwarting	   the	  
emerging	  use	  of	  referenda	  as	  political	   tools	  by	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  protest	  movements.162	  Under	  
the	  proposed	  law,	  referendum	  initiators	  were	  required	  to	  gather	  the	  signatures	  of	  at	  least	  10%	  
of	  the	  electorate	  (about	  150,000	  people)	  without	  the	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  state	  previously	  
provided	   after	   the	   first	   10,000	   signatures.	   The	   amendments	   to	   the	   referendum	   procedure	  
became	  a	  new	  battlefield	  between	  government	  and	  parliamentary	  opposition.163	  	  
7.2 The	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma	  for	  minority	  mobilisation	  
The	   analysis	   of	   minority	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   shows	   that	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   experienced	  
diverging	  trajectories	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  Russophone	  minority’s	  capacity	  for	  mobilisation	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	   ‘Latvia	   gears	   up	   for	   another	   national	   referendum’,	   Baltic	   Times,	   5	   September	   2012.	   Available	   at:	  
http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/31797/	  (Last	  accessed	  3	  February	  2015).	  
161	   ‘Referendum	   process	   to	   change’,	   Baltic	   Times,	   28	   March	   2012.	   Available	   at:	  
http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/30881/#.U-­‐IFbFbqJg0	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	  
162	   ‘Latvia	   gears	   up	   for	   another	   national	   referendum’,	   The	   Baltic	   Times,	   5	   September	   2012.	   Available	   at:	  
http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/31797/#.U-­‐IMDVbqJg0	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	  
163	   After	  much	   political	   squabbling	   and	   after	   the	   president	   refused	   twice	   to	   promulgate	   the	   law,	   a	   slightly	   revised	  
version	  of	  the	  amendments	  to	  the	  referendum	  law	  was	  passed.	  This	  foresees	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  system	  
starting	  from	  1	  January	  2015	  and	  includes	  a	  transition	  period	  in	  which	  the	  30,000	  signatures	  (instead	  of	  the	  original	  
10,000)	  must	  be	  collected	  before	  state	  funding	  is	  provided.	  Harmony	  Centre	  asked	  the	  constitutional	  court	  to	  review	  
these	  amendments	  as	  they	  might	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  voters’	  rights,	  but	  the	  court	  returned	  a	  positive	  assessment	  of	  the	  
new	  referendum	  law,	  especially	  as	  it	  compensates	  for	  higher	  demands	  on	  the	  referendum	  initiators	  with	  provisions	  
for	  online	  signature	  collection.	  Harmony	  Centre	  threatened	  to	  call	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	  new	  referendum	  procedure.	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potential	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  gain	  voice	  and	  influence	  through	  grassroots	  activism.	  In	  Estonia,	  the	  
trajectory	   of	   minority	   mobilisation	   has	   been	   generally	   downward.	   Grassroots	   advocacy	  
organisations	   are	   small	   and	   underfunded,	   minority	   activists	   have	   failed	   to	   mobilise	   Russian-­‐
speakers	  in	  significant	  numbers,	  and	  Estonia’s	  Russophone	  community	  remains	  isolated,	  with	  a	  
low	  self-­‐esteem,	  and	  politically	  passive	  (Berg,	  2001;	  Heidmets,	  2008).	  	  
The	  events	  that	  have	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Bronze	  Night’	  are	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  only	  
in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  saw	  an	  unprecedented	  peak	  of	  mobilisation	  and	  visibility	  for	  the	  otherwise	  
silent	  Russophone	  community.	  The	  Bronze	  Night	  was,	  however,	  an	  isolated	  event	  and	  it	  did	  not	  
signal	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  period	  of	  heightened	  minority	  activism.	   In	  fact,	   these	  events	  are	  
perfectly	   in	   line	  with	  the	  negative	  trajectory	  described	  here.	  Powerlessness	  and	  exclusion	  have	  
been	   indicated	   as	   central	   to	   the	   logics	   of	   rioting:	   communities	   that	   feel	   marginalised	   and	  
excluded	  from	  institutional	  avenues	  of	  political	  influence	  find	  in	  riots	  the	  only	  way	  to	  have	  their	  
voice	  heard	   (Tshimanga,	  Gondola,	  &	  Bloom,	  2009).	   This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	   that	   rioting	  
voices	  are	  also	  listened	  to.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  conditions	  of	  powerlessness	  and	  exclusion	  that	  
trigger	   rioting	   are	   heightened	   by	   the	   riots,	   which	   tend	   to	   provoke	   hostile	   responses	   from	  
authorities	  and	  rarely	  elicit	  solidarity	  from	  the	  general	  public	  (Tshimanga	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  p.	  43).	  The	  
fact	   that	   the	  2007	   riots	  were	  not	   followed	  by	  heightened	  minority	   activism	   is	   in	   line	  with	   this	  
understanding	   of	   riots	   not	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   minority	   empowerment,	   but	   rather	   as	   a	  
manifestation	   of	   powerlessness.	   If	   anything,	   the	   Bronze	   Night	   events	   contributed	   in	  
delegitimising	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  and	  protest	  as	  tools	  for	  minority	  political	  participation.	  
Conversely,	  Latvia	  has	  experienced	  an	  upward	  trend	  in	  minority	  political	  activism.	  Protests	  
against	  the	  reform	  of	  Russian-­‐language	  schools	  mobilised	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	  
(Silova,	  2006,	  p.	  149).	  Although	  not	  all	   those	   involved	  consider	   the	  resulting	  school	  policy	  as	  a	  
victory,	  protests	  showed	  the	  minority’s	  mobilising	  capacities	  and	  were	   instrumental	   in	  pushing	  
the	   government	   to	   compromise.	  Minority	   advocacy	   organisations	   have	   been	   bigger	   and	  more	  
active	   in	   Latvia	   than	   their	   Estonian	   counterparts,	   and	   the	   relative	   success	   of	   the	   non-­‐citizens’	  
alternative	  elections	  confirms	  minority	  activists’	  organisational	  and	  mobilisation	  capacities.	  The	  
2012	  referendum	  constituted	  another	  peak	  of	  mobilisation	  that	  made	  Russophone	  voices,	  if	  not	  
necessarily	  welcome,	  at	  least	  difficult	  to	  ignore.	  	  
Two	   sets	   of	   conclusions	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   Estonia’s	   and	   Latvia’s	  
experience	   with	   minority	   mobilisation.	   The	   first	   concerns	   the	   relationship	   between	   minority	  
grassroots	  movements	  and	  minority	  representatives	  in	  formal	  institutions.	  The	  second	  has	  to	  do	  
with	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   minority	   mobilisation	   has	   successfully	   functioned	   as	   an	   alternative	  
channel	  for	  minority	  inclusion	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process.	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Three	   main	   points	   emerged	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   minority	   mobilisation	   and	  
minority	   formal	   representation.	   Firstly,	   the	  minority’s	   capability	   for	   independent	  mobilisation	  
(that	   is,	   the	  expectation	  that	  a	  minority	  might	  successfully	  mobilise	   for	  or	  against	  policies	   that	  
concern	  it	  directly)	  and	  the	  size	  of	  minority	  mobilisation	  have	  their	  own	  impact,	  independent	  of	  
minority	   formal	   representation.	   This	   applies	   in	   particular	   to	   protests	   and	   initiatives	   like	  
alternative	   elections,	   which	   explicitly	   expose	   the	   number	   of	   the	   discontented.	   Strong	  
mobilisation	  capabilities	  offer	  grassroots	  activists	   the	  possibility	   to	  put	  direct	  pressure	  both	  on	  
the	   government	   and	   on	   minority	   representatives.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   low	   capability	   for	  
mobilisation	  makes	   it	  difficult	   for	   the	  minority	   to	  be	  seen	  as	  other	   than	  a	  policy	  object	  by	   the	  
policymakers.	  It	  also	  makes	  minority	  grassroots	  overly	  dependent	  on	  support	  by	  minority	  formal	  
representatives.	  This	  dependency,	  in	  turn,	  reduces	  the	  activists’	  capacity	  to	  shape	  the	  agenda	  of	  
minority	  official	  representatives,	  and	  contributes	  to	  their	  marginality.	  
Secondly,	   and	   following	   from	   the	   previous	   point,	   the	   relationship	   between	   minority	  
formal	  representation	  and	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  reciprocal.	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  has	  its	  own	  rationale	  and	  activists	  pursue	  their	  own	  independent	  
agendas;	  this	  can	  affect	  political	  representation	  by	  raising	   issues	  that	  the	  representatives	  must	  
address,	   and	   by	   putting	   pressure	   on	   the	   representatives	   to	   be	   responsive	   and	   stay	   ‘on	   track’.	  
Moreover,	  strong	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  can	  give	  additional	  strength	  to	  the	  minority	  demands	  
that	  are	  articulated	  by	  minority	  representatives.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  minority	  representatives	  in	  
formal	  institutions	  often	  take	  the	  role	  of	  mediating	  between	  grassroots	  activists	  and	  authorities	  
(Stroschein,	   2012,	   pp.	   21–23).	   This	   mediation	   significantly	   increases	   the	   chances	   for	   minority	  
voice	   to	   be	   translated	   into	   actual	   policy	   influence.	   Indeed,	  while	  minority	  mobilisation	   has	   its	  
own	   logics	   and	   can	   have	   its	   independent	   genesis,	   high	   minority	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   in	   a	  
context	  in	  which	  there	  are	  no	  official	  representatives	  to	  act	  as	  bridges	  between	  grassroots	  and	  
institutional	  level	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  discounted	  or	  securitised	  by	  policymakers.	  The	  presence	  
of	  minority	  formal	  representation	  (and	  the	  normalisation	  of	  minority	  voices’	  participation	  in	  the	  
political	   debate	   it	   entails)	   creates	   the	   conditions	   for	   minority	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   to	   be	  
heeded	  rather	  than	  ignored	  or	  (only)	  securitised.	  
Finally,	   the	   two	   previous	   points	  must	   be	   complemented	   by	   the	   understanding	   that	   the	  
relationship	  between	   the	  minority’s	   formal	   representation	   (parties,	  MPs,	   local	   councillors)	  and	  
spontaneous	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  is	  fundamentally	  complex.	  A	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  
two	  forms	  of	  minority	  participation	  in	  political	  life	  would	  be	  largely	  artificial,	  and	  substantial	  grey	  
areas	  exist.164	   In	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  official	  minority	   representatives	   (and	  parties)	  were	  at	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  For	  a	  general	  point	  about	  the	  blurry	  nature	  of	  distinctions	  between	  civil	  and	  political	  society,	  see	  Michael	  Foley	  and	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the	   same	   time	   responding	   to	   their	   constituency’s	   independent	   mobilisation	   and	   actively	  
participating	   in	  mobilisation	  activities.	  Minority	   representatives	  are	  often	   in	  very	  close	  contact	  
with	  activists,	  can	  be	  activists	  themselves,	  and	  often	  take	  part	  in	  organising	  protests.	  Some	  level	  
of	   interpenetration	   is	   to	   be	   expected,	   especially	   given	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia’s	   small	   size	   and	   the	  
reduced	  pool	  of	  minority	  elite.	  However,	  when	  this	  partial	  overlap	  is	  tantamount	  to	  co-­‐optation	  
of	   grassroots	   movements	   into	   specific	   parties	   (as	   seen	   in	   Estonia),	   this	   might	   reduce	   the	  
potential	  for	  minority	  mobilisation	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  independent	  minority	  channel	  to	  policymaking.	  
In	  this	  case,	  ‘grassroots’	  mobilisation	  becomes	  very	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  from	  party	  strategy.	  	  
The	   second,	   broader	   conclusion	   concerns	   the	   potential	   for	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   to	  
constitute	  an	  alternative	  channel	   for	  minority	  access	  to	  the	  policymaking	  debate.	  First	  of	  all,	   it	  
must	   be	   noted	   that	   in	   contexts	   like	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   in	  which	   ethnic	  majority	   elites	   tend	   to	  
dominate	   the	   political	   process,	   the	   very	   boundaries	   of	   legitimate	   minority	   grassroots	  
mobilisation	   and	   civil	   society	   participation	   are	   at	   core	   politically	   contested.	   It	   has	   been	   noted	  
that	  not	  all	  grassroots	  activities	  and	  initiatives	  bring	  positive	  elements	  to	  the	  democratic	  debate,	  
and	   some	   forms	   of	   civil	   association	   can	   even	   be	   detrimental	   to	   democratic	   institutions	  
(Chambers	  &	  Kopstein,	  2001).	  While	   this	  might	  be	  relatively	  self-­‐evident	   for	  organisations	  that	  
promote	  violence,	  racism,	  hate,	  xenophobia	  or	  similar	  anti-­‐democratic	  agendas,	  the	  distinction	  
between	   ‘bad’	   and	   ‘good’	   civil	   society	   is	   less	   obvious	   in	   ethnically	   divided	   societies.	   In	   these	  
cases,	  the	  definition	  of	  which	  activities	  and	  organisations	  fall	  under	  the	  bracket	  of	  healthy	  civil	  
society	   and	  which	  ones	   are	   instead	   ‘bad’	   and	  unhealthy	  becomes	  one	  of	   the	   contested	   issues	  
between	  the	  majority	  and	  the	  minority.165	  	  
The	  definition	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  ‘good’	  civil	  society	  is	  eminently	  political:	   it	  delineates	  
the	  limits	  within	  which	  the	  democratic	  debate	  can	  take	  place	  and	  determines	  the	  voices	  that	  can	  
legitimately	   take	   part	   in	   it.	   The	   consultative	   mechanisms	   for	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   Integration	  
Programmes	   (analysed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter)	   are	   one	   example	   of	   how	  unilaterally	   imposed	  
boundaries	   to	   the	   democratic	   debate	   can	   seriously	   undermine	   the	   democratic	   principle	   of	  
minority	   inclusion.	   These	   same	   boundaries	   constrain	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   minority	   advocacy	  
organisations	   in	   particular,	   but	   they	   apply	   to	   all	   forms	   of	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   insofar	   as	  
grassroots	  policy	   impact	   is	   regulated	  by	   the	  national	   elites’	   role	  as	  democracy	  gatekeepers.	   In	  
assessing	  the	  impact	  of	  minority	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  on	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  therefore,	  
we	  must	  take	   into	  account	  the	   level	   to	  which	  mobilisation	  can	  successfully	  push	  beyond	  those	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  (1996)	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  Petr	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  and	  Cas	  Mudde	  (2003,	  pp.	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  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  difficulties	  of	  normatively	  distinguishing	  ‘civil	  society’	  from	  ‘uncivil	  society’	  see	  Kopecký	  and	  




boundaries	  and	  renegotiate	  them.	  Only	  if	  it	  is	  able	  to	  challenge	  existing	  boundaries	  to	  minority	  
democratic	  participation,	  minority	   grassroots	  mobilisation	   can	  effectively	   create	  an	  alternative	  
channel	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  
Speaking	  strictly	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  outcome,	  only	  the	  2003–2004	  protests	  in	  Latvia	  can	  be	  
said	  to	  have	  been	  effective	   in	   influencing	  policy.	  Sizeable	  and	  protracted	  mobilisation	   imposed	  
the	  activists’	  voices	  as	  something	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with	  and	  pushed	  the	  government	  to	  enter	  in	  a	  
dialogue	  at	  least	  with	  the	  sections	  of	  the	  protest	  movement	  it	  considered	  more	  moderate.	  The	  
resulting	   policy,	   although	   not	   satisfactory	   for	   all,	  was	   a	   compromise.	   The	  mobilisation	   for	   the	  
2012	   referendum	   on	   Russian	   language,	   although	   successful,	   did	   not	   achieve	   its	   stated	   policy	  
goal.	  On	  the	  contrary,	   it	  elicited	  a	  policy	  backlash	  that	  will	  make	   it	  difficult	   for	   the	  minority	   to	  
use	  citizens’	   legislative	   initiative	  again	  to	  promote	  desired	  policies.	  The	  alternative	  elections	  to	  
the	   PNR	   in	   Latvia	   successfully	   put	   non-­‐citizenship	   back	   in	   the	   agenda,	   and	   functioned	   as	   a	  
‘reminder’	   for	   Harmony	   Centre.	   However,	   it	   is	   still	   unclear	  whether	   they	  will	   have	   any	   actual	  
impact	   on	   citizenship	   policies	   or	   on	   non-­‐citizens’	   voting	   rights.	   In	   Estonia,	   low	   minority	  
mobilisation	  meant	  that	  the	  minority	  had	  little	  chance	  of	  having	  any	  impact	  on	  policies	  through	  
the	  grassroots	  route.	  The	  Bronze	  Soldier	  riots	  did	  see	  a	  high	  number	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	  on	  the	  
streets,	   but	   there	   was	   no	   possibility	   that	   this	   was	   going	   to	   affect	   the	   policy	   outcome	   of	   the	  
statue	   dispute	   (the	   Bronze	   Soldier	   statue	   had	   already	   been	   removed).	   The	   softening	   of	   the	  
education	  reform	  in	  Estonia	  might	  have	  partially	  been	  the	  government’s	  pre-­‐emptive	  response	  
to	  the	  possibility	  of	  minority	  protest.	  It	  is	  arguable,	  however,	  whether	  this	  can	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  
policy	  success	  for	  minority	  mobilisation,	  especially	  given	  that	  the	  minority	  had	  virtually	  no	  active	  
role	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  
If	   we	   broaden	   our	   gaze	   beyond	   policy	   outcome	   to	   the	  wider	   implications	   of	   these	   two	  
different	  ‘stories’	  of	  minority	  mobilisation,	  the	  same	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma	  observed	  at	  the	  
level	  of	  formal	  representation	  emerges	  at	  grassroots	  level.	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  illustrate	  the	  two	  
faces	  of	  this	  dilemma.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  policy	  outcome	  is	  not	  a	  good	  indicator	  
of	  the	  inclusiveness	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  The	  education	  reform	  is	  a	  good	  case	  in	  point.	  
While	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   ended	   up	  with	   rather	   similar	   education	   reforms	   in	   upper-­‐secondary	  
minority	   schools,	   they	   came	  at	   it	   through	   remarkably	  different	  processes	   in	   terms	  of	  minority	  
mobilisation	  and	  empowerment.	  While	  in	  Latvia	  minority	  protests	  and	  the	  mediation	  of	  minority	  
representatives	  were	  key	  in	  reaching	  a	  compromise	  solution,	  in	  Estonia	  the	  decision	  to	  ease	  the	  
requirements	   on	   minority	   schools	   was	   not	   the	   result	   of	   a	   deliberative	   process	   in	   which	   the	  
minority	   took	  part.	   It	  was	   rather	  a	  pragmatic	  decision	   taken	  by	   the	  national	   elites,	  partly	   as	   a	  
compromise	   between	   different	   opinions	   within	   it,	   and	   partly	   as	   a	   way	   to	   weaken	   minority	  
180	  
	  
opposition.	   After	   that,	   the	   discussion	   on	   the	   reform	  was	  mostly	   technical,	   focused	   on	   how	   to	  
better	   implement	   the	   policy	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   policy	   itself.	   Minority	   representatives	   in	  
parliament	  remained	  constrained	  within	  this	  framework	  and	  pushed	  for	  postponements	  rather	  
than	  for	  a	  rediscussion	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  
In	   Estonia,	   therefore,	   low	   minority	   mobilisation	   made	   for	   a	   somewhat	   less	   polarised	  
political	  debate	  and	  did	  not	  make	  a	  big	  difference	  if	  we	  look	  only	  at	  the	  policy	  outcome,	  but	  this	  
apparent	   quiet	   came	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   minority	   voice.	   Low	   mobilisation	   meant	   that	   the	  
contribution	  of	  minority	  grassroots’	  initiatives	  to	  the	  democratic	  debate	  was	  marginal	  and	  often	  
negligible.	   This	   absence	   of	   voice	   had	   been	   seen	   until	   the	   Bronze	   Night	   riots	   as	   a	   signal	   of	  
acquiescence	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  minority.	   The	   riots	  disrupted	   this	   picture	  only	   insofar	   as	   they	  
showed	  that	  minority	   integration	   is	  not	  working	   in	  the	  way	   it	  had	  been	  expected	  to.	  However,	  
the	  riots	  (and	  the	  ‘good	  Russian’	  and	  ‘bad	  Russian’	  discourse	  that	  followed	  them)	  also	  reinforced	  
the	   status	   quo	   by	   further	   delegitimising	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   (and	   especially	   protest)	   as	   a	  
viable	  tool	  for	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  political	  debate.	  
Latvia	  illustrates	  the	  other	  side	  of	  this	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma.	  In	  Latvia,	  high	  capacity	  
for	  minority	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  did	  constitute	  a	  viable	  channel	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  access	  the	  
policymaking	  debate.	  Through	  civic	  mobilisation,	  grassroots	  minority	  activists	  can	  put	  pressure	  
both	   on	   the	   governing	   parties	   and	   on	   minority	   representatives	   in	   formal	   institutions,	   and	   in	  
general	   can	   impose	   minority	   voices	   as	   legitimate	   participants	   in	   the	   political	   debate.	   This,	  
however,	   comes	   at	   the	   price	   of	   high	   levels	   of	   polarisation.	   The	   heated	   debate	   around	   the	  
language	   referendum	   is	   a	   case	   in	   point.	   Polarisation	   poses	   the	   risk	   that	   the	   minority’s	   high	  
capacity	   for	   mobilisation	   might	   scare	   majority	   voters	   and	   the	   majority	   elite	   into	   defensive	  
positions,	  which	  can	  in	  turn	  be	  counterproductive	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  outcome	  and	  in	  terms	  
of	  minority	  voice	   legitimacy.	   In	  an	  ethnically	  polarised	  environment,	  high	  minority	  mobilisation	  
can	  be	  presented	  to	  (and	  perceived	  by)	  the	  ethnic	  majority	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  democratic	  fabric	  
of	  Latvian	  society	  rather	  than	  a	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  its	  healthy	  development.	  
7.3 Conclusions:	  Mobilisation	  and	  quality	  of	  democracy	  
This	   chapter	   provided	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   most	   relevant	   episodes	   of	   minority	   grassroots	  
mobilisation	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   A	   picture	   emerged	   that	   reveals	   the	   different	   strength	   of	  
minority	  grassroots	  activism	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  (higher	  in	  Latvia,	  lower	  in	  Estonia).	  This	  closely	  
mirrors	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia’s	  diverging	  trajectories	  of	  formal	  minority	  representation.	  In	  general,	  
the	   analysis	   showed	   that	   grassroots	  mobilisation	   can	   indeed	   be	   an	   alternative	   (or	   additional)	  
channel	   for	   minorities	   to	   access	   the	   policymaking	   process.	   The	   success	   of	   mobilisation	   in	  
influencing	  policies,	  however,	  depends	  on	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  size,	  duration	  and	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independence	  of	  grassroots	  movements.	  Second,	  the	  existence	  of	  minority	  representatives	  that	  
can	   work	   as	   bridges	   and	   mediate	   between	   the	   mobilised	   minority	   and	   the	   institutions.	   And	  
finally,	   the	   paradoxical	   effects	   of	   the	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   must	   also	   be	   taken	   into	  
account,	  as	  high	  mobilisation	  can	  polarise	  society	  and	  make	  compromise	  more	  difficult.	  	  
All	   in	   all,	   looked	  at	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  quality	  of	  democracy	   (where	  more	  minority	  
inclusion	   in	   the	   democratic	   process	   is	   indication	   of	   better	   quality),	   the	   comparison	   between	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  suggests	  once	  again	  that	  in	  the	  latter	  there	  is	  more	  room	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  
effectively	   challenge	   ethnocentric	   understandings	   of	   the	   democratic	   polity.	   The	   emergence	   of	  
grassroots	  minority	   voices	   that	   claim	   their	   space	   as	   legitimate	   participants	   in	   the	   democratic	  
debate	   surely	   creates	   tensions	   and	   poses	   the	   concrete	   risk	   that	   extreme	   polarisation	   might	  
emerge.	   However,	   it	   also	   creates	   the	   possibility	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   positive	   democratic	  
dynamics.	   While	   extreme	   polarisation	   can	   be	   detrimental	   to	   inter-­‐ethnic	   coexistence,	   the	  
minority’s	   emergence	   as	   a	   voice	   capable	   of	   contestation	   and	   mobilisation	   is	   a	   healthy	  
democratic	   sign.	   The	  Bronze	  Night	   riots	   stand	  as	  a	   reminder	   that	  quietness,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  
genuine	  democratic	  inclusion,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  symptom	  of	  minority	  contentment.	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The	   previous	   five	   chapters	   analysed	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   minority	   voices	   could	   participate	   in	  
policymaking	   through	   parliamentary	   representation,	   recourse	   to	   international	   organisations,	  
incorporation	   in	   city	   governments,	   institutionalised	   consultation	   mechanisms	   and	   minority	  
grassroots	   mobilisation.	   Each	   one	   of	   these	   ‘channels’	   offers	   at	   least	   the	   potential	   for	   the	  
Russophone	  minority	  to	  access	  decision-­‐making	  and,	  more	  in	  general,	  to	  establish	  themselves	  as	  
legitimate	  members	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia’s	  democratic	  polity.	  	  
This	   chapter	   pulls	   together	   the	   findings	   from	   the	   five	   analytical	   chapters,	   to	   draw	  
attention	   to	   recurrent	   patterns,	   differences	   and	   similarities	   that	   emerge	   from	   the	   comparison	  
between	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  The	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  the	  risks	  and	  opportunities	  offered	  by	  the	  five	  
access	  channels,	  the	  actors	  that	  make	  use	  of	  those	  channels,	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  thesis’s	  
findings	   for	   the	   study	   of	   minority	   political	   representation	   and	   ethnic	   parties.	   This	   chapter	  
ultimately	  assesses	  the	   level	  of	  democratic	   inclusiveness	  that	  has	  emerged	  in	  the	  policymaking	  
process	  of	  the	  two	  countries,	  and	  thus	  their	  quality	  of	  democracy.	  	  
8.1 The	  five	  channels	  
Parliamentary	   representation,	   recourse	   to	   international	   organisations,	   incorporation	   in	   city	  
governments,	  consultation	  mechanisms	  and	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  are	  by	  no	  means	   insulated	  
one	   from	   the	  other,	   as	   explained	   in	  more	  detail	   in	   the	  next	   section.	  However,	   for	   the	   sake	  of	  
analytical	   clarity	   they	   have	   been	   analysed	   as	   separate	   channels.	   The	   inclusiveness	   of	   the	  
Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   policymaking	   process	   (that	   is,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  minority	   voices	   have	  
access	  to	  policymaking	  and	  can	  influence	  it)	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  opportunities	  
that	   these	   channels	   offer	   for	   effective	   minority	   participation.	   This	   section	   reviews	   the	   main	  
findings	   concerning	   each	  of	   the	   five	   channels	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  possibilities	   they	  offered	   the	  
Russophone	   minority	   to	   (a)	   influence	   the	   policy	   outcome,	   and	   (b)	   establish	   themselves	   as	  
legitimate	  participants	  in	  their	  country’s	  democratic	  debate.	  	  
The	   first	   channel	   for	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	  minority	   to	   influence	   policies	   that	   concern	   it	  
directly	  is	  parliamentary	  representation.	  This	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  direct	  channel	  as	  Estonia	  and	  
Latvia	   are	   both	   parliamentary	   democracies,	   where	   policies	   are	   discussed	   and	   adopted	   by	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parliamentary	  majorities.	  Members	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority	  have	  run	  for	  parliamentary	  
seats	   both	   within	   mainstream	   (that	   is,	   not	   explicitly	   minority-­‐oriented)	   parties	   and	   on	   ethnic	  
party	   lists.	  Minority	   issues	   –	   especially	   concerning	   citizenship,	   education	   and	   language	  –	  were	  
part	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  parliaments’	  agendas	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  and	  constituted	  
some	  of	  the	  main	  lines	  of	  division	  between	  the	  major	  political	  parties.	  	  
The	  analysis,	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  channel	  revealed	  that	  a	  ‘minority-­‐friendly’	  
policy	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   result	   of	   more	   minority	   representation	   and	   of	   a	   more	   inclusive	  
decision-­‐making	  process.	  Rather,	  and	  somewhat	  paradoxically,	  under	  certain	  circumstances	   less	  
minority	   representation	  and	  a	   less	   inclusive	  process	  created	   the	  conditions	   for	  more	  minority-­‐
friendly	   policies	   to	   be	   passed.	   This	   is	   one	   side	   of	   what	   I	   have	   called	   the	   voice/polarisation	  
dilemma.	  This	  dilemma	  emerges	  from	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process	  on	  the	  non-­‐
citizens’	   local	   voting	   rights	   in	   the	   Estonian	   Riigikogu	   and	   the	   Latvian	   Saeima.	   Low	   state-­‐level	  
representation	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   electorally	   successful	   ethnic	   parties	   in	   Estonia	   led	   to	   a	  
somewhat	   de-­‐ethnicised	   policy	   debate,	   largely	   taking	   part	   between	   the	  moderate	   and	   radical	  
components	   of	   the	   Estonian	   national	   elite.	   The	   policy	   that	   emerged	   from	   this	   debate	   was	  
favourable	  to	  the	  minority,	  that	  is,	  non-­‐citizens	  were	  granted	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  local	  elections.	  
In	   terms	  of	   policy	  outcome,	   therefore,	   the	   Estonian	   case	   suggests	   that	  minority	  absence	   from	  
the	   process	   might	   in	   some	   circumstances	   facilitate	   ‘minority-­‐friendly’	   policies	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
concessions	  by	  the	  majority	  elite.	   In	  Latvia,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  competition	  between	  mainstream	  
Latvian	   parties	   and	   Russophone	   ethnic	   parties	   exacerbated	   ethnic	   polarisation	   in	   the	   party	  
system	  and	  made	   compromise	  on	   the	   issue	  of	   non-­‐citizens’	   voting	   rights	  unlikely.	   The	   case	  of	  
Latvia,	  therefore,	  suggests	  that	  minority	  presence	  might	  be	  counterproductive	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  
outcome.	  
The	   comparison	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   policymaking	   on	   non-­‐citizens’	   voting	   rights	  
aptly	   illustrates	   the	   two	   faces	   of	   the	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   and	   it	   does	   so	   in	   particularly	  
stark	  terms	  as	  the	  policy	  output	  was	  opposite:	  non-­‐citizens’	   local	  voting	  rights	  were	  granted	   in	  
Estonia	   and	   denied	   in	   Latvia.	   This	   pattern	  was	   replicated	   (allowing	   for	   the	   specificity	   of	   each	  
case)	   also	   for	   other	   minority-­‐related	   policies.	   For	   instance,	   the	   education	   reform	   in	   minority	  
upper-­‐secondary	   schools	  was	   very	   similar	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   in	   terms	  of	  policy	  outcome.	   In	  
Estonia,	   however,	   its	   implementation	   was	   delayed	   several	   times	   and	   was	   in	   general	   more	  
gradual	  than	  in	  Latvia.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  Estonian	  policy	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  more	  favourable	  to	  the	  
minority	  than	  the	  Latvian	  one.166	  Also	  in	  this	  case,	  Latvia	  experienced	  a	  more	  polarised	  debate,	  
which	   included	   minority	   mass	   mobilisation	   and	   street	   protests,	   whereas	   in	   Estonia	   minority	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  This	  might	  explain	  why	  protests	  against	  the	  reform	  have	  been	  much	  weaker	  in	  Estonia	  than	  in	  Latvia.	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voices	   had	   a	   far	  more	  marginal	   role	   in	   the	  policymaking	  process.	   This	  would	   seem	   to	   confirm	  
that	   minority	   absence	   (or	   at	   least	   limited	   representation	   and	   co-­‐optation	   within	   mainstream	  
parties)	  should	  be	  considered	  preferable	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  democracies	  as	  it	  makes	  for	  a	  less	  
polarised	  debate	  and	  potentially	  more	  minority-­‐friendly	  policies.	  	  
A	   deeper	   analysis,	   however,	   indicates	   otherwise.	   First	   of	   all,	   it	  was	   not	   always	   the	   case	  
that	   policy	   output	  was	  more	   favourable	   for	   the	  minority	   in	   Estonia	   than	   it	   was	   in	   Latvia.	   For	  
instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  language	  law	  Estonia’s	  policy	  was	  not	  more	  favourable	  than	  Latvia’s.	  
Especially	   for	  what	   concerns	   the	  powers	  of	   the	   language	   inspectors,	   in	   fact,	   the	   legislation	  on	  
language	  requirements	  for	  employment	  is	  rather	  harsher	  in	  Estonia.	  This	  suggests	  that	  (relative)	  
minority	   absence	  might	   bring	   about	  more	   favourable	   policies	   for	   the	  minority	   but	   this	   is	   not	  
always	  and	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case.	  Secondly,	  the	  relative	  de-­‐ethnicisation	  of	  the	  policymaking	  
process	   in	  Estonia	  did	  not	   correspond	   to	  a	  de-­‐ethnicisation	  of	   the	  wider	  political	  debate	  or	   to	  
more	  minority	  integration.	  Several	  studies	  show	  that	  exclusionary	  discourses	  on	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  
lines	  persist	  in	  Estonia	  both	  at	  the	  political	  level	  (Agarin,	  2010;	  Lagerspetz,	  2001)	  and	  among	  the	  
general	  population	  (Heidmets,	  2007,	  p.	  58).	  
Finally,	  and	  crucially,	   if	  we	  widen	  the	  analysis	  beyond	  the	  policy	  outcome	  to	   look	  at	   the	  
inclusiveness	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  the	  picture	  changes	  considerably.	  Indeed,	  even	  when	  
the	  policy	  outcome	  was	  favourable	  to	  the	  minority,	  the	  policymaking	  process	   in	  Estonia	  largely	  
excluded	  minority	  voices	  from	  the	  democratic	  debate.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐citizens’	  voting	  rights,	  
in	  fact,	  the	  favourable	  policy	  outcome	  was	  achieved	  not	   in	  spite	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  exclusion	  
from	   the	   policymaking	   process	   but	   because	   of	   it.	   Under	   these	   conditions,	   policy	   concessions	  
reinforced	   the	   role	   of	   the	   ethnic	  majority	   elite	   as	   the	   gatekeepers	   of	   the	   democratic	   process,	  
keeping	  minority	   voices	  marginal	   in	   a	   policymaking	   debate	   in	   which	   they	   were	   policy	  objects	  
rather	   than	   policymakers.	   Therefore,	   while	   lack	   of	   significant	   minority	   presence	   did	   in	   some	  
instances	   result	   in	   more	   liberal	   policies,	   it	   consistently	   had	   negative	   implications	   in	   terms	   of	  
minority	  access	  to	  the	  democratic	  process.	  	  
In	   Latvia,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	   debate	   on	   minority-­‐sensitive	   policies	   took	   place	   mostly	  
between	   the	   Latvian	   national	   elite	   and	   the	   Russophone	   political	   elite	   (both	   with	   their	   more	  
moderate	  and	  more	  radical	  components).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  led	  to	  a	  highly	  polarised	  debate	  
that	  made	  it	  often	  difficult	  to	  reach	  compromise	  solutions	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  local	  voting	  rights,	  
resulted	   in	   the	   total	  disenfranchisement	  of	   Latvia’s	  non-­‐citizens.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  
high	   Russophone	   political	   presence	   made	   for	   a	   lively	   democratic	   debate	   in	   which	   minority	  
political	   exclusion	   is	   challenged	   and	   minority	   voices	   have	   the	   chance	   to	   assert	   their	   right	   to	  
legitimately	  participate	   in	  Latvia’s	  democratic	  process.	  While	   this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	   in	  Latvia	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the	  ethnic	  majority	  elite	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  of	  control,	   it	  does	  suggest	  that	  there	  were	  more	  
possibilities	   for	   Russophone	   voices	   to	   challenge	   the	   majority	   elite’s	   gatekeeping	   role	   and	   to	  
position	   themselves	   as	   full	   members	   of	   Latvia’s	   democratic	   polity	   rather	   than	   mere	   policy	  
objects.	  
The	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   debates	   on	   minority	   policies	   happened	   within	   a	   wider	  
international	  context.	  International	  and	  regional	  organisations,	  of	  which	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  were	  
first	  aspiring	  members	  and	  later	  full	  members,	  issued	  recommendations	  on	  minority	  policies	  as	  
part	   of	   the	   accession	   process.	   The	   EU	   and	   OSCE	   were	   particularly	   	   vocal	   on	   these	   themes,	  
especially	   when	   minority	   issues	   were	   seen	   as	   posing	   hindrances	   to	   the	   new	   countries’	  
democratic	  stability	  and	  consolidation.	  This	  cannot	  be	   ignored,	  as	  pressures	   from	  international	  
organisations	  have	  been	  often	  pointed	  to	  as	  central	  in	  determining	  policy	  outcomes	  on	  minority	  
issues	  (Gelazis,	  2003;	  Hoffmeister,	  2004;	  Kelley,	  2004).	  
Recourse	   to	   international	  organisations	   can	   function	  as	   a	   channel	   for	  minority	   voices	   to	  
access	  policymaking	  in	  different	  ways.	  Russian	  speakers	  can	  lobby	  international	  organisations	  to	  
put	   pressure	   on	   policymakers	   to	   pass	   more	   minority-­‐friendly	   policies.	   Furthermore,	   minority	  
representatives	   can	   refer	   to	   international	   recommendations	   and	   adopt	   international	  
organisations’	  language	  of	  minority	  rights	  and	  minority	  participation	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  and	  
legitimise	   their	   claims.	   Indeed,	   especially	   during	   EU	   accession	   negotiations,	   international	  
recommendations	  were	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  domestic	  debates	  on	  minority	  
policies,	  and	  both	  minority	  and	  majority	  political	  actors	  made	  open	  reference	  to	  them	  in	  order	  
to	   promote	   their	   own	   agenda.	   After	   EU	   accession,	   even	   if	   minority	   activists	   and	   civil	   society	  
organisations	  express	  disillusionment	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  OSCE	  to	  enforce	  significant	  
change,	   they	   regularly	   lobby	   those	   organisations	   in	   order	   to	   ‘shame’	   their	   country	   on	   the	  
international	   stage.167	   Although	   international	   organisations	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   open	   entirely	   new	  
avenues	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  enter	  the	  policymaking	  debate,	  they	  were	  very	  relevant	  in	  providing	  
arguments	  and	  the	  language	  to	  frame	  domestic	  debates.	  	  
The	  findings	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  where	  the	  international	  channel	  is	  analysed,	  add	  to	  the	  
literature	  that	  is	  cautious	  about	  the	  direct	  role	  of	  international	  pressures	  in	  guaranteeing	  liberal	  
minority	  legislation	  (Agarin	  &	  Brosig,	  2009;	  Hughes	  &	  Sasse,	  2003;	  Sasse,	  2008;	  Schulze,	  2010).	  It	  
is	  doubtful	  that	  external	  pressures	  by	  themselves	  determined	  policies;	  indeed,	  on	  other	  minority	  
policies	   the	   same	   kind	  of	   pressures	   brought	   about	   considerably	   different	   outcomes	   in	   Estonia	  
and	  Latvia.	  The	  likelihood	  of	  determining	  policy	  outcomes	  became	  even	  more	  insubstantial	  after	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  joined	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO	  in	  2004,	  with	  pressures	  to	  liberalise	  minority	  policies	  
significantly	   decreasing	   in	   both	   quantity	   and	   intensity.	   While	   –	   especially	   before	   accession	   –	  
international	  recommendations	  did	  provide	  fuel	  for	  the	  debate,	   in	  both	  cases,	  policy	  outcomes	  
were	  ultimately	  determined	  by	  domestic	  politics.	  	  
But	   the	   dubious	   effectiveness	   of	   international	   pressures	   in	   achieving	   liberal	   minority	  
policies	   is	  only	  half	  of	   the	  story.	  The	  role	  of	   international	  organisations	  was	  also	  ambiguous	   in	  
terms	   of	   its	   influence	   on	   the	   inclusiveness	   of	   the	   policymaking	   process.	   Pressures	   to	   adopt	  
minority-­‐friendly	   policies	   undoubtedly	   created	   additional	   opportunities	   for	   Russian-­‐speakers’	  
parties,	   grassroots	  movements	  and	   civil	   society	  organisations	   to	   support	   their	  own	  claims	  and	  
demands.	  This	  window	  of	  opportunity,	  however,	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  years	  immediately	  preceding	  
accession	  and	  was	  not	  consistently	  successful.	  Most	  importantly,	  policy	  negotiations	  took	  place	  
between	   EU	   and	   OSCE	   representatives	   on	   the	   one	   side	   and	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	  
governments	  on	  the	  other,	  largely	  bypassing	  the	  Russophone	  elite.	  This	  left	  the	  minority	  in	  the	  
position	   of	   policy	   object.	   Seen	   from	   this	   perspective,	   the	   involvement	   of	   international	  
organisations	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  did	  not	  foster	  minority	  inclusion	  in	  the	  process	  but	  
actually	  contributed	  in	  reinforcing	  its	  exclusion.	  	  
The	   analysis	   of	   policymaking	   on	   language	   requirements	   for	   employment	   provides	   an	  
example	  of	  how,	  by	  pushing	  for	  minority-­‐friendly	  policies	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  bypassing	  the	  
minority,	   international	   organisations	   can	   in	   fact	   contribute	   to	   normalising	   minority	   political	  
exclusion.	   Chapter	   4	   also	   highlighted	   the	   risks	   of	   a	   ‘dependency	   effect’	   for	   minority	  
representatives	  and	  activists.	  Indeed,	  overreliance	  on	  international	  support	  to	  push	  their	  agenda	  
left	  minority	  representatives	   in	  a	  significantly	  weaker	  position	  once	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  entered	  
the	  EU	  and	   their	   governments	   could	   claim	   to	  have	   received	   the	  definitive	   seal	   of	   approval	   on	  
their	  minority	  policies.	   Thus,	  even	  when	   some	   liberalisation	  of	  minority	  policies	  was	  achieved,	  
international	   pressures	   had	   the	   paradoxical	   effect	   of	   legitimising	   minority	   exclusion	   from	   the	  
decision-­‐making	  process.	  
While	   international	   pressures	   can	   offer	   opportunities	   (however	   limited	   and	   ambiguous)	  
for	  the	  minority	  to	  enter	  the	  policy	  process	  from	  above,	  representation	  in	  local	  governments	  can	  
offer	   an	   alternative	   channel	   from	   below.	   In	   particular,	   the	   fact	   that	   Russian-­‐speakers	   have	  
gained	   important	   positions	   of	   power	   in	   the	   local	   governments	   of	   Riga	   and	   Tallinn	   cannot	   be	  
ignored	   if	   we	   want	   a	   complete	   picture	   of	   minority	   representation.	   Because	   of	   their	   limited	  
policymaking	  responsibilities,	  city	  governments	  can	  primarily	  offer	  influence	  over	  policies	  at	  the	  
implementation	   stage.	   City	   governments	   do	   not	   simply	   receive	   policies	   from	   above	   but	  must	  
also	   take	   decisions	   on	   how	   to	   interpret	   and	   implement	   them.	   Impact	   through	   this	   channel,	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however,	  is	  limited	  as	  not	  all	  policies	  allow	  for	  the	  same	  level	  of	  flexibility	  in	  implementation.	  For	  
instance,	   laws	   on	   citizenship	   or	   on	   non-­‐citizens’	   local	   voting	   rights	   leave	   no	   room	   for	  
reinterpretation	   further	   down	   the	   implementation	   line.	   Even	   on	   policies	   that	   are	   more	  
susceptible	   to	   being	   modified	   during	   implementation	   (like	   the	   school	   reform	   or	   language	  
requirements),	   city	  governments	  are	   still	  bound	  by	   the	  general	   terms	  of	   the	   state-­‐level	  policy.	  
This	   suggests	   that	   while	   city-­‐level	   representation	   can	   provide	   an	   additional	   entry	   point	   for	  
minority	  voices	  to	  influence	  policies,	  there	  are	  important	  limitations.	  	  
As	  with	   the	  other	   channels,	  policy	  outcome	   is	  but	  one	  aspect	   to	  be	   taken	   into	  account.	  
Representation	  in	  city	  government	  can	  also	  provide	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  –	  which	  is	  poorly	  
represented	   in	   state	   government	  –	  with	   an	  alternative	   route	   to	   the	  wider	  democratic	  debate.	  
The	   comparison	  between	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	   in	  Chapter	  5	   reveals	   that	  minority	   inclusion	   in	   local	  
government	   can	   indeed	   offer	   a	   valuable	   channel	   for	   minority	   voices	   to	   take	   central	   stage	   in	  
policy	  debates	  and	  can	  normalise	   the	  presence	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	   in	   the	  public	   arena	  and	   in	  
positions	  of	  power.	   Inclusion	   into	   city	   government	   (what	   I	   have	   called	   incorporation	   following	  
the	  US	   literature	  on	  the	  topic),	  however,	  can	  also	  function	  as	  a	  palliative,	  or	   ‘trap’.	   It	  can	  offer	  
some	   local	   returns	   to	   the	  minority	   (in	   the	   form	   of	   patronage)	   without	   opening	   an	   additional	  
channel	  for	  minority	  voices	  to	  access	  the	  national	  democratic	  process	  or	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  
national	  political	  debate.	  Riga	  and	  Tallinn	  offer	   illustrations	  of	   these	  two	  different	  possibilities.	  
Representation	  in	  city	  government	  in	  Riga	  is	  contributing	  to	  normalising	  the	  presence	  of	  Russian-­‐
speakers	   in	  positions	  of	  power.	   In	  Tallinn,	  however,	   it	  has	  resembled	  a	  palliative	  more	  than	  an	  
occasion	   for	   empowerment.	   Like	   at	   the	   state	   level,	   minority	   political	   representation	   in	   city	  
government	   is	   necessary	   for	   empowerment	   but	   is	   not	   sufficient	   by	   itself	   to	   guarantee	   either	  
effective	  influence	  on	  policies	  or	  minority	  political	  empowerment.	  
Consultations	   organised	   by	   policymakers	   to	   establish	   minority	   needs	   and	   opinions	   on	  
specific	   policies	   offer	   a	   fourth	   channel	   for	   the	   minority	   to	   participate	   in	   policymaking.	  
Consultations	   can	   be	   organised	   at	   different	   stages	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   –	   from	   the	  
initial	  stages	  of	  agenda	  setting	  to	  feedback	  on	  existing	  policies	  and	  their	  implementation	  –	  and	  
they	  undoubtedly	  offer	  an	  important	  opportunity	  for	  policymaking	  to	  be	  opened	  up	  to	  minority	  
scrutiny	   and	   participation.	   The	   analysis	   of	   the	   consultation	   mechanisms	   organised	   by	   the	  
Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  governments	  to	  draft	  the	  Integration	  Programmes,	  however,	  showed	  that	  
in	   practice	   consultations	   afforded	   no	   room	   for	   minority	   voices	   to	   effectively	   participate	   in	  
policymaking	  as	  equals.	  This	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  selection	  bias	  in	  the	  organisations	  invited	  to	  
take	  part	  in	  consultations	  and	  the	  rigid	  framework	  within	  which	  discussions	  could	  take	  place	  and	  
feedback	  could	  be	  considered	   legitimate	  and	  acceptable.	   Indeed,	  consultations	  were	  based	  on	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policy	   frameworks	   that	   had	   already	   been	   decided	   by	   the	   majority	   elite	   without	   significant	  
contribution	   from	   the	   minority,	   and	   their	   focus	   tended	   to	   be	   on	   finding	   the	   best	   way	   to	  
implement	   the	   policy	   rather	   than	   to	   discuss	   its	   content.	   This	   technicised	   approach	   to	  
consultations	  disregarded	  the	  (inherently)	  political	  nature	  of	  minority	  participation	  and	  left	  the	  
Russian-­‐speakers	   little	   room	   to	   question	   the	   essence	   of	   policies.	   Participation	   on	   these	   terms	  
was	   largely	   tokenistic,	   as	   minorities	   were	   called	   in	   to	   validate	   decisions	   taken	   by	   a	   ‘core’	   of	  
decision-­‐makers	   from	   which	   they	   were	   largely	   excluded.	   Changes	   to	   policies	   through	   this	  
channel	  have	  therefore	  tended	  to	  be	  cosmetic.	  	  
The	  findings	  of	  Chapter	  6	  on	  the	  Integration	  Programmes	  confirm	  those	  of	  other	  studies	  
on	   other	   minority	   consultation	   mechanisms	   adopted	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   (Agarin,	   2011,	   pp.	  
190–191;	   Kallas,	   2008,	   p.	   8;	   LCHR,	   2008,	   p.	   43;	  Muižnieks,	   2010,	   p.	   117).	   That	   is,	   Russophone	  
minorities	   have	   had	   little	   chance	   to	   significantly	   influence	   policies	   through	   consultations,	   as	  
these	   have	   typically	   been	   box-­‐ticking	   exercises	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   policymakers	   rather	   than	  
genuine	   occasions	   for	   inclusion.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   my	   analysis	   reveals	   that	   consultation	  
mechanisms	  –	  as	  applied	  by	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  policymakers	  –	  were	  not	  only	  ineffective	  in	  
opening	  up	   the	  policy	  process	   to	  minority	   influence,	  but	  had	   further,	  negative	   implications	   for	  
the	  minority.	  Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  had	  been	  (at	  least	  nominally)	  
involved	   in	   consultations	   served	   as	   a	   smokescreen	   for	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	  minority	   from	   the	  
decision-­‐making	   ‘core’.	   By	   formally	   responding	   to	   international	   recommendations	   for	  minority	  
inclusion,	  consultations	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  majority	  elite	  to	  allow	  minority	  participation	  
without	   any	   redistribution	   of	   power	   over	   the	   policy	   process.	   That	   is,	   the	  majority	   elites	  were	  
open	   toward	  minority	   consultations	  only	   insofar	   as	   they	  did	  not	  question	   their	  own	  dominant	  
position	   in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  The	  top-­‐down	  nature	  of	  policymaking	   in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  
means	  that	  this	  is	  potentially	  true	  for	  all	  civil	  society	  consultations,	  not	  only	  those	  involving	  the	  
minority.	  This	  observation,	  however,	  does	  not	  detract	  from	  the	  key	  finding	  that	  institutionalised	  
mechanisms	  for	  minority	  participation	  –	  although	  in	  principle	  valuable	  ways	  to	  include	  minority	  
voices	   –	   can	   in	   practice	   be	   used	   in	   ways	   that	   reinforce	   political	   exclusion	   rather	   than	   foster	  
inclusion.	  
The	   fifth	  and	   final	   channel	   through	  which	   the	  Russophone	  minority	   can	  attempt	   to	  gain	  
access	   to	   policymaking	   is	   grassroots	   mobilisation.	   Chapter	   7	   analysed	   different	   forms	   of	  
mobilisation	  (from	  advocacy	  to	  street	  protests)	  and	  highlighted	  their	  potential	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  
route	  for	  minority	  participation	  in	  the	  policy	  process	  and	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  claim	  a	  place	  in	  the	  
national	   democratic	   debate.	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   have	   considerably	   different	   levels	   of	   minority	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few	   and	   generally	   small,	   and	   Russian-­‐speakers	   are	   perhaps	   even	   discouraged	   and	   frightened	  
from	  participating	  in	  pickets	  and	  street	  protests	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Bronze	  Soldier	  riots.	  In	  
Latvia,	   minority	   mobilisation	   has	   been	   stronger	   and	   activists	   have	   on	   different	   occasions	  
demonstrated	   their	   organisational	   and	   mobilisation	   capabilities.	   It	   follows	   from	   this	   that	  
participation	  through	  mobilisation	  had	  more	  chances	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  Latvia	  than	  in	  Estonia.	  
Minority	  grassroots	  mobilisation	  can	  put	  pressure	  on	  both	  the	  government	  and	  minority	  
representatives	   in	  parliament.	  The	  analysis	  of	  different	  experiences	  of	  minority	  mobilisation	   in	  
Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   in	   Chapter	   7	   shows	   that,	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	   mobilisation	   can	  
successfully	  serve	  as	  an	  alternative	  minority	  channel	  into	  policymaking.	  The	  size	  and	  visibility	  of	  
minority	  advocacy	  organisations,	  the	  size	  and	  duration	  of	  grassroots	  protests,	  the	  independence	  
of	   grassroots	   movements	   in	   setting	   their	   own	   agenda,	   and	   the	   mediation	   of	   minority	  
representatives	  in	  formal	  institutions	  determined	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  mobilisation	  channel.	  
Successful	  mobilisation,	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  education	  reform	   in	  Latvia,	  can	  have	  an	  effective	  
impact	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  
However,	   the	   relationship	   between	   minority	   mobilisation	   and	   minority	   influence	   on	  
policies	   is	   far	   from	   linear.	   The	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   observed	   at	   the	   level	   of	   formal	  
minority	   representation	   also	   occurs	   at	   the	   grassroots	   level.	   In	   Latvia,	   high	   levels	   of	   minority	  
grassroots	  mobilisation	   imposed	  Russophone	   voices	   in	   the	  policymaking	  debates.	   This	   created	  
room	   for	   the	  minority	   to	  actively	   renegotiate	   the	  boundaries	  of	   legitimate	  participation	   in	   the	  
democratic	   process.	   However,	   this	   also	   comes	   at	   the	   risk	   of	   scaring	   the	   ethnic	   majority	   into	  
defensive	   nationalist	   positions	   and	   reinforcing	   polarisation	   on	  minority	   issues.	   In	   Estonia,	   low	  
levels	   of	   minority	   mobilisation	   ensured	   a	   quieter	   decision-­‐making	   process	   and	   might	   avoid	   a	  
nationalist	   backlash,	   but	   this	   comes	   at	   the	   price	   of	   continued	  minority	   disempowerment	   and	  
marginalisation.	  	  
8.2 Where	  the	  channels	  overlap	  	  
Although	  analysed	  separately,	  the	  five	  channels	  for	  minority	  access	  to	  the	  policymaking	  process	  
are	   intertwined.	   First	   of	   all,	   while	   a	   different	   policy	   was	   analysed	   in	   relation	   to	   each	   of	   the	  
channels,	  no	  single	  policy	  is	  solely	  determined	  by	  the	  input	  from	  only	  one	  of	  them.	  In	  each	  case,	  
minority	   voices	   used	   more	   than	   one	   channel,	   often	   simultaneously	   and	   in	   no	   particular	  
hierarchical	   order.	   Moreover,	   the	   channels	   often	   interact	   and	   feed	   into	   each	   other	   –	   for	  
instance,	  grassroots	  protests	  can	  strengthen	  the	  bargaining	  position	  of	  minority	  representatives	  
in	  parliament.	  	  
Secondly,	   the	   same	   political	   actors	   can	   use	   different	   channels,	   even	   simultaneously.	  
Actors	   who	   are	   institutionally	   located	   within	   one	   of	   the	   channels	   (for	   example	   the	   city	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administration)	  can	  also	  actively	  exploit	  other	  channels,	  for	  instance	  by	  lobbying	  their	  own	  party	  
at	   state	   level,	   organising	   protests,	   or	   lobbying	   international	   organisations.	   Russophone	   local	  
councillors	   responsible	   for	   implementing	   the	   school	   reform	   in	   Tallinn	   and	   Riga,	   for	   instance,	  
were	   involved	   with	   anti-­‐reform	   grassroots	   protests,	   and	   pressured	   the	   government	   and	   their	  
own	  party	  to	  change	  the	  policy.	  
Finally,	  as	  the	  policymaking	  process	  goes	  through	  different	  stages	  (from	  agenda-­‐setting	  to	  
implementation	  and	  feedback),	  different	  channels	  can	  offer	  different	  opportunities	  for	  minority	  
access	   at	   various	   points	   in	   time.	   For	   example,	   while	   parliamentary	   representation	   allows	   for	  
minority	  voices	  to	  be	  heard	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  policy	  formulation,	  city-­‐level	  representation	  offers	  a	  
channel	   into	  the	   implementation	  stage.	  Though	  dividing	  the	  policymaking	  process	   into	  a	  series	  
of	  subsequent	  stages	  can	  be	  useful	  for	  analytical	  purposes,	  policymaking	  is	  usually	  less	  orderly	  in	  
practice.168	   Lines	  of	   conflict	   and	   feedback	   run	  across	   the	  different	   stages,	   opening	   and	   closing	  
avenues	   for	   policy	   renegotiation	   and	   redefinition	   through	   multiple	   channels.	   Moreover,	  
decision-­‐making	  on	   specific	   policies	  does	  not	  happen	   in	   a	   vacuum	  but	  within	   a	   larger	  political	  
context:	   it	   is	   therefore	   influenced	   by	   events	   not	   directly	   related	   to	   the	   policy	   itself,	   such	   as	  
elections,	  the	  formation	  of	  governing	  coalitions,	  and	  party	  bargaining	  on	  other	  policies.	  	  
Therefore,	   the	   channel	   by	   channel	   analysis	   simplifies	   somewhat	   the	   complex	   reality	   of	  
overlapping	  and	  interdependent	  routes	  that	  the	  minorities	  can	  use	  to	  access	  policymaking.	  This	  
simplification,	   however,	   was	   expedient	   to	   analyse	   to	   what	   extent	   different	   forms	   of	   political	  
participation	   effectively	   opened	   up	   possibilities	   for	   the	   Russophone	  minorities	   to	   legitimately	  
participate	  as	  equals	  in	  Estonia’s	  and	  Latvia’s	  democratic	  process.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  
the	  risks	  and	  opportunities	  offered	  by	  each	  channel	   in	  order	  to	  properly	  assess	  their	  combined	  
effect	  on	  minority	  political	  inclusion.	  
8.3 The	  actors	  
The	  existence	  of	  channels	  to	  access	  policymaking	  presupposes	  the	  existence	  of	  minority	  actors	  
that	   can	   use	   those	   channels.	   Their	   interactions	  with	   the	   ‘titular’	  majority	   elite	   and	  with	   their	  
country’s	  institutional	  constraints	  determined	  the	  role	  of	  Russophone	  voices	  in	  the	  policymaking	  
process	   and,	   ultimately,	   the	   policy	   outcome.	   The	   key	   actors	   that	   emerge	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	  
policymaking	   processes	   on	  minority	   issues	   are,	   therefore,	   the	   Russophone	  minority	   elite,	   the	  
national	  elites,	  and	  the	  Russophone	  civil	  society.	  The	  ethnic	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  public	  do	  not	  
feature	  in	  this	  list	  as	  they	  did	  not	  mobilise	  on	  minority	  issues.	  The	  only	  instance	  when	  some	  form	  
of	  mobilisation	  did	  occur	  was	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  language	  referendum	  in	  Latvia,	  when	  ethnic	  
Latvians	  mobilised	  to	  reject	  Russian	  as	  a	  second	  state	  language.	  The	  mobilisation	  was,	  however,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  For	  this	  argument	  in	  the	  policy	  process	  literature,	  see	  Peter	  John	  (2012).	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predominantly	   elite-­‐led	   and	   directed	   by	   governing	   parties.	   In	   general,	   the	   ‘titular’	   majorities	  
have	  not	   felt	   the	  need	   to	  express	  views	  on	  minority	   issues	  outside	  of	  elections.	  While	  we	  can	  
assume	  that	  political	  parties	  were	  to	  some	  extent	  responsive	  to	  the	  perceived	  opinions	  of	  their	  
constituencies	   on	  minority	   issues,	   the	   ‘emulation	   patterns’	   observed	   by	   Sherrill	   Stroschein	   in	  
Slovakia,	  Romania	  and	  Ukraine	  (2012,	  p.	  55)	  –	  in	  which	  majority	  ‘masses’	  mobilised	  in	  response	  
to	  minority	  mobilisation	  and	  vice	  versa	  –	  did	  not	  occur	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  
Domestic	  actors	  dominate	  the	  analysis.	  This	  is	  at	  least	  partially	  a	  function	  of	  the	  research	  
design:	  a	  focus	  on	  national	  policymaking	  directs	  the	  attention	  towards	  political	  parties,	  domestic	  
institutions	  and	  local	  civil	  society.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  international	  organisations	  
played	   no	   role	   in	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   policy	   processes.	   Rather,	   international	   organisations	  
created	  a	   set	  of	   constraints	  on	  domestic	  actors	   that	   changed	  over	   time	   (especially	  before	  and	  
after	  the	  EU	  accession).	  They	  also	  influenced	  the	  language	  of	  minority	  rights	  and	  inclusion	  used	  –	  
in	   different	  ways	   and	  with	   different	   effects	   –	   by	   domestic	   political	   actors.	   As	   noted	   above,	   in	  
addition	  to	  their	   (doubtful)	  direct	   impact	  on	  policy	  outcomes,	  the	   involvement	  of	   international	  
organisations	   in	  debates	  on	  minority	  policies	  also	  had	  paradoxical	  effects	  on	  minority	   inclusion	  
in	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  
My	  research	  design	  poses	  Estonia’s	  and	  Latvia’s	  Russophone	  minorities	  as	  actors	   in	  their	  
own	   right	   rather	   than	   simply	   the	   object	   of	   minority	   policies.	   That	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   the	  
minorities	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  unitary	  actors,	  with	  fixed	  and	  inherent	  interests	  and	  needs.	  
While	   the	   positions	   of	   Russophone	   party	   representatives,	   grassroots	   activists	   and	   civil	   society	  
organisations	  on	  minority	  issues	  did	  often	  converge,	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Opinions	  and	  
strategies	  varied	  from	  moderate	  and	  compromise-­‐prone	  to	  radical	  and	  maximalist,	  and	  different	  
minority	   actors	   had	   different	   priorities.	   For	   instance,	  minority	   advocacy	   organisations’	   priority	  
has	   been	   to	   denounce	   policies	   that	   they	   see	   as	   creating	   a	   legal	   framework	   skewed	   against	  
Russian-­‐speakers,	   while	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   priority	   has	   been	   to	   make	   it	   into	   the	   Latvian	  
government,	  and	  Russophone	  MPs	  from	  Estonian	  Centre	  Party	  may	  have	  prioritised	  re-­‐election	  
or	  personal	  status	  within	  the	  party	  hierarchy.	  
Different	   minority	   actors	   faced	   different	   constraints	   and	   a	   different	   constellation	   of	  
incentives	   and	   disincentives.	   The	   analysis	   revealed,	   for	   instance,	   that	   Harmony	   Centre’s	   and	  
Centre	  Party’s	  different	  relationship	  with	  the	  Russophone	  electorate	  and	  different	  expectations	  
about	  their	  role	  in	  the	  party	  system	  determined	  the	  way	  they	  implemented	  education	  reforms	  in	  
Riga	  and	  Tallinn.	  Street	  protesters,	  civil	   society	  organisations	  and	  grassroots	  activists	   faced	  the	  
same	   issue	  with	  yet	  again	  different	   incentives	  and	  constraints.	  These	   included	   their	   resources,	  
their	   capacity	   for	  mobilisation,	   and	   their	   relationship	   (more	   or	   less	   cooperative,	  more	   or	   less	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dependent)	  with	  political	  parties.	  Hence,	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minorities	  cannot	  be	  understood	  
as	  monoliths	  with	   uniform	   interests	   and	   demands,	   but	   rather	   as	   constellations	   of	   voices	   that	  
express	  (at	  times	  conflicting)	  needs	  and	  concerns	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minority.	  This	  is	  
in	   line	  with	   an	   understanding	   of	   representation	   as	   a	   dynamic	   process	   of	   claim-­‐making	   rather	  
than	  a	  linear	  relationship	  in	  which	  representatives	  represent	  the	  pre-­‐determined	  interests	  of	  the	  
represented	  (Saward,	  2006,	  2010).	  	  
Different	   actors	   emerged	   as	   claiming	   to	   represent	   the	   Russophone	   minority.	   Ethnic	  
parties,	  Russophone	  politicians	  within	  non-­‐ethnic,	  minority-­‐friendly	  parties,	  minority	  civil	  society	  
organisations,	   and	   grassroots	   activists	   all	   claimed	   in	   different	  ways	   to	   represent	   the	  minority,	  
and	   in	   some	   consultation	   mechanisms	   sections	   of	   the	   Russophone	   general	   public	   were	  
understood	   as	   statistically	   representing	   the	   whole.	   Among	   these,	   parliamentary	   parties	   that	  
claim	  to	  represent	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  often	  tended	  to	  take	  central	  stage	  as	  they	  have	  access	  
to	   the	   parliament	   (although	   typically	   not	   the	   government)	   and	   the	   local	   institutions	   where	  
policies	   are	   decided.	   However,	   no	   single	  minority	   voice	   can	   claim	   to	   represent	   the	   totality	   of	  
minority	  needs	  and	  demands,	  and	  the	  range	  of	  minority	  voices	  cannot	  be	  ranked	  according	  to	  
representative	   legitimacy.	   It	   is	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   different	   voices	   that	   creates	   the	  
composite	  picture	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  political	  presence.	  
Studies	   of	   substantive	   representation	   have	   usually	   understood	   effective	   minority	  
representation	   as	   the	   correspondence	   between	   minority	   interests	   and	   either	   minority	  
representatives’	   behaviour	   or	   the	   policy	   outcome.	   My	   findings	   suggest	   that	   allowing	   for	   the	  
existence	  of	  multiple	  voices	  within	   the	  minority	  can	  reveal	   intra-­‐group	   interactions	   that	  would	  
otherwise	  be	  obscured	  by	  other	  approaches	  that	  take	  minorities	  as	  monoliths.	  For	   instance,	  as	  
detailed	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  minority	  voices	  in	  Latvia	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  
Estonia	   –	   facilitated	   compromise	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   education	   reform.	   Internal	   differentiation	  
also	   had	   the	   arguably	   positive	   effect	   of	   triggering	   democratic	   debates	   within	   the	   minority	  
community.	  
8.4 The	  role	  of	  Russia	  
An	  actor	  that	  makes	  little	  or	  almost	  no	  appearance	  in	  this	  study	  is	  the	  Russian	  Federation.	  This	  is	  
partially	  due	  to	   the	  domestic	   focus	  of	   the	  research	  design.	  This,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  
the	  presence	  of	  a	   large	  kin	   state	  at	   the	  border	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  does	  not	  play	  any	   role	   in	  
their	  political	  developments	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minorities.	  In	  the	  framework	  
of	  this	  research	  both	  the	  direct	  and	  indirect	  impact	  of	  Russia	  on	  policymaking	  and	  policy	  output	  
should	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	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The	   analysis	   of	   policymaking	   processes	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
discernible	  direct	   impact	  of	   the	  Russian	  Federation	  on	   these	   countries’	  policies	  with	   regard	   to	  
the	   Russophone	  minority.	   Russian	   Federation	   officials	   have	   regularly	   spoken	   out	   against	  what	  
they	   see	   as	   anti-­‐Russophone	   discrimination	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   Interestingly,	   they	   often	  
framed	  their	  critiques	  along	  similar	  lines	  as	  international	  organisations.	  However,	  pressures	  from	  
Russia	  had	  even	  less	  chance	  of	  achieving	  specific	  policy	  aims	  than	  international	  organisations,	  as	  
Russia	  did	  not	  have	  the	  tool	  of	  accession	  conditionalities	  to	  extract	  policy	  concessions.169	  As	  for	  
Russia’s	  impact	  on	  the	  political	  debate,	  this	  might	  be	  more	  substantial	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  media	  
consumption	  among	  Estonia’s	  and	  Latvia’s	  Russian-­‐speakers	  includes	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Russian	  
outlets.	   The	   information	   divide	   between	   the	  minority	   and	   the	   ethnic	  majority	   can	   potentially	  
give	  Russia	  the	  tools	  to	  sway	  Estonia’s	  and	  Latvia’s	  Russophone	  public	  opinion.	  While	  the	  actual	  
impact	  of	  Russian	  media	  on	  public	  opinion	  is	  difficult	  to	  measure	  –	  especially	  because	  we	  cannot	  
assume	   that	   Russian-­‐speakers	   uncritically	   absorb	   information	   coming	   from	   Russia	   –	   this	   is	  
definitely	   cause	   for	   concern.	   It	   must	   be	   noted,	   however,	   that	   the	   electoral	   choices	   of	   the	  
Russophone	  voters	   in	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  has	  swayed	  more	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  moderation	  
rather	  than	  towards	  Russian	  nationalism.	  This	  also	  remained	  true	  during	  the	  Ukrainian	  crisis	   in	  
2014,	  when	  Russian	  nationalist	  propaganda	  was	  arguably	  at	  a	  peak.	  	  
As	   for	   indirect	   effects,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   in	   both	   countries	   there	   has	   been	   a	  
tendency	   to	   securitise	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority	   due	   to	   the	   real	   or	   perceived	   threat	  
represented	   by	   Russia.	   This	   securitisation	   was	   at	   the	   roots	   of	   exclusionary	   and	   ethnocentric	  
conceptualisations	  of	  the	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  states	  upon	  independence	  (Mole,	  2012,	  p.	  83;	  D.	  
J.	   Smith,	   2005,	   p.	   308).	  More	   or	   less	   direct	   accusations	   of	   being	   Russia’s	   ‘fifth	   column’	   or	   the	  
‘Kremlin’s	  hand’	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  are	  common,	  especially	  during	  electoral	  campaigns.170	  On	  
the	   other	   hand,	   Russian-­‐speakers’	   parties	   in	   Latvia	   and	   the	   Centre	   Party	   in	   Estonia	   often	  
campaign	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   maintaining	   good	   (especially	   commercial)	   relations	   with	   the	  
Russian	   Federation,	   an	   approach	   they	   expect	   their	   Russophone	   constituencies	   to	   support.	  
Harmony	  Centre	  and	   the	  Centre	  Party	  also	  have	  established	  cooperation	  agreements	  with	   the	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  The	   presence	   of	   Russian	   (Soviet)	   troops	   on	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	   soil	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1990s	  might	   have	  
served	  a	  similar	  bargaining	  role	  in	  the	  years	  just	  following	  independence,	  but	  for	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  still	  
through	  international	  mediation.	  
170	  In	  fact,	  these	  accusations	  are	  not	  levelled	  only	  at	  Russophone	  or	  Russophone-­‐friendly	  parties.	  In	  the	  October	  2014	  
elections	   in	  Latvia,	  the	   leader	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  party	  From	  the	  Heart	  of	  Latvia	  was	  also	  subjected	  to	  a	  media	  
campaign	  in	  which	  she	  was	  accused	  of	  having	  close	  relations	  to	  Putin’s	  circle	  and	  the	  Russian	  secret	  services.	  For	  an	  
example	   of	   this	   campaign,	   see	   ‘’De	   facto’:	   Sudraba	   apmeklē	   dziednieku	   centru,	   kas	   slavina	   Putinu’	   (‘De	   facto’:	  
Sudraba	   attends	   the	   healers’	   centre	   that	   praises	   Putin),	   Delfi.lv,	   28	   September	   2014.	  
http://www.delfi.lv/news/saeimas-­‐velesanas/zinas/de-­‐facto-­‐sudraba-­‐apmekle-­‐dziednieku-­‐centru-­‐kas-­‐slavina-­‐
putinu.d?id=45029044	  (Last	  accessed	  16	  February	  2015).	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Putin-­‐controlled	  party	  United	  Russia.	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  (if	  anything)	  this	  cooperation	  
amounts	   to	   in	   practice,	   the	   agreements	   were	   presumably	   meant	   to	   please	   the	   domestic	  
Russophone	   constituency.	   There	   is	   no	   evidence,	   however,	   that	   these	   cooperation	   agreements	  
actually	  offer	  any	  direct	  route	  for	  Russia	  to	  interfere	  in	  Estonia’s	  and	  Latvia’s	  policymaking.	  As	  is	  
the	   case	   for	   international	   organisations,	   then,	   the	   strongest	   impact	   of	   Russia	   on	   Estonian	   and	  
Latvian	   politics	   comes	   indirectly,	   through	   the	   way	   in	   which	   domestic	   actors	   use	   this	   topic	   to	  
advance	  their	  own	  agenda.	  
8.5 Minority	  representation	  
The	   theoretical	   framework	   of	   this	   study	   was	   informed	   by	   the	   literature	   on	   minority	  
representation	   (mostly	  US-­‐based)	   and	  on	  ethnic	  parties	   (which	  has	   a	   stronger	  CEE	   focus).	   The	  
central	   questions	   of	   these	   debates	   concern	   whether	   descriptive	   representation	   is	   needed	   to	  
guarantee	   substantive	   representation,	   and	   what	   role	   ethnic	   parties	   play	   in	   ethnically	   divided	  
democracies.	  My	  approach	  departs	   from	  this	   literature	   in	  so	  far	  as	   it	  proposes	  to	   focus	  on	  the	  
systemic	   issue	   of	   inclusiveness	   rather	   than	   on	   responsiveness,	   and	   on	   quality	   of	   democracy	  
rather	   than	   on	   conflict	   management.	   Notwithstanding	   this,	   some	   observations	   on	   minority	  
representation	  and	  ethnic	  parties	  did	  emerge	  in	  the	  analysis.	  These	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  and	  
the	  next	  section.	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  minority	  representation,	  this	  study	  suggests	  that	  in	  Estonia	  
and	  Latvia	  descriptive	   representation	  matters.	  The	  voices	   that	  most	  commonly	   raised	  minority	  
issues	   were	   members	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   community,	   both	   from	   ethnic	   parties	   (like	  
Harmony	  Centre	  in	  Latvia)	  and	  from	  non-­‐ethnic,	  minority-­‐friendly	  parties	  (like	  the	  Centre	  Party	  
in	  Estonia).	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  internal	  disagreements	  and	  differences	  have	  emerged	  at	  times	  in	  
the	   party	   about	   the	   attitudes	   and	   strategies	   of	   its	   Russophone	   members,	   especially	   those	   in	  
Tallinn	  city	  government.	  
The	  observation	   that	  descriptive	   representation	  matters,	  however,	  must	  be	  qualified,	  as	  
not	   all	   members	   of	   the	   minority	   can	   be	   considered	   ‘natural	   representatives’	   of	   minority	  
interests.	   For	   instance,	   the	   few	   Russian-­‐speaking	   MPs	   that	   are	   not	   from	   the	   Centre	   Party	   in	  
Estonia	  or	  Harmony	  Centre	  in	  Latvia	  have	  not	  been	  specifically	  responsive	  on	  minority-­‐sensitive	  
issues,	   not	   least	   because	   their	   constituencies	   are	   not	   dominated	   by	   Russian-­‐speakers.	   On	   the	  
other	   hand,	   in	   the	   early	   discussions	   about	   citizenship	   and	   voting	   rights	   in	   Estonia	   –	   when	  
Russian-­‐speakers	  were	  not	  represented	   in	  the	  parliament	  –	  ethnic-­‐Estonian	   liberals	  among	  the	  
political	  elite	  were	  in	  effect	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  against	  the	  views	  
of	   the	  more	   nationalistically	   inclined	  MPs.	   Similarly,	   the	   ethnic-­‐Latvian	  members	   of	   Harmony	  
Centre	   have	   held	   liberal	   attitudes	   towards	   minority	   rights	   and	   minority	   inclusion	   in	   the	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democratic	   process.	   Thus,	   descriptive	   representation	   matters	   for	   individual	   representatives’	  
behaviour	  and	  commitment	  to	  a	  minority	  constituency,	  but	  is	  neither	  sufficient	  nor	  necessary	  to	  
guarantee	  responsiveness.	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	  wider	   role	   of	  minority	   voices	   in	   the	  democratic	   debate	  my	   analysis	  
confirms	   that	   substantial	   descriptive	   representation	   –	   that	   is,	   a	   significant	   minority	   political	  
presence	  in	  representative	  institutions	  –	  has	  a	  strong	  symbolic	  effect.	  The	  relatively	  high	  number	  
of	  Russophone	  MPs	  in	  the	  Latvian	  Saeima	  and	  the	  taboo-­‐breaking	  mayorship	  of	  the	  Russophone	  
Nils	  Ušakovs	   in	  Riga	  are	  arguably	  normalising	   the	  presence	  of	  Russian-­‐speakers	   in	   the	  political	  
debate	  and	  in	  positions	  of	  power.	  At	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  level,	  strong	  minority	  political	  presence	  
also	   makes	   majority–minority	   debate	   on	   minority-­‐sensitive	   issues	   inevitable.	   Significant	  
presence	  of	  minority	  members	  in	  political	  institutions	  makes	  them	  necessary	  (even	  if	  not	  always	  
welcome)	  interlocutors	  for	  the	  majority.	  
The	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma	  that	  emerged	  from	  my	  analysis	  complicates	  binary	  views	  
of	   minority	   descriptive	   representation	   as	   either	   necessary	   or	   unnecessary	   (or	   even	  
counterproductive)	   to	   achieve	   minority-­‐friendly	   legislation.	   Low	   minority	   representation	   in	  
Estonia	  meant	  that	  the	  policy	  process	  was	  relatively	  less	  polarised	  and	  occasionally	  allowed	  for	  
concessions	  that	  resulted	  in	  more	  liberal	  policies.	  These	  came,	  however,	  at	  the	  price	  of	  minority	  
absence	   from	   the	   policymaking	   process	   and	   the	   de-­‐legitimisation	   of	   minority	   voices	   in	   the	  
democratic	   debate.	   Although	   low	   descriptive	   representation	   in	   Estonia	   did	   not	   translate	   into	  
‘worse’	   policies	   for	   the	   minority,	   it	   did	   reinforce	   the	   majority	   elite’s	   control	   over	   the	  
policymaking	   process	   and	   left	   Russian-­‐speakers	   in	   the	   role	   of	   policy	   objects.	   Conversely,	   high	  
levels	  of	  minority	  descriptive	  representation	  in	  Latvia	  made	  for	  a	  more	  polarised	  policy	  debate,	  
which	  often	  did	  not	  facilitate	  compromise	  on	  minority	  issues.	  Nevertheless,	  although	  substantial	  
descriptive	   representation	   did	   not	   always	   translate	   into	   ‘better’	   policies	   for	   the	   minority,	   it	  
created	   the	   conditions	   to	   establish	   minority	   voices	   as	   legitimate	   participants	   in	   the	   political	  
debate.	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   different	   levels	   of	   descriptive	   representation	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   had	  
sometimes	   paradoxical	   effects	   on	   the	   policy	   outcome	   (when	   ‘friendlier’	   policies	   were	   made	  
possible	  by	  the	  minority’s	  low	  representation).	  The	  fact	  that	  high	  representation	  can	  sometimes	  
be	   counterproductive	   in	   terms	   of	   policy	   outcome,	   however,	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   lower	  
descriptive	  representation	  is	  to	  be	  preferred.	  Indeed,	  the	  policy	  concessions	  allowed	  for	  by	  low	  
representation	   come	   at	   a	   very	   high	   price,	   with	   long-­‐term	   negative	   consequences	   for	   the	  
minority,	  which	  remains	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  democratic	  process.	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8.6 Ethnic	  parties	  
Minority	   political	   representation	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   has	   differed	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
number	   of	   minority	   representatives	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   kind	   of	   parties	   that	   claim	   to	  
represent	  the	  minority	  and	  are	  popular	  among	  Russian-­‐speaking	  voters.	  In	  Estonia,	  Russophone	  
parties	  emerged	   in	  the	  1990s	  but	  quickly	   lost	  support	  and	  all	  but	  vanished	  by	  the	  early	  2000s.	  
The	   Centre	   Party,	   a	   mainstream	   Estonian	   party	   with	   an	   overwhelmingly	   ethnic	   Estonian	  
leadership	   and	   a	   relatively	   consistent	   minority-­‐friendly	   outlook,	   succeeded	   in	   establishing	   a	  
near-­‐monopoly	   among	   Russian-­‐speaking	   voters.	   It	   also	   became	   the	   party	   of	   choice	   for	   the	  
Russophone	  elite	  and	  has	  accounted	  for	   the	   large	  majority	  of	   the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  MPs	   in	  the	  
Riigikogu.	  Russian-­‐speakers	  have	  remained	  proportionally	  underrepresented	   in	  parliament,	  but	  
the	   Centre	   Party	   has	   established	   itself	   as	   the	   main	   avenue	   for	   minority	   politicians	   to	   enter	  
parliament	  and	  for	  minority	  needs	  and	  interests	  to	  gain	  some	  level	  of	  recognition.	  	  
In	   Latvia,	   Russophone	   parties	   increased	   their	   support	   throughout	   the	   1990s.	   Eventually	  
Harmony	   Centre,	   a	  moderate	   ethnic	   party,	   not	   only	   established	   a	   near-­‐monopoly	   of	   Russian-­‐
speaking	  voters	  but	  also	  became	  the	  biggest	  party	   in	  parliament	  since	  the	  2011	  elections.	  This	  
guaranteed	   an	   almost	   proportional	   descriptive	   representation	   of	   Russian-­‐speakers	   in	   the	  
Saeima.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  Harmony	  Centre	  has	  been	  consistently	  left	  out	  of	  government	  –	  mainly	  
because	  of	  its	  association	  with	  the	  Russophone	  community.	  The	  more	  radical	  For	  Human	  Rights	  
in	   a	   United	   Latvia	   (renamed	   Latvian	   Russian	   Party	   in	   2014)	   has	   progressively	   lost	   electoral	  
support	   and	   remained	   out	   of	   parliament,	   but	   has	  maintained	   a	   visible	   public	   profile	   and	   one	  
representative	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  	  
Five	  important	  observations	  emerge	  from	  the	  comparison	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  academic	  debate	  on	  ethnic	  parties.	  These	  have	  to	  do	  with	  how	  to	  define	  an	  ethnic	  party,	  
with	   the	   often-­‐supposed	   innate	   intransigence	   of	   ethnic	  minority	   voters	   and	   of	   ethnic	   parties,	  
with	   the	   claim	   that	   ethnic	   parties	   foster	   inter-­‐ethnic	   conflict,	   and	   with	   whether	   minority	  
representation	   through	   an	   ethnic	   party	   (rather	   than	   through	   a	   mainstream	   party)	   makes	   a	  
difference.	  
First,	  in	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  rigid	  definitions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  an	  ethnic	  party	  fail	  to	  
appropriately	   describe	   reality.	   Traditional	   definitions	   posit	   that	   an	   ethnic	   party	   must	   serve	  
exclusively	   the	   interests	   of	   a	   specific	   ethnic	   group,	   and	   that	   ‘the	   boundaries	   of	   party	   support	  
stop	  at	  the	  boundaries	  of	  ethnic	  groups’	  (Horowitz,	  1985,	  p.	  346),	  but	  they	  are	  of	  little	  analytical	  
use	  for	  the	  cases	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  Harmony	  Centre	  is	  an	  ethnic	  party	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   its	  
electoral	   strength	   rests	   on	   the	   Russophone	   electorate,	   its	   leadership	   is	   mainly	   (although	   not	  
exclusively)	   Russophone,	   and	   it	   claims	   to	   represent	   minority	   interests.	   However,	   it	   has	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increasingly	   adopted	   a	   social-­‐democratic,	   anti-­‐austerity	   platform,	   it	   frames	   minority	  
representation	   within	   a	   broader	   discourse	   of	   social	   harmony,	   and	   has	   attracted	   growing	  
(although	  still	  limited)	  support	  among	  ethnic	  Latvians.	  	  
The	   Centre	   Party,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   did	   not	   start	   off	   as	   an	   ethnic	   party,	   has	   an	  
overwhelmingly	  ethnic	  Estonian	  leadership,	  and	  has	  a	  more	  diluted	  minority	  focus	  in	  its	  agenda.	  
However,	  it	  has	  relied	  increasingly	  on	  the	  Russophone	  vote	  for	  keeping	  control	  of	  Tallinn	  and	  the	  
local	  councils	  in	  North-­‐East	  Estonia	  and	  for	  keeping	  a	  stable	  presence	  in	  the	  Riigikogu.	  It	  has	  also	  
been	  consistently	  minority-­‐friendly	  and	  has	  been	  responsible	  for	  most	  of	  Estonia’s	  Russophone	  
MPs,	   although	   still	   disproportionately	   few	   given	   the	   composition	   of	   its	   electorate.	   The	  
similarities	   between	   Harmony	   Centre	   and	   Centre	   Party	   seem	   to	   blur	   the	   distinction	   between	  
ethnic	  and	  non-­‐ethnic	  parties:	  both	  can	  claim	  a	  near	  monopoly	  on	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  vote,	  
both	   have	   a	   pro-­‐minority	   agenda,	   and	   both	   are	   often	   ostracised	   for	   their	   connection	   to	   the	  
minority.	  However,	  Harmony	  Centre	  is	  widely	  (and	  correctly)	  regarded	  as	  an	  ethnic	  party	  while	  
the	   Centre	   Party	   is	   not.	   This	   notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that,	   differently	   from	   FHRUL/Latvian	  
Russian	  Party,	  Harmony	  Centre	  campaigns	  on	  a	  wider	  agenda	  that	  goes	  beyond	  minority	  issues	  
and	   claims	   to	   represent	   Russian-­‐speakers	   within	   an	   inclusive,	   non-­‐ethnic	   discourse	   of	   social	  
unity.	  	  
In	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  therefore,	  a	  more	  flexible	  definition	  of	  ethnic	  parties	  is	  more	  useful	  
to	   understand	   differences	   and	   similarities	   between	   minority-­‐oriented	   parties.	   This	   must	   take	  
into	   consideration	   the	   party	   leadership,	   and	   whether	   a	   party	   is	  widely	   regarded	   as	   being	   an	  
ethnic	   party	   (Ishiyama,	   2009,	   p.	   64).	   It	  must	   also	   accept	   the	   possibility	   that	   an	   ethnic	   party’s	  
agenda	  can	  go	  beyond	  minority	  advocacy	  (Gherghina	  &	  Jiglau,	  2011,	  p.	  53;	  Van	  Cott,	  2005,	  p.	  3),	  
and	   must	   distinguish	   between	   ethnic	   parties	   with	   more	   or	   less	   exclusively	   ethnic	   agendas	  
(Ishiyama	  &	  Breuning,	  2011).	  Moreover,	   the	  definition	  must	   recognise	   that	  parties	  can	  change	  
over	   time,	  adapting	   to	   changing	  circumstances.	  One	  of	   the	  defining	   features	  of	  ethnic	  parties,	  
according	  to	  Chandra,	  is	  ‘temporality’,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  change	  together	  with	  the	  
ethnic	  group	  they	  represent	  (2011,	  p.	  155).	  The	  moderation	  of	  Harmony	  Centre’s	  minority-­‐based	  
demands	  and	   its	  adoption	  of	  an	   inclusive,	  multi-­‐ethnic	   rhetoric	  may	   indeed	  correspond	   to	   the	  
progressive	   moderation	   and	   integration	   of	   the	   section	   of	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority	   it	  
represents.171	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  Indeed,	  since	  non-­‐citizens	  are	  disenfranchised,	  Harmony	  Centre	  relies	  on	  the	  votes	  of	  Russophone	  citizens,	  who	  are	  
generally	   more	   integrated	   (Muižnieks,	   2010,	   p.	   121;	   Smooha	   &	   Järve,	   2005,	   p.	   104),	   participate	   more	   in	   public	  
debates	  (Muižnieks,	  2010,	  p.	  118),	  enjoy	  a	  higher	  socio-­‐economic	  status,	  feel	  less	  alienated	  from	  the	  general	  society	  




The	  second	  observation	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  comparison	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  assumption	  
–	   implied	   by	   the	   thesis	   of	   ethnic	   outbidding	   –	   that	   ethnic	   minority	   voters	   are	   innately	  
intransigent	  and	  thus	  necessarily	  respond	  to	  radical	  ethnic	  appeals.	  Although	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  
are	  divergent	  in	  many	  other	  respects,	  both	  disprove	  this	  assumption.	  In	  both	  countries,	  among	  
parties	   that	  claim	  to	   represent	  Russian-­‐speakers’	   interests,	  moderate	  parties	  have	  consistently	  
been	  more	  popular	  than	  radical	  ones.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  Harmony	  Centre	  is	  confronted	  with	  
a	   paradoxical	   trade-­‐off	   situation:	   it	   can	   have	   a	   real	   impact	   on	   policymaking	   and	   thus	   more	  
effectively	  represent	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  only	  by	  being	  in	  government,172	  but	  only	  by	  ‘diluting’	  
its	   representation	   of	   minority	   interests	   it	   can	   have	   a	   chance	   to	   actually	   be	   included	   in	   a	  
governing	   coalition	   (Dudzińska,	   2011,	   p.	   99).173	   However,	   although	   the	   party’s	   moderate	  
approach	  to	  ethnic	  issues	  might	  under	  specific	  circumstances	  become	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  before	  
its	   minority	   electorate,	   assumptions	   of	   ethnic	   intransigence	   on	   the	   part	   of	   minority	   voters	  
(implied	  by	  the	  polarisation	  paradigm)	  seem	  to	  be	  off	  the	  mark	  in	  Latvia.	   Indeed,	  so	  far	  radical	  
Russophone	   parties	   have	   failed	   to	   constitute	   a	   serious	   challenge	   to	   the	   moderate	   Harmony	  
Centre	   and	   the	   latter	   has	  managed	   to	   acquire	   an	   increasingly	   higher	   political	   profile	   without	  
losing	  its	  Russophone	  electorate.	  
Thirdly,	   and	   following	   from	   the	   previous	   point,	   the	   comparison	   does	   not	   support	   the	  
argument	  that	  ethnic	  party	  representatives	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  engage	  in	  conflict	  over	  minority-­‐
sensitive	   policies	   than	  minority	   representatives	   from	  non-­‐ethnic	   parties	   (Diamond	  &	  Gunther,	  
2001,	   p.	   24;	   Rabushka	   &	   Shepsle,	   1972;	   Reilly,	   2006).	   Indeed,	   the	   different	   relationship	   of	  
Harmony	   Centre	   and	   the	   Centre	   Party	   with	   the	   Russophone	   electorate	   and	   their	   different	  
positions	  in	  the	  party	  system	  shaped	  party	  strategies	  more	  than	  any	  attitudes	  inherent	  to	  being	  
an	  ethnic	  or	  a	  non-­‐ethnic	  party.	  Although	  the	  Centre	  Party	  is	  a	  mainstream	  party	  with	  a	  mostly	  
ethnic-­‐Estonian	  elite,	  it	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  use	  the	  ‘ethnic	  card’,	  especially	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  to	  
keep	  the	  Russophone	  voters	  faithful	  and	  somewhat	  dependent.	  Harmony	  Centre,	  despite	  being	  
widely	  regarded	  as	  an	  ethnic	  party,	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  position	  itself	  as	  an	  inclusive,	  responsible	  
party	   to	   ease	   its	  way	   into	   government.	   The	   two	  parties’	   approach	   to	   ethnic	   policies	   has	   been	  
more	  the	  function	  of	  their	  different	  incentives	  and	  aspirations	  than	  a	  reflection	  of	  their	  being	  or	  
not	  an	  ethnic	  party.	  As	  suggested	  by	  Gherghina	  and	  Jiglau	  (2011,	  p.	  52),	  the	  ‘ethnic’	  dimension	  
of	  an	  ethnic	  party	  does	  not	  necessarily	  take	  precedence	  over	  its	  ‘party’	  dimension,	  that	  is,	  over	  
the	  party’s	  goal	  to	  win	  seats	  and	  its	  related	  strategic	  decisions.	  The	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  cases	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	   Parties	   in	  opposition	  have	   few	  chances	   for	  direct	   impact	  on	  policy	  outcomes	   in	   Latvia:	   the	  majority	  of	   the	   laws	  
discussed	   and	   approved	   in	   parliament	   are	   of	   governmental	   initiative,	   and	   factions	   usually	   vote	   strictly	   following	  
party	  lines	  (Rozenvalds,	  2007,	  p.	  56–57).	  
173	  Bernd	  Rechel	  (2007,	  p.	  353)	  reached	  a	  similar	  conclusion	  about	  minority	  politics	  in	  Bulgaria.	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suggest	  that	  whether	  a	  party	  decides	  to	  take	  a	  conflictual	  rather	  than	  a	  consensual	  strategy	  on	  
minority	  issues	  does	  not	  depend	  primarily	  on	  whether	  the	  party	  is	  ethnic	  or	  not,	  but	  rather	  on	  its	  
electoral	  incentives	  and	  its	  position	  in	  the	  party	  system.	  
Fourth,	   some	   studies	   suggests	   that	   ethnic	   parties	   might	   have	   a	   negative	   effect	   on	  
democratic	   stability	   by	   crystallising	   ethnic	   opposition	   and	   fostering	   inter-­‐ethnic	   conflict	  
(Diamond	  &	  Gunther,	  2001;	  Horowitz,	  1985;	  Rabushka	  &	  Shepsle,	  1972).	  This	  expectation	  is	  not	  
supported	   by	   the	   cases	   of	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   There	   is	   little	   evidence	   that	   violent	   inter-­‐ethnic	  
conflict	  could	  emerge	  in	  either	  of	  these	  countries,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  ethnic	  parties.	  
Moreover,	  Harmony	  Centre	  –	  widely	  perceived	  as	  an	  ethnic	  party	  –	  typically	  avoids	  exclusionary	  
language	   in	   favour	  of	   appeals	   for	   societal	   unity	  beyond	  ethnic	  boundaries.	   The	   ‘ethnic	   card’	   –	  
which	   is	   supposed	   to	   crystallise	   inter-­‐ethnic	   opposition	   and	   trigger	   conflict	   –	   has	   been	   more	  
consistently	  used	  by	  the	  non-­‐ethnic	  Estonian	  Centre	  Party	   (especially	  at	   the	   local	   level)	  and	  by	  
the	  ‘titular’	  nationalist	  parties.	  My	  findings	  are	  more	  in	  line	  with	  studies	  that	  emphasise	  ethnic	  
parties	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  minority	  demands	  to	  be	  voiced	  and	  for	  inter-­‐ethnic	  divergences	  to	  
be	   channelled	   into	   a	   regulated,	   institutionalised	   democratic	   process	   (Stroschein,	   2001,	   p.	   61).	  
Seen	  this	  way,	  ethnic	  parties	  might	  actually	  tame	  rather	  than	  trigger	  conflicts.	  
The	  fifth	  and	  final	  observation	  has	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  minority	  representation	  through	  an	  
ethnic	   party	   makes	   a	   difference	   and,	   if	   so,	   what	   kind	   of	   a	   difference.	   In	   other	   words,	   is	   the	  
nature	  of	  minority	  representation	  through	  an	  ethnic	  party	  (as	  in	  Latvia)	  different	  from	  minority	  
representation	  through	  a	  mainstream,	  minority-­‐friendly	  party	  (as	   in	  Estonia)?	  The	  observations	  
made	  with	  regard	  to	  descriptive	  representation	  hold	  true	  for	  ethnic	  parties.	  The	  comparison	  of	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  suggests	  that	  there	   is	  no	  direct	  correlation	  between	  representation	  through	  
an	  ethnic	   (or	  non-­‐ethnic)	  party	  and	  more	  minority-­‐friendly	  policy	  outcomes.	  The	  difference	   is,	  
rather,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  minority	  inclusion,	  where	  minority	  representation	  through	  an	  ethnic	  or	  a	  
non-­‐ethnic	  party	  evokes	  again	  the	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma.	  In	  Latvia,	  representation	  through	  
an	  ethnic	  party	  has	  guaranteed	  stronger	  descriptive	  representation	  and	  minority	  presence	  in	  the	  
political	   debate,	   but	   at	   the	   price	   of	   higher	   polarisation.	   In	   Estonia,	   minority	   representation	  
through	   co-­‐optation	   into	   a	   non-­‐ethnic	   party	  made	   for	   a	   quieter	   debate	   on	  minority	   issues	   (at	  
least	  at	  the	  national	  level),	  but	  at	  the	  price	  of	  weaker	  minority	  voice.	  Co-­‐optation	  also	  increases	  
the	  risk	  that	  the	  party	  becomes	  a	  patron	  rather	  than	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  co-­‐opted	  minority.	  
Indeed,	   co-­‐optation	   in	   Estonia	   did	   guarantee	   some	   returns	   to	   the	   local	   minority,	   career	  
opportunities	   for	  minority	   politicians,	   and	   other	   advantages	   of	   patronage,	   but	   did	   not	   change	  




8.7 Inclusiveness	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy	  
I	   started	   my	   analysis	   of	   minority	   representation	   in	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   from	   the	   normative	  
assumption	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  democratic	  decisions	  depends	  on	  the	  inclusion	  in	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  process	  of	  those	  most	  concerned	  by	  them	  (Lijphart,	  1999,	  p.	  31;	  Young,	  2000,	  pp.	  5–6).	  
In	  this	  sense,	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  democracy	  can	  be	  evaluated	  not	  least	  by	  the	  level	  of	  inclusion	  its	  
policymaking	   process	   affords	   to	   a	   number	   of	   disadvantaged	   groups,	   including	   ethnic	  
minorities.174	  My	  approach	  focused	  on	  the	   inclusiveness	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  rather	   than	  
on	  the	  responsiveness	  of	  minority	  representatives	  to	  a	  homogeneous	  ‘minority	  constituency’	  or	  
the	   congruence	   of	   policies	   to	   pre-­‐determined	   minority	   interests.	   The	   question	   of	   the	  
inclusiveness	   of	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia’s	   policymaking	   towards	   the	   Russian-­‐speaking	   minority,	  
therefore,	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  question	  of	  quality	  of	  democracy.175	  	  
While	  a	  quality	  democracy	  has	  also	  been	  understood	  as	  a	  political	  system	  that	  can	  deliver	  
effective	  and	  widely	  accepted	  policies,	  the	  understanding	  of	  democratic	  quality	  adopted	  in	  this	  
study	   is	   procedural.176	   That	   is,	   quality	   of	   democracy	   is	   intended	   as	   primarily	   a	   question	   of	  
inclusiveness	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  rather	  than	  of	  ‘liberality’	  of	  the	  policy	  outcome.	  This	  
does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	  policy	  process	   (the	  policy	   itself)	   is	  not	   important,	  but	  
that	   it	   cannot	   be	   the	   focus	   of	   analysis	   if	   we	   want	   to	   assess	   democratic	   quality	   in	   ethnically	  
divided	   democracies.	   Different	   needs,	   aspirations	   and	   interests	   are	   in	   competition	   with	   each	  
piece	  of	  policy.	  Therefore,	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  policy	  outcome	  would	  ‘empt[y]	  the	  political	  process	  of	  
its	  main	  function:	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  content	  of	  policies’	  (Munck,	  2012,	  p.	  31).	  Moreover,	  
the	   fact	   that	   representation	   is	   not	   a	   one-­‐way	   relationship	   but	   rather	   a	   reciprocal	   process	  
(Saward,	  2006,	  2010)	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  determine	  innate	  and	  immutable	  minority	  interests	  
or	  to	  define	  the	  ‘right	  policy’	  a	  priori.	  
The	  cases	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  clearly	  confirm	  that	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  democracies	  the	  
quality	  of	   the	  content	  of	  minority-­‐sensitive	  policies	   cannot	  be	   taken	  as	  a	  proxy	   for	   the	  quality	  
(that	   is,	   inclusiveness)	   of	   the	   policymaking	   process.	   In	   other	   words,	   liberal	   policies	   are	   not	  
necessarily	   a	   reflection	   of	   an	   inclusive	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   policy	  
outcomes	  are	  not	  only	  an	   insufficient	  measure	  of	   the	  quality	  of	   the	  policymaking	  process,	  but	  
often	  a	  misleading	  one.	  Therefore,	  in	  studying	  ethnically	  divided	  democracies,	  attention	  must	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  For	  a	   critique	  of	  democracy	  and	  democratisation	   studies	   that	  use	   limited	   conceptualisations	  of	   inclusion	   (to	   the	  
exclusion	  of	  issues	  of	  gender,	  race	  and	  ethnicity)	  see	  Caraway	  (2004).	  
175	  While	  my	  research	  focuses	  on	  the	  Russophone	  minority	  as	  a	  specific	  case	  of	  group-­‐based	  political	  exclusion,	  other	  
groups	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  (not	  least	  the	  poor,	  the	  less	  educated,	  immigrants,	  sexual	  minorities,	  and	  women)	  are	  
also	   often	   seen	   as	   policy	   subjects	   rather	   than	   legitimate	   policymakers.	   The	   exclusion	   of	   these	   groups	   from	   the	  
policymaking	  process	  is	  as	  problematic	  for	  quality	  of	  democracy	  as	  that	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minority.	  
176	  For	  a	   summary	  of	   the	  debate	  between	   substantial	   and	  procedural	  definitions	  of	  democratic	  quality	   see	  Gerardo	  
Munck	  (2012,	  pp.	  28–31).	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shifted	   from	   the	   policy	  outcome	   –	  whether	   certain	   policies	   are	  more	   or	   less	  minority-­‐friendly	  
based	  on	  a	  superimposed	  understanding	  of	  minority	  interests	  –	  to	  the	  policy	  process,	  that	  is,	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  minority	  voices	  were	  included	  as	  equals	  in	  the	  democratic	  processes	  from	  which	  
the	  policy	  resulted.	  
The	   comparison	   between	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   reveals	   two	   opposing	  models	   along	   which	  
democracy	  can	  operate	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  societies.	  In	  Estonia	  the	  minority	  is	  marginal	  to	  the	  
policymaking	  process,	  which	  reduces	  polarisation	  and	  at	  times	  results	  in	  more	  liberal	  policies.	  In	  
Latvia	  the	  minority	  has	  a	  stronger	  political	  presence;	  this	  polarises	  the	  debate	  on	  minority	  issues	  
and	   can	   make	   compromise	   more	   challenging.	   Different	   normative	   assumptions	   about	   what	  
democracy	   in	   ethnically	   divided	   countries	   should	   look	   like	   inform	   different	   preferences	   about	  
which	  model	   is	   the	  most	   desirable.	   Literature	   that	   frames	  minority	   issues	   in	   terms	   of	   conflict	  
prevention	   and	   conflict	   management	   tends	   to	   take	   avoiding	   conflict	   (and,	   by	   extension,	  
polarisation)	   as	   a	   primary	   goal.	   My	   argument	   is	   that	   in	   ethnically	   divided	   democracies	   like	  
Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  in	  which	  chances	  for	  violent	  inter-­‐ethnic	  conflict	  are	  low,	  absence	  of	  conflict	  
cannot	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   measure	   for	   good	   management	   of	   inter-­‐ethnic	   relations	   or	   for	   good	  
democratic	  practices.	  Preference	  should	  be	  given	  to	  issues	  of	  minority	  democratic	  inclusion	  and	  
the	   focus	   should	   be	   on	   quality	   of	   democracy	   rather	   than	   (only)	   on	   conflict	   management	   or	  
conflict	  prevention.	  Or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  low	  polarisation	  and	  democratic	  
inclusiveness	  should	  be	  recognised	  in	  the	  debate.	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  high	  minority	  political	  presence	  and	  ethnic-­‐party	  representation	  in	  
Latvia	   is	   not	   only	   and	   not	   primarily	   cause	   for	   concern	   because	   of	   the	   associated	   risk	   of	  
heightened	   ethnic	   polarisation.	   Quite	   the	   contrary,	   it	   is	   an	   opportunity	   for	  minority	   voices	   to	  
‘access	   democracy’	   as	   equals	   and	   to	   challenge	   ethnocentric	   views	   of	   the	   Latvian	   state.	  
Conversely,	  relative	  quiet	   in	  Estonia	   is	  not	  an	   indication	  of	  successful	  democratic	  consolidation	  
on	  the	  path	  to	  overcoming	  the	  ‘ethnic	  question’,	  but	  it	  might	  in	  fact	  be	  the	  symptom	  of	  minority	  
exclusion	  from	  democracy.	  	  
This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   Latvia	   is	   necessarily	   on	   a	   quiet	   path	   to	   full	   minority	   political	  
integration	  whereas	  no	  change	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  in	  Estonia.	  Rather,	  my	  findings	  suggest	  that	  in	  
Latvia	  the	  democratic	  (although	  often	  heated)	  inter-­‐ethnic	  political	  debate	  opens	  more	  room	  for	  
change	   towards	   a	   more	   inclusive	   democratic	   process	   and	   the	   higher	   democratic	   quality	   this	  
entails.	   This	   is	   by	   no	   means	   a	   smooth	   process	   or	   one	   that	   will	   not	   encounter	   obstacles	   and	  
setbacks.	  Like	  any	  change	  that	  entails	  a	  redistribution	  of	  power,	  this	  is	   likely	  to	  be	  a	  conflictual	  
process.	   As	   long	   as	   it	   can	   take	   place	  within	   the	   structures	   of	   democracy,	   however,	   a	   level	   of	  
conflict	   on	   sensitive	   minority	   policies	   might	   in	   fact	   reflect	   lower	   barriers	   to	   the	   minority’s	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political	   inclusion	   and	   a	   healthy	   democratic	   debate	   rather	   than	   necessarily	   be	   a	   risk	   for	  
democratic	  stability.	  The	  fact	   that	   the	  minority	  has	  a	  higher	  stake	   in	  the	  democratic	  process	   is	  
also	  potentially	  a	  guarantee	  against	  other,	  more	  violent,	  forms	  of	  conflict.	  
Estonia	  offered	  more	  limited	  room	  for	  minority	  political	  inclusion.	  Change,	  however,	  is	  not	  
impossible.	  The	  fact	  that	  other	  parties	  (notably	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party,	  SDE)	  have	  started	  to	  
court	   the	  Russophone	   electorate	  more	   convincingly	   and	   that	   the	   government	   formed	   in	   2014	  
included	   a	   Russian-­‐speaker	   from	   SDE	   as	   its	   Education	   Minister	   could	   be	   indicators	   of	   this	  
potentiality.	   So	   far,	   however,	  minority	   voices	   have	  been	  marginal	   in	   the	  political	   process,	   and	  
none	   of	   the	   channels	   analysed	   above	   has	   offered	   an	   effective	   way	   to	   challenge	   the	  majority	  
elite’s	  gatekeeping	  role	  and	  to	  impose	  Russian-­‐speakers	  as	  legitimate	  policymakers	  rather	  than	  
only	  policy	  receivers.	  
8.8 Conclusions:	  The	  limits	  of	  ethnic	  democracy	  
Several	  other	  studies	  have	  approached	  majority–minority	  relations	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  in	  terms	  
of	  systemic	  imbalances	  of	  power	  (Commercio,	  2008;	  Järve,	  2000;	  Linz	  &	  Stepan,	  1996;	  Pettai	  &	  
Hallik,	  2002;	  Pettai,	  1998;	  Smooha	  &	  Järve,	  2005).	  These	  studies	  have	  seen	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  as	  
(sometimes	   imperfect)	   examples	   of	   ethnic	   democracies.	   These	   are	   political	   regimes	   in	   which	  
minority	  political	  exclusion	  has	  been	  institutionalised,	  allowing	  for	  the	  contradictory	  coexistence	  
of	   elements	   of	   participatory	   democracy	   with	   ethnocentric	   elements	   aimed	   at	   guaranteeing	  
disproportionate	  political	  dominance	   to	  one	  ethnic	  group.	   In	   such	  systems	   the	  ethnic	  majority	  
‘extends	   individual	   and	   collective	   rights	   to	   the	   minority	   but	   also	   controls	   the	   state	   and	  
appropriates	  power	  and	  privilege’	  (Smooha,	  2009,	  p.	  55).	  
My	  analysis	  confirms	  the	  ethnic	  democracy	  thesis	  insofar	  as	  in	  both	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  the	  
majority	   elites	   were	   found	   to	   be	   the	   gatekeepers	   of	   policymaking	   and,	   by	   extension,	   of	   the	  
democratic	  process.	  The	  institutions	  of	  post-­‐independence	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  created	  collective	  
advantages	   for	   their	   ‘titular’	  populations,	  not	   least	   through	  decisions	   regarding	  citizenship	  and	  
language.	   Within	   these	   institutions,	   Russian-­‐speakers	   tended	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   objects	   of	   policy	  
rather	  than	  political	  subjects	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  My	  findings,	  therefore,	  confirm	  the	  usefulness	  of	  
the	   ethnic	   democracy	   model	   as	   a	   framework	   to	   understand	   and	   explain	   the	   logics	   of	   state-­‐
building	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  and	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  state	  by	  the	  ethnic	  majority	  elites.	  
My	   analysis,	   however,	   departs	   from	   the	   ethnic	   democracy	   thesis	   in	   three	   fundamental	  
ways.	  First	  of	  all,	  my	  approach	  assigns	  an	  active	  role	  to	  the	  minorities,	  which	  are	  not	  simply	  at	  
the	  receiving	  end	  of	  majority-­‐controlled	  institutions	  and	  policies,	  but	  are	  political	  actors	  in	  their	  
own	   right.	  While	   it	   offers	   a	   valuable	   perspective	   onto	   the	   constrictions	   that	   politically	   active	  
minority	   members	   encounter,	   the	   ethnic	   democracy	   model	   does	   not	   leave	   much	   room	   for	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minority	   agency	   and	   risks	   brushing	   off	   instances	   of	  minority	   effective	   political	   action	   as	  mere	  
imperfections	  of	   the	  system	  of	  ethnic	  control.	  Hence,	  categorising	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  as	  ethnic	  
democracies	   can	   tell	   us	   something	   about	   the	  majority’s	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   democratic	  
process,	  but	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  minority	  can	  (and	  does)	  challenge	  such	  
dominant	   position.	   Consequently,	   the	   model	   cannot	   account	   for	   change.	   By	   focusing	   on	   the	  
policymaking	  process,	  my	  analysis	  allows	  me	  to	  look	  at	  ‘democracy	  in	  action’	  –	  that	  is,	  not	  only	  
at	   the	   structural	   deficiencies	   of	   the	   Estonian	   and	   Latvian	  democracies	   but	   also	   at	   the	  ways	   in	  
which	   minorities	   actively	   negotiate	   the	   existing	   power	   structures.	   This	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	  
account	  for	  change	  over	  time.	  
Secondly,	   my	   approach	   avoids	   putting	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   under	   the	   same	   banner	   of	  
somewhat	  deficient	  democracies.	  Assigning	  the	  same	  label	  of	  ‘ethnic	  democracy’	  to	  Estonia	  and	  
Latvia	  usefully	  highlights	   similarities	  between	   them,	  but	  at	   the	   same	   time	  discounts	   important	  
differences.	   By	   using	   the	   same	   yardstick	   of	   democratic	   inclusiveness	   to	   assess	   quality	   of	  
democracy	  in	  the	  two	  countries,	  my	  approach	  reveals	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  Estonia	  
–	  where	  few	  effective	  channels	  for	  minority	  political	  inclusion	  exist	  –	  and	  Latvia,	  where	  Russian-­‐
speakers	  are	  in	  a	  stronger	  position	  to	  challenge	  the	  gatekeeping	  role	  of	  the	  ethnic	  majority	  elite.	  
Thirdly,	   by	   rejecting	   the	   label,	   my	   analysis	   also	   rejects	   the	   temptation	   of	   bracketing	  
Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   out	   of	   the	   family	   of	   ‘normal’	   democracies	   and	   portraying	   them	   as	   unique,	  
deviant	   cases	   that	   cannot	   be	   compared	   to	   other,	   better	   democracies.	   Arguably,	   the	   issue	   of	  
inclusiveness	   –	  with	   regard	  not	  only	   to	  ethnic	  minorities	  but	   also	   to	  other	   groups	   such	  as	   the	  
poor,	   the	   immigrants,	   racial	  minorities,	   religious	  minorities	   and	  women	  –	   is	   problematic	   in	   all	  
democracies.	   By	   avoiding	   the	   label,	   my	   approach	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   envisage	   broader	  
comparisons	   and	   calls	   for	   a	   deeper	   questioning	   of	   the	   quality	   of	   new	   and	   established	  
democracies	   alike.	   The	   next,	   concluding	   chapter	   highlights	   the	   implications	   of	   this	   study’s	  
findings	  beyond	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia,	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  potential	  directions	  that	  such	  broader	  
comparisons	  and	  questioning	  could	  take.	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This	  thesis	  has	  analysed	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Russophone	  minorities	  in	  the	  policymaking	  processes	  of	  
Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   Starting	   from	   the	   assumption	   that	   in	   a	   democracy	   no	   sections	   of	   society	  
should	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  (especially	  on	  policies	  that	  concern	  them	  
directly),	   I	   have	   analysed	   the	   access	   of	   minority	   voices	   to	   policymaking.	   The	   five	   channels	  
through	  which	  the	  minorities	  can	  (at	  least	  potentially)	  participate	  in	  policy	  debates	  and	  influence	  
policymaking	  are	  parliamentary	  representation,	  pressures	  from	  international	  organisations,	  city-­‐
level	  incorporation,	  civil	  society	  consultations,	  and	  grassroots	  mobilisation.	  	  
In	  both	  cases	  the	  majority	  elites	  emerged	  as	  the	  gatekeepers	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process:	  
they	  occupied	  the	  major	  decision-­‐making	  positions	  and	  the	  policy	  outcome	  ultimately	  depended	  
on	   them.	   Nevertheless,	   there	   were	   considerable	   differences	   between	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	  
Although	  these	  two	  countries	  are	  often	  placed	  under	  the	  same	  banner	  of	  ‘ethnic	  democracies’,	  a	  
more	   nuanced	   picture	   emerged,	   which	   highlighted	   some	   fundamental	   differences	   between	  
them.	   These	   differences	   have	   to	   do	   with	   the	   possibilities	   open	   to	   Russophone	   minorities	   to	  
challenge	   the	  dominant	   role	  of	  majority	   elites	   as	   the	   gatekeepers	  of	  democracy	   and	   to	   affirm	  
themselves	  as	  legitimate	  and	  equal	  participants	  in	  the	  democratic	  processes.	  
In	  Estonia	  the	  minority	  remains	  underrepresented	  in	  parliament,	  its	  civil	  society	  is	  weakly	  
organised,	   and	   the	   minority’s	   capacity	   for	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   has	   been	   low.	   Russian-­‐
speakers	   are	   also	   severely	   underrepresented	   in	   the	   governing	   board	   of	   the	   party	   that	   has	   a	  
quasi-­‐monopoly	   of	   the	   minority	   vote,	   the	   Centre	   Party.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   in	   Latvia,	   Russian-­‐
speakers	  have	  had	  substantial	  representation	  in	  parliament	  (but	  not	  in	  government),	  and	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  writing	  Harmony	  Centre,	  a	  moderate	  Russian-­‐speakers’	  party,	  is	  the	  largest	  party	  in	  the	  
Saeima.	   Moreover,	   Russian-­‐speakers	   have	   the	   possibility	   to	   vote	   for	   another	   –	   more	  
exclusionarily	   ethnic	   –	   party,	   which	   is	   not	   in	   parliament	   but	   has	   one	   MEP	   (FHRUL/Latvia’s	  
Russian	  Union).	   The	  minority	   grassroots	   have	   also	   demonstrated	   relatively	   high	  organisational	  
and	  mobilisation	  capacities.	  The	  political	  presence	  of	  the	  Russian-­‐speaking	  minority	  in	  Latvia	  has	  
therefore	  been	  decidedly	  higher	  than	  in	  Estonia.	  
The	   comparison	   between	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   however,	   shows	   that	   the	   relationship	  
between	   political	   presence,	   policy	   impact	   and	   empowerment	   is	   not	   linear.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  
more	  presence	  meant	  that	  in	  Latvia	  minority	  voices	  have	  enjoyed	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  access	  to	  the	  
policy	  debate	  than	  in	  Estonia.	  More	  minority	  access	  in	  turn	  meant	  that	  minority	  voices	  managed	  
to	   impose	   themselves	   as	   legitimate	   (or	   at	   least	   inescapable)	   participants	   in	   Latvia’s	   political	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debate.	  The	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  Estonia,	  where	  the	  Russian-­‐speakers	  enjoyed	  less	  political	  
access	   and	  had	   a	  more	  marginal	   role	   in	   the	  democratic	   debate.	  On	   the	  other	   hand,	   however,	  
more	   presence	   did	   not	   always	   translate	   into	   direct	   impact	   on	   policies.	   Rather,	   somewhat	  
paradoxically,	  presence	  and	  access	  also	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  fostering	  polarisation,	  often	  hindering	  
compromise	  on	  policies.	  Conversely,	  absence	  and	  lack	  of	  access	  did	  in	  some	  cases	  open	  the	  way	  
to	  more	  liberal	  policies.	  	  
This	   is	  what	   I	  called	  the	  voice/polarisation	  dilemma.	  At	   the	  core	  of	   the	  dilemma	  there	   is	  
the	   normative	   choice	   between	   favouring	   minority	   voice	   (with	   the	   risk	   of	   polarisation)	   and	  
favouring	   limited	   polarisation	   (with	   the	   risk	   of	   limiting	  minority	   voice).	  While	   the	  polarisation	  
side	  of	  this	  dilemma	  has	  been	  the	  preoccupation	  of	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  CEE	  minorities,	  this	  
thesis’s	   focus	  on	  quality	  of	  democracy	   rebalances	   this	   tendency	  by	  showing	   the	   trade-­‐off	  with	  
the	  voice	  side.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  turning	  attention	  from	  issues	  of	  conflict	  prevention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	   democratic	   processes	   include	   (or	   fail	   to	   include)	   existing	   societal	   diversity.	   Quality	   of	  
democracy	  is	  thus	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  inclusiveness	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  that	  is,	  
of	  the	  chances	  that	  minorities	  have	  to	  participate	  as	  equals	   in	  decision-­‐making.	  Seen	  from	  this	  
perspective,	  Latvia	  presents	  a	  more	  promising	  picture	  than	  Estonia.	  
Another	  important	  observation	  emerges	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  five	  channels	  for	  minority	  access	  
to	   policymaking	   comparatively:	   ethnic	   parties	   and	   grassroots	   mobilisation	   (especially	   protest)	  
were	  the	  most	  effective	  channels	  for	  the	  minority	  to	  access	  policymaking.	  Other,	  potentially	  less	  
conflictual,	  forms	  of	  participation	  such	  as	  international	  mediation	  and	  consultations,	  were	  often	  
reduced	   to	   little	  more	   than	   smokescreens	   and	   ‘box-­‐ticking’	   exercises.	   In	   both	   countries	   these	  
channels	   left	   the	   minorities	   in	   the	   passive	   role	   of	   policy	   objects	   and	   offered	   only	   tokenistic	  
opportunities	   for	   minority	   presence.	   That	   is,	   they	   did	   not	   offer	   the	   minority	   an	   avenue	   to	  
challenge	  the	  majority	  elites’	  role	  as	  democracy’s	  gatekeepers.	  This	  suggests	  that	  a	  measure	  of	  
(peaceful)	   majority–minority	   conflict	   is	   inescapable	   (and	   perhaps	   desirable)	   if	   the	   goal	   is	   for	  
politically	  marginalised	  minorities	  to	  become	  politically	  empowered.	  While	  extreme	  polarisation	  
can	   admittedly	   be	   a	   risk,	   this	   has	   not	  materialised	   in	   Latvia	   so	   far.	   Rather,	  majority–minority	  
frictions	   have	   taken	   place	   within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   democracy	   and	   have	   not	   threatened	  
democratic	  stability.	  Relatively	  more	  inter-­‐group	  political	  frictions	  in	  Latvia	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  not	  
as	  a	  risk	  for	  democratic	  stability,	  but	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	   is	  more	  room	  for	  
the	   Russophone	   minority	   to	   challenge	   the	   Latvian	   elite’s	   political	   dominance	   and	   to	   claim	   a	  
legitimate	  role	  as	  equals	  in	  the	  country’s	  democracy.	  
The	  theoretical	  and	  methodological	  implications	  of	  this	  study	  go	  beyond	  the	  Estonian	  and	  
Latvian	   cases.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   suggests	   that	   the	   two	   competing	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paradigms	  that	  often	  frame	  studies	  of	  minority	  politics	  each	  capture	  only	  part	  of	  the	  picture.	  The	  
polarisation	   paradigm	   assumes	   that	   ethnicity	   is	   an	   uncompromising,	   zero-­‐sum	   issue	   and	   so	  
minority	   representation	   through	   ethnic	   parties	   tends	   to	   lead	   to	   ethnic	   polarisation	   or,	  worse,	  
inter-­‐ethnic	   conflict.	   The	  presence	   paradigm,	   conversely,	   sees	   ethnicity	   as	   flexible	   rather	   than	  
zero-­‐sum	   and	   considers	   representation	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   ‘“domesticate”	   ethnic	   issues’	  
(Stroschein,	  2001,	  p.	  61).	  While	  the	  normative	  starting	  point	  of	  this	  study	  is	  closer	  to	  this	  second	  
paradigm,	   the	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   suggests	   that	   more	   presence	   is	   not	   necessarily	  
translated	  into	  ‘better’	  policies	  and	  that	  potentially	  irreconcilable	  polarisation	  can	  indeed	  be	  the	  
result	  of	  presence.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  my	   findings	  also	  point	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  ethnic	  minorities	  
should	  not	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  uncompromising	  monoliths	  and	  that	  minority	  political	  presence	  is	  
related	   to	   a	  more	   inclusive	   (hence,	   democratic)	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	  
dilemma	   points	   to	   the	   need	   to	   understand	   the	   effects	   of	   minority	   political	   presence	   and	   of	  
representation	  via	  ethnic	  parties	  as	  a	  matter	  for	  empirical	  study	  rather	  than	  something	  that	  can	  
be	  assumed	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other.	  	  
Such	  empirical	  approach	  has	  been	  more	  widespread	  in	  the	  US	  academic	  debate	  on	  Black	  
political	  representation,	  which	  explicitly	  problematises	  the	  relationship	  between	  group	  presence	  
and	   political	   outcomes,	   and	   questions	   the	   effects	   of	   a	   group’s	   descriptive	   representation	   on	  
policy	   outcomes	   and	   on	   the	   group’s	   political	   status.	   This	   approach,	   however,	   is	   far	   less	  
widespread	  in	  studies	  of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  minorities,	  where	  –	  as	  the	  present	  study	  
suggests	  –	  it	  could	  be	  fruitfully	  applied.	  The	  insights	  from	  US	  literature	  can	  be	  merged	  with	  those	  
from	   the	   literature	   on	   CEE	  minorities,	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   a	  more	   thorough	   understanding	   of	  
minority	  representation	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  democracy.	  In	  particular,	  the	  study	  of	  CEE	  ethnic	  
parties	  –	  so	  far	  mostly	  preoccupied	  with	  descriptive	  representation	  and	  conflict	  prevention	  –	  can	  
be	   usefully	   reframed	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   descriptive	   representation	   on	   minority	  
empowerment	   and	   quality	   of	   democracy.	   The	   US	   literature	   on	   this	   theme	   also	   questions	   the	  
implications	  of	  minority	   representation	   (and	   incorporation)	   in	   city-­‐level	   power	   structures.	   This	  
same	   approach	   can	   be	   fruitfully	   applied	   in	   the	   context	   of	   CEE	   cities	   with	   sizeable	   minority	  
populations.	   In	   general,	   the	   insights	   from	   US	   studies	   on	   Black	   and	   Latino	   representation	   and	  
studies	  on	  CEE	  can	  be	  combined	  to	  set	  a	  research	  agenda	  that	  goes	  beyond	  mere	  presence	  of	  
minority	  members	   in	   representative	   or	   consultative	   institutions,	   to	   look	   at	   its	   implications	   for	  
the	  functioning	  of	  democracy.	  
Furthermore,	  some	  common	  assumptions	   in	  studies	  of	  minority	  politics	  are	  contradicted	  
by	   the	   evidence	   from	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia.	   This	   is	   especially	   the	   case	   for	   the	   ethnic	   outbidding	  
thesis	  and	  the	  expectation	  that	  an	  ethnic	  party	  would	  always	  be	  more	  radical	  on	  ethnic-­‐related	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issues	   than	   a	   non-­‐ethnic,	  minority-­‐friendly	   party.	   This	   does	   not,	   of	   course,	  mean	   that	   there	   is	  
never	   ethnic	   outbidding	   and	   that	   is	   never	   the	   case	   that	   ethnic	   parties	   take	   more	   conflictual	  
positions	   on	   minority	   issues.	   It	   points	   instead	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   eventualities	   must	   be	  
empirically	   tested	   rather	   than	   assumed.	  Minorities	   do	  not	   necessarily	   respond	   favourably	   and	  
compactly	   to	   exclusionary	   ethnic	   messages.	   Ethnic	   parties	   can,	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	  
have	   structural	   incentives	   to	   adopt	   cooperative,	   inclusive	   stances	   rather	   than	   conflictual	   and	  
exclusive	  ones.	  Empirical	  studies	  should	  start	  from	  this	  premise	  and	  then	  determine	  why	  ethnic	  
outbidding	   happens	   in	   certain	   cases	   but	   not	   in	   others.	   The	   findings	   from	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	  
suggest	   that	   one	   possible	   explanation	   lays	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   party	   system	   and	   the	  
aspirations,	  expectations	  and	  incentives	  of	  ethnic	  and	  non-­‐ethnic	  parties.	  
The	   fact	   that	   potentially	   more	   conflictual	   channels	   (ethnic	   party	   representation	   and	  
grassroots	  mobilisation)	  were	   the	  most	   effective	   in	   terms	   of	  minority	   empowerment	   also	   has	  
important	   implications.	   Effective	   political	   participation	  by	  definition	   implies	   a	   redistribution	  of	  
political	  power	  from	  the	  ethnic	  majority	  elite	  to	  the	  ethnic	  minority	  (or	  at	   least	   its	  elite).	  Since	  
any	  redistribution	  of	  power	  is	  bound	  to	  encounter	  resistance	  and	  create	  frictions,	  the	  fact	  that	  
minority	  empowerment	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  measure	  of	  conflict	   is	  hardly	  surprising.	  The	  cases	  
of	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia,	   however,	   show	   that	   conflict	   is	   only	   half	   of	   the	   story.	   Indeed,	   too	  much	  
emphasis	  on	  conflict	  and	  polarisation	  prevention	  risks	  overly	  discounting	  issues	  of	  inclusiveness	  
and	   quality	   of	   democracy.	   Especially	   in	   cases	   where	   the	   risk	   of	   violent	   ethnic	   conflict	   is	   low,	  
absence	  of	  conflict	  or	  low	  polarisation	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  goal	  per	  se.	  Indeed,	  low	  polarisation	  
is	  not	  necessarily	  an	   indication	  of	  a	  solid	  democracy,	  but	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  a	  symptom	  of	  minority	  
political	  exclusion.	  The	  Estonian	  and	  Latvian	  cases	  show	  that	  a	  measure	  of	  (peaceful)	  conflict	  –	  
within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  democracy	  –	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  any	  majority–minority	  interaction	  in	  
which	  the	  redistribution	  of	  political	  power	  is	  at	  stake.	  
This	   research	   also	   demonstrates	   the	   methodological	   advantages	   of	   an	   approach	   that	  
favours	   process	   over	   outcome	   and	   inclusiveness	   over	   responsiveness	   in	   the	   study	   of	  minority	  
representation.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  to	  
look	  at	  multiple	  ways	   in	  which	  minority	  voices	  can	  access	  such	  process	  at	   its	  different	  stages	  –	  
what	  I	  have	  called	  ‘channels’.	  The	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  these	  channels	  can	  give	  us	  a	  full	  picture	  of	  
whether	  a	  minority	  is	  included	  in	  policymaking	  and	  on	  what	  terms.	  Parliamentary	  representation	  
is	   the	   channel	   that	   has	   received	   by	   far	   the	   most	   attention	   in	   the	   literature.	   However,	   the	  
process-­‐focused	  approach	  allows	  us	  to	  look	  at	  it	  in	  a	  novel	  way,	  going	  beyond	  mere	  presence	  or	  
absence	   of	   minority	   representatives	   to	   look	   at	   the	   consequences	   of	   such	   presence/absence.	  
Besides	   parliamentary	   representation,	   other	   channels	   are	   available	   to	   minorities	   to	   access	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policymaking.	   Minorities	   can	   be	   represented	   in	   local	   governments,	   where	   presence	   can	  
potentially	   be	   translated	   into	   influence	  over	   policy	   implementation.	   Civil	   society	   consultations	  
can	   offer	   minorities	   a	   way	   to	   have	   their	   voice	   heard	   on	   issues	   that	   concern	   them	   directly.	  
Minorities	   can	   mobilise,	   self-­‐organise	   and	   protest,	   to	   claim	   legitimate	   inclusion	   in	   decision-­‐
making.	  And	  international	  organisations	  can	  push	  minority-­‐friendly	  agendas,	  potentially	  boosting	  
the	   legitimacy	  of	  minority	  demands.	  Attention	   to	   these	  alternative	  channels	  has	  been	   in	  some	  
cases	  scarce	  (especially	  for	   local-­‐level	  representation)	  and	  in	  others	  it	  has	  been	  mainly	  focused	  
on	  outcomes	   (especially	   for	   the	   international	   channel).	  However,	   if	  we	  analyse	   them	   from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  inclusiveness,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  channels	  in	  pushing	  for	  liberal	  policies	  is	  
only	  half	  of	  the	  story.	  Each	  channel	  must	  also	  be	  assessed	  on	  whether	  it	  allows	  minority	  voices	  
to	   be	   policy	  makers	   rather	   than	  mere	   policy	   receivers.	   In	   other	  words,	   channels	  must	   also	   be	  
evaluated	  on	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   they	  empower	  minorities	  and	  offer	   them	  a	  way	   to	  be	  equal	  
citizens	  in	  the	  democratic	  polity	  of	  their	  country.	  
Secondly,	  focusing	  on	  multiple	  channels	  into	  the	  policymaking	  process	  means	  that	  there	  is	  
no	   need	   to	   decide	   a	   priori	   what	   the	   interests	   of	   a	   group	   are,	   and	   to	   see	   them	   as	   fixed	   and	  
homogenous.	   This	   is	   what	   Brubaker	   calls	   ‘groupism’	   (2004).	   Studies	   concerned	   with	   the	  
proximity	  of	  policy	  outcomes	  or	  of	  representatives’	  voting	  behaviour	  to	  group	  interests	  –	  which	  
are	   by	   necessity	   fixed,	   uniform,	   and	   pre-­‐determined	   –	   are	   bound	   to	   essentialise	   minority	  
interests	   and	   needs.	   Conversely,	   looking	   at	   multiple	   channels	   through	   which	   minorities	   can	  
access	  policymaking	  allows	  us	   to	  account	   for	   in-­‐group	  differences,	  as	  different	  minority	   voices	  
can	  use	  those	  channels	  to	  pursue	  different	  agendas.	  The	  research	  strategy	  of	  looking	  at	  multiple	  
channels	  makes	  it	  possible	  not	  only	  to	  account	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  different	  minority	  voices,	  but	  
also	   to	   analyse	   their	   interactions,	   both	  with	   each	   other	   and	  with	  majority	   political	   actors	   and	  
institutions.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   policymaking	   process	   problematises	   the	   link	   between	  
desirable	   policies	   and	  desirable	   processes.	   As	   the	   voice/polarisation	   dilemma	   reveals,	   a	   ‘good’	  
policy	  can	  be	  the	  result	  of	  an	  exclusionary	  democratic	  process,	  and	  an	  inclusionary	  democratic	  
process	   does	   not	   necessarily	   return	   ‘optimal’	   policies.	   While	   the	   preference	   for	   process	   or	  
outcome	   is	   ultimately	   a	   normative	   decision,	   questions	   about	   the	   inclusiveness	   of	   the	  
policymaking	  process	  must	  be	  asked	   in	  order	  to	  assess	  democratic	  quality	   in	  ethnically	  divided	  
societies.	  Indeed,	  the	  inclusiveness	  of	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  accounts	  for	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
fundamental	   dimensions	   of	   democracy:	   the	   political	   equality	   of	   all	  members	   of	   society.177	  My	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	  Robert	  Dahl	  grounds	   the	  principle	  of	  political	  equality	  on	   the	   ‘belief	   that	  all	  human	  beings	  are	  of	  equal	   intrinsic	  
worth;	   that	   no	   person	   is	   intrinsically	   superior	   to	   another;	   and	   that	   in	  making	   collective	   decisions,	   the	   good	   or	  
interests	  of	  each	  person	  should	  be	  given	  equal	  consideration.	  Insuring	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  each	  are	  given	  equal	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findings	  show	  that	  a	  ‘desirable’	  policy	  outcome	  (whether	  in	  terms	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  supposed	  
minority	   interests	   or	   based	   on	   overarching	   international	   norms)	   is	   only	   a	   very	   flawed	  way	   of	  
estimating	   inclusiveness	   and	   can	   in	   fact	   be	   highly	  misleading.	   The	  most	   reliable	  way	   to	   study	  
inclusiveness	   is,	   instead,	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   process	   of	  making	   decisions,	   that	   is,	   on	   the	   avenues	  
minorities	   have	   to	   effectively	   participate	   in	   policymaking	   as	   equals.	   The	   process	   tracing	   of	  
appropriately	  selected	  policymaking	  cases	  offers	  an	  optimal	  way	  to	  do	  this.	  
A	   research	   strategy	   based	   on	   this	   approach	  would	   proceed	   in	   four	   steps.	   First,	   a	   group	  
must	  be	  identified	  that	  is	  at	  risk	  from	  political	  exclusion.	  Second,	  policies	  must	  be	  selected	  that	  
concern	  directly	  or	   affect	  mainly	   that	   group.	   It	  must	  be	  noted	   that	   groups	   are	  heterogeneous	  
and	  there	  can	  be	  different	  policy	  preferences	  within	  any	  given	  group,	  even	  on	  sensitive	  group-­‐
related	  policies.	  However,	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  being	  included	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  
on	  policies	   that	  are	  going	  to	  affect	   them	  is	  a	  shared	   interest	  of	  all	  group	  members.	  Moreover,	  
the	  systematic	  exclusion	  of	  a	  group	  from	  policymaking	  contradicts	  the	  basic	  democratic	  principle	  
of	  equal	  citizenship.	  The	  third	  step	  is	  to	  process-­‐trace	  the	  policymaking	  process	  on	  the	  selected	  
policies.	  The	  focus	  here	  must	  be	  on	  who	  is	  included	  and	  who	  is	  excluded	  from	  decision-­‐making,	  
and	  on	  the	  existing	  channels	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  minority	  voices.	  The	  fourth	  and	  final	  step	  is	  to	  
draw	  conclusions	  on	  the	  group’s	  chances	  to	  influence	  policies	  that	  concern	  it	  directly	  and,	  more	  
generally,	   on	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   group	   can	   be	   a	   legitimate	   and	   equal	   participant	   in	   the	  
country’s	  democratic	  processes.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   this,	   my	   research	   strategy	   of	   looking	   at	   policymaking	   processes,	   at	   the	  
multiple	   channels	   for	  minority	   access	   to	   decision-­‐making,	   and	   at	   the	   different	  minority	   voices	  
that	  make	  use	  of	  those	  channels	  opens	  up	  the	  potential	  for	  further	  intersectional	  studies.178	  That	  
is,	  studies	  that	  take	  into	  account	  more	  than	  one	  dimension	  of	  exclusion	  at	  a	  time	  –	  for	  instance	  
considering	   the	   intersection	   between	   ethnicity	   and	   class,	   or	   between	   ethnicity	   and	   gender.	  
Although	  this	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  present	  study,	  an	  ulterior	  step	  allowed	  by	  my	  research	  strategy	  
would	  be	  to	   investigate	  not	  only	  whether	  minority	  voices	  can	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  policy	  process	  
but	   also	   which	   minority	   voices	   can	   do	   it.	   It	   might	   be	   the	   case	   that	   class,	   gender,	   sexual	  
orientation	  or	   other	  within-­‐group	   cleavages	  determine	  which	   voices	   gain	  what	   kind	  of	   access,	  
which	   voices	   are	   heard	   and	   which	   ones	   ignored.	   This	   also	   must	   be	   studied	   empirically.	   For	  
example,	   a	   follow-­‐up	   research	   could	   look	  at	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  minority	  women’s	   voices	   are	  
included	  in	  the	  political	  debate,	  through	  what	  channels,	  and	  on	  whose	  terms.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
consideration	   in	   turn	   requires	   that	   every	   adult	  member	   of	   an	   association	   be	   entitled	   to	   participate	   in	  making	  
collective	  and	  binding	  decisions	  affecting	  that	  person’s	  good	  or	  interest’	  (1996,	  p.	  639).	  
178	   For	   an	   early	   definition	   of	   intersectionality	   as	   a	   Black	   feminist	   critique	   to	   both	   antidiscrimination	   and	   feminist	  
frameworks,	  see	  Kimberlé	  Crenshaw	  (1989).	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The	  approach	  to	  minority	  representation	  suggested	  by	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  extended	  beyond	  
the	  cases	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  First	  of	  all,	  a	  similar	  approach	  could	  be	  usefully	  applied	  to	  the	  
study	  of	  minority	  politics	  in	  other	  democracies.	  Patterns	  that	  emerged	  from	  my	  analysis	  could	  be	  
empirically	   verified	   in	   other	   contexts.	   For	   instance,	   the	   comparative	   analysis	   revealed	   a	  
voice/polarisation	  dilemma	  that	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  understand	  trade-­‐offs	  and	  contradictory	  effects	  
of	  minority	  political	  presence	  in	  other	  countries	  with	  significant	  minority	  populations.	  The	  most	  
obvious	   application	  would	   be	   in	   other	   CEE	   countries	   that	   share	  with	   Estonia	   and	   Latvia	   large	  
minorities,	   the	   communist	   past,	   and	   the	   post-­‐communist	   nationalising	   tendencies.	   Studies	   on	  
CEE	  minorities	   have	   so	   far	  mostly	   focused	  on	   issues	  of	   descriptive	   representation	   and	   conflict	  
prevention.179	   My	   approach	   proposes	   to	   shift	   the	   research	   agenda	   on	   CEE	   minorities	   from	  
descriptive	  representation	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  presence,	  and	  from	  conflict	  prevention	  to	  minority	  
empowerment	   and	   quality	   of	   democracy.	  Moreover,	   such	   an	   approach	   would	   allow	   different	  
minority	  voices	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  especially	   in	  light	  of	  the	  
emergence	   of	   multiple	   parties	   and	   political	   movements	   representing	   the	   same	   minority	   in	  
several	  CEE	  countries	  (Szöcsik	  &	  Bochsler,	  2013).	  
Interesting	   comparative	   examples	   in	   CEE,	   for	   instance,	   could	   be	   Romania	   and	   Slovakia	  
(with	  their	  Hungarian	  minorities),	  as	  well	  as	  Bulgaria	  (with	  its	  Turkish	  minority).	  In	  all	  these	  three	  
cases	  ethnic	  parties	   gained	   representation	   in	  parliament	  and	  have	  been	   included	   in	   governing	  
coalitions	   (Andriescu	  &	  Gherghina,	  2013;	  Rechel,	  2007;	  Stroschein,	  2012,	  pp.	  86–87;	  Szöcsik	  &	  
Bochsler,	   2013).	   However,	   it	   remains	   unclear	   what	   representation	   in	   parliament	   and	  
participation	   in	   governments	  has	  meant	   in	   these	   cases	   in	   terms	  of	  policy	   impact	   and	  minority	  
empowerment	  (Regelmann,	  2009,	  2013;	  Stefanova,	  2012;	  Szöcsik	  &	  Bochsler,	  2013).	  Applying	  a	  
process-­‐focused	   approach	   to	   the	   cases	   of	   Slovakia,	   Romania	   and	   Bulgaria	   could	   be	   helpful	   to	  
systematically	   investigate	   the	   implications	   of	   minority	   presence,	   extending	   it	   to	   presence	   in	  
governing	  coalitions.	  Conversely,	   the	   limited	  political	   representation	  of	  Roma	  minorities	  across	  
Eastern	  and	  Western	  Europe	  (Sigona	  &	  Trehan,	  2009)	  would	  offer	  the	  possibility	  to	  analyse	  the	  
consequences	   of	   absence.	   It	   would	   also	   serve	   as	   an	   interesting	   comparison	   to	   evaluate	   the	  
effectiveness	   of	   alternative	   channels	   for	   minority	   empowerment,	   in	   particular	   international	  
channels	  and	  the	  instruments	  for	  Roma	  inclusion	  put	  forward	  by	  European	  institutions.	  
While	   post-­‐communist	   countries	   have	   been	   central	   in	   the	   study	   of	   minority	  
representation	   in	   Europe	   (not	   least	   for	   the	   emergence	   in	   these	   countries	   of	   ethnic	   parties),	  
issues	  of	  democratic	  inclusiveness	  are	  not	  unique	  to	  CEE	  or	  to	  new	  democracies.	  Indeed,	  racial,	  
ethnic	  and	   religious	  minorities	   that	  are	  potentially	  at	   risk	   from	  political	  marginalisation	  can	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  Examples	  of	  this	  focus	  are	  Sonia	  Alonso	  and	  Rubén	  Ruiz-­‐Rufino	  (2007),	  Sergiu	  Gherghina	  and	  George	  Jiglau	  (2011),	  
and	  John	  Ishiyama	  (2001,	  2009).	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found	  in	  several	  Western	  European	  countries.	  To	  give	  just	  a	  few	  examples,	  in	  the	  UK	  over	  11%	  of	  
the	  population	  belongs	  to	  an	  ethnic	  minority	  and	  4.8%	  are	  Muslims,180	  in	  France	  there	  are	  about	  
five	  million	  Muslims	  mostly	  of	  North	  African	  origins	  –	  about	  8%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  (Laachir,	  
2007,	   p.	   101),	   and	   in	   Germany	   the	   Turkish	   community	   composes	   4%	   of	   the	   total	   population	  
(Woellert	  &	  Klingholz,	   2014,	  p.	  27).	  However	   these	  minorities	   in	  West	  European	  countries	  are	  
rarely	  studied	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  representation.181	  Consequently,	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy	  in	  
Western	   Europe	   is	   usually	   not	   evaluated	   against	   the	   principle	   of	   inclusiveness.	   A	   flexible	  
approach	   that	   takes	   into	   account	   multiple	   channels	   through	   which	   minorities	   can	   effectively	  
take	   part	   in	   decision-­‐making	   would	   be	   suitable	   to	   study	   issues	   of	   minority	   inclusion	   in	   and	  
exclusion	   from	   the	   political	   processes	   of	   established	   democracies.	   Applying	   the	   same	   level	   of	  
scrutiny	   on	   the	   inclusiveness	   of	   both	   new	   and	   established	   democracies	   would	   also	   allow	   to	  
envisage	  broader	  East–West	   comparisons.	   Such	  comparisons	  would	  help	  us	  understand	  better	  
how	  different	  democracies	  manage	  (or	  fail)	  to	  represent	  diversity.	  	  
While	  identity	  politics	  has	  usually	  been	  considered	  more	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  East	  than	  of	  the	  
West,182	  the	  question	  of	  the	  equal	  political	  inclusion	  of	  all	  members	  of	  society	  pertains	  to	  every	  
democracy.	  As	  illustration	  of	  this,	  my	  research	  entails	  an	  implicit	  comparison:	  findings	  from	  US-­‐
focused	  literature	  are	  showed	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  the	  very	  different	  contexts	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  
This	   suggests	   that	   the	   political	   inclusion	   of	   marginalised	   communities	   might	   face	   similar	  
obstacles	   and	  dilemmas	   even	   across	   otherwise	   very	   different	   cases.	   For	   instance,	   the	   findings	  
about	  the	  risks	  and	  opportunities	  of	  minority	  incorporation	  in	  Tallinn	  and	  Riga	  strongly	  resonate	  
with	  studies	  of	  Black	  and	  Latino	  representation	  in	  American	  cities.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  it	  might	  be	  
the	   case	   that	  patterns	  of	   exclusion	  and	   inclusion	  observed	   in	  Eastern	  Europe	   can	  be	  useful	   to	  
understand	  similar	  patterns	  in	  other	  countries.	  
Finally,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  evaluate	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  democracy	  (whether	  in	  new	  or	  established	  
democracies)	   we	   must	   look	   at	   who	   is	   excluded	   and	   who	   is	   included	   in	   decision-­‐making,	   and	  
which	   channels	   are	   available	   to	   different	   groups	   to	   influence	   policies.	   This	   applies	   to	   all	  
marginalised	   groups,	   beyond	   ethnic	   and	   racial	   minorities.	   For	   instance,	   the	   representation	   of	  
women,	   sexual	  minorities,	   and	   the	   poor	   could	   be	   conceptualised	  within	   this	   same	   framework	  
and	   studied	   through	   a	   similar	   process-­‐focused	   method.	   Interestingly,	   issues	   of	   ‘unequal	  
citizenship’	   and	  political	   exclusion	   in	   advanced	  democracies	  have	  been	   raised	   in	   the	   literature	  
that	  looks	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  high	  socio-­‐economic	  inequality	  on	  the	  democratic	  processes	  (Jacobs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  Data	  from	  the	  2011	  UK	  census,	  retrieved	  from	  the	  Office	  of	  National	  Statistics	  website:	  http://www.ons.gov.uk	  
181	   Some	   exceptions	   are	   studies	   of	   Black	   and	  minority	   ethnic	   (BME)	   representatives	   in	   UK	   institutions	   (Saalfeld	   &	  
Bischof,	  2013;	  Saalfeld,	  2011;	  G.	  Smith	  &	  Stephenson,	  2005;	  Sobolewska,	  2013).	  	  
182	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  ‘Eastern’	  and	  ‘Western’	  European	  nationalism	  and	  identity	  politics	  see	  Erika	  Harris	  
(2012,	  pp.	  339–343).	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&	   Skocpol,	   2005,	   p.	   232).183	   Insights	   from	   this	   literature	  will	   also	  be	  helpful	   to	   devise	   a	  multi-­‐
dimensional	  research	  agenda	  that	  looks	  not	  only	  at	  which	  groups	  are	  included	  in	  policymaking,	  
but	   also	   at	   which	   voices	   within	   each	   group	   stand	   a	   higher	   chance	   of	   being	   effectively	  
represented.	  
To	   conclude,	   although	   the	   sheer	   size	   of	   the	   Russophone	   minorities	   makes	   issues	   of	  
minority	  political	  representation	  in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  particularly	  stark,	  these	  countries	  are	  not	  
alone	  in	  facing	  issues	  of	  democratic	  inclusiveness.	  The	  comparison	  of	  these	  two	  cases	  points	  to	  a	  
wider	   research	   agenda	   on	   democratic	   inclusiveness,	   which	   should	   look	   into	   how	   well	   ‘real-­‐
existing’	   democracies	   are	   performing	   their	   promise	   of	   equal	   citizenship.	  Who	   is	   included	   and	  
who	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  democratic	  process?	  How	  does	  this	  inclusion	  or	  exclusion	  work?	  What	  
channels	  are	  available	  to	  marginalised	  groups	  to	  claim	  their	  legitimate	  role	  as	  active	  part	  of	  the	  
democratic	   polity?	   Similar	   challenges	   for	   the	   realisation	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   inclusiveness	   and	  
equal	  citizenship	  are	  faced	  by	  all	  democracies.	  The	  better	  we	  understand	  how	  political	  inclusion	  
and	  exclusion	  work,	  the	  closer	  we	  get	  to	  addressing	  these	  challenges.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183	   For	  other	  examples	  of	   studies	  on	  democratic	   representation	  and	   inequality	   see	  Armèn	  Hakhverdian	   (2010),	   and	  
Nathalie	  Giger,	  Jan	  Rosset	  and	  Julian	  Bernauer	  (2012).	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